CHAPTER IX

PALESTINE

I. FORMATION OF 10TH BATTALION

At the commencement of the year 1917 another battalion was added to the Buffs and from that time onward took a very interesting and important part in the fighting done by the regiment. The first deeds of arms accomplished by this, the 10th Battalion, were in Egypt and Palestine, and it may be as well to state baldly what had been happening in this region from the commencement of the war till the end of the year 1916 and to explain then how the 10th Buffs suddenly came into existence, as they did, on Egyptian soil on the 1st February, 1917.

As early as November, 1914, the Turk, who claimed to be the suzerain of the Land of Egypt and had always been jealous of the practical governorship exercised by the English, had advanced in considerable force on the Suez Canal; and perhaps it was only the arrival in the country, soon afterwards, of strong Australian and New Zealand contingents which had enabled the somewhat meagre garrison to hold its own. Even as it was the enemy had made a determined attempt to cross the Canal in February, 1915, and only retired from its neighbourhood in the following April.

Sir Archibald Murray was appointed to the supreme command in December, 1915, and Sollum, on the sea coast, something over two hundred miles west of Alexandria, was occupied in March, 1916, because of a troublesome tribe in those parts called the Senussi, who had been egged on by our enemies to make themselves a nuisance and who had to be dealt with. In August, 1916, the Turks had attacked at Romani, near the sea and a few miles east of the Suez Canal, but they had been badly beaten, and in September had withdrawn further along the coast to El Arish. On the 21st December the British occupied El Arish and two days later Magdhabar. They also carried the Turkish position at Rafa, near the coast and on the frontier of Egypt and Palestine, on the 9th January, 1917. To follow up these successes and advance on Gaza was now Sir Archibald Murray’s plan of campaign, and the army under his command was carefully prepared and reorganized for the adventure.

There was at this time in Egypt a considerable quantity of dismounted Yeomanry, dismounted simply because of the paucity of horses, and it was determined to form of them the 74th Infantry Division, consisting of the usual number of infantry brigades and infantry battalions, and working entirely on infantry lines, excepting for certain slight matters such as the use of trumpets instead of bugles and the like.

Every decent soldier is proud of the arm to which he belongs and which he deliberately joined of his own free will on enlistment or enrolment, and it is hard on him to ask him to serve in any other, but it has sometimes to be done, and it has been proved once and again that an Englishman of pluck, spirit and average intelligence can serve his country and serve it well under any circumstances. In the Boer War, for instance, thousands of foot soldiers had to take over horses and act as mounted men. In the same campaign, after the Boers had lost their artillery, many of our gunners were formed into battalions of infantry. In the Great War hundreds of all arms took to fighting in the air, and, if the navy wanted them, soldiers would man submarines to-morrow. As a matter of fact, soldiers have in the old days served on the fleet in the capacity of marines. It being recognized, then, that if at any time there be a surplus of one kind of soldier and a deficit of another, that surplus will easily be taught to fight in other guise than he has been trained to do, the bulk of the Yeomanry in Egypt changed on the 1st February, 1917, into infantry soldiers. The county ideas and associations were respected as much as possible, and so it came about that the Royal East Kent Yeomanry then at Sollum was amalgamated with the West Kent (Q.O.) Yeomanry quartered at Matruh, a coast town about 125 miles west of Alexandria; they became the 10th Battalion of the Buffs, under the command of Major A. O’B. ffrench Blake, who was appointed Lt.-Colonel in the absence, due to sickness, of Lt.-Colonel Lord Sackville. The strength of the battalion was 46 officers and 875 other ranks; A and B Companies were men of the East Kent, and C and D West Kent Yeomanry. A period of intensive infantry training now commenced. The 10th Battalion formed part of the 230th Brigade and 74th Division. The other battalions of the brigade were made from the Sussex, Suffolk and Norfolk Yeomanry and became battalions of the same county regiments.

Early in March the battalion moved to Sidi Bishr, near Alexandria, the move taking no less than thirteen days to accomplish, and here the battalion was equipped. Drafts of 2 officers and 140 men joined on the 16th March and these were nearly all Buffs, no fewer than 64 with previous war service. Thus came into being the 10th Battalion of the “Old Buffs.”

Its earlier history is as follows: at this time the Eastern Force under Lt.-General Sir Charles Dobell was concentrated about El Arish, through which the railway ran, on the northern coast of the Sinai Peninsula; whilst the Desert Column, under Lt.-General Sir P. Chetwode, was at Sheikh Zowaid about twenty miles further up the coast towards Palestine. This column was very strong in mounted men, and some of them were in advance of Sheikh Zowaid covering the further construction of the coast railway line, which was being pushed on towards Rafa, the frontier town of Egypt and Palestine. Murray’s plan was to advance slowly and steadily up the coast, moving troops forward just as fast as the railway could be made to supply them. The railhead, by the 16th March, was at Rafa, and now it became necessary to hold the great Wadi[18] Ghuzze in order to protect what had been constructed. The enemy occupied the ground from Gaza through Sheria to Beersheba. Though the Buffs did not arrive on the scene of conflict at Deir el Belah till the 11th April, it is as well to state here that in March an attempt was made on the town of Gaza, and on the 26th of that month it was actually enveloped; but our mounted troops could not keep the field for want of water and had to retire across the Wadi Ghuzze while the enemy was pouring in reinforcements from the north and north-east, so that a second attempt met with such strong opposition that the whole force retired over the Wadi and took up a strong defensive position.

II. SECOND BATTLE OF GAZA

The next attempt was arranged to commence on the 15th April and was to consist of two stages: the first object being the occupation of Sheikh Abbas and the ridge south of Gaza; then, these points being held, careful arrangements in every detail were to be made and a supply of water organized. Meanwhile, however, the enemy was getting stronger every day, not only in numbers but in the development of his fortified line. Gaza itself became a very important fortress. On the 15th April the Buffs were ordered on outpost duty to take a line just north of the Wadi Ghuzze, and the next day came battle orders and company commanders went out to reconnoitre the position for the Second Battle of Gaza.

From Sheria to Gaza is sixteen miles and the enemy was in force the whole distance. The 52nd and 54th Divisions were told off to seize what was known as the Abbas Ridge and the 74th (Yeomanry) Division was detailed as General Reserve; therefore at 1.15 a.m. on the 17th our brigade left its bivouac and reached its battle position at 4 a.m. The ridge was taken shortly after with very little opposition, and the remainder of the day and the whole of the 18th were devoted to consolidating what was won and preparing for further advance by the 52nd Division on the left and the 54th on its right, which was to be aided by a containing attack by cavalry. The work was carried out according to plan, and the task set the troops was found to be a very difficult one. The casualties were heavy, particularly in the case of the 54th Division. The cavalry attacked at dawn and achieved success, but only one brigade of the reserve (74th Division) was utilized this day and our battalion, bivouacked in a barley field, had merely to watch the cavalry action in progress.

As a net result of the fighting the 54th Division had advanced as far as possible without exposing the flank which rested on the 52nd, but the latter had found such extremely broken ground, which was occupied by so many nests of machine guns, that its progress had been stayed and another day’s fighting seemed to be a necessity. Orders were therefore circulated that all ground was to be maintained with a view to the renewal of the attack the following morning, namely, the 20th April, but it appeared that Sir Archibald Murray changed his mind, on the strong representation of General Dobell that the prospect of success was not sufficient to justify the great number of casualties bound to occur. So slow, deliberate trench warfare was decided on until more reinforcements should arrive, and, on the 23rd, the Buffs occupied a line in Wadi Ghuzze in the neighbourhood of Tel el Jemmi, and then commenced a long period of trench digging saddened by the inevitable conclusion that the great victory, which had been confidently expected and greatly looked forward to, had failed to eventuate.

The heat was now becoming intense; that scourge of the country, the hot Khamseen wind, was blowing, work was hard and, what was worse than anything else, water was scarce. However, after a few days, a move was made to Shellal and Hisea, still in the Wadi, and here more water was found and men could indulge in a wash. For a considerable period the digging of trenches was proceeded with, amidst all sorts of trials and troubles: the heat grew fiercer and fiercer as the season advanced; and, with the heat, animal life in the shape of scorpions, lice, flies, mosquitoes and spiders flourished and multiplied exceedingly. Wadi Nukahbir runs from near Sheikh Abbas into the great Ghuzze Wadi at Sheikh Nebhan, and there are many tributary Wadis to Nukahbir. These smaller nullahs received from our army the names of the tribes of Israel in order to distinguish them, and the next move of the Buffs, which took place on the night of the 27th May, was to the Wadi Levi, which is close to Sheikh Abbas, and from this centre working parties were sent out day and night to improve the front-line trenches or make elaborate redoubts in the second line of defence. During the stay in this Wadi the battalion suffered a good deal from sickness, there being many cases of scarlet fever and diphtheria; also nearly everybody developed boils and blains. It was discovered later that the dug-outs occupied had been previously inhabited by men suffering from the more serious complaints, but the sores were directly attributable to the want of vegetables owing to the difficulties of transport. It has nearly always happened in war time that septic sores have broken out amongst the soldiers and it has always been from the same cause. Lack of transport meant amongst many other things lack of vegetable food, and this in its turn means corruption of the human blood.

On the 28th June, 1917, General Sir Edmund Allenby, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., took over from Sir Archibald Murray the supreme command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, and the principal result of this was, to the Buffs, that their long period of hard digging work was very soon changed to one of strenuous training. On the 9th July the battalion left Wadi Levi and marched to a reserve area, and there, after a few days’ refitting and rest, commenced the practice by day and night of attacks over open country together with some musketry. On the night of the 7th August the battalion marched to the sand dunes two miles south-west of Belah for field firing, and, after another move to the hills above Belah, the 5th of September found the Buffs commencing to dig again, the work being done at night at a point near where the Wadi Ghuzze joins the sea and where sea bathing made a very welcome change in the mode of life. Signs and tokens were at this time becoming more and more noticeable that, as the hot summer was nearing its limit, the new Commander-in-Chief had been arranging for some active and energetic war business against the enemy and that a fighting period was coming with the autumn. As a matter of fact, Allenby had early determined to postpone his great operations till the cooler season. The Turkish front extended from what was now the fortress of Gaza as far as Beersheba. There were well-fortified localities all along this line, which was thirty miles in length. This was a considerable extent to hold, but the lateral communications were good, and help and reinforcements could be comparatively easily brought to any particular point on the front which might be threatened by the English.

Water was Allenby’s trouble. He could not keep the field without it and it affected his whole plan of campaign. No stroke at all could be effected without long and careful preparations for the necessary supply of water, and no preparation, however careful, could make that supply anything but a meagre one. A pipe-line 147 miles long brought up what was actually necessary from the Land of Egypt as far as the Wadi, whence it was camel-borne to the troops. There was, however, water at Beersheba and the general determined that it should be his. He would make a tremendous demonstration, in which the fleet would co-operate, opposite Gaza and cause the enemy to believe that he was determined to take that place. Then, while this great feint held the Turks’ attention, he would strike resolutely at Beersheba on his other flank. There were great difficulties in the way. There were no roads, which meant that pack animals must carry all necessary stores, and the country was so cut up by Wadis that even to move these camels and mules became a very considerable difficulty. The railways were improved: the coastal line was pushed on to Khan Yunos; another was made from Dera Belah to a point on the Wadi Ghuzze, and a new one as far towards Beersheba as was safe. The men were carefully trained to exist on as little water as possible and to march with empty water-bottles. Operations were to commence on the 31st October, and cavalry was to make a wide turning movement and come down on Beersheba from the north and north-east.

III. THIRD BATTLE OF GAZA

On the 25th October the march south-eastward commenced. It was carried out by moonlight, and the fourth night brought the Buffs, together with the bulk of the division, to El Khasif and on the night of the 30th into their battle position. The march was a memorable one. The ground varied but was always open, so that movement in line was easy, and the moon was always shining. The operation seems to have been a triumph of staff work, and all the units slipped into their allotted positions for the attack that was to follow without a hitch of any kind. Khasif was some six miles from the Turkish lines, and, after a quiet day there, the 230th Brigade moved off at night and got into the places from which it was to attack at dawn.

The following description of what followed is given by one who was there: “We reached our jumping-off point about midnight, and at 4 a.m. on the 31st the advance began with B and C Companies, the unit on our right being the 25th Royal Welch Fusiliers and on the left the 12th Norfolks. Our objective being Z.6 Z.7 works. This position consisted of a line of trenches cut in white lime-stone rock, cleverly sited on the forward slope of a steep gully. A communication trench ran back into sloping ground in the rear and the wire was about seventy to one hundred yards down the sloping front. The leading waves of B and C Companies came under heavy shrapnel fire almost directly they started and the battalion suffered about sixty casualties, but, by continuing their advance and making use of the dead ground, they reached Hill 960, which was about one thousand two hundred yards from their objective. It became necessary to bring D Company into the line to fill a gap caused by the brigade on the right being drawn away. About 10 a.m. the 60th Division, who were on the right of the 74th, took Point 1070, and at 12.30 the final attack on Z.6 works was begun and, after a fierce fight, the position was captured. An intensive bombardment had previously been concentrated on the wire, but it was found to have been very ineffectual. By 1.30 the outpost line had been thrown out east of the captured positions and there the men remained for the night. It had been a very long and trying day’s fighting in the hot sun and wearing heavy packs and winter serges, which had been issued two days before the advance.”

* * * * *

In this Third Battle of Gaza 9 men were killed and Lieuts. Garle, Haughton, Hollom and Stockdale, 2nd. Lieuts. Aylward and Maddick, with 98 men, were wounded, 4 missing, 2 got shell-shock and 2 received injuries owing to the rough nature of the ground; 122 casualties in all. On the evening after the fight, news came that Beersheba had fallen.

On the 1st November the battalion bivouacked in Wadi Saba and were busied with salvage work, and on the next day at a public parade for the presentation of medal ribands, Corpl. Webb of D Company got the Military Medal. In the afternoon a march northward commenced, and on the 3rd November the battalion relieved the left unit of the 229th Brigade on outpost line in the vicinity of El Muweileh, which it held for a day, during which a half-hearted Turkish attack was easily repulsed and large bodies of troops were observed moving north and north-east.

During this period the scarcity of water was very severely felt and men and animals were suffering badly, as the Khamseen was blowing and all water had to be carried fifteen miles by camel. The available supply of the necessary fluid at Beersheba had been found to have been exaggerated by report and to be inadequate to sustain for long a large force in the field. This fact greatly influenced the Commander-in-Chief in his plans and determined him to attack Sheria on the 4th or 5th of November, and Gaza forty-eight hours earlier--this latter operation being in the nature of a feint rather than a determined attempt at capture.

At 5.30 p.m. on the 5th November, therefore, the battalion received orders to go forward, take up an outpost line previously held by another unit and then advance one thousand yards before dawn. There were no landmarks in the region and no points on the map which could be identified, and the greatest difficulty was found in complying with instructions. A guide was supposed to be provided, but when, after some trouble, he was found he said he only knew his way to his own brigade headquarters and from these to the outpost line. Notwithstanding these troubles the battalion got into position ready for the coming advance by 3 a.m. on the 6th, but this was not the case with the units on either flank. Finally, the Buffs started their advance, the objective being a Turkish trench reported very lightly held, but after proceeding about five hundred yards, they came under a tremendous fire from a somewhat unexpected quarter. A fierce fight ensued and the Suffolk and Sussex men were pushed up into our line to reinforce it, with satisfactory results, and that portion of the Sheria defences was captured, after which, while the others pushed on, the Buffs were withdrawn into reserve in Wadi Union only to be ordered out again at 3 p.m. to fill a gap between two brigades away to the left. The pace of the attack throughout the day had been abnormally fast and the men suffered considerably from thirst. That evening the battalion took up an outpost line on the Wadi Sheria, and, just before dawn, a tremendous bombardment and explosion was heard from the town which announced that the capture of the place was complete. The casualties to the Buffs on the 6th November were fortunately very slight, but Lieut. R. W. Mitchell was severely wounded and subsequently died of his injuries. The same day the Turks evacuated Gaza.

On the 10th November the Buffs moved back to Kharm and on the 17th to Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzze, the reason being that the transport of the 74th and another division had to be taken away to keep the cavalry and the 53rd Division in contact with the defeated enemy; so the remainder of the force had to be near the railway. Lists of decorations for Beersheba and Sheria were made public on various dates, and the following were awarded to the Buffs: Military Crosses to Captain D. S. Campbell and Lieuts. J. A. S. Aylward and M. G. Haughton; the Distinguished Conduct Medal to Sgt. D. G. Turner; and Military Medals to Sgt. L. G. Betts, L.-Corpl. W. Timmins, Ptes. C. Hughes, D. O. Melrose, H. Scott, H. Tidcombe and G. A. Wiles. Another move on the 18th took the battalion to the neighbourhood of Gaza for salvage work, and on the 23rd came orders for a march to the north.

The general situation, while the Buffs had been without transport at Kharm and Gaza, had developed considerably. Although the enemy made attempts to stand, it was necessary for his right flank to retire rapidly from Gaza, so much so that as early as the 9th November we had troops at Beit[19] Duras with supports at Mejdel, and as the enemy’s left flank was retreating towards Hebron, it became a case of direct pursuit by as many troops as could be fed and watered away from the railhead. There existed water, but in deep wells, and it takes much time to draw water from such. This is easily understood if one considers the actual number of seconds or minutes it takes to draw a bucket up two hundred feet. If that bucket is drunk by a cavalry horse it will be found that by the time the five hundredth animal or so of a cavalry unit is watered, the first is thirsty again. The Turkish forces were mostly supplied by the railway that comes from the north to the junction for the Jerusalem line, which is about nine miles south of El Ramle, and Allenby’s object now was the capture of this junction.

About the 11th November the Turks appeared to be making a final effort to save Jerusalem, which is a sacred city to them. The resistance about the Wadi Sukerier was considerable and the Hebron wing of the enemy’s forces moved towards Beit Jibrin to get more into touch with their brethren, so that by the 13th the enemy was facing west along the twenty-mile space between El Kubeibe and Beit Jibrin. Here they were resolutely attacked on the 13th November and the junction was occupied the following day, the enemy’s army being cut in two, one part retreating north and the other east through the hills towards Jerusalem, in which direction the Turk was energetically followed up, all going very well until the 23rd of the month, on which date came a check. By this time our troops, namely, those of the British forces which could be provided for in the field, were very close to Jerusalem, the main objective being the road to Nablus. Beit ur el Tahta was in our hands as well as Kuryet el Enab to the south of it. Some Yeomanry had got within four miles of the Nablus road, but were stopped by strong opposition about Beitunia. On the 21st November a body of infantry was on the ridge where stands Nebi Samwil, about five miles north-west of the city. On the 23rd and 24th the Turks held a position west of the Nablus road which was gallantly attacked by the British, but without success. The road itself proved the deciding factor in the struggle, because the enemy not only brought up his guns and machine guns by it, but used it as an artillery position, whereas our people were on very rough ground and had no road at all. And so it came to pass that a pause in our hitherto triumphant progress became apparently necessary. The army must be organized and preparations made and completed for further efforts. Also reliefs must be brought up, and thus, as has been said, the Buffs, who were as far back as the Wadi Ghuzze, got orders to move to the north. The journey was done by Mejdel, Nahr Sukerier, Junction Station and Latrun to Beit Nuba, which was reached on the 29th November. The sixty-miles’ march was accomplished in six days.

It is between the two latter places that the mountainous region commences and marching becomes climbing, for Jerusalem stands very high and the approaches to it are by no means a gradual ascent. At Beit Nuba the battalion was employed on road-making to enable the guns to move, the result of the Buffs’ labour being known as the New Kent Road. By the 4th December Allenby had completed his final preparations and a line was held from Kustol by Nebi Samwil Ridge, Beit Izza and Beit Dukka to Beit ur el Tahta, the Buffs moving to Kubeibeh on the 6th December. On this day the rains broke and fell consistently and determinedly for three days and three nights, rendering roads almost impassable for camel transport, so that the battalion was put on one-third rations. Observation was most difficult; the bivouacs were soaked and comfort for the time being abolished. The morning of the 8th December was fixed upon for the grand attack, and during the previous night the troops moved into their positions of assembly to take their share in the Battle of Nebi Samwil.

IV. BATTLE OF NEBI SAMWIL

The 230th Brigade was at dawn to attack some high mountains close to Nebi Samwil: the Buffs and the Norfolks in the first line, with the 229th Brigade on the right of the Buffs. To reach the position it was found necessary to move in single file down the slippery slopes of a great Wadi, and this made the keeping of touch extremely difficult and the subsequent proper deployment no simple matter. A battalion in single file in a difficult country will tail out to almost any length. However, all was well, the job was done and the men deployed along the lower slopes of the great hill, C Company on the right and A Company on the left--the ground in their front being almost precipitous. However, the first wave of troops got half-way up the slope before the dawn broke and the Turk took in the situation. Then he opened heavily with machine guns and snipers, both very well concealed. C Company being a good deal exposed, suffered somewhat severely; but A Company was fairly well covered by a spur, and the 229th Brigade on the Buffs’ right was still more fortunate and was able to push on more rapidly, so that the enemy, fearful for his flank, withdrew and our people successfully occupied his trenches. No further advance was now possible for some hours, as a tremendous fire was brought to bear against the assailants. An attempt was made before dark, as it was incorrectly reported that the left flank of the brigade was secured by a successful advance of the 231st Brigade, but this force had in reality failed to clear the whole of the hill, and consequently the renewed attack of the 230th was held up till dusk by a sweeping machine-gun fire. A miserable night was the sequel of this fight: practically no rations, and pouring rain. In the morning the Sussex Regiment moved through the Buffs and continued the advance, only to find that the enemy had abandoned the place during the night. This manœuvre seems to have been a favourite one of the Turkish forces both in Palestine and Mesopotamia and one at which they were adepts. At the top of the hill the British troops got their first view of Jerusalem. By this time the London troops and the Yeomanry had got across the Nablus road four miles north of the city, and Welshmen were across the Jericho road to the east of the town. Jerusalem was isolated; and about noon on the 9th December the Holy City surrendered. Two days later Sir Edmund Allenby officially entered the place. The casualties of the Buffs at Jerusalem were 14 men killed and 1 officer and 42 other ranks wounded. Directly after the fall of Jerusalem, while at Beit Iksa, the 230th Brigade lost its commander, General McNeill, who was taken to hospital with malaria.

[Illustration:

_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_

GENERAL ALLENBY ENTERS JERUSALEM]

On the 13th December the Buffs took over the outpost line between Nebi Samwil and Beit Hannina, and this period will be difficult to obliterate from the memories of those who were serving, because the advance of the armies had now far outstripped that of the railway line and by this time the winter rains had set in in earnest. The Wadis, which were practically the only means of communication, were streaming with mud and water, making the country in the vicinity impossible for camel transport, with the immediate result that food grew very scarce and the soldier had to exist on half rations, while tobacco, cigarettes and matches ran out altogether. The state of things is thus described by a member of the regiment: “Only those who have been through it could realize the awful days and nights which the transport men and camels spent trying to get up ammunition and supplies. The camels falling down at every turn and preferring to die rather than get up again, while the natives in charge of them wrapped themselves in their blankets and howled through the night like a pack of dogs, and many of these too died.” Donkeys were tried, but without much success. The donkey is a very hardy beast, but the majority of these came from the warmer parts of Egypt and they did not thrive.

The military situation in Palestine after Jerusalem became ours was simply that the portion of the Turkish army, which had retreated northwards after our capture of the junction railway station, was now halted on the hills north of Jaffa and Ramle, faced by our 21st Corps, while the 20th Corps held a position covering the Nablus and Jericho roads about four miles to the northward and eastward of the city. To provide for the security of Jerusalem and of Jaffa it was necessary for these two army corps to advance, and, to enable such an advance to be successfully carried out, it was necessary first to undertake an abnormal amount of road-making as well as to make important arrangements for the organization of the supply of food, ammunition and all the various military requisites. The 21st Corps moved north and, supported by the fleet, crossed the Nahr el Auja north of Jaffa--a difficult job, well carried out. The 20th Corps was employed meanwhile in minor operations. Thus on the 18th December the 60th Division, on the right of the 230th Brigade of the 74th, attempted an advance, and at 6.15 a.m. A Company of the Buffs went out in support of the movement; but the thing was a failure, the Turk having evidently been quite aware of what was going forward and having made all due preparations; in fact, A Company had some difficulty in withdrawing, but happily the casualties were light. But road-making was the usual fate of the Buffs at this time and the men had long since become experts at the business. There was no work done on Christmas Day, but up till then the roads claimed much labour. The 25th itself was one of the wettest days yet experienced and there were only half rations; but singing seems to have kept the soldier from feeling his hardships too acutely, and Boxing Day saw the Buffs in the outpost line again.

V. DEFENCE OF JERUSALEM

Now at this time the enemy had conceived it possible that on account of our supposed despair at the shortage of rations and difficulty of transport it would be possible by a resolute attack to recover possession of Jerusalem, which is a place as sacred to Mahommedans as it is to Jews or Christians, and so, on the night of the 26th/27th December, John Turk marched resolutely southwards, astride the Nablus road, until he came up against the 60th Division, who refused to make way, and the enemy soon found himself resolutely counter-attacked by the 10th Irish Division, which was on the left of the 20th Corps. The struggle lasted three days, for the enemy also attacked the 53rd Division to the east of Jerusalem, and it was quite evident that the operation was not a minor affair by any means, but had been carefully prepared and planned out and was being determinedly attempted. By noon on the 27th, however, the great counter-attack made by the 74th and 10th Divisions, which was launched at 6.30 a.m., had made itself felt, and on the following day, this counter-offensive continuing, the 230th Brigade, Buffs included, of course, was pushed up the centre of the line towards Ram Allah. Fortunately the day was fine and dry. At first this forward movement took the Buffs up the valley and the battalion was in artillery formation, but, later on, broken and rocky ground was experienced again until there came a rest as darkness fell, and the men sat down and made preparations for some food. Very soon, however, came orders to advance in line on Ram Allah, taking direction from the 60th Division on the right. The companies were somewhat scattered, and in the stony country with a night as black as pitch it was a terrible job for the runners to discover the several companies and for them to come back into touch with battalion headquarters. There were no paths or tracks and the map was useless. As one who was out that night remarked, “If you take a line to march on and then bark your shin on a rock, next have to circumvent a boulder and immediately afterwards fall into a bog, you are apt to lose your direction.” The Buffs stumbled about till they reached a large marshy valley, where they came across the Royal Sussex and learnt that the division was resting close by with no intention of going on to Ram Allah that night; so an outpost line was thrown out and the men lay down till dawn. About 8 o’clock next morning an advance was made straight across a most tremendous country of vine terraces and walls, and, with but little opposition, A and D Companies got into the town, a filthy place on the brink of another precipice. On the top of the hill opposite to it the Turks had several machine guns and snipers posted and they now began to show some activity, the Sussex Regiment coming under a fairly heavy fire, so that B Company was held in readiness to go to their aid, while C and A Companies took post along the front of the village overlooking the precipice. That night was as black as the former, and a line of advance allotted to the Buffs was so precipitous that the battalion formation was bound to get into some sort of confusion, though every effort was made to keep touch with the companies and with other units. Opposition had died away, however, and so ultimately a new outpost line was taken up with the Suffolk Regiment on the Buffs’ left, and here the regiment remained for several days. The weather was terribly wet at this time and the ground so saturated as to be almost impassable for mules.

The Jerusalem-Jaffa road was now in our hands and was the principal lateral communication. General Allenby now decided that no further advance was possible or necessary for the present and that his next task was to drive the enemy over the Jordan. The outpost line referred to above was relieved on the 3rd January, 1918, and the Buffs went back to Beit Izza and Beit Likia, the rain still continuing with fury and the shortage of rations proving still a considerable hardship. The 10th Irish Division had commenced making a new road to supply the front line and save to some degree the permanent Latrun-Jerusalem one. This engineering work was called, out of compliment to that division, the Irish Road, and it now became the scene for some weeks of the Buffs’ activities. The battalion began work on it on the 9th January near Beit Sirra, and it was not till the 7th March that it took over an outpost line, this time in front of Lake Balua. This period of labour was lightened on the 18th January by a parade for the distribution of medal ribbands, on which occasion Sgt. Turner got the D.C.M., and Ptes. Kite, C. W. Scott and Betts the Military Medal.

The above-mentioned move was in reality a very complete change from two months’ heavy work to real soldiering again, even if it were only infantry soldiering, as the gallant Yeoman of Kent may possibly have put it. A patrol of B Company advancing from this outpost line found Yebrud occupied by Turkish snipers and the battalion got orders to occupy the village by midnight, but it was found to be so strongly held that the reserve companies had to be absorbed into the line to support the attack, and it was not till 8 a.m. on the 9th that the place was occupied and a new outpost line on Burj Bardawile taken up. 2nd Lieut. F. W. H. Cooper was killed in this affair and Captain Ponsonby and seven other ranks wounded. Next day the advance continued, the country getting worse and worse, but more positions were taken in the evening, A and B Companies having a climb of three and a half hours before the Turkish trenches and sangars, perched on the forward slope of a precipice, were theirs. Eight other ranks were wounded. The Buffs were now three thousand feet up, and it was bitterly cold and wet. Moreover, the old ration and supply difficulty became once more acute; the stuff could only be got to the foot of the precipice on which the men were, and then the tired soldiers, after a heavy day’s work, had to scramble down to fetch it. On the 11th March El Tel was occupied, which meant another very stiff climb. After this road-making south-east of El Tel and on the Nablus road was resumed, and outpost work near Turmus Aya. A very good piece of patrol work is recorded during this period. It was carried out by Lieut. Barnard of the Buffs and a few of his men on the 1st April. These men met an enemy’s patrol and promptly charged them with the bayonet, though the enemy were backed by machine guns. The Buff party killed three Turks and had one of their number slightly wounded.

On the 21st March, 1918, the Germans, who had now been freed from all anxiety as regards Russia, commenced in France their last stupendous effort for victory and were so far successful that all troops that could possibly be spared from other theatres of war were hurried to the rescue of our Western front. For this reason it came to pass that early in April it was decided that the 74th Division must be taken from the Egyptian Force, in which it had served one year, and be shipped off to Europe, where it was grievously needed. On the 8th of this month, therefore, the march to the railhead at Ludd commenced, the Buffs moving by Beitunia and Beit Sirra. On the 13th they entrained for Kantara, and on the 28th left that place for Alexandria and for France.

[Illustration: SOUTHERN PALESTINE]