Part 9
When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by performing their engagements in respect to their debts.
_June 25. 1812._
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_The Spaniards cry "Viva!" but don't act._
I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards, notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry _viva!_ and are very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have ever known; the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own country.
_August 18, 1812._
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_Imbecility of the Spanish Leaders._
It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking, and talking of any other subject but Spain.
_November 1, 1812._
_Evils of uncontrolled popular Legislatures._
The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and, if we could be certain that legislative assemblies could on all occasions act according to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems. Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, it unfortunately happens too frequently, that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain, there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.
_January 29, 1813._
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_Ingratitude of the Portuguese to the British Army._
I must say, that the British army, which I have the honour to command, have met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and authorities in Portugal for their services; and that everything that could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the last of Portugal.
_July 20, 1813._
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Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns, is the characteristic of all Spaniards.
_July 12, 1813._
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Sound sense is better than abilities.
_August 8, 1813._
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_Basis of military operations against the United States from the side of Canada._
Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by a naval superiority on the lakes. But even if we had that superiority, I should doubt our being able to do more than secure the points on those lakes at which the Americans could have access. In such countries as America, very extensive, thinly peopled, and producing but little food in proportion to their extent, military operations by large bodies are impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport, which such a country can rarely supply.
I conceive, therefore, that were your army larger even than the proposed augmentation would make it, you could not quit the lakes; and, indeed, would be tied to them the more necessarily in proportion as your army would be large.[7]
[Footnote 7: The letter from the Duke the above is taken was written in reply to an application by the home government for his opinion. We frequently find the Duke applied to for his opinion on political matters at home, while serving in the Peninsula.]
_February 22, 1814._
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_The Morale of an Army important to Discipline._
No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the enemy, who have been accustomed to plunder, and those officers alone can expect to derive honour in the day of battle from the conduct of the troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought in their cantonments, their quarters, and their camps.
_March 5, 1814._
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English officers are very strictly instructed, and those who mean to serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless they may be of responsibility. Indeed, I attribute this fearlessness very much to the determination never to disobey, as long as the circumstances exist under which an order is given.
_April 16, 1814._
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_French Feelings about the Slave Trade._
You (Mr. Wilberforce) judge most correctly regarding the state of the public mind here upon this question. Not only is there no information, but, because England takes an interest in the question, it is impossible to convey any through the only channel which would be at all effectual, viz., the daily press. Nobody reads anything but the newspapers; but it is impossible to get anything inserted in any French newspaper in Paris in favour of the abolition, or even to show that the trade was abolished in England, from motives of humanity. The extracts made from English newspapers upon this, or any other subject, are selected with a view, either to turn our principles and conduct into ridicule, or to exasperate against us still more the people of this country; and therefore the evil cannot be remedied by good publications in the daily press in England, with a view to their being copied into the newspapers here.
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I must say that the daily press in England do us a good deal of harm in this as well as in other questions. We are sure of the king and his government, if he could rely upon the opinion of his people. But as long as our press teems with writings drawn with a view of irritating persons here, we shall never be able to exercise the influence which we ought to have upon this question, and which we really possess.
_Letter to Mr. Wilberforce, October 8, 1814._
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The real power in Spain is in the clergy.
_October 20, 1814._
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Les choses neuves, surtout quand elles sont compliquées, ne vont pas bien.
_Letter to Doumouriex, November 3, 1814._
FRANCE.
_Effects of Buonaparte's Government of France._
Ce qu'il y a de pis c'est le mécontentement général, et la pauvreté universelle. Cette malheureuse révolution et ces suites ont ruiné le pays, de fond en comble. Tout le monde est pauvre, et, ce qui est pis, leurs institutions empêchent qu'aucune famille devienne riche et puissante. Tous doivent donc nécessairement viser à remplir des emplois publics, non, comme autrefois, pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc cherche de l'emploi public.
Buonaparte laissa une armée de million d'hommes en France, outres les officiers prisonniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le roi ne peut pas en maintenir le quart. Tous ceux non employées sont mécontens. Buonaparte gouvernait directement la moitié de l'Europe, et indirectement presque l'autre moitié. Pour des causes à présent bien develloppées et connues, il employait une quantité infinie de personnes dans ses administrations; et tous ceux employés, ou dans les administrations extérieures, civiles, ou dans les administrations militaires des armées, sont renvoyés, et beaucoup des ceux employés dans les administrations intérieures; à cette classe nombreuse ajouter la quantité d'émigrés, et de personnes rentrés, tous mourant de faim, et tous convoitant de l'emploi public afin de pouvoir vivre, et vous trouverez que plus des trois quarts de la classe de la société, non employée à la main d'oeuvre ou à labourer la terre, sont en état d'indigence, et, par conséquence, mécontens. Si vous considerez bien ce tableau, qui est la stricte vérité, vous y verrez la cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'armée les officiers, sourtout, sont mécontens. Ils le sont pour plusieurs raisons inutiles à detailler ici, mais ce mécontentement pourra ce vaincre en adoptant des mesures sages pour améliorer l'esprit.
_Letter to Doumouriex, November 26, 1814._
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_Re-establishment of the Bourbons necessary to the Peace of Europe._
I have frequently told your highness, and every day's experience shews me that I am right, that the only chance of peace for Europe consists in the establishment in France of the legitimate Bourbons. The establishment of any other government, whether in the person of----, or in a regency in the name of young Napoleon, or in any other individual, or in a republic, must lead to the maintenance of large military establishments, to the ruin of all the governments of Europe, till it shall suit the convenience of the French government to commence a contest which can be directed only against you, or others for whom we are interested. In this contest we shall feel the additional difficulty, that those who are now on our side will then be against us, and you will again find yourself surrounded by enemies. I am convinced that the penetration of your highness will have shewn you the danger of all these schemes to the interests of the emperor, and that you will defeat them all by adhering to that line of conduct (in which you will find us likewise) which will finally lead to the establishment in France of the legitimate government, from which alone can Europe expect any genuine peace.
_May 20, 1815._
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_Effects of Waterloo._
I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his death-blow: from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are deserting in parties, even the generals are withdrawing from him. The infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their horses to the people of the country, and desert to their homes. Allowing for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Buonaparte can still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th corps d'armée, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd corps, which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as the others, and probably some troops from La Vendée, I am still of opinion that he can make no head against us--qu'il n'a qu'à se pendre.
_June 23, 1815._
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Some of the regiments (the new ones I mean) are reduced to nothing; but I must keep them as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the service, at great expense; or I must send them home, and part with the few British soldiers I have.
I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with this; and I only hope that I am going the right way to bring it to an early determination some way or other.
_June 25, 1815._
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_Waterloo described to a Soldier._
Notre Bataille du 18 a été une de géans; et notre succès a été complet, comme vous voyez. Que Dieu me favorise assez pour que je n'en aie plus, parceque je suis désolé de la perte de mes anciens amis et comrades.
Mon voisin et collaborateur (Blücher) est en bonne santé quoique un peu souffrant d'une chute qu'il a faite d'un cheval blessé sous lui dans la bataille du 16.
_Letter to Doumouriex, June 26, 1815._
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_If Buonaparte is to be put to Death, he will not be his Executioneer._
General----has been here this day to negociate for Napoleon's passing to America, to which proposition I have answered, that I have no authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me, believing that I will save his life.---- wishes to kill him; but I have told him I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; and that he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to become executioners, and that I was determined that, if the sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me.
_June 26, 1815._
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_The "Pounding Match."_
You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a pounding match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an enormous quantity of artillery.
I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French cavalry walking about as if they had been our own. I never saw the British infantry behave so well.
_Letter to Marshal Beresford, July 9, 1815._
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_Blucher's Vandalism averted._
To Marshal Prince Blucher.--Several reports have been brought to me during the evening and night, and some from the government, in consequence of the work carrying on by your highness on one of the bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to destroy.
As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the town, and as the sovereigns when they were here before, left all these bridges, &c., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay the destruction of the bridge, at least till they should arrive; or, at all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow morning.
_July 8, 1815._
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The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the king and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely because the bridge is considered as a monument of the battle of Jena, notwithstanding that the government are willing to change the name of the bridge. Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to suggest that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to the commissioners on behalf of the part of the army, during the negociation of the convention, viz., that the monuments, museums, &c., should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.
All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection.
_July 9, 1815._[8]
[Footnote 8: The Duke rarely writes or speaks twice, when once will do. On this occasion he was anxious; and--successful.]
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_Summary Justice._
To the Sous-Préfet de Pontoise.--J'ai ordonné qu'on vous fasse prisonnier, parceque, ayant envoyé une réquisition à Pontoise pour des vivres, vous avez répondu que vous ne les donneriez pas, sans qu'on envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre.
Vous vous êtes mis dans les cas des militaires, et je vous fais prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.
Si je vous traitais comme l'usurpateur et ses adherens ont traité les habitans des pays ou ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller; mais, comme vous vous êtes constitué guerrier, je vous fais prisonnier de guerre.
_July 13, 1815._
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_Characteristic Letter to Marshal Beresford_.
The battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought that has been for many years, I believe, and has placed in the power of the allies the most important results. We are throwing them away, however, by the infamous conduct of some of us; and I am sorry to add that our own government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects; and, having got their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it.
As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend you to resign, and come away immediately. It is impossible for the British government to maintain British officers for the Portuguese army, at an expense even so trifling as it is, if the Portuguese government are to refuse to give the service of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch them to the devil, then, in the mode which will be most dignified to yourself, and that which will have the best effect in opening the prince's eyes to the conduct of his servants in Portugal; and let the matter work its own way. Depend upon it, the British government must and will recall the British officers.
_August 7, 1815._
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SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT.
_Praise of Lord Hastings and the Indian Army._
He professed his entire concurrence in the tribute of approbation bestowed on the Marquis of Hastings, for his conduct of the late war in India. There could not remain a doubt in the minds of those acquainted with the facts, but that the wisdom of the plan on which it was commenced, and the vigour of its execution, merited the highest praise. The noble Duke said, he was pleased that an opportunity, like the present, had occurred to do justice to the services and gallantry of our troops in India, which were often neglected or disallowed. No troops in the world performed their duty better, or observed a more steady discipline. They had evinced their good qualities in all their late transactions, whether acting in great masses or small detachments. In all situations they had nobly performed their duty.
_House of Lords, March 9, 1819._
_Impossibility of granting Catholic Emancipation._
The whole question turned upon the degree of security which could be given to the Protestant religion as by law established in Ireland. To consider this, it was necessary to consider how the reformation had been established in Ireland. It was not necessary for him to recall to their lordships remembrance that the unreformed religion had been established in Ireland at the point of the sword, and by means of confiscations. All this was repeated at the revolution, and was fresh in the recollection of the people of Ireland. Keeping in view that the Irish Roman Catholic church, under all oppressions, continued in the same state--the pope having the same influence over the clergy, the clergy the same power over the people; in this state of things, he would ask, whether it was possible that Roman Catholics could be safely admitted to hold seats in parliament? The influence of the priesthood over the people was fostered by the remembrance of the events to which he had alluded; and the idea of unmerited and mutual suffering; and no doubt could be entertained, from their present feelings, that if the Roman Catholics were admitted to the enjoyment of political power, their first exertion would be to restore their religion to its original supremacy; and to recover the possessions and property of which they had been stripped by the reformation. It was, however, said, that securities were offered on the part of the Roman Catholics.
The pope, it seemed, had in the appointment of bishops, relinquished all to the crown, except the mere conferring of a spiritual blessing. But how had that concession been received by the people of Ireland? It had excited the utmost discontent, and was regarded as an abandonment of the essential principles of their religion, and an attack on their national independence. Did that arise from the people of Ireland having a less clear idea of national independence than other people? No; but they felt if the executive power possessed any control over the appointment of the Roman Catholic bishops, some security would be thereby obtained for the Protestant church. Considering, then, that the whole question turned on the degree of security which could be given, and looking at the various securities which had at several times been proposed, he had never yet seen anything that came up to his notion of that which ought to be required. As to what had been said of the domestic nomination of bishops, he did not see how the laws of the country could operate upon it, so as to make it an adequate security. Then as to the oath of allegiance which the bishop was to take, of what avail could it be, that the law required this oath from a bishop, appointed God knows how, or by whom? When all these circumstances were considered, the state of the Irish Catholic church, the way in which the reformation had been effected, the rivalry and enmity between the Catholics and the established church, and the inadequacy of all securities which had been proposed, there was in his opinion, enough to decide the question; for, the first and greatest duty of the legislature was, to secure the establishments as settled at the revolution.
_House of Lords, May 17, 1819._
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County meetings if properly regulated, are a fair constitutional mode of taking the sense of the county; but this cannot be the case if they are attended by a mob for the express purpose of supporting one side.
_House of Lords, January 26, 1821._
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_The Porte our ancient Ally._
The Ottoman Porte is the ancient ally of this country. It forms an essential part of the balance of power in Europe. The preservation of the Ottoman Porte has been an object of importance not merely to England but also to the whole of Europe; and the changes of possession which have taken place in the east of Europe within the recollection of all who hear me, render its existence as an independent and powerful state, necessary to the well being of this country.
In the late war, had it not been for the influence of the councils of England over the Porte, I may safely say that the disaster which finally led to the establishment of Europe as it now is, would not have occurred to the extent it did in 1812. Under these circumstances I think we may term the Ottoman Porte the "ancient ally" and friend of this country, even though the treaties upon which our alliance is founded are not of a hundred years standing.
_House of Lords, Jan. 29, 1828._
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_Battle of Navarino an untoward Event. Sir E. Codrington acquitted of all blame._
There is one other subject to which I shall address myself, I mean the sense in which the word "untoward" has been used. It was intended by "untoward" to convey, that the event referred to was unexpected--was unfortunate. The sense in which the word was used was this: in the treaty which is not yet before the house, and which cannot, therefore, regularly come under discussion, though all of us have read it, it is mentioned as one stipulation, that the execution of it, if possible, shall not lead to hostilities; and therefore, when the execution of it did lead to hostilities, it was a consequence which the government did not anticipate, and which it has, therefore, a right to call untoward.