Part 16

I am convinced that there are no less than 4000 or 5000 such inhabitants of towns in Hampshire, who will have votes for the county, as well as the freeholders. Now, of whom does this class of electors consist? As I before stated, they are shopkeepers--respectable shopkeepers--in the towns. I beg to ask, are they fit persons to be the only electors to return county members to a Parliament, which Parliament is to govern the affairs of this great nation, consisting of 100,000,000 of subjects, and so many various relations, foreign, domestic, colonial, commercial, and manufacturing? Men of the description I have mentioned, with their prejudices and peculiar interests, however respectable as a body, cannot be fit to be the only electors of members of the House of Commons. But, I beg to say that, however respectable this, or any other class of electors may be, there is a strong reason against any uniformity of system in the representation of the country. I have heard already of the establishment, in this town, of a committee formed for the purpose of recommending candidates for the representation to the different towns throughout the country. I confess, I do not believe that this committee has been established more than a few days; but I beg to say that, taking into consideration the means of combinations, and the facilities of communications in the country, such a body is dangerous. I know that such committees, in other countries, have been found to be effectual in putting down the Government. And I ask whether you should allow such a uniform system of election--it matters not in whose hands it is placed--that a committee, sitting in London, shall have the power to dictate what members shall be returned for Leeds, or for Manchester, for instance? I wish to know what security noble Lords have for their seats in this House, if such a committee as this should exist at the first general election of a reformed Parliament? But, my Lords, these are not all the objections which I entertain to this measure; I have others, founded upon facts, which I know to have existed in other countries. I was in France when the law of election was passed, in the year 1817; and this circumstance deserves your Lordships' attention, because the situation of the two countries is not dissimilar. At that period there were, in each department 300 persons, who, paying the highest amount of taxes, were chosen to manage the representation. The King and Government altered this, and gave the power of choosing representatives to persons paying taxes to the amount of 300 francs. Two years afterwards, they were obliged to alter the law again, and form two classes of electors. Since then, there have been two general elections, one more unfavourable than the other to the Government; and the matter ended in the formation of a Parliament, the spirit of which rendered it impossible for a Government to act.

My Lords, I do not mean here to justify the Government of Charles X.; and I trust the noble and learned Lord (Lord Brougham) will allow me, on this occasion, to declare that I never wrote to Prince Polignac in my life (much as I have been accused of encouraging the proceedings of that person), and I have never written to Charles X. from the time that monarch lost his son, and his grandson was born. In fact, I have never corresponded with any French minister without the knowledge of my colleagues. The noble and learned Lord on the woolsack may rely on it, that I had no more knowledge of Prince Polignac's proceedings, than the noble and learned Lord himself; or, most probably, still less. I am not the apologist of Prince Polignac; but, I say, that things had been brought to that state in France, that it was impossible but there should be a revolution.

When I see a similar mode of election established in this country--when I see the adoption of a uniform system of election--when I see the election placed in the hands of shopkeepers in boroughs all over the country--I think that we incur considerable danger, and put the country in such a situation as that no minister can be certain that any one measure which he brings forward will succeed, or that he will he enabled to carry on the Government. The circumstances of France and England are, in many particulars, alike, and we ought to take warning by the dangers of the neighbouring country.

I wish the House to advert to what the business of the King's Government in Parliament is. It is the duty of that Government to manage everything. I heard the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, in a speech of admirable eloquence and knowledge, propose a new judicial system at the commencement of the Session; but I tell him, that it is impossible for the Government ultimately to decide on that question; and that if a Parliament be constructed on the new plan, it will be too strong for Government on that question. So, also, in matters affecting commerce and manufactures, Government would depend entirely upon Parliament.

I want to hear how Government is to carry any measure, on the appointment of a new Parliament? There is a great question now before the House of Commons on the subject of tithes. How is any Government to meet that question? A Government may submit to the will of a majority opposed to its own view on other questions, but on the question of tithes and the Church, the duty of any Government is clearly pointed out--the King's Coronation Oath, and the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland, guaranteeing the integrity of the Church Establishment, and the protection of the estates and prosperity of the Church. But I want to know how Government is to maintain the safety of the Established Church, after placing Parliament on the footing proposed. I really do not wish to carry this argument farther than it will go; but, looking round, and considering the operation of the proposed measure in towns, as well as in counties, and forming the best judgment I can on affairs so complicated, I must infer, from every thing I see, that the Constitution of the country cannot be carried on as hitherto, if this plan be adopted. In such an event, you would alter your whole system of Government. I do not say the Crown cannot last. You may still permit the King's interference in the management of the army, the navy, and the ordnance; and the rest of the Government may he carried on by the House of Commons. Things may go on under such a system; but this will not be the British Constitution. It will not be the same England, which has been, for so many centuries, prosperous and glorious under our present Constitution.

_March 28, 1831._

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_The Unreformed House a complete Legislative Body._

As to the present House of Commons, I maintain that it is as complete a legislative body as can be required; and that the House of Commons, since the peace particularly, has shown itself to be the most efficient legislative body that ever existed in any country in the world, not excepting this. I say, that it has rendered more services than any Legislature ever did in the same period--I say, it has continued those great services up to the present moment, and that those services have only been interrupted by the introduction of this discussion upon the Reform Bill.

_March 28, 1831._

_Reasons why the Duke resigned Office in November, 1830._

It is quite true, that when the late Government brought forward the Catholic question, they were supported by many noble Lords who were usually opposed to the Government; but it is not correct that the disfranchisement of the forty-shilling freeholders was made a _sine qua non_ to ensure the support of the noble Lords to the Relief Bill. I certainly had the misfortune, on that occasion, to lose the support and regard of a great number of friends, both here and in the other House of Parliament--a misfortune I have never ceased to lament; yet I have the consolation of knowing, that in what I then did, I did no more than what my duty required of me; and I was not justified in relinquishing that measure by any intimidation, or by any imaginary circumstance of danger--which I had no right to apprehend. But I own that things were going on in Ireland which induced me to think they might lead to a civil war, in the event of our continuing to refuse the settlement of the question; and I am satisfied that I should have been wanting in duty, both as a man and a Minister, if I had hesitated to give up those opinions which I had previously entertained with regard to that measure. I afterwards had some difference with a noble Earl opposite (Earl Grey), but notwithstanding I felt called upon to retain the position I held in the Government as long as I enjoyed the approbation of my Sovereign, and the confidence of the Legislature.

Then came the Revolution in France, followed by that of Belgium; and like the former revolutions of Naples and of Spain, they naturally excited a strong sensation here; that excitement, increased by speeches made in various parts of the country, created a strong desire for Parliamentary Reform. But I did not think then, any more than I think now, that that desire was irresistible. If Parliament should see reason to decide that the proposed alteration in the Constitution is not necessary, and ought not to be made, I am confident the country will acquiesce in that decision. I believe that the wish for reform is strong and growing; but if the people see that the subject is fairly discussed, and honestly determined here, I am sure they will submit without a murmur. Already the sensation produced by the French and Belgian Revolutions has subsided; the natives of the country have seen the deplorable results by which those commotions have been followed, and are wisely warned by the sufferings of their neighbours.

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Upon the defeat on the Civil List, finding I had the misfortune no longer to enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons, I thought proper to resign the situation which I held in his Majesty's service. Upon that occasion, the question of Parliamentary Reform had no more to do, as far as I was concerned, with the resignation which I tendered to his Majesty on the day following the defeat on the Civil List, than anything else in the world. I admit I resigned next morning, because I did not wish to expose his Majesty and the country to the consequences that might result from the Government going out on the success of the question of Parliamentary Reform. This is the truth; but, to say I resigned on account of Parliamentary Reform, is wrong; I resigned upon the ground before stated; and I resigned at that particular moment on the Tuesday, because I did not choose to expose his Majesty and the country to the consequences that might ensue from the occurrence of the case just mentioned. This is the real fact of the story. But the noble and learned Lord has said, that the late Ministry gave up the principle of Parliamentary Reform by their resignation; no such thing--we resigned because we did not possess the confidence of the House of Commons, and we thought that the same majority which defeated us on Monday on the Civil List, might defeat us Tuesday on Reform; and then we should have sacrificed (as the noble Lord says), the principle of Parliamentary Reform in the Commons. We did not think it worth while to make any farther struggle in order to retain office a day or two longer.

_March 28, 1831._

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_The Civil List principle, on what arranged._

My Lords, the principle on which I and my colleagues drew up the Civil List, was always directed to enable the Sovereign, so far as was practicable, to defray all the expenses necessary to be incurred in supporting the dignity, splendour, and comforts of the Crown, without mixing them up with the other expenses of the Government. For this purpose, it was formerly the practice to grant a considerable sum for those various, but necessary expenses. Certainly, the Crown enjoyed great advantage in supporting its dignity, influence, and efficiency, as long as the system of supporting itself on its hereditary revenues remained in practice. That system, my Lords, was departed from at the commencement of the reign of Geo. III.; and a further departure from it has since taken place, into which I shall, with your Lordships' permission, examine presently, and compare that departure with those proposed by the late Government. From the accounts I have seen of the hereditary revenues enjoyed by Geo. II., I have reason to believe that were they now enjoyed by our Sovereign, and employed in defraying the civil expenses of the Government, and sustaining the dignity and splendour of the Crown, they would amount to a sum larger than would be necessary to meet those expenses, notwithstanding the increase which has been made in them by the increased salaries of the judges, the increased number of the public officers, and the vast increase of the royal family of England. I say, my Lords, that these hereditary revenues would be more than adequate to defray all these charges. I believe that these revenues, independent of droits and West Indian duties, amount, at the present moment, to 850,000 l. a-year; and these revenues, my Lords, I consider as much the King's property, as I hold the possessions of your Lordships to be yours. I make this statement, because it is important that your Lordships should recollect it, and the public should know that notwithstanding the magnitude of the expenses of the Sovereign, the Sovereign has as much right to the sum which I have mentioned, as any of your Lordships to your own estates. The system of giving the Sovereign the amount of certain taxes to defray the expenses of the civil government, was first departed from at the commencement of the reign of Geo. III., when a fixed sum was appointed, instead of that mode of payment, for its support. In process of time the expenses of the civil government increased, and the Civil List became a debt. The consequence was, that in the year 1815, an inquiry was instituted into the circumstances which had caused this increase of charges upon the Civil List, up to the period of the Regency. What was the course then adopted by Parliament? Why, it was to bring certain charges--as, for instance, the charges for ambassadors and ministers abroad--under the annual vote of Parliament; and the immediate object was to avoid thereby the fixing of any fresh debt, for which no estimate could be previously made, upon the Civil List. In 1820 it was determined that nothing whatever should be brought before Parliament, in connexion with the Civil List, that was a casual expense, or for which a regular vote could not be submitted.

The original system, I have already stated, had been departed from in the reign of George III., and the late Government in presenting their civil list made a still further departure from it, and upon this principle;--wherever a part of a salary was to be paid out of the civil list, and part out of the consolidated fund, it was resolved to pay all out of the consolidated fund. The course was adopted with regard to the salaries of the Judges, the Lord Chancellor, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, and also of various other offices, some of which have been since abolished. This was thought a less objectionable mode than that of subjecting those salaries to an annual discussion in the Committee of the House of Commons. We wished my Lords to place those salaries upon the consolidated fund, in order to prevent the possibility of the country being left without a proper and efficient administration of public affairs. We did not wish to leave the Government to the chance of being impeded by a small majority, in the House of Commons, which, according to other proposed plans, might diminish the salaries of public officers at pleasure. If my Lord we look to the period of the Revolution we shall find that there were long discussions respecting the right of the crown to its hereditary revenues, which ended in a concession of the principle that these revenues did belong to the crown. At that time nobody ever dreamed of separating the expenses of the crown from those of the civil government, and of making a separate provision for the support of the state and dignity of the crown, which should be subject to the controul of parliament. The plan of separation, my Lords, is one of modern invention altogether, and I totally dissent from it. Because, let us look to the situation in which the crown is placed under the operation of such a system, and we must observe that it will place the crown in a situation such as it ought not to be reduced to; namely that it will render it liable to be deprived of the assistance--say of a public officer, whose salary may be lost by a single vote in a committee of supply.

_April, 19th, 1831._

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_The Expenses of Ministers ruinous, unless they have large Private fortunes._

With respect to the reduction in the salaries of the great officers of state, I have only to observe, that even under the existing rate of salaries, unless a First Lord of the Treasury, (and the remark will apply to the other state officers) possesses a large private fortune, he must be ruined in consequence of the heavy expences entailed on him by his situation, and the inadequacy of the sum allowed by the public for the maintenance of those expenses. In proof of this, I may instance the case of three prime ministers--Mr. Pitt, Mr. Percival, and Mr. Canning,--all of whom were almost ruined by their being in office. I took upon myself to propose a provision for the family of Mr. Canning in consequence.

_April, 19th. 1831._

_The Roman Catholic Relief Bill settled the question of the Repeal of the Union._

It is not my intention at present to enter into the question, as to the expediency of granting the Roman Catholic claims; for I hope that question is for ever set at rest. The former government of this country derived some advantage from the settlement of that question; and I believe that this advantage will at least be admitted to have flowed from it,--that now there is no question either in this or the other House of Parliament, or among the public, respecting the necessity or expediency of repealing the Union. When I introduced the Catholic Relief Bill, I stated that political power already existed in the hands of the Roman Catholics, and that was a statement, generally admitted by noble Lords on both sides of the House. What the Bill effected was to give the capacity of enjoying political power to the higher classes of the Roman Catholics, and to take it out of the hands of those of the lower classes who did not exercise it themselves for their own purposes, and according to the suggestion of their own sentiments, but at the dictation of a body among the Catholic people, who, it will be admitted by everybody, ought not to possess any political power whatever,--I mean the Roman Catholic priesthood.

_April, 21st. 1831._

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_If the Reform Bill be passed, it will be impossible to preserve inviolate the Union with Ireland._

My opinion is, that your Lordships will find it difficult, indeed, after having passed the Bill under discussion of the other House of Parliament, to maintain inviolate that Union which now exists between the two countries. I mean to say, that in the event of that bill passing, it would be impossible to maintain that article of the Union which recognises the Church of England as a branch of that Union, and which guarantees its safety. I beg to call to your Lordships' recollection, that his Majesty is sworn to maintain that Union inviolate; and that, in adopting the Reform measure, the Parliament do actually expose his Majesty to the risk of consenting to a bill calculated to break down the Church Establishment in Ireland. This is the impression I have always entertained--and it is an impression which I cannot remove from my mind; and, I must confess, that when I heard the other night the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack (Lord Brougham) assert that the Reform Bill had put down agitation in Ireland, on the subject of a Repeal of the Union, I was much surprised.

_April 22, 1831._

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_Importance of Portugal to England._

There is no country in Europe whose alliance is so important to England as Portugal; there is no country, the preservation of whose independence is so important to us, as that of Portugal.

_July 26, 1831._

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_A preventive Police checks Crime._

In all foreign countries there exists a preventive police,--but there is no such thing in England,--which preventive police has the effect of checking crime in a very great degree. We have nothing of the sort in England, neither can there be, according to the principles of our law and constitution. Such being the case, your Lordships must use great caution in drawing comparisons between convictions in this and foreign countries; if that is not done, the most erroneous conclusions will be arrived at.

_September 6, 1831._

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_A War of Opinions the worst of Wars._

The truth is, that the government of Portugal has, for the last ten months, been looked upon with inimical feelings and with passion by the King's servants; and this measure[13] is not brought forward with any view to revenue, but for the purpose of opposing and embarrassing the existing Government of that country. The noble Lords opposite do not like the situation of the Government of Portugal; it is not to their mind; and they are anxious, either by revolutionary measures, or any other, to overthrow it. Let them, however, look well at the responsibility they are incurring. Let them consider the frightful consequences in which their planning may involve this country, and the whole of Europe. If their designs even met with a temporary success, they would inevitably lead to a war of opinion, to a war of religion--the worst of wars, and the most deplorable consequences for all Europe would ensue.

_September 30, 1831._

[Footnote 13: The Wine Duties Bill; for regulating the tariff as regards Portugal.]

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_The Duke's Declaration against all Reform._