Part 25

From my own experience, I must take the liberty of observing, that I consider the conduct pursued by noble lords on this side of the house, throughout the present session, to have been marked with the utmost moderation. For myself, I think I am correct in stating, that since the address to the throne in answer to the king's speech, with the exception only of one occasion, when I requested the noble viscount to postpone the Corporations (Ireland) Bill till after the Easter holidays, I never entered the house till after Easter. Since that period, I have certainly taken part in the proceedings that have been going forward in the house, and I have felt it my duty to oppose some of the measures of government; but I think I shall be borne out when I say that I have accompanied the vote which I have given with observations expressed in terms of great moderation. I have acted on all occasions to the best of my opinion, and in a way which I thought most calculated to be beneficial to the country. The noble viscount has been pleased to taunt us for not having addressed the king with a view to obtain his and his colleagues' removal from the situations which they hold. If the noble viscount would look at the manner in which they were appointed to office, if he would look at the whole history for the last twelve months I think he would find sufficient reason for our not having adopted that course of proceeding. The noble viscount knows very well upon what ground he stands, and knowing that, it would have been just as well in him if he had avoided his taunts against us for not having asked the king to remove him from office. I would take the liberty to recommend the noble viscount to consider himself not as the minister of a democratic body in another place, but as the minister of a sovereign in a limited monarchy, in a country, great in point of extent, great in its possessions, and in the various interests which it comprises; and that considering these circumstances, he should, in future, concert such measures as he has reason to think may pass with the approval and suit the general interests of all,--meet the good will of all,--and not of one

## particular party in one particular place only. If the noble viscount

will but follow that course for some little time, he will find no difficulty in conducting the business of government in this house, but will find every facility afforded him in forwarding measures of the above description. I would beg the noble lord to recollect one fact, in regard to the church of England, whether in England or Ireland. Let him recollect that the avowed policy followed by this country during the last three hundred years, has been to retain inviolable the church establishment. We are called here to consult particularly for the good of the church; and if the noble viscount brings forward any measures relating to that subject, let him recollect that all measures of such a kind must be discussed by us with that particular object in view. This is not only the old feeling of this house of three hundred years' standing, but it is that on which we acted no longer than eight or nine years ago, when we had occasion to review the safeguards and general landmarks whereby the church establishment of this country was defended.

_August_ 18, 1836.

_The Quadruple Treaty. Effects of our Intervention in Spain_.

It is well known to your lordships that I was one of those who objected to the treaty called the "Quadruple Treaty." It is perfectly true that I was afterwards instrumental in carrying it into effect; because it was my duty, in the situation in which I was placed at that time, to carry into effect those treaties which his majesty had entered into, whether I had originally approved of them or not. I cannot, therefore, now, disapprove of the due execution of the quadruple treaty by others; nor will I refuse my assent to the proposition that the measures which his majesty has adopted in execution of the treaty are satisfactory as far as we have any knowledge of them. If any measures should have been adopted, not already provided for in the treaty, it will be our duty to consider them calmly and dispassionately. Much discussion has taken place in other countries with respect to the course pursued by other members of this alliance, in the execution of this treaty. I must say, that so far as I am enabled to form a judgment of the treaty, (and I know nothing more than what appears on the face of the treaty itself) it seems to me that it has been fairly executed by all the parties who subscribed it. When I had the honour of serving his majesty in 1834, I was called upon to state whether the treaty in question would be carried into execution. I then stated what I understood was the meaning and scope of the treaty;--viz. that there should be no armed intervention in the internal affairs of Spain, which should tend to affect the independence of that country. That was my sense of the treaty at the time--it is my sense of the treaty at the present moment--it was so understood by the other parties to the treaty. It was the understanding of all parties that there should he no military intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. This was the understanding of the treaty, and in the month of November, 1834, this explanation was communicated and was satisfactory to the Spanish government.

I consider that the attempt by his majesty's government, aided even by the strongest power in Europe, to force upon Spain any form of government, must fail. Those who should make the attempt must take upon themselves not only the expenses of their own army in a most expensive contest, but those of the civil and military government of Spain; and they must hold their position in Spain, and defray their expenses till the new government should be settled and submitted to, and tranquillity established in the country. I should like to see how the Commons House of Parliament, or the Chamber of Deputies, would treat a proposition that should call upon them to agree to a vote of money for any such operation, for the purpose of forcibly imposing a liberal government on Spain, or on any other country. I contend my lords, that this scheme is absolutely impracticable. His majesty's ministers may rely on it, that they have undertaken that which they never can perform; and that the sooner they place themselves on the footing on which they ought strictly to stand with reference to the quadruple alliance, the sooner will the pacification of Spain, which we must all of us anxiously wish for, be accomplished. I feel, for one, the strongest objection to anything like interference with the internal affairs of the Peninsula. I object to it, not only on account of the vast expense it must inevitably entail upon this country, but still more so on account of the injury which it inflicts on the parties existing in that state. Of my own certain knowledge I can state, that the individuals composing these parties in Spain, have actually been ruined, their properties confiscated, their fortunes sacrificed, by the course which his majesty's government have pursued. Acting under the assurances of his majesty's government, individuals have adopted a certain line of conduct. They followed his majesty's government, as a party in the state. His majesty's government, thus acting, is obliged to move forward with the democratic movement The unfortunate persons I have alluded to have, in consequence, been abandoned, their fortunes sacrificed, and their prospects blighted for ever. Events like these, my lords, which affect the character as well as the influence of the country, inclined me to be more adverse to such interference than I should be on the mere score of expense. I do not mean to oppose the address, but in taking this course, I beg to be clearly understood as not holding myself bound to approve of the employment of any force beyond that stipulated for by the quadruple treaty, which treaty parliament has recognised.

_January_ 30,1837.

_The Poor Law Act has surpassed his expectation_.

My lords, I supported the bill while it was in this house; and having given that support to the bill from being a witness to the evils, and being apprehensive of the consequences likely to have attended the former system, I conceive it to be my duty to come forward on this occasion, and to state that this bill has surpassed any expectation which I had formed of the benefits likely to result from it. The bill, my lords, may require amendment in certain parts, and it appears that his majesty's government have taken measures to ascertain what points in the bill so require amendment. I, for one, am ready to pay the greatest attention to the points which may be brought under the consideration of this house. But I must say that I approve of the measure as far as it has gone hitherto, and I have witnessed its operation. I do not talk of what I have seen generally, I talk of the details of the management of the bill, from having witnessed that management in different workhouses, in different parts of the country in which I have resided; and I must say that it has been practically beneficial, and particularly in cases such as these. First of all, it has put the workman and his employer upon a true and friendly footing of confidence. Then it has connected the man of property, the man of the highest rank in his country, with the lowest class, with the labouring class, by admitting such to the board of Guardians. I can mention some noble lords, who are ornaments to this house, and who constantly attend at the weekly meetings of the guardians, being elected guardians by the parishes in the neighbourhood in which they reside. No measure could be attended with better results, and being convinced that it will effect still greater benefits, sincerely thinking so, I should be ashamed if I did not step forward, and at once avow my sentiments respecting it. I avow at once that I supported the bill at the time his majesty's ministers proposed it--that I do not repent of what I did on that occasion in so supporting it--but, on the contrary, that I rejoice in the part I then took; and I now congratulate his majesty's ministers on its success.

_April_ 7, 1837.

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_The Universities--their Education System the admiration of the World._

The working of all these colleges and of the system on which they are regulated, is for the benefit of the public; and in each and every college the object is to carry into execution the will of the founder, just as it would probably have been had he lived to this period. In every case the great object of the governing authorities is, to benefit the public by the education of the youth who resort to these institutions. The noble viscount (Melbourne) could not help admitting that these institutions have worked well, and that latterly a great improvement has taken place in the system of education pursued under their auspices. The noble viscount has also spoken of the great improvement in the system of education pursued in the new university of Durham, and in other new universities elsewhere. But, nevertheless, the noble viscount could not help admitting that the old universities of Oxford and Cambridge possess the merit of having established in England an excellent system of education, which is, in point of fact, the envy and admiration of the world.

_April_ 11, 1837.

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_The Quadruple Treaty condemned_.

My lords, I must confess that I did not approve of the original Quadruple Treaty. I considered it inconsistent with the ancient principle and the policy and practice adopted in this country with regard to Portugal, to avoid to interfere in the disputes between the two princes of the House of Braganza, which had been the policy of this country for many years. It sanctioned the introduction of Spanish troops into Portugal, which measure was inconsistent with our defensive relations with Portugal, and which had been objected to and prevented in that very contest between the rival princes of the House of Braganza. Yet it gave no fresh assistance to bring the contests in Portugal to a conclusion, excepting the promise to give the aid of this country by the employment of a naval force in co-operation with the Spanish and Portuguese troops, which aid was not necessary. Another objection which I entertained to the Quadruple Treaty was, that it mixed up France and this country in the offers and promises made to Don Carlos and Don Miguel, in the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty. These powers became, in fact, guarantees for the performance of these engagements, as well as for the performance of the engagements made under the same articles of the treaty to the subjects of Portugal and Spain. It is impossible to describe the inconvenience of such articles; they require the interference of government in hundreds of little questions. I have felt the inconvenience of those articles since their adoption; I stated my objections to them at the time, and I have seen no reason, since, to alter the opinions I then formed.

_April_ 21, 1837.

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_Effects of the Additional Articles to the Quadruple Treaty._

By the first of the additional articles to the treaty, the King of the French obliged himself to take such measures in those parts of his dominions which adjoined to Spain, as might be calculated to prevent succours of men, arms, and warlike stores being sent from France into Spain; and the King of Great Britain engaged, under the second of the said additional articles, to furnish such arms and warlike stores as her majesty the Queen of Spain might require; and further to assist her majesty with a naval force if necessary. The Duke of Braganza was to give his best assistance to serve her majesty, that he might be called upon to render. So that those additional articles were essentially different from the terms and provisions of the original treaty, by which the removal of the two princes from Portugal was effected. I do not mean to say, that, in the preamble to that treaty, allusion is not made to the affairs both of Spain and Portugal, but there still is a remarkable difference between the words used in the treaty and the additional articles; and moat particularly in relation to the part to be taken by this country.

_April_ 21, 1837.

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_The Legion and the Stock Exchange.--Impotency of our interference_.

I contend, as I have before contended in this house, that his majesty's present ministers (Lord Melbourne's government) ought not to have departed from the position which the previous administration had established while they were in power. I will not pretend to say what would have been the result of their following out that course, but this I do say, that the course pursued by his lordship's government has not benefited the military or the financial affairs of Spain, or promoted the peace of that country or the general tranquillity of Europe, or attained any of the political advantages which the noble viscount boasts have been attained by his departure from that position which the previous government had occupied and left to their successors. But, my lords, it did unfortunately happen that certain parties in this country had been connected with the Spanish finances; and it was important to those parties that the red coats should make their appearance in Spain, and that the name of "Great Britain," and of the British legion, should be mixed up in the operations of the war. Money was raised in this country to defray the expense of the equipment of the "Legion," as it was called, of 10,000 or 12,000 men, and also of their pay, their food, and maintenance, for a certain number of months; and the noble lords, in order that this scheme might be carried into execution, gave their consent to the order in council for the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The corps gathered in this country, and went to Spain, in the spring of the year 1835, nearly two years ago. Their first operation upon their arrival at St. Sebastian, was a march over the very same ground to the very spot which was the scene of the late disaster. My lords, up to that moment, the Eliot convention, as it is most honourably and justly called, had been carried into execution. It was on that day departed from on both sides, and from that day to this, I firmly believe, from all I have seen and read,--and I have read much on the subject within the last few days--there has been no certainty in the execution of that convention. Not only has there been no certainty in the execution of that convention, but, notwithstanding the millions of money that Spain has expended,--notwithstanding the blood which has been shed and the number of lives that have been lost,--I will venture to say, that the military affairs of the Queen of Spain are in a worse condition now than they were in the month of May, 1835.

The whole of the policy of the British government, therefore; all the operations of the British legion, backed by the British squadron; have effected nothing more nor less towards putting an end to the war, and giving peace to Spain and to Europe, than the removal of the blockade of St. Sebastian from one point to another, so as not to come within the liability of being affected by the 68-pounders of the British steamers, under the command of Lord John Hay.

_April_ 21,1837.

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_Uselessness of the operations of the Legion, and Lord John Hay's Squadron, at St. Sebastian_.

If the noble lord supposes that the safety of St. Sebastian had been more or less endangered by the blockade, I can assure him that he is much mistaken; for, from what I know of that fortified town, which is one of the first or second order in Europe, I can take upon myself to say that the Carlists might have been left in their original position without any danger whatever to the town, because they could not make an attack upon such a fortress. In the whole course of the war they have not, to my knowledge, taken by an attack any fortified post; or even any open town of any magnitude, prepared for its defence. They could not have distressed St. Sebastian for provisions, because its communication with the sea could not be prevented. I say, it could not be prevented, even if the whole British fleet were blockading it, instead of being there to relieve it. The amount of inconvenience felt in the town from the Carlist force being in the neighbourhood, was neither more nor less than the unpleasantness of ladies and gentlemen, residing there, being prevented taking their evening walks in the neighbourhood. This is the whole amount of the inconvenience from which the town was relieved. This was the whole amount of the service rendered.

_April_ 21,1837.

_Strictures on General Evans_.

My lords, I will go a little further. I will say, that I firmly believe that the connexion between the legion and the fleet has been injurious to the military operations of the queen of Spain's generals. That is my decided opinion, founded upon my knowledge of the nature of the country, and of the position of both parties. My lords, there is one point to which I refer; that is, the want of communication between the Queen of Spain's generals, which can be relied upon. If corps of the size of those now employed are not actually joined, there must be a certain communication between them; for, without communication there can be no co-operation; and any attempt at co-operation would, in my opinion, in all probability, lead to disasters such as have recently taken place at Hernani. How are these troops situated? General Evans's troops are at St. Sebastian; General Saarsfield is at the other side of the Borunda, at Pampeluna; and Espartero, with his army, is at Bilboa. It is impossible that there can be any communication between these three, except by the French frontier, and by sea from Socoa, or by the Ebro. An arrangement is made for an attack, and a day named. What was the consequence? General Evans made an attack, but General Saarsfield, at Pampeluna, does not attack; there is a frost or snow, or rain, or some physical impediment which prevents a movement on the part of Saarsfield. General Evans cannot be informed in time, and the enemy has opportunity and leisure to throw his whole force upon General Evans; who, even if the troops had behaved well, would have been compelled to retire. The position, therefore, of the legion at St. Sebastian, in order to co-operate with the British squadron, that there might be something like British co-operation, was not an operation of war, it was one of stock-jobbing. My lords, it is a matter of much surprise to me, that General Evans, who, having acquired the confidence of his majesty's government, and that of the Queen of Spain, I presume must be an able man--it is, certainly, a surprising circumstance, that having had experience of the difficulties of carrying on communication in that country, and having met with a check in the month of January, 1836, for want of communication, he should not have felt the danger of his position, and should have omitted to put himself in communication to a certainty with corps in whose co-operation he was to act, instead of keeping himself at a distance, in order that he might carry on operations in concert with his majesty's fleet.

_April_ 21,1837.

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_Undisciplined state of the Legion_.