Part 17

But, my Lords, if I wanted an example of the value of the House of Commons, I should find it in the opinion of the noble Earl (Grey) the last time, I believe, the last time that he spoke of the House of Commons. In the month of February, 1817, the noble Lord said, "constituted as it now was, he, in his conscience, believed that the House of Commons was, of all other institutions, in all the other countries of the world, the institution best calculated for the general protection of the subject. Supported by the people, in temperate and firm claims for redress, it was not only able, but certain to remedy every wrong. It was capable of acting as the most efficient control upon the executive, by diminishing the means of consumption, and reducing the pressure of a severe and grinding taxation." That was the opinion of the noble Earl himself, in 1817; and what, I would ask, has the Parliament done, subsequently, to deserve the disapprobation of the noble Earl? What had it done between 1817 and the moment when I pronounced that approbation of Parliament, of which my noble friend (Earl Winchelsea) and the noble Earl (Grey) have so much disapproved? When the noble Earl quoted what I said not quite a twelvemonth ago, he might, I think, quote it correctly. What I said was, that Parliament had done its duty by the country, and enjoyed its confidence. I said, that if I had to create a constitution of Parliament, I could not create that which now existed, because I did not believe the art of one man could invent such a system; but I said, that I would do my endeavour to establish one like it, in which property in land should be preponderant. That was what I said; and I afterwards had the satisfaction to hear the noble Marquis (Lansdowne) deliver a similar opinion. He stated that, in any system of representation which he could support, property and learning must be preponderant. I said that I should consider it my duty to resist the adopting of any plan of reform that should be brought forward. I spoke as a minister of the Crown; I meant to resist reform. The noble Lords say, that this statement of mine caused great enmity to me, and created that spirit of reform which has since pervaded the whole country. I beg the noble Earl's pardon; but the spirit of reform in this country was the consequence of the French revolution. It is true, that ever since the American war, a desire for Parliamentary Reform has been manifested,

## particularly when any disturbance or insurrection has occurred in any of

the neighbouring foreign countries--above all, since the French revolution; and when there has been any extraordinary distress or difficulty in the country. At the same time, I believe that, from year to year, the manifestations of such a desire have been less frequent. I have, indeed, the authority of those most friendly to reform for saying that the manifestations of the desire for reform were less frequent, till the period of the revolution of July, 1830, than they had formerly been for a number of years.

_October 4, 1831._

_Electoral Pledges Unconstitutional._

It is on the ground of the dissolution, and of the Speech from the Throne,[14] that I charge the noble Lords with having excited the spirit which existed in the country at the period of the last general election; and with having been the cause of the unconstitutional practice, hitherto unknown, of electing delegates for a particular purpose to Parliament--delegates to obey the daily instructions of their constituents, and to be cashiered if they should disobey them, whatever may be their own opinion; instead of being, as they have been hitherto, independent members of Parliament, to deliberate with their colleagues upon matters of common concern, and to decide according to the best of their judgment, after such deliberation and debate. This is an evil of which the country will long feel the consequences, whatever may be the result of these discussions.

[Footnote 14: The Whig ministry dissolved the Parliament in April, 1831. A new Parliament met in June; and, on the 21st of that month, the King made the speech alluded to. In the interval there had been great excitement in the country.]

My Lords, this measure, thus delegated by the people, and thus brought forward by the Government in Parliament, for the decision of members thus delegated to give it the force of a law, alters every thing; and requires, as the noble Secretary of State (Lord Melbourne) says, new powers, in order to render it practicable to carry on the Government at all.

_October 4, 1831._

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_A Democratic Assembly of the worst description will be elected under the Reform Bill._

Throughout the whole of the empire, persons of the lowest condition of life, liable to, and even existing under, the most pernicious influences, are to have votes; or, in other words, are to exercise political power. Persons in those stations of life do exercise political power already; but, in a few places, in large masses; preponderating over the influence of other classes of society. What must we expect when these lower classes will preponderate everywhere? We know what sort of representatives are returned by the places I have described. What are we to expect, when the whole will be of the same description?

We hear, sometimes, of radical reform; and we know that the term applies to universal suffrage, vote by ballot, annual parliaments, and their consequences. But, I declare, that looking at these changes pervading every part of the representation, root and branch, destroying or changing everything that has existed, even to the relative numbers of the representatives from the three kingdoms fixed by treaty, I should call this a radical reform, rather than reform of any other description.

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I cannot but consider that the House of Commons returned by it will be a democratical assembly of the worst description; that radical reform, vote by ballot, and all the evil consequences to be expected from the deliberations of such an assembly, must follow from this establishment. I entreat your Lordships to pause before you agree to establish such a system in your country.

_October 4, 1831._

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_The popular Will no ground for conceding Reform._

But we are told that the people wish for this measure; and when we express our sense of the danger which attends it, on account of the democratical power which it tends to establish, an endeavour is made to calm our apprehensions, by the assurance that the people are attached to the Government of King, Lords, and Commons.

If we are to rely upon that feeling of the people--if we are to adopt this measure because it is the pleasure of the people, and because they are attached to the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, why do we not, at once, adopt the measure which we know the people prefer--I mean radical reform; that is to say, universal suffrage, vote by ballot, and annual parliaments? If we are to make a change, there can be no reason for not going the full length that the people wish, if we can be sure that the measure will not injure the Government--that to which they are attached--of King, Lords, and Commons.

_October 4, 1831._

_Necessity of the Influence of Property in the House of Commons._

But before we go further, it is desirable that we should examine what is the Government of King, Lords, and Commons, as established in this kingdom. In this Government the King is at the head of everything. All the power is in his hands. He is the head of the Church, the head of the law. Justice is administered in his name. He is the protector of the peace of the country, the head of its political negociations, and of its armed force--not a shilling of public money can be expended without his order and signature. But, notwithstanding these immense powers, the King can do nothing that is contrary to law, or to the engagements of himself or his predecessors.

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Every act of the Government, or of the King, is liable to be brought under discussion in, and is in fact controlled by, the House of Commons; and for this reason alone, it is important that we should consider of what description of men the House of Commons is likely to be composed, when we are discussing a question of Parliamentary Reform, in order that we may be quite certain that they will exercise their high function with wisdom and discretion.

It was on these grounds, that I, some time ago, called upon the noble Earl (Grey) to state by what influence he intended to carry on the King's Government in Parliament, according to the principles fixed at the period of the Revolution, and in practice from that period to this, when this Reform Bill should be passed. The noble Lord answered immediately--not by means of corruption. I am aware of that, my Lords. I am convinced that the noble Lord is incapable of resorting to such means, as I hope he believes that I am incapable of resorting to them. I did not consider this any answer to my question, which I repeated in a subsequent discussion, on the motion of my noble friend, the noble Baron behind me (Lord Wharncliffe). The noble Earl said, that the Government had nothing to do with such questions; that Parliament was to decide for itself; and that there was no necessity for the interference of Government.

I beg your Lordships to consider what are the questions which in every week, and on every day, are brought under the discussion of the House of Commons--questions affecting the honour, the interests, the rights, the property, of every individual in the country, which the King is bound by his oath to protect, and in the protection of which, all are equally interested. They are questions regarding the proceedings of Courts of Justice, regarding the use of the public force, and hundreds of others, which occur daily, in which every individual is interested. I put legislation out of the question; but can the King from that Throne give to his subjects the necessary protection for their rights and property? No, my Lords. It is only by the influence of property over the election of Members of the House of Commons, and by the influence of the Crown and of this House, and of the property of the country upon its proceedings, that the great powers of such a body as the House of Commons can be exercised with discretion and safety. The King could not perform the duties of his high station, nor the House of Lords, if the House of Commons were formed on the principle and plan proposed by this bill.

_October 4, 1831._

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_The Sacrifice of the Established Church will follow the Reform Bill._

There is one institution which would become peculiarly liable to attack in such a House of Commons, to which I wish to draw the attention of the Right Reverend Bench, and that is, the Establishment of the Church of England in Ireland. This Church is the object of a fundamental Article of the Treaty of Union between the two countries, and is secured by Acts of both Parliaments; and the King is, besides, sworn to maintain its right and possessions: can any man believe that, when the representatives for Ireland come to be elected in the manner proposed by the bill, the Church of England in Ireland can be maintained?

I have already shown that these representatives must be elected under the influence of the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Who are those who now show the greatest hostility to the Church, its rights, and possessions?--the Members for populous places. The reason is, that the deprivation of the Church of their property is one of the popular objects of the day. The object of the bill is, and its effects will be, to increase the number of this description of Members in Parliament, and to render the influence of this party predominant and irresistible.

I believe that the noble Earl (Grey) has already found the Members returned by Ireland, under this influence, very inconvenient to himself, upon more than one occasion; and it appears, that the right honourable Gentleman who conducts the affairs of Ireland in the House of Commons, was under the necessity, very lately, of giving up a measure which he thought important for the benefit and peace of Ireland, because the Members from Ireland, of this party, were opposed to it. How can the noble Lord suppose, that the Church of England can be protected, or even the Union itself preserved in a Reformed Parliament? There is no man, who considers what the Government of King, Lords, and Commons is, and the details of the manner in which it is carried on, who must not see, that Government will become impracticable, when the three branches shall be separate--each independent of the other, and uncontrolled in its

## action by any of the existing influences.

_October 4, 1831._

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_Danger of a Democratic House of Commons._

A noble earl (the Earl of Winchelsea) who has spoken on this side of the House, has made an observation to your Lordships, which well deserves your attention. The noble earl has told you, that if you increase but a little the democratic power in the state, the step can never be withdrawn. Your Lordships must continue in the same course till you have passed through the miseries of a revolution, and thence to a military despotism, and the evils which attend that system of government. It is not denied, that this bill must increase beyond measure the democratic power of the state--that it must constitute in the House of Commons a fierce democracy: what must be the consequences, your Lordships will judge.

I will not detain your Lordships by adverting to the merits of the system of government which has existed up to the present moment, upon which my opinion is by no means altered. No man denies that we have enjoyed great advantages; that we have enjoyed a larger share of happiness, comfort, and prosperity, for a long course of years, than were ever enjoyed by any nation; that we have more riches, the largest fortunes, personal as well as real, more manufactures and commerce, than all the nations of Europe taken together; the richest, most extensive, most peopled, and most prosperous foreign colonies and possessions, that any nation ever possessed. There is not an important position in the world, whether for the purpose of navigation, commerce, or military defence, that does not belong to us.

If this democratic assembly should once be established in England, does any one believe that we should continue to enjoy these vast advantages? But a democracy has never been established in any part of the world, that it has not immediately declared war against property--against the payment of the public debt--and against all the principles of conservation, which are secured by, and are, in fact, the principal objects of the British constitution, as it now exists. Property, and its possessors, will become the common enemy. I do not urge this argument as one in which your Lordships are peculiarly interested: it is not you alone, nor even other proprietors, who are interested in the protection of property; the whole people, middling classes as well as the lower orders, are interested in this subject. Look at the anxiety prevailing in every part of London, in respect to the great revolution to be made by this bill. My noble friend, the noble baron (Lord Wharncliffe) has been ridiculed for adverting to the opinions of tradesmen in Bond-street and St. James's-street. Those in Bond-street consist of more than 200 respectable persons, who are well able to form an opinion of the effect of this bill upon the resources of themselves, the middling classes, and the poor, as they supply the luxuries of persons in easier circumstances, residing in that quarter of the town. Anything which can effect the resources of their customers, must be interesting to them, and they do feel that this bill must affect property, private expenditure, and the resources of themselves, and of those whom they employ. A noble lord on the other side, who adverted to this topic, greatly underrated the wealth of these tradesmen. I know of one, residing in Bond-street, who employs at all times from 2,000 to 4,000 workmen, whose trade depends, as well as the employment of this body of people, upon the expenditure of his customers: is he not interested in upholding the public faith, and the system of property now established in England? Are not the people, of all classes and descriptions, down to the lowest, interested in the maintenance of our extensive manufactures and commerce, in the conservation of our enormous dominions abroad, and the continued respect of all nations?

If I am right in thinking that this fierce democracy will be established in the House of Commons, does any man believe that that harmony can continue between the king and his government and the House of Commons, so necessary to insure to both general respect, and to the king's government the strength which is necessary to enable his Majesty to protect and keep in order his foreign dominions, and to insure the obedience of their inhabitants? We shall lose these colonies and foreign possessions, and with them our authority and influence abroad.

There is no instance of any country having maintained its strength or its influence in its foreign possessions, or the respect of foreign nations, during the existence of internal troubles and disturbance; and there is no case of the existence, without such troubles, of a Government consisting of King, Lords, and Commons, independently of each other, and the members of the latter depending solely upon the popular choice, and being delegates of the people. We have had an example in England of a House of Commons which was independent of the influence of the Crown; and of this House, turning the Spiritual Lords out of it, murdering their Sovereign, and voting the House of Lords useless. I will read your Lordships the account given by a man, who was knowing in his time (Oliver Cromwell), of what this House became.

"The parliament, which had so vigorously withstood the encroachments of the royal power, became themselves too desirous of absolute authority; and not only engrossed the legislative, but usurped the executive power."

"All causes, civil and criminal, all questions of property, were determined by committees, who, being themselves the legislature, were accountable to no law, and for that reason their decrees were arbitrary, and their proceedings violent. Oppression was without redress, unjust sentence without appeal; there was no prospect of ease or intermission. The parliament had determined never to dissolve themselves."

"At length the army interfered. They soon perceived that, unless they made one regulation more, and crushed this many-headed monster, they had hitherto ventured their lives to little purpose, and had, instead of assuring their own and their country's liberty, only changed one kind of slavery for another."

This is the account of the state of a house of Commons acting independently of all influence; and of the state to which it brought the country.

_October 4, 1831._

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_Contempt of intimidation by popular meetings._

I do not deny that I always felt strongly the attempts that were made to intimidate your Lordships by public meetings. For all such meetings, I feel the greatest contempt; and I am perfectly satisfied that the house is superior to any intimidation founded on the proceedings of any such assemblages. I feel no concern for all those threats, whether proceeding from Birmingham or elsewhere. I have always thought, and I think still, that the law is too strong to be overborne by such proceedings. I know further, that there does exist throughout this country a strong feeling of attachment to the government of the country, as by law established. I know that the people look up to the laws as the best means of protection, and those laws they will not violate in any manner to endanger the government of the country, or any of its established institutions. I am afraid of none of these, but I will tell your Lordships what I am afraid of, I am afraid of revolution, and of revolutionary measures, brought in and proposed by his Majesty's government. I assert, and I believe that history will bear me out in the assertion, that there has been no revolution in this country, or any great change, which has not been brought about by the parliament, and generally by the government introducing measures, and carrying them through by the influence of the Crown. I would therefore entreat your Lordships to do all you can to defeat this measure--use every means of resistance which the just exercises of your privileges will warrant; and trust to the good sense of the country to submit to the legal and just decision you come to.

_October 5,1831._

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_Comparison of the Finance Administration of the Wellington with that of the Grey government._

I believe we find ourselves in this singular situation: we have an increased expenditure, (increased within this year,) and have, at the same time, a reduction of taxation, and no overplus whatever (or one not amounting to more than 10,000 l.) of revenue. I say we are in that peculiar situation, because I put out of the question those occasions on which ministers of the crown have thought it their duty to propose and effect loans, to carry on the public service of the country. Even in these cases, those who have made such propositions have thought it their duty to provide a surplus over revenue, in order to meet the unforeseen casualties in the amount of revenue, which every man knows must occur in so large a revenue as this country has the happiness to boast of. This principle of having a surplus revenue over the expenditure, has been considered advantageous with a view to the diminution of the national debt. I am aware that this is a part of the subject on which a difference of opinion exists. I am aware that many great authorities are of opinion that no surplus is necessary for the express purpose of reducing the national debt, and I perfectly agree with them that it is not desirable that a surplus should be created by borrowing, and thus creating new liabilities for the purpose of getting rid of the old. But I cannot look to what has taken place of late years, even in my own time, when I filled the situation of first Lord of his Majesty's Treasury,--cannot look to what took place then without seeing the advantage of having an overplus of income over expenditure, such as would tend to the gradual diminution of the public debt.