Part 46

The word 'but' discards the objection raised.--We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose; but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement. We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature[310], without reference to any purpose. For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord. Nor can his nature be questioned.[311]--Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited. And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.--Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the Lord's omniscience on the other hand. And, finally, we must remember that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.

34. Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not (be reproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.

In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.--The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him. Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position. To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person

## acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential

goodness of the Lord affirmed by /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even. For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.

The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, "because he is bound by regards." If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i.e. he has to look to merit and demerit. Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain. For as Parjanya is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls. Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.--And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed' (Kaush. Up. III, 8)[312]; and, 'A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work' (B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 13). Sm/ri/ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, for instance, 'I serve men in the way in which they approach me' (Bha. Gî. IV, 11).

35. If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.

But--an objection is raised--the passage, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,' affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal. And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work. The Lord may be considered as

## acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen;

but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free, from inequalities.

This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is without beginning.--The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.--To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sûtra replies.

36. (The beginninglessness of the world) recommends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).

The beginninglessness of the world recommends itself to reason. For if it had a beginning it would follow that, the world springing into existence without a cause, the released souls also would again enter into the circle of transmigratory existence; and further, as then there would exist no determining cause of the unequal dispensation of pleasure and pain, we should have to acquire in the doctrine of rewards and punishments being allotted, without reference to previous good or bad

## action. That the Lord is not the cause of the inequality, has already

been remarked. Nor can Nescience by itself be the cause, and it is of a uniform nature. On the other hand, Nescience may be the cause of inequality, if it be considered as having regard to merit accruing from

## action produced by the mental impressions or wrath, hatred, and other

afflicting passions[313]. Without merit and demerit nobody can enter into existence, and again, without a body merit and demerit cannot be formed; so that--on the doctrine of the world having a beginning--we are led into a logical see-saw. The opposite doctrine, on the other hand, explains all matters in a manner analogous to the case of the seed and sprout, so that no difficulty remains.--Moreover, the fact of the world being without a beginning, is seen in /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti. In the first place, we have the scriptural passage, 'Let me enter with this living Self (jîva)', &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). Here the circumstance of the embodied Self (the individual soul) being called, previously to creation, 'the living Self'--a name applying to it in so far as it is the sustaining principle of the prâ/n/as--shows that this phenomenal world is without a beginning. For if it had a beginning, the prâ/n/as would not exist before that beginning, and how then could the embodied Self be denoted, with reference to the time of the world's beginning, by a name which depends on the existence of those prâ/n/as. Nor can it be said that it is so designated with a view to its future relation to the prâ/n/as; it being a settled principle that a past relation, as being already existing, is of greater force than a mere future relation.--Moreover, we have the mantra, 'As the creator formerly devised (akalpaya) sun and moon (/Ri/. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3), which intimates the existence of former Kalpas. Sm/ri/ti also declares the world to be without a beginning, 'Neither its form is known here, nor its end, nor its beginning, nor its support' (Bha. Gî. XV, 3). And the Purâ/n/a also declares that there is no measure of the past and the future Kalpas.

37. And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).

The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world.

Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Mâyâ,--on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections.

Notes:

[Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sâ@nkhya/s/âstra as taught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Âsuri, Pa/ñk/a/s/ikha, and others.]

[Footnote 254: Mîmâ/m/sâ Sû. I, 1, 2: /k/odanâlaksha/n/osxrtho dharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odanâ iti kriyâyâ/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam âhu/h/.]

[Footnote 255: Purushârtha; in opposition to the rules referred to in the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.]

[Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Pûrvâ Mîmâ/m/sâ already that Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.]

[Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Müller, vol. ii, p. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhâshya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.]

[Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.]

[Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavâdin is not mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvâtmavâdin is mentioned there.]

[Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon' (nididhyâsâ) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of the Yoga.]

[Footnote 261: The ash/t/akâs (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira) furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Pûrvâ Mim. that Sm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.]

[Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the refutation of the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other Sm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedânta views?]

[Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.]

[Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely connected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply reasoning to /S/ruti.--Ânanda Giri comments on the passage from anubhavâvasânam as follows: brahmasâkshâtkârasya mokshopâyatayâ prâdhânyât tatra /s/abdâd api parokshago/k/arâd aparokshârthasâdharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara@ngam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihyamâtre/n/a pravâdapâramparyamâtre/n/a parokshatayeti yâvat. Anubhavasya prâdhânye tarkasyoktanyâyena tasminn antara@ngatvâd âgamasya /k/a bahira@ngatvâd antara@ngabahira@ngayor antara@nga/m/ balavad ity nyâyâd ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam. Anubhavaprâdhânya/m/ tu nâdyâpi siddham ity â/s/a@nkyâhânubhaveti. Nanu Brahmaj/ñ/âdna/m/ vaidikatvâd dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/ tat kutosxsyânubhavâvasânâvidyânivartakatva/m/ tatrâha moksheti. Adhish/th/ânasâkshâtkârasya /s/uktyâdj/ñ/âne tadavidyâtatkâryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/ñ/ânasyâpi tarkava/s/âd asambhâvanâdinirâsadvârâ sâkshâtkârâvasâyinas tadavidyâdinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nâd/ri/sh/t/aphalatety artha/h/.]

[Footnote 265: Nirati/s/ayâ/h/, upajanâpâyadharma/s/ûnyatva/m/ nirati/s/ayatvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be intelligent.]

[Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi /k/aitanyasya tatra tatrânta/h/kara/n/apari/n/âmânuparâgâd anupalabdhir aviruddhâ. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 268: On î/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69, note 41.]

[Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted.]

[Footnote 270: Ânanda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyâkâ@nkshita/m/ tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udâharati svapnânteti. Svapnajâgaritayor mithovyabhi/k/ârâd âtmana/h/ svabhâvatas tadvattvâbhâvâd avasthâ dvayena tasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jîvasyâvasthâvatvena nâbrahmatvam ity artha/h/. Tathâpi dehâditâdâtmyenâtmano bhâvân na ni/h/prapa/ñk/abrahmatety â/s/a@nkyâha sa/m/prasâde /k/eti. Satâ somya tadâ sa/m/panno bhavatîti /s/rute/h/ sushupte ni/h/prapa/ñk/asadâtmatvâvagamâd âtmanas tathâvidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha/h/. Dvaitagrâhipratyakshâdivirodhât katham âtmanosxdvitîyabrahmatvam ity â/s/a@nkya tajjatvâdihetunâ brahmâtiriktavastvabhâvasiddher adhyakshâdînâm atatvâvedakaprâmâ/n/yâd avirodhâd yuktam âtmano xsvitîyabrahmatvam ity âha prapa/ñk/asyeti.]

[Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a vailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.]

[Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakâle kâryadharmâ/s/ /k/en nâvatish/th/eran na tarhi kâra/n/adharmâ api tish/th/eyus tayor abhedât tatrâhânanyatveszpîti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhâna they must as such be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.]

[Footnote 274: And that the Vedânta view is preferable because the nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.]

[Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mîmâ/m/sâ would be impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no pûrvapaksha view could be maintained.]

[Footnote 276: The following arthavâda-passage, for instance, 'the sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning.]

[Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.]

[Footnote 278: Pari/n/âmavâdam avalambyâpâtato virodha/m/ samadhâya vivartavâdam â/s/ritya paramasamâdhânam âha. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 279: Ânanda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramârthato vij/ñ/âtam iti sambandha/h/.]

[Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kadâ/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am anityam iti yâvat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asû/k/ita/m/ pratîtikâlesxpi sattârâhitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram âha svarûpe/n/eti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.]

[Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes.]

[Footnote 283: Svapnajâgraddehayor vyabhi/k/ârezpi pratyabhij/ñ/ânât tadanugatâtmaikyasiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rûtmano dehadvayâtiredkasiddher dehâtrâtmavâdo na yukta ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahâra' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahâra; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahâra vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]

[Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yâdi/s/rutînâ/m/ svârthe phatavaikalye satîti yâvat. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 286: A Mîmâ/m/sâ principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act.]

[Footnote 287: According to the /S/rutî 'in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he passes himself.']

[Footnote 288: Tattvânyatvâbhyâm iti, na hîsvaratvena te niru/k/yete ja/d/âjadayor abhedâyogât nâpi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/ svâtantrye/n/a sattâsphûrtyasambhavât na hi j/ad/am aga/d/ânapekshya/m/ sattâsphûrtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha@ngaprasa@ngât tasmâd avidyâtmake nâmarûpe ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]

[Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]

[Footnote 291: I.e. (as Ân. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvam tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatva/m/ /k/â kâryasya kâra/n/ânanyatve hetur dhûmavi/s/eshasya /k/âgnibhâvânuvidhâyibhâvatvesxpi na tadbhânânuvidhâyibhânatvam agnibhânasya dhûmabhânâdhînatvât.]

[Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non-existing.]

[Footnote 293: Samavâya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate relation, is, according to the Nyâya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]

[Footnote 294: Samavâyasya svâtantryapaksha/m/ dûshayati anabhyupagamyamâne/k/eti. Samavâyasya samavâyibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate ki/m/ tu svâtantryam evety atrâvayavâvayavinor dravyagu/n/âdînâ/m/ /k/a. viprakarsha/h/ syât sa/m/nidhâyakâbhâvâd ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyâya tenet that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.]

[Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.]

[Footnote 297: Kalpântaram utthâpayati atheti, tathâ /k/a yathâvayavai/h/ sûtra/m/ kusumâni vyâpnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi g/r/ihyate tathâ katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am ity artha/h/. Tatra kim ârambhakâvayavair eva teshv avayavî vartteta ki/m/ vâ tadatiriklâvayavair iti vikalpyâdyam pratyâha tadâpîti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktâvayavair eva tatra vartamâna/m/ drish/l/am iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum â/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitîyam dûshayati anavastheti. Kalpitânantâvayavavyavahitatayâ prak/ri/tâvayavino dûraviprakarshât tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syâd iti bhâva/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.]

[Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkâra says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.]

[Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pâda of this adhyâya.]

[Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]

[Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the 'and' of the Sûtra.]

[Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etanâ' as found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]

[Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti, pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadârthasvabhâvebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am â/k/âryâdyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sûtra; Ân. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: âtmani /k/eti vyâkhyâya vi/k/itrâ/s/ /k/a hîti vyâ/k/ash/t/e.']

[Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of parts.]

[Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.]

[Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.]

[Footnote 309: The Sûtra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sûtra 24.]

[Footnote 310: The nature (svabhàva) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Mâyâ joined with time and karman.]

[Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Mâyâ the creation is unavoidable. Go. Ân. Avidyâ naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bhâ.

Ân. Gi. remarks: Nanu lîládâv asmadâdînâm akasmâd eva niv/ri/tter api darsanâd î/s/varasyâpi mâyâmayyâm lîlâyâm tathâ-bhâve vinâpi sa/my/agj/ñ/âna/m/ sa/m/sârasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatrâha na /ke/ti. Anirvâ/ky/â khalv avidyâ paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhâvo lîleti /kok/yate tatra na prâtîtikasvabhâvâyâm anupapattir avataratîty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common cause only (as Parjanya does).]

[Footnote 313: Râgadveshamohâ râgadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhâdibhi/h/ kli/s/yantîtá kle/s/âs tesb/âm/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/âs tâbhir áksbipta/m/ dharmâdilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshâvidyâ. Ân. Gi.]

SECOND PADA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. That which is inferred (by the Sâ@nkhyas, viz. the pradhâna) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedânta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedânta to refute the Sâ@nkhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedânta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Vedânta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others.

Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.

But, it might be said, the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sûtras of the first adhyâya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sâ@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedânta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedânta-texts.