CHAPTER I

THE FIRST BATTALION GOES TO WAR

I. INTRODUCTORY

In the early hours of Tuesday morning the 5th August, 1914, the British Foreign Office issued this statement: “Owing to the summary rejection by the German Government of the request made by His Majesty’s Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium will be respected, His Majesty’s Ambassador at Berlin has received his passports and His Majesty’s Government have declared to the German Government that a state of war exists between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m. on the 4th August.” Thus was the British Empire officially informed that the Great War had, at last, come upon Europe. Actually the Government had given orders for the mobilization of the Army some eight hours earlier, at 4 p.m. on the 4th; so that at that hour on that day this history properly begins.

The war took Great Britain by surprise. This does not mean that England was totally unprepared for such an eventuality; though comparatively small our land forces were in a condition of readiness and efficiency never before equalled. Nor does it mean that the idea of a war with Germany was new; through many years its likelihood had been canvassed and openly speculated upon both by soldiers, headed by the veteran Earl Roberts, and politicians. But it does mean that the man in the street did not think it would come in our time, and certainly no one could see any possible connection between the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort at Serajevo on 28th June and an international war on a vast scale. The British temperament is not in its nature warlike; Englishmen do not soldier, like some, from a sheer love of soldiering. That is why the mass of the nation has always been steadily averse to conscription. In spite of warnings it was willing to take the risk, preferring quality to quantity where its army was concerned.

It is perhaps well to give here, in this introductory, in order to link up the story that is to follow with the past history of the regiment, a brief outline of the changes which went to the making of the British Army as it was at the beginning of hostilities, and the situation which led to the war.

The South African War had brought it home to the Government that the system initiated in 1871 failed to meet modern needs in certain fundamental respects. It was realized that drastic reforms were overdue; that new methods were essential. The work of reorganization was undertaken by Mr. (now Lord) Haldane, then Secretary of State for War; it was made all the more imperative by the aggressive and openly ambitious imperialism of Germany. Whilst still relying in the first instance on her naval supremacy, England could no longer think in terms of small forces fighting in far-flung corners of her mighty Empire. The danger loomed nearer home, and the possibility of a British force at grips with a foe across the narrow seas had to be faced; nay more, it had to be provided for and planned against. An agreement was made with France, our ancient enemy on many a bloody field, and the General Staffs of the two countries explored the measures necessary for the defence of the frontiers from the sea to the Vosges.

This _entente_ was little more than a friendly understanding, and so little was England under any obligation to go to the aid of France that the actual position of the British Expeditionary Force was not settled until after the outbreak of war. Whether Great Britain would have remained neutral had Germany not forced her hand by invading Belgium, cannot now be stated. What is known is that Germany believed she would remain neutral; that, harassed by the threat of civil war in Ireland and other domestic difficulties, she would content herself as a looker-on. Therein Germany made her first big mistake. She made her second when she assumed that the British Army was too negligible to be seriously considered, and that if it came into the field at all it would arrive too late to affect the issue. Germany counted on a swift and fatal thrust across Flanders at the heart of France. She underestimated British feeling upon the treaty rights guaranteeing the integrity of Belgium, and she also forgot that Britain would look upon her advent, entrenched on the Belgian coast, as an intolerable menace. Thus, as events shaped, Belgium was the tinder on which the spark was struck that lighted the war-torch in Britain.

As regards the reconstruction undertaken by Haldane great progress had been made. The Army Council had taken the place of a commander-in-chief; the Imperial General Staff had been set up; the Militia, which had been converted into the Special Reserve, was ready to train and despatch recruits as required by the regular battalions; and the Territorials were organized on the same principle as the First Line, and, although they were under strength and only partially trained, it was thought that many old Territorials would rejoin in case of war and that complete units would be able to take the field after a few months’ training. In addition, the universities and public schools had responded to the invitation to turn their units into Officers’ Training Corps and a reserve of men capable of leadership in a time of crisis had thus been created. Above all, the Expeditionary Force, consisting of six divisions and a cavalry division, was ready to move at a moment’s notice. This finely tempered weapon, this wonderful fusion of skill and discipline with British courage, this “contemptible little army” was ready to thrust or parry, wherever it might be sent and against whatever odds.

II. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Before trying to follow the history of any particular unit it is, of course, necessary to bear in mind the military proceedings as a whole. Most people have a general idea of what took place in the different theatres of war, but events are apt to be forgotten, and it may be as well before describing any particular operations to remind the reader how it came about that such operations became necessary.

On the 4th August, 1914, war was declared with Germany, and in compliance with prearranged and carefully drawn up plans that Power, having already declared war on France on the 3rd, proceeded at once to violate the neutrality of Belgium whose roads supplied the easiest way to the heart of France, and the idea was to strike that country prostrate before Russia was ready to move. It was well understood that the Russians must be slower than any of the other immediate combatants to mobilize their forces.

Thus, on the 5th August, the Germans, who thoroughly recognized the advantage of getting in the first blow, were opposite Liége and occupied that city five days afterwards, although the last fort did not fall until the 17th. On the 14th August the French, too, were in Belgium, and between the 12th and 17th the British Expeditionary Force had landed on the coast and the army was moved into position extending from Condé through Mons and Binche.

During the few days prior to the British landing the Belgians had been driven steadily backward by overwhelming forces, as also had the French; and as the British Expeditionary Force only consisted of four divisions (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th) and a cavalry division its numbers were far too small to make any very perceptible alteration in the situation. The result was a steady general retreat of all the Allies commencing on the 24th August and lasting to the 5th September, by which time the armies were behind the River Marne and in the immediate neighbourhood of Paris, and the British base had necessarily been shifted from the Channel ports to the mouth of the Loire.

A cold statement that the Great War opened with a rapid retreat conveys the truth perhaps, but not all of it. Never in its long history of adventure and heroism had the British Army covered itself with such glory. There are retreats and retreats in war. When an army runs away that disaster is described under this term, and there seems to be no other correct military expression for what happened in Flanders and France in August, 1914, though, as a matter of fact, the little army sent from these shores was fighting one long continuous battle against overwhelming odds; its artillery completely outnumbered; its infantry facing death and wounds in the most soldier-like spirit possible to any troops, quite unable to understand why the movement was backward and not forward, but resolved to a man to get some of their own back when their time came.

On the 5th September the retreat had ceased, and by this date the German Colonies of Togoland and Samoa had been wrested from them and their fleet had learnt what the British sailor was capable of, notably in the Bight of Heligoland on the 28th August.

On the 6th September the tide of war had turned on land: a general offensive by French and British troops had commenced, the Battle of the Marne begun and Paris saved.

Strictly speaking, there was no Battle of the Marne, the fighting between the 6th and 10th of September being desultory and chiefly in the nature of independent and to a great extent disconnected engagements, but the struggle or series of struggles, however described, proved, indeed, a turning point--the British crossed the river on the 9th and the Germans were in full retreat.

On the 13th the Allies recovered the important town of Soissons and forced the passage of the Aisne, on which river the enemy stood to fight, and there the combatants were still engaged on the 20th, for now the German retreat was over; on this day the British Expeditionary Force was reinforced by the British 6th Division (16th, 17th and 18th Infantry Brigades) which had landed on the 10th September, and the Buffs once more in their long history came into the presence of England’s foes.

All this time the Territorial Force was working hard to fit itself to help, and in a short time the bulk of it was sent to India to release our forces there which were promptly sent to France.

Meanwhile the new armies, whose numbers under the voluntary system were such as to fill every Englishman with pride, were straining every nerve to prepare themselves for war, and they were drafted off to the different fighting theatres as fast as they could be armed and equipped. The most wonderful fact of the early days of the war was the way that Kitchener’s appeal for recruits was answered. Thousands and thousands of quiet, peaceable citizens, who had never dreamed of anything to do with soldiering, much less of getting into uniform and themselves going off to fight, men from every rank of life, now thronged and jostled each other at the recruiting offices. They took long railway journeys at their own expense, or walked miles if they had no money, for the pleasure of standing, often for days, in queues waiting their turn to enlist. They faced the doctor with fear, hiding their disabilities, and passed the test with a sigh of relief.

What was true of England was true to an equal extent of the Colonies and oversea possessions, and the total number of soldiers raised, equipped and put into the firing line astonished ourselves almost as much as it dismayed the Germans, whose reckonings in this respect, as in all others, were completely at fault. The Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada, the Allied Regiment of Canadian Militia, was represented in several of those gallant battalions which sailed in such numbers from their shores and which did such glorious service in France and Flanders.

The story of the struggle is so long, and the Buffs fought in so many theatres and places, that the clearest and best way of describing the deeds of the regiment appears to be the division of the eventful years of 1914 to 1918 into sections, so that the story of each battalion of the regiment may appear as clearly as possible between certain approximate dates. Of course, this system must be to a certain extent elastic, for, if a fixed date happened to be one during which a particular unit was in the midst of a very particular job, it would obviously be better to finish the description of that operation before drifting off to the doings of its brother Buffs somewhere else. The doings of the ten battalions, then, which together formed the regiment of Buffs, are what the reader is invited to consider in the following pages.

III. MOVE TO FRANCE AND THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The 1st Battalion on the 4th August, 1914, was quartered at Fermoy in Ireland and the 2nd was in India. It is obvious, therefore, that as the 2nd Battalion had to come home, the 4th and 5th to complete their training, and all others to be not only trained, but raised before they could add their splendid quota to the glory of the Buffs, the story of the first period of the war up to the 17th November, 1914, must mainly concern the senior battalion of the regiment. This date is taken because it was then that the desperate attempt of the Germans to hack their way through to Calais and the Channel ports finally proved a failure, and in France and Belgium heavy, murderous and continuous fighting merged into stonewall tactics, if tactics they could be called: when each of the opposing sides dug themselves in and when the long, dull, trying period of trench warfare set in on the Western Front. Up to this date no attempt had been made to force the Dardanelles. In fact, Turkey had only become a declared enemy a very few days and Italy was still at peace.

The 1st Buffs were, as has been said, at Fermoy. Their brigade was the 16th and the Brigadier-General was E. C. Ingouville-Williams, C.B., D.S.O., himself a very well-known old Buff who, after being adjutant of the 2nd Battalion, distinguished himself as commander of a column in the Boer War and was promoted out of the regiment, as is sometimes the fate of soldiers who serve in a “slow-promotion” corps. The other battalions of the 16th Brigade were the 1st Leicestershire Regiment, 1st King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (K.S.L.I.) and the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment; it will be useful to remember the names of these battalions as they must naturally be frequently referred to in the following narrative, and they were the close and very good comrades of our men.

The history of the 1st Battalion had, up to this time and since the commencement of the war, been briefly as follows: as early as the 29th July directions had been received that certain precautionary measures were to be taken at once, and on the 4th August the order for mobilization reached the battalion at Fermoy. Almost immediately the strength was augmented by 554 reservists, many of whom were wearing the Indian Frontier and South African Medals. Thus a very fine battalion resulted. The commanding officer, Lt.-Colonel H. C. de la M. Hill, was a well-known musketry expert, and he had with him Brevet-Colonel Julian Hasler, who had distinguished himself in both the campaigns alluded to, Major E. H. Finch Hatton, who won his D.S.O. in South Africa, Major R. McDouall, who also gained a D.S.O. in the same war, and many another good officer. The sergeants were very highly trained, so much so, indeed, that nearly all the survivors were made commissioned officers within a few months of the battalion reaching the shores of France. The privates, after the great influx of reservists, were composed of brisk and energetic youngsters, keen and bold, and steady old soldiers--invaluable as a stiffening.

It proved afterwards that “the dash was all on the side of the youngsters, but the old reservists were a great backbone in holding off the German advance--in trench warfare they were excellent--in fact, they liked it.”[1]

On the 12th August the battalion left Fermoy, and after a troublous journey reached Cambridge on the 19th. As everybody knows that the song of “Tipperary” was most popular at this time in the Army, it may be interesting to note that it was first played by this battalion. It was arranged by Bandmaster Elvin for the band a year before and the score was lent to many other units. The stay at Cambridge, which lasted up to the 8th September, was beneficial in so far that it remade soldiers of the reservists whose physical condition had somewhat deteriorated during a long spell of civil life. The battalion was hospitably entertained by Christ’s College; the officers were entertained at the High Table and frequent presents of fruit, chiefly mulberries, from Milton’s Mulberry Tree, were sent to the men.[2]

On the 8th September at noon the 1st Battalion The Buffs, together with the 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment, sailed for the mouth of the Loire to which Sir John French had now transferred his base. The journey was made by rail and march after the port of St. Nazaire was reached, the train starting at dim dawn on the 11th and taking the route: Nantes, Angers, Tours, Verdun, Paris to Mortcerf, a twenty-six-hour journey. The ensuing eight days’ march was not without incident and not without discomfort, but there was excitement, too. Heavy firing was heard all day on the 12th. The first taste of outpost duty in war time came the following night. Billets were used each night, but these were not always of the best and the weather was generally execrable. The billets, which one night consisted of a cowshed, were sometimes shared with Belgian refugees, and altogether it was with a sort of relief that the real fighting line was reached at last at 2.30 a.m. on the 21st September. Vailly on the Aisne was entered and the Fifth and Royal Fusiliers relieved in the trenches at that place, A, C and D Companies being in the front line with B in reserve.

It will be remembered that the Germans, after their retreat from the Marne, were now standing fast, and that in its turn the Allied pursuit was checked upon the Aisne. The enemy knew somehow that fresh troops were now in front of them and, hoping to find an inferior article to that they had been sampling for the last month, determined to attack and try what they were made of.

The Buffs were on the left of the brigade line, on the crest of a small plateau beyond the river, and the enemy’s trenches were on the far slope, from two hundred to seven hundred yards away, with all the best of the situation because, owing to the shape of the ground, our artillery had great difficulty in aiding this particular part of the line, whereas the Germans were very closely supported by their guns. On the right was an improvised sub-section of defence consisting of the Norfolk Regiment and King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, under Colonel Hasler of the Buffs.

The attack commenced at 8 p.m., lasted for two and a half hours, and was a failure. The firing was heavy and the attempt was resolute enough, but as the locality was difficult for our guns the Buffs employed prolonged rapid fire as a substitute and succeeded in repulsing the onslaught. Major E. H. Finch Hatton, D.S.O., and Captain F. C. R. Studd were wounded in the action, two men were killed and five wounded.

The battalion remained in these trenches till the 13th October and suffered several casualties. In fact, each day added a few to the killed and wounded, and each day brought to light some good quality in the men. The first name in the regiment to be brought to notice for gallantry was No. 9967 Corpl. Randall who, himself wounded, on the 2nd October showed great courage in attending to Pte. Hamilton under fire. Hamilton, however, did not survive. The stretcher bearers, too, were proved to be a most gallant set of men--stretcher bearers always are somehow. The sight of the pain and mutilation of others seems to bring out a sort of ferocious tenderness on the part of those who protect and assist the maimed. Pte. Medway was conspicuous even amongst these devoted fellows.

Particularly heavy firing along the whole line and including reserves occurred on the 9th October. The church at Vailly was struck and ten horses belonging to the regimental transport were killed close to it. The hospital also suffered.

Early in October it appeared to Sir John French that it was advisable to withdraw the army from the Aisne and strongly reinforce the forces in the north with a view to outflanking the enemy and so making him withdraw from his position. In fact, each army at this time was trying to outflank the other, because frontal fighting, owing to the complete system of entrenchments in vogue on both sides, was found to bring no practical results. This accounted for the fact that in a very short time flanks ceased to exist, for one soon rested on the sea and the other on neutral Switzerland. French’s first attempt at outflanking was rendered abortive by the German capture of Antwerp, and so the war developed into a fierce struggle for the coast, which may be said to have commenced on the 11th October and continued till the 17th November; the enemy’s idea being to seize Calais and the Channel ports and so make up for their failure to capture Paris.

This struggle is sometimes called the Battle of Flanders, but it in reality included several fights, the chief of these being collectively described as the Battles of Ypres, 1914. Of course, the great move from the Aisne to the neighbourhood of St. Omer and Hazebrouck took time, and it was not till the 19th October that the move was completed. General Foch, whose headquarters were at Doullens, at this time commanded all French troops north of Noyon and our Commander-in-Chief had arranged with him a general wheel of troops to the right, in order to menace the German flank; this arrangement was made before the fall of Antwerp. It brought the English 7th Division to Ypres; caused heavy fighting for the 3rd Division about Givenchy, which lasted for three weeks; moved the 4th Division to the north and 6th to south of the town of Armentieres, and was the immediate cause of the flight which followed at Radinghem.

Antwerp fell on the 9th October, and this event released 90,000 enemy troops, and the Germans also at this time brought four fresh Army Corps from their Eastern or Russian front, and so the English Army and that part of the French one which was in its neighbourhood were facing greatly superior numbers. As far as the Buffs were concerned they were relieved in their trenches on the Aisne by French troops on the 12th of the month, marched to Bazoches with the rest of the 16th Brigade and there entrained for Cassel, which they reached on the 13th. The relief of the trenches at Vailly was carried out successfully, but not altogether without difficulty. The enemy seemed to have an idea of what was going on and fired a number of flares, and a searchlight was also seen. The wheels of the transport were, however, covered with straw, as was the floor of the pontoon bridge over the river, in order to deaden noise. The French took up their position very quietly and very quickly, and the battalion re-crossed the Aisne at 2.15 a.m., the last of the brigade marching by Rouge Croix and Oultersteene.

The 16th Brigade was directed to Bois Grenier on the 17th as reserve to the division. The 17th was also sent here and the 18th to Armentieres, about four miles to the north. During the morning, however, as hostile firing was heard and observed, certain alterations were made by the 6th Division by order of superior authority, and it took up and constructed a defensive position along a new line: the 17th Brigade on the left, 18th in the centre and 16th on the right from Croix Marechal to Rouge de Bout--French cavalry being on the right again.

On the 18th October the 17th and 18th Brigades advanced to ascertain what the enemy was doing about Perenchies, le Paradis and La Vallée, and to discover his strength, and in connection with this movement the 16th Brigade was ordered to send one battalion towards La Vallée and Bacquart. The Buffs were selected and the York and Lancasters were sent to Bridoux to cover their right flank. At 10.30 on this Sunday morning the Buffs debouched from Grand Flamengrie Farm with orders to seize the line of the Hameau de Bas-La Vallée road, but not to get seriously involved. B, C and D Companies deployed, with A in reserve.

IV. BATTLE OF ARMENTIERES: ACTION AT RADINGHEM

Before reaching the above line the battalion got orders to take the village of Radinghem.

Just beyond this village is a fairly high ridge or plateau on which stands the Chateau de Flandres, and there is a wood on the edge of the plateau screening the house from the village, the distance between this wood and the south edge of the village being about three hundred yards.

Brevet Colonel Julian Hasler was in command of the forward or firing line which advanced through Radinghem, seized the ridge and, pushing on, took the Chateau where severe hand-to-hand fighting occurred. But soon considerable German reinforcements coming up, the Buffs had to abandon the Chateau itself, though they still clung to the edge of the wood.

During the attack Company Sergeant-Major Brady, with nineteen men of C Company, on surmounting a piece of rising ground, suddenly found himself about two hundred yards from a German battalion in close order. Each Buff had three hundred rounds of ammunition, and one of the most beautiful displays of rapid firing ever made was the result: that particular German battalion was very quickly “put out of action,” as they say on field days. The successful attack on the Chateau de Flandres was immensely helped by Major Bayley’s company of the York and Lancaster Regiment, which had worked its way round to take the enemy in flank; so that when these men approached, the enemy had hastily to withdraw. Without a doubt the Buffs owe very much to this gallant company.

At 6.10 p.m. the situation was looking serious, but after a German counter-attack had been repulsed things became better. Then orders came to hand over Radinghem to some French cavalry and to withdraw. When the Frenchmen arrived, however, they were found to be only 130 strong, so the Buffs and York and Lancaster consolidated themselves on the south edge of the village and settled in for the night. The artillery, a mixed brigade under Lt.-Colonel Humphrey, had most nobly supported the infantry during the day. Later on, when the regiment had more experience, they found that the devotion to duty shown by the Gunners at Radinghem was quite a normal state of things with that arm, and was so looked for as a matter of course that notice was hardly taken of their excellent work, but in this, almost their first battle of the war, praise of the Gunners was in every man’s mouth.

On the 19th touch was obtained with the 18th Brigade at the railway crossing east of Bas Champs. At 3 p.m. the 16th Brigade was ordered to withdraw to Bois Grenier and to leave one battalion only at Radinghem. The consequence of this was of course that, the York and Lancaster being withdrawn, the Buffs were left alone to occupy the lines which last night had been constructed for both regiments.

The morning of the 20th opened with very heavy artillery fire from the enemy’s guns of large calibre, and then the German infantry pressed very heavily. About 2 p.m. Colonel Hasler was badly wounded,[3] and command of the front line devolved on Major McDouall. At 3 p.m. the artillery reported that the Germans were advancing along the two roads from Le Maisnil leading to Radinghem. This meant that the Buffs would probably be surrounded, as touch with the 18th Brigade and French cavalry had failed, and indeed it was ultimately found that these troops had been driven back. At 3.35 and again at 4 o’clock McDouall reported that the situation was very serious, but that he was holding on; that the machine guns were knocked out, the trench on his left hitherto held by C Company had been captured and that he was “in a tight corner.” He received orders to retire company by company, and replied that it was very difficult, but that “We will do the best we can.” At 4.50 came a message from the brigade to hold on at all costs and promising the support of two companies of the York and Lancaster. The Headquarter party of the battalion manned a barricade in the village and McDouall retired, the work being carried out in a most soldierly manner, and at 7 p.m. the promised help arrived, followed half an hour later by the brigadier himself, who ordered the front of the village to be held, unaware that both flanks were exposed. A staff officer of the division, however, shortly arrived who was acquainted with the situation, and he directed the retirement of the Buffs, which was carried out without trouble, as the enemy was not enterprising and appeared to have had enough of the battalion. At 1 a.m. on the 21st the rear guard cleared the village, and that morning Grand Flamengrie Farm was reached again and billets resumed.

In this action the Buffs lost Lieuts. J. D. Phillips, R. McDougall, M. Noott and R. S. Glyn killed, and Colonel J. Hasler and Lieuts. G. F. Hamilton, C. C. Stanfield and Orwan wounded. Of the rank and file 17 were reported killed and 62 missing, but these were undoubtedly all or nearly all killed; 57 were wounded. The regiment earned great praise for the stand it made at Radinghem, and, though it will be impossible in this history accurately to chronicle each honour and reward as conferred, it is interesting to note that on the 28th November No. 8922 Sgt. J. McNeir was awarded the D.C.M. for the gallant manner in which he brought up his platoon to the support of B Company at Chateau de Flandres, near Radinghem, on the 20th October, 1914, and that:--

“On the 20th October, 1914, at Chateau de Flandres, near Radinghem, Sergeant Forwood continued to serve his machine guns, after the officer in charge had been killed, until all the team and both the guns had been knocked out by heavy artillery, himself being wounded in five places. He crawled in and reported the situation.” Sergeant Forwood was awarded the D.C.M., and the incident is described by a General Officer, who later on commanded the 6th Division, as being typical of the fierce fighting at this time.

On the 23rd October a heavy attack developed at dawn against the Shropshire and York and Lancaster battalions and part of the line, which consisted of isolated trenches only, was rendered untenable by machine guns which the shape of the ground enabled the enemy to bring up. This attack was a very bold one and Germans were actually bayoneted in the trenches, and two hundred dead were counted opposite one of the Shropshire defences.

At one time there was a gap just east of Bridoux, caused by some of the trenches being lost and others still held, and matters were in rather a confused state, so, to clear up the situation, Lieut. G. R. Thornhill’s platoon of the Buffs, under the direction and guidance of Major Clemson of the York and Lancaster Regiment, was pushed forward from the Touquet-La Boutillerie road by some dongas running south. There appeared to be no enemy in the gap, and on approaching one of the trenches Thornhill and his men rushed forward to secure it, when he and several of his followers were shot down by a concealed machine gun. Indeed, only ten returned, bringing with them seven wounded men, but they were obliged to leave Thornhill, who was actually in the trench, and several others. Pte. Pearce made a manly effort at rescue and managed to drag Pte. Bull in, but could not reach his officer. Both A and C Companies employed the bayonet on this day, counter-attacking in front of the Shropshire and the Leicestershire trenches.

It is not so very long ago that many thoughtful army officers were of opinion that the days of the bayonet were over for ever; but then, of course, no one at all dreamed in the summer of 1914 that soldiers would again fight in iron helmets or throw grenades, and there have been many similar surprises during this war.

There seems to be no doubt that from the 23rd to the 25th of October the situation of the 16th Brigade was very critical, and indeed Br.-General Ingouville-Williams twice reported that this was the case. The reason was that the line held was not continuous and it was impossible to make it so, on account of the great number of Germans who were attacking. It was therefore resolved to construct a proper line of trenches 100 yards or so south of the Touquet-La Boutillerie road and to withdraw into it; but as, during the whole of the 23rd, the Leicestershire right flank was being enveloped, new dispositions were made by Brigadiers Williams and Congreve in consultation; they resolved that the Leicestershire should hold their trenches east of the railway and then bend back along it--a most prominent salient and with a poor field of fire, but the best that could be done till the new trenches were ready for occupation.

On the 24th October loud cheering was heard in this direction, and it was feared that the Leicestershire had been rushed, and a company of the Buffs and another of the York and Lancaster were immediately deployed to take the supposedly successful enemy in flank. Verbal reports came in during the morning to Brigade H.Q. at La Touquet that the Leicestershire battalion had been forced to retire, that some posts had been surrounded and that no officers were left. This account, however, fortunately proved to have been exaggerated. The enemy had, in fact, made a small gap in the line, occupying the railway, but the good old battalion from Leicestershire had quickly closed it and, though it had suffered severely, it still held its own and was moreover in touch with the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry.

On the 25th the withdrawal of the whole brigade to the newly made trenches which had been carefully prepared was carried out without a hitch, but in most unpleasantly wet weather.

The student, interested in the tactical movements of military forces, rarely thinks of weather and other little details, but to the poor suffering soldier weather, punctual or fairly punctual delivery of rations (not forgetting the rum), baths, clean clothes, nature of shelter by day and night, and even the phases of the moon seem almost of more importance than the chance of a few casualties.

C.S.M. Stone and Sgt. Stock had been highly complimented during these last few days, as was Corpl. Marsh for his good reconnoitring work; but this occurred to the N.C.O.’s and men of the Buffs so frequently from 1914 to 1918 that it is impossible to refer to all acts of devotion and gallantry. It may well be noted, however, that on the 25th October C Company was resolutely attacked, the enemy getting within seventy yards of their trench, and that Captain E. B. Chichester showed all the gallantry of his English ancestry, cheering on his men and showing a noble example till he fell mortally wounded. D Company gallantly repulsed German attacks at 8 and at 9 o’clock and then retired to a prepared position in rear. The Buffs’ casualties this day were Captain Chichester and Lieut. Stock killed, Lieuts. R. W. Homan and Child wounded, five other ranks killed, twenty wounded and two missing.

About this time the discovery seems to have been made that officers could be supplied not only from civilians in England, but from highly trained, very gallant and thoroughly reliable non-commissioned officers, who were daily adding to their war experience; so Company Sergeant-Majors (C.S.M.) Nesbit and Stone, Sgts. Corrall, Stock and Orwin, and a little later on Company Quarter-Master Sergeant (C.Q.M.S.) Sayer, C.S.M. Kesby, C.S.M. Price, and Sgts. King, Hallan and Harris were promoted to be 2nd Lieutenants. Most of them, alas, were sent out of the regiment, which was a great blow, but of course the needs of the Army as a whole must always be the first consideration.

[Illustration: RADINGHEM]

On the 5th November the death took place of Major-General R. G. Kekewich,[4] C.B., Colonel of the Buffs; General the Right Honourable Sir Arthur Paget,[5] P.C., G.C.B., K.C.V.O., was appointed to succeed him.

On the 15th November Colonel H. C. de la M. Hill, the commanding officer, was invalided home and Major McDouall temporarily took over the battalion. This was the first of a long series of changes in the command, which was the common fate of all units.

After the very strenuous attack by the Germans had died away the 1st Battalion had a longish spell of comparative quiet. Casualties, which in one of our frequent minor wars would have made a stir, were of regular occurrence and almost taken for granted; the records show almost every day something like two killed and five wounded, and drafts to replace these good fellows were fairly often arriving from England. Later on the relief of units actually in the trenches by others in rear occurred at short intervals, but it may be noted here that on the 24th November the Buffs, when relieved by the Shropshire Light Infantry, had been no less than four weeks and six days in the front line, east of Bois Grenier.

During the winter the wet weather, followed by frosts, caused the sides of the trenches to fall in, and the low-lying nature of the country made it impossible to drain them properly; so it was decided, as a temporary measure, to abandon the ditches themselves and build and man breastworks in lieu. These were generally placed just in rear of the old works so that the latter could be reoccupied when the weather improved.

Of course, the long, dull and dreary trench warfare was not entirely without incident. A poem by Captain C. W. Blackall[6] describes in graphic verse how one of the ration carriers being a little late in slipping into the safety of the trench was bowled over by the enemy and was at first supposed to be dead, but he managed after a while to crawl in somehow and in spite of his agony he brought in his sack of bacon with him. That is the sort of spirit which, when it animates everyone in an army, renders that force absolutely unconquerable. It has often been the same. On the Indian frontier once a Buff soldier was apparently killed. Someone bent over him to take any possible last message. The man was in agony and shot in the stomach, but he could just speak. “Where’s my bloody rifle?” was all he said.

On St. George’s Day, 1915, the enemy had the audacity to stick out a flag at their sap head and on it was inscribed the words “Gott strafe England.” 2nd Lieut. Corrall, Sergt. Vigors and Pte. Russell disapproved of this, as showing an improperly defiant attitude, so they crept out and triumphantly brought it in with them.

The Army Commander, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, inspected the battalion in the spring and was much struck with the smart turn-out. Such is custom and the result of training and education. The Buffs must be smartly turned-out, and conditions and circumstances have nothing to do with the matter.

It was on the 3rd May that the 1st Battalion and the rest of the 16th Brigade first heard of the German gas attacks, which occurred north-east of Ypres and to which reference will be made in the next chapter. Precautionary measures were taken, but the second battle of Ypres did not greatly affect the troops so far south of the town as was the 6th Division, but about 1,500 shells fell into Armentieres on the 6th May. On the last day of this month a move was made to the neighbourhood of Bailleul and Poperinghe--the village of Wittenhoek, four miles south of the latter town, being the Buffs’ billet.

On the 2nd June it so happened that the 2nd Battalion, whose adventures are now to be related, were in Poperinghe, and so, in the nature of things, a meeting, which will be referred to later, had to be arranged.

It must be remembered in reading the foregoing pages, and indeed in studying the next chapter also, that the enemy was, during the last quarter of 1914 and early in the next year, making a well-organized and very determined attempt to gain Calais and the coast of the English Channel, and that enormous masses of men were devoted to this effort, as well as artillery vastly superior in weight of metal to that which our side could then by any possibility bring to bear. The English lines of communication ran across the Channel, and it is a maxim of war that if such lines are lost the army that relies on them must either win an overwhelming victory or surrender. If Calais had been won by the Germans the connection between England and her armies would have been to a great extent severed, for how could reinforcements, munitions and necessaries daily cross the Channel under heavy and continuous fire, and repeated and constant attacks from submarine bases?

At Radinghem and at Ypres then, our regiment was helping to defend England from a dreadful and unprecedented disaster, and Men of Kent must further consider that to a certain extent, at any rate, the Buffs were, more than any other regiment, defending their own homeland, for if hostile batteries of modern long-range guns could have been planted on Cape Gris Nez, not only would Dover harbour and dockyard have been destroyed, but, knowing the Germans as we do now, we may be pretty certain that Hythe, Folkestone, Sandgate and perhaps Deal would soon have been in as ruinous a condition as were, a little later, Rheims, Arras and Ypres.

Leaving the 1st Battalion for a while doing its duty in the neighbourhood of Poperinghe, we will now turn our attention to the story of the 2nd Battalion from India.