Part 6
From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given in the Srî-bhâshya differs totally. According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as antaryâmin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil, apahatapâpman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities, satyakâma, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.) (11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free from evil--according to the Prajâpativâkya in the Chândogya--yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies, so the antaryâmin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryâmin (in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dvâ supar/n/â sayujâ sakhâyâ) (13).--Should it be said that, according to the Chândogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence
## participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sára;
we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent; pradhâna) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to 'âkâ/s/o ha vai nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ') (14).--But does not the passage 'satya/m/ j/ñ/ânam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittirîya of their purport, we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover the Taittirîya passage only asserts so much, viz. the prakâ/s/arûpatâ of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti (17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryâmin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).
Sûtras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; B/ri/hadâr) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sûtras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upâdhis. The last four Sûtras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.
According to Rámânuja, Sûtras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in Sûtra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakâra), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmâtra)?--The reply given in Sûtra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them again[16]), but merely denies the prâk/ri/taitâvattva, the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sûtra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the intuition (sákshâtkkâra) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/râdhana, i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as prakâ/s/a, luminousness, j/ñ/âna, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world (prapa/ñk/avsish/t/atâ) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that prakâ/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vâmadeva) in the work of sa/m/râdhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special arrangements (sa/m/sthanaviseshâ/h/) of Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29, 30).
Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.
Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called apûrva, but is allotted by the Lord.
PÂDA III.
With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more
## particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to
each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different /s/âkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same /s/âkhâ exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/âkhâ were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other /s/âkhâs also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one /s/âkhâ may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/âkhâs; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is the special task of the present pâda.
Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyâs, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyâs, or one vidyâ only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those vidyâs whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/â/nd/ilyavidyâ which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the /S/atapathabráhma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (prâ/n/a/s/arîratva and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chândogya Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.
Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in both identified with prâ/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad represents the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.
Sûtra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the O/m/kâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kâra which,' &c.--According to Râmânuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prâ/n/a-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the prâ/n/a, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.
Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to /S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyâ only.--Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.
According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a. Sûtras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sûtra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sûtra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sûtra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ ânandamaya) is applied to it.'--But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in âtma pra/n/amaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in âtmâ ânandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (âtmaâ vâ idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the prâ/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in ânandamaya âtman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayâd iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'
Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the prâ/n/asa/m/vâda.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyâs.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Râ/n/âyanîya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Chândogya vidyâ, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidyâ.--Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.
Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brâhma/n/a passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance, a brâhma/n/a about the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-âra/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidyâ, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.
Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.
Sûtras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.
The /S/rî-bhâshya treats the four Sûtras as one adhikara/n/a whose two first Sûtras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sûtra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death,
## partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a
contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sûtra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir upasampadya svena rûpe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krî/d/an ramamâna/h/ sa svarâ/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kâma/k/âro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyâmâhâtmya.--That the explanation of the /S/rî-bhâshya agrees with the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam ubhayathâ,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.
The next Sûtra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyâs which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyâs of Brahman.--The explanation given in the /S/rî-bhâshya (in which Sûtras 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The /S/rî-bhâshya reads 'sarveshâm,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvâsâm,' all sagu/n/a-vidyâs.)
Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.--In the /S/rî-bhâshya, where the Sûtra follows immediately on Sûtra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.
Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyâs--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Kâ/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidyâ only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Râmânuja the Sûtra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidyâ only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidyâ of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only--According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.