Part 7

According to this mode of proceeding, subsistence will be provided for all; the public will receive some benefit from the expense which will be incurred, and, above all, it will be certain, that no able-bodied person will apply for relief, unless he should be unwilling to work for his subsistence, that none will apply who are able to work, and who are not real objects of charity; and that none will come to Ahmednuggur for the purpose of partaking of the food which must be procured by the labour, or to obtain which they must submit to the restraint of an hospital.

_Dispatch, April 11, 1804._

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_Tactics to be pursued against Predatory Troops_.

I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly, and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief; at all events the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, and they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily; the freebooter ends by having with him only a few adherents, and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting to separate, and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

_Dispatch, May 27, 1804._

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_Importance of Secresy in Public Affairs_.

There is nothing more certain than that of one hundred affairs ninety-nine might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests; but the misfortune is that where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept a secret, as a matter of course, upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view. For this reason secresy is always best; and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the habit of never making known public business of any description that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is that secresy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper.

Remember that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery; in fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any.

_Dispatch, June 28, 1804._

* * * * *

In all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps.

_Dispatch, Sept. 12, 1804._

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_Neglect of his Services in India._

In regard to staying longer (in the Deccan), the question is exactly whether the court of directors, or the king's ministers, have any claim upon me, strong enough to induce me to do anything so disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain, for a great length of time, in this country. I have served the company in important situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury from the court of directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all governments, and in communication with all the political residents, and many civil authorities; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill-temper from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted. The king's ministers have as little claim upon me as the court of directors. I am not very ambitious, and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered in the scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff in India; and yet if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

_Jan. 4, 1805._

* * * * *

I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which his own wishes are concerned.

_Feb. 3, 1805._

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_Advice to a Native Ruler in India._

Let the prosperity of the country be your great object; protect the ryots and traders, and allow no man, whether invested with authority or not, to oppress them with impunity. Do justice to every man.

_March 2, 1805._

* * * * *

Without distinction of religion every man ought to be called upon to do service to the state, wherever he is particularly qualified to do that service.

_House of Commons, May 11, 1808._

_Control of the Navy and Army._

The navy is the characteristic and constitutional force of Britain, and may therefore be governed by regulations of the legislature; but the army is a new force, arising out of the extraordinary exigencies of modern times, and from every consideration of expediency and necessity, must be left under the control of the crown.

_House of Commons, June 3, 1808._

* * * * *

_The Law-breaker always Wrong._

It frequently happens that the people who do commit outrages and disturbances have some reason to complain; but he who breaks the law must be considered in the wrong, whatever may have been, the nature of the provocation which he has received.[3]

[Footnote 3: This remark, though it applies generally, was made with respect to Ireland.]

_Ibid, July 7, 1808._

* * * * *

THE PENINSULA.

_The Battle of Vimeiro._

The action of Vimeiro is the only one I have ever been in (1808), in which everything passed as was directed, and no mistake was made by any of the officers charged with its conduct.

_Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1806._

* * * * *

_Distinction between Civil and Military Responsibility._

There is a great distinction of duty between military and civil inferior situations. If, in a civil officer, the inferior differs materially from the superior, he ought to resign, but in military appointments, it is the duty of the inferior officer to assist his commander in the mode in which that commander may deem his services most advantageous.

_Defence of his conduct with regard to the Convention of Cintra. House of Commons, Feb. 21, 1809._

* * * * *

_Rapidity of the French Retreats accounted for._

It is obvious, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments, and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress;[4] it must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same sacrifice.

[Footnote 4: Alluding to the rapidity of the French retreat.]

_Dispatch, May 18, 1809._

* * * * *

I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure.[5]

[Footnote 5: Referring to their habits of plunder.]

_Dispatch, May 31, 1809._

* * * * *

_Inefficiency of Spanish Officers._

Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army, and it is extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this nation has by the measures which it has adopted in the last two years, so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I cannot say they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception of running away, and assembling again in a state of nature.

_Dispatch, Aug. 1809._

* * * * *

_Terrorism and Force, not Enthusiasm, enabled the French Revolutionary Armies to conquer._

People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined, it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance in the same system of applying every individual and every description of property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered Europe.

_Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1809._

_The Spaniards and Portuguese want the true spirit of Soldiers._

We are mistaken if we believe that what these Portuguese and Spanish armies require is discipline, properly so called. They want the habits and spirit of soldiers--the habits of command on one side, and of obedience on the other--mutual confidence between officers and men; and above all, a determination in superiors to obey the spirit of the orders they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell the true cause if they do not.

_Dispatch, Sept. 8, 1809._

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_Importance of good understanding between Negotiating Parties._

Half the business of the world, particularly that of our country, is done by accommodation, and by the parties understanding each other, but when rights are claimed they must be resisted, if there are no grounds for them; when appeal must be made to higher powers there can be no accommodation, and much valuable time is lost in reference which ought to be spent in action.

_Dispatch, Sept. 20, 1809._

* * * * *

_Popular Assemblies unmanageable._

I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular assembly; even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and in three days, would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the example of the French revolution; and if there were not certain rules and orders for its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of which render safe, and successfully direct, its proceedings.

_Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809._

* * * * *

_Distracted State of Spain._

I declare that if I were in Buonaparte's situation, I should leave the English and the Cortes to settle Spain in the best manner they could; and I should entertain very little doubt but that in a very short space of time Spain must fall into the hands of France. At the same time I must agree with you in thinking that affairs are now in so desperate a situation that they cannot be worse; that there is a real want of men of common capacity in Spain, in whose hands any form of government, intended for vigorous action, could be placed with any hope that their powers could he used to the public advantage; and that the Cortes, with all their faults, and the dangers attendant upon such an assembly, will have at least this advantage, that they will have the confidence of the country, and the prejudices of their countrymen of the lower class in our favour, and against France; the remark being perfectly well founded, that there is no prejudice or jealousy of us any where in Spain excepting by the government.

But in order to enjoy common safety under such an assembly as the Spanish Cortes, the rules and orders for their proceedings and internal government ought to be well defined, and to be, if possible, a part of the constitution of the assembly. Great care should also be taken in their formation to protect them from the effects of popular fury in the place of their sitting; but still with all these precautions I should prefer a wise Bourbon, if we could find one, for a regent, to the Cortes.

_Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809._

* * * * *

Whatever may be eventually the fate of Spain, Portugal must be a military country.

_Dispatch, Sept. 24, 1809._

* * * * *

_Military Value of an Armed and Friendly People._

In respect to the army and armament of the people in Spain and Portugal, there is no man more aware than I am of the advantage to be derived from these measures; and if I had not reflected well upon the subject, my experience of the war in Portugal and in Spain--(in Portugal, where the people are in some degree armed and arrayed; and in Spain, where they are not)--would have shewn me the advantage which an army has against the enemy when the people are armed and arrayed, and are on its side in the contest. But reflection, and, above all, experience have shewn me the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view; and I only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training regular bodies, by any notion that the people, when armed and arrayed, will be of, I will not say any, but of much use to them.

_Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1809._

* * * * *

_Difficulties in the Peninsular War. The Battle of Talavera._

You will have heard of all that has passed in this country, and I will not therefore trouble you with a repetition of the story. The battle of Talevera was certainly the hardest fought of modern days, and the most glorious in its results to our troops. Each side engaged lost a quarter of their numbers.

It is lamentable that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the Spaniards, to their want of exertion, and the deficiency of numbers, even, of the allies, much more of discipline and every other military quality, when compared with the enemy in the Peninsula, the glory of the

## action is the only benefit we have derived from it. But that is a solid

and substantial benefit, of which we have derived some good consequences already; for, strange to say, I have contrived with the little British army to keep everything in check since the month of August last; and if the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own folly and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose an army in La Mancha about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through the contest; as it is, however, I do not despair. I have in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate myself; but I must not shrink from it, I command an unanimous army; I draw well with all the authorities in Spain and Portugal; and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances, one may fail, but it would be dishonourable to shrink from the task.

_Letter to Col. Malcome, Dec. 3, 1809._

* * * * *

_Buonaparte's System Hollow._

The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great movement on the continent for the present. Still I do not despair of seeing, at some time or other, a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent transactions in Holland shew that it is all hollow within; and that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and even the existence of civilized society, that he cannot trust even his brothers to carry it into execution.

_Dispatch, April 4, 1810._

* * * * *

_Military Law the will of the General._

Military law, as applied to any persons excepting the officers, soldiers, and followers of the army, for whose government there are

## particular provisions of law in all well regulated countries, is neither

more nor less than the will of the general of the army. He punishes either with or without trial, for crimes either declared to be so, or not so declared, by any existing law, or by his own orders. This is the plain and common meaning of the term military law. Besides the mode of proceeding above described, laws have been made in different countries at different times to establish and legalize a description of military constitution.

The commander-in-chief, or the government, has been authorized to proceed by military process--that is, by court martial or council of war--against persons offending against certain laws, or against their own orders, issued generally for the security of the army; or for the establishment of a certain government or constitution odious to the people among whom it is established.

Of both descriptions of military law, there are numerous instances in the history of the operations of the French army during the revolution; and there is an instance of the existence both of the first-mentioned description and of the last-mentioned in Ireland, during the rebellion of 1798, when the people were in insurrection against the government, and were to be restrained by force.

_Dispatch, April 19, 1810._

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_Letter to a Portuguese of Rank on the Position and Duties of Persons in his station._

I have received your letter containing a complaint against----, of the quarter-master general's department, that he had ill-treated one of your servants, into which I shall make inquiry, and let you know the result.

It is impossible, however, for me to interfere in any manner with a billet, given by the magistrates of Coimbra, for an officer and his family to be quartered in your house. I must at the same time inform you, that I am not a little surprised that a person of your rank and station, and quality in the country, should object to give accommodation in your house, and should make a complaint of this officer, that he had asked you for additional accommodation, when it appears by the letter which you enclosed, and which I now return, that when you objected to give him this additional accommodation for which he asked, he acquiesced in your objection, and did not any longer require this accommodation.

The unfortunate situation in which Portugal is placed, and the desire of the insatiable enemy of mankind to force this once happy and loyal people to submit to his iron yoke, to plunder them of their properties to destroy their religion and to deprive them of their monarch, has rendered it necessary to collect in this country a large army, in order, if possible, to defeat and frustrate the designs of the enemy. It is the duty of those whose age, whose sex, or whose profession, do not permit them to take an active part in the defence of their country, to assist those employed in its defence with provisions, lodgings for officers and troops, means of transport, &c., and at all events not to oppose themselves to the granting of this description of assistance. These duties are more particularly incumbent upon the rich and high in station, who would be the first victims of, and greatest sufferers from, the enemy's success, unless, indeed, they should be of the number of those traitors who are aiding to introduce the common enemy into the country, to destroy its happiness and independence.

Under these circumstances I am not a little astonished to receive these frivolous and manifestly unfounded complaints from you, and that you should be the person to set the example of objecting to give quarters to an officer, because he is married and has children.

It is not very agreeable to anybody to have strangers quartered in his house; nor is it very agreeable to us strangers, who have good houses in our own country, to be obliged to seek for quarters here. We are not here for our pleasure; the situation of your country renders it necessary: and you, a man of family and fortune, who have much to lose, should not be the first to complain of the inconvenience of our presence in the country.

I do everything in my power to alleviate the inconvenience which all must suffer. We pay extravagant prices with unparalleled punctuality for everything we receive; and I make it a rule to inquire into and redress every injury that is really done by the troops under my command, as I shall that to which I have above referred, of which you complain, in the conduct of----towards your servant.

_Dispatch, August 23, 1810._

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_Croaking Spirit in the British Army in Portugal_.