CHAPTER VIII

WITH MAUDE IN MESOPOTAMIA

I. THE POSITION IN 1916

The summer of the year 1916 was more or less an uneventful one for the Mesopotamia Force. The situation is very plainly set forth in the despatches of Sir Percy Lake, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief. He says: “No operations on a large scale have been undertaken since the fall of Kut. On the Tigris line the troops immediately facing the enemy were, with the exception of those actually on duty in the trenches, resting and recuperating and, at the same time, consolidating their position. Fatigues were very heavy, the heat of the summer came on rapidly and a good deal of sickness prevailed.”

A Russian advance from Persia began to make itself felt on the Turks, however, and on the 20th May the right bank of the Tigris as far as the Hai, with the exception of bridge guards on the latter water, was clear of the enemy. This, and the fact that the Turks still held the Sanna i Yat lines on the other side of the Tigris, materially influenced the plan of campaign which came later.

As far as the Buffs were concerned their summer work consisted mostly in harvesting barley early in the hot weather, and in road making. There was also a great deal of work in connection with the necessary supply of water. The battalion was between four and five miles from the river--the only supply, and consequently water had to be carried, Indian fashion, on mules in “packals,” which held about eight gallons each. These, made of zinc and covered with felt, soon got knocked about and, as they began to leak, much water was lost in transit. The so-called friendly Arabs were consistent and determined thieves, and if the water-carrying mules had been left under the sole care of their Indian drivers, they would soon have disappeared. Consequently water convoy work became a very heavy and regular duty amongst the many others our soldiers had to perform. The local Arabs were very enterprising marauders and gave considerable trouble sneaking about the camp. On one occasion some of them actually entered the orderly room tent, but they found nothing which they considered worthy of removal.

Sir Stanley Maude took over supreme command on the 28th August, 1916, a time of the year when active operations might soon be possible and when the improvement in communications, inaugurated by Sir Percy Lake, had begun to bear fruit. When early in the year every man’s mind was eagerly bent on the relief of Kut he could, as soldiers in former campaigns always had to, digest his bully beef and biscuit somehow and sustain life on it; moreover, when sick, he contrived to do without luxuries and to bear discomforts. But now all this was rapidly changing for the better, and with improved communications came greatly superior comfort. The Turks seemed very full of enterprise and to be planning various ambitious campaigns, and Maude very rightly considered that the best way to stop all that sort of thing was to aim at the heart of the beast and to make Baghdad the object of resolute and determined attack.

First of all, however, there was still a good deal to do in the way of preparation, and August was too early a date, in any case, for active work. The men were, of course, still suffering from heat and were not by any means fit for a strenuous campaign. Then the communications still wanted perfecting, and large reserves of ammunition and stores of all kinds must be brought up to the fighting area. “By the end of November,” he says, “preliminary arrangements were well advanced, a steady stream of reinforcements had been moving up stream and drafts joining. The health of the soldiers was improving and the training for war was advancing.” The general concentration was at Sheikh Saad. The River Tigris was by no means a straight line, but still it flowed from Baghdad to Sheikh Saad, and, in order to defend himself against an advance up it, it is plain that the Turk should continue to hold positions astride the river; for these positions could be selected to rest with their flanks on marshes so that they could not be turned, and so would necessitate one frontal attack after another.

II. BATTLE OF KUT, 1917

As has already been seen, however, the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his troops from the main river’s right bank, though as a matter of fact he held a strong line of trenches across the Hai covering a bridge over that water just south of Kut and bending back to the Tigris at each end. His main line, however, was along the left bank of that river, his right flank, of course, being almost in the direction of Baghdad, while his left was thrown back along the Sanna i Yat lines, which he still held strongly. Seeing this, Maude determined to attack him up stream and so make him bolt back to his only road to his base or else cut him off from Baghdad altogether. One party of ours, under Lt.-General Cobbe, V.C., faced the Sanna i Yat lines on the left bank of the Tigris, and another, under Lt.-General Marshall, in which were serving the Buffs, were as much as eleven miles up stream of them and on the other side of the river. The first thing to do was to seize the Hai stream, and this was done by Marshall by surprise on the night of the 13th/14th December, 1916, while Cobbe demonstrated in front of the Sanna i Yat lines as if about to attack furiously. After getting possession of the Hai, which he crossed at Bessouia and Atab, Marshall extended towards the north and at the same time wheeled up the bulk of his command to attack the bridgehead. He broke through on the night of the 18th opposite Kut and reached the main river, thus securing command of the Tigris up stream of the Khadaira Bend. This was important because, after he advanced, his food and stores had to go up by land for some miles.

In connection with all this manœuvring the Buffs had on the 13th December struck their camp and marched out to reserve trenches, in support of the movement of that date, and had followed up and formed a backing to the troops in advance. At 7 a.m. on the 16th the battalion appeared to be going into a serious action and B Company was sent out to take a certain ridge in front, with C in support. Everything appeared to be working satisfactorily, but at 12.30 orders came for withdrawal to another position, where the men dug in as far as possible and connection was obtained with the 13th Division on the left of the Buffs. B Company had three men wounded in this advance and D had one during the retirement to the new position. On the 17th a concentration on Bessouia was ordered and carried out, and the next day a demonstration was made without much result, Captain Harrison receiving a shrapnel wound and the little expedition returning to Bessouia in the evening.

In connection with Maude’s plan of getting up stream of his enemy, Major-General Crocker with his command attempted on the 20th to throw a bridge over the Tigris at the Shumran Bend and the 35th Brigade marched up to that place to assist, the Buffs being in reserve; but somehow the enemy had got wind of this attempt, the enterprise proved a failure and the men returned to their old bivouac. The remainder of the old year and up to the 10th January was spent working west of the Hai and exercising in drill and musketry in the neighbourhood of Bessouia, the work being interrupted only on the 9th, when the cavalry attempted a raid supported by the Buffs; but the horsemen lost their way in a dense fog and the force returned to camp early, having effected nothing, on account of the weather.

During these early days of January, Cobbe’s party, which, in addition to demonstrating in front of the Sanna i Yat lines, had the task of manning the right bank of the Tigris up to the point where Marshall was working, got orders to clear the Khadaira Bend, which occasioned some heavy fighting by the 3rd Indian Division and necessitated a diversion on the Hai bridgehead by Marshall and his men; so on the 11th of the month the Buffs went into the trenches and had four men killed and as many wounded on the first day. The clearing of the bend by Cobbe proceeded satisfactorily after this and by the 18th all was ready for the final assault, which was arranged for the following day. When dawn broke, however, it was found that during the night the whole of the Turks who had occupied this portion of their defences had cleared out and crossed the Tigris.

The next job the British forces had to take in hand was to reduce the very extensive trench system that the enemy still held across the Hai stream in the immediate vicinity of Kut. This was a slow and somewhat tedious business, but by the 24th January, after steady and persistent pushing, our troops got to within four hundred yards of the enemy, and an assault was arranged for the following day. This slow approach consisted of a series of small advances at various points and subsequent consolidation of what was gained. Thus a new line was occupied by the Buffs on the 12th, and the next day, while this was made strong, 2nd Lieut. Hook made a reconnaissance to the front, which resulted in establishing an advanced post, which was occupied by a platoon under 2nd Lieut. Filmer. On the 15th two endeavours were made by 2nd Lieut. Angus to reach another point, but without success. Captain V. Arnold was killed on this date.

A still more important little action of the same nature took place on the 16th: a party of about sixty of all ranks went out from the trench in the morning and attempted the occupation of a point about 450 yards in advance of the line. This enterprise was successfully accomplished and, in the words of Sir Stanley Maude, “with great gallantry,” but with severe loss considering the number engaged, and it was hard that, after the sacrifice made, the party was by superior authority ordered back again after dark. Lieut. Jeffreys and four men were killed, and Lieut. MacFadyen, 2nd Lieut. Gibson and twenty-seven men wounded--more than fifty per cent of the two platoons becoming casualties.

On the 18th another advanced point was reached by 2nd Lieut. Tustin and his platoon, and this time the place was consolidated and a communication trench dug. Later in the day the battalion was relieved from the trenches, but it was back again in four days’ time, suffering the loss of three men killed on the 22nd and Captain Usher, 2nd Lieut. Western and nine men wounded on the 24th. On the next day an attack was made in conjunction with the 3rd Indian and 13th British Divisions, with a view to clearing up the corner of the east bank of the Hai. This operation, however, was not successful and the Buffs lost some casualties to no great purpose, one officer and eighty other ranks being wounded in the business. The next day, however, the 36th Brigade attacked with great success and the 35th was able to come into line: Lieut. Sergeant and four men of the Buffs being wounded. The first blow of a hammer will often not drive in a nail, but it prepares the way for a successful second or third blow. The next two or three days were spent in consolidating and improving the new line.

The 31st of the month brought a fresh attack, and the brigade was progressing with its work when orders came that it was to move no further till the 37th Brigade came up on its left. This move, however, never materialized and, in consequence, the advance came to a standstill. Two men were killed and eleven wounded on the 1st February, but 2nd Lieut. Tustin and a party of bombers established themselves in a forward position. A further attack was prepared and was to be executed on the 2nd, but the dense fog, rendering all work impossible, made postponement necessary on the part of the 35th Brigade. The Turk was making fairly resolute counter-attacks, but they were broken by our artillery or met resolutely by our advanced troops.

On the 3rd the Devons and Ghurkas carried the enemy’s first and second lines, and in the evening there were signs that he contemplated withdrawal. In fact, it seemed a little later as if this retreat had actually taken place, for everything was very quiet, so much so that things looked like a withdrawal, partial at any rate, from the other bank as well; and the Buffs, Ghurkas and Dogras all sent forward strong patrols, while the whole brigade stood ready to move forward at a moment’s notice. On the 4th February the whole of the left bank of Hai had passed into our hands and the enemy was found to have fallen back to the Liquorice Factory and a line east and west across the Dahra Bend. On this day the Buffs took up a line of picquets facing the enemy in the bend, being relieved at nightfall.

It was not Maude’s intention to let any of the enemy remain on the south side of the Tigris, in case such could resist his contemplated march on Baghdad by saving the communications with that city, and so enabling the Turkish army to keep the field. Obviously, therefore, the next task was to clear the Dahra Bend and drive its occupants across the main river. With this object in view, the King’s Own Regiment effected a lodgment in the centre of the enemy’s line on the 9th February, and the same day the Worcestershire, capturing some advanced posts, established a line 2,500 yards or so south of the river at the southern end of the Shumran Bend, and on the 10th our infantry, lying west of the Liquorice Factory, after being attacked all night by bombing parties, began early to assail the Turkish position. In this connection the Buffs moved from their line against that of the enemy with the 2/4th Ghurkas on their right. The move was successful because the Turks would not abide the issue but vacated their trenches, and, after occupying them, the Buffs pushed forward patrols and bombing parties who, on the 11th, in pouring rain, took up a line well forward, from whence a communication trench was started towards the north. Four men were killed during these two days, and 2nd Lieuts. Tustin and Sergeant and fourteen men were wounded. On the 12th there was severe fighting over the job of driving in the enemy’s picquets and covering troops, and the 102nd Grenadiers of the 35th Brigade greatly distinguished themselves by gallantly capturing a redoubt and holding it against all counter-attacks.

[Illustration: THE RECAPTURE OF KUT-EL-AMARA

On the right a company of the Buffs is seen advancing on the Turkish position, which rests on the right bank of the river, roughly indicated by the bursting shrapnel. Kut, with its tall minaret, is seen in the dark palm-grove across the river. Beyond are the Pushtikuh Hills and the snow-capped Persian mountains. The tall yellow column (centre) is spray from lyddite bursting in the river.

_From a sketch made from the parapet in foreground by Herbert Alexander, A.R.W.S._]

But the principal day of battle in the Dahra Bend was the 15th February, and it was the date of a complete and glorious success. Quite early the Loyal North Lancashires carried a strong point opposite our left; then the South Wales Borderers and Welch Fusiliers captured the enemy’s right centre, taking many prisoners; and later, about 1.30 p.m., the Buffs and the Dogras, of their brigade, took up the work. On the occasion of occupying the forward position referred to above, A Company of the Buffs had been detached a little distance from the rest of the battalion and on the morning of the 15th patrols, sent out from this company, reported that the enemy’s line in front was strongly held. Nevertheless when the hour came, the remaining three companies, with the good and faithful Dogras, rushed forward and nothing could stay their onslaught. It was most successful and together they reached the river line, isolating the Turkish extreme left and taking one thousand prisoners, of which six hundred, together with five machine guns, surrendered to the Buffs. Tactically this success was of the greatest importance, for the Dahra Bend was cleared and nothing was left but to cross and try conclusions on the left bank of the Tigris. Our casualties were twelve men killed and 2nd Lieut. Brooke and sixty-seven men wounded. As Sir Stanley Maude pointed out in his despatches: “To eject the enemy from his horse-shoe bend, bristling with trenches, and commanded from across the river on three sides by hostile batteries and machine guns, called for offensive qualities of a high standard on the part of the troops.” To take the army across the river it would be necessary to keep the Turk fully occupied at Sanna i Yat and all along the bank from there to Kut, while preparations were made to pass the great obstacle as far to the westward as possible; so orders were issued to Lt.-General Cobbe to attack the lines at Sanna i Yat on the 17th.

An abnormally heavy rain fell on the 16th which flooded everything. The river rose--the trenches in the picquet line along the river bank, which were the temporary home of the Buffs, were swamped--the country was half under water and it was impossible to clean up the battlefield. Our battalion being relieved from picquet on the 18th returned to camp at a place called Kala Haji Fahan and remained there till the 22nd, all this time being utilized by Marshall and his men in methodical preparations for the great crossing which was to be about the Shumran Bend whilst Cobbe, fifteen miles away, was assaulting the lines, in front of which he had been so long, and inducing the enemy to believe that there was the point of danger. On the 17th he gained some trenches, but had to withdraw, only to attack again on the 22nd, on which date the two first trenches were taken and made secure.

Meanwhile Marshall made several feints as if to cross the stream, particularly one opposite Kut, but the real point selected was the south end of the Shumran Bend and there three ferries were arranged, while the bridge was being made. The first ferry trip was a success, but subsequent journeys were pretty strongly opposed; nevertheless by 3 p.m. on the 22nd February three battalions were established across the river about a mile north of the site selected for the bridge, and at 4.30 the work was ready for use. The enemy had tried more than one counter-attack which failed, on account of the quickness and accuracy of our artillery. The Buffs crossed about 7 p.m. on the 23rd and bivouacked three hundred yards or so from the bank.

The enemy on the 24th made a very good fight to retain possession of, at any rate, some portion of the Shumran peninsula, in the northern corners of which exist quite a network of nullahs which, giving good cover and excellent concealment for machine guns, were utilized to their fullest extent. It took four or five hours to clear the peninsula and push back the Turk, but it was done. The Buffs were in support of the 67th Punjabis who were held up on the left. Together these battalions at last made some progress, but were stopped some three hundred yards in front of a nullah which was strongly held; the Gurkhas attacked on the Buffs’ right, but were also stopped, and an attempted flanking movement was of no avail. However, about 9 p.m. patrols which had gone out as soon as it was dark reported that the enemy had evacuated the place and the nullah was at once occupied. The Buffs’ casualties on this day were twelve men killed and Lieut. Howell and thirty-four wounded. Meanwhile cavalry, artillery and another division crossed the river, and Cobbe finished his task by capturing Sanna i Yat and clearing the bank of the main stream as far as Kut.

III. PURSUIT TO BAGHDAD

On the evening of the 24th February there were clear indications that the enemy was in full retreat and that Marshall had been fighting a strong and well-posted rear guard. The next few days were strenuous and energetic ones, but they were triumphant to an extraordinary degree. Since March, 1915, the Turkish enemy in Mesopotamia had proved a stubborn and a dogged foe. Till now he had never been badly beaten and he had scored, to his credit, the capture of a British Field Force at Kut. At last, however, he was on the run; and Baghdad, after Constantinople, the principal city of his empire, as well as the main centre of his Asiatic operations, had lost its defensive positions--so patiently perfected and prepared, and now lay open to the advance of the British army. But for hundreds of years there have been few better fighting men than the Turkish soldier, and even now he proved ready to see the thing out to a finish. He took up a strong position in some nullahs eight miles from Shumran, and it took us severe fighting on the 25th, in which, however, the Buffs did not take part, to gain a footing in his line; but after that his retreat was rapid. On the 26th one column followed the river while another, in which our battalion was, made a forced march over the arid plain of from eighteen to twenty miles to intercept him while the naval flotilla pushed up stream; the Turkish vessels struggling to escape, by no means wholly with success.

All movements to intercept the retreat were too late, however: the enemy had gone, leaving guns and all sorts of impedimenta behind him; and he streamed through Aziziya in confusion, shelled by gunboats and harassed by cavalry. Our pursuit was almost too rapid, the reason being that there was at one time hope of huge captures of fugitives. These, however, proved too quick for us, and about the 1st March it was found necessary to halt at Aziziya because the Field Force had outstripped their supplies. On that day the Buffs had no rations and had to obtain leave to consume the emergency one which everybody carries, but which is never opened except by high permission and in extreme cases.

On the 2nd March the regiment obtained some Turkish flour and a few sheep, late in the evening, but the first supply ship arrived late that night. Cobbe and his force had been following in Marshall’s footsteps and found on their way immense quantities of rifles, vehicles, stores, equipment and so on, which the enemy had abandoned in his flight.

On the 5th March, things being now a little more in order, Marshall marched to Zeur and the Buffs marched with him, in a terrible dust storm and over a network of nullahs. On the 6th, the dust still continuing, a position was found to have been carefully prepared by the enemy at Ctesiphon, but it was unoccupied and the men pushed on to Bustan: a terrible day’s march, particularly when the weather was taken into consideration; but fatigue and exhaustion were treated with the light-hearted contempt of triumphant conquerors, who knew that the object striven for so long was now within their grasp.

[Illustration:

_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_

ARCH AT CTESIPHON]

On the 8th March our advance guard came in contact with the enemy on Dialah river, eight miles below Baghdad, where the country was as flat and afforded as little cover as a billiard table. At first it was thought that the river bank had been abandoned, but the first pontoon that was launched was riddled with bullets from rifle and machine guns, and it was found that the crossing must be made with skill and care. A small party ferried across the Tigris to bring the Turks under enfilade fire, and a lodgment was made on the far bank of the Dialah by about seventy men of the Loyal North Lancashires, who formed a post there and held it alone for twenty-two hours, when they were followed up, after the river had been bridged. It was now ascertained that on the other bank of the Tigris the enemy had taken up a position at a place called Shawa Khan to cover Baghdad from the south and south-west; so, on the 8th March, a bridge was made near Bawi and a portion of Cobbe’s force (the 7th Indian Division) crossed to drive him away from it. Prior to the building of the bridge, however, and on the night of the 7th/8th March, the 35th Brigade, which had marched to Bawi and reached that place about noon, crossed the river by river-boat and barges. This proved a very difficult job as a landing-place could only be found a mile down-stream; the barges were very difficult to load, and the first-line transport carts had to be left behind to follow on the first opportunity. After getting across in two trips the brigade marched for the remainder of the night, with frequent and tiresome halts, for it was necessary to ramp the banks of the various nullahs which crossed the path. At length, on the 8th, however, more open ground was reached and the troops deployed and proceeded in two lines of platoons, the Dogras with their right on the Tigris directing the movement; then came the Buffs, with the Ghurkas in reserve. The march was kept up till 2 p.m., when a high-walled and extensive garden was reached and utilized for bivouacs.

At 11 a.m. next day the journey was continued in company with the 7th Division, which had also crossed the Tigris, and at noon our brigade was directed to fit in between this division and the river and advance with it and under the command of its general, the Buffs, nearest the stream, to act as directing unit; and the battalion commander directed A Company to hug the river and direct the whole movement. The enemy was found and he was strongly enough entrenched, but his resistance was somewhat feeble. His left was driven back and an attempted counter-attack defeated by A Company. The Turks vacated their position after dark and it was occupied by our patrols. Lieuts. Johnson and Holyman and four men were killed and thirty-nine men wounded on this day.

On the 10th March patrols, pushing forward, gained touch with the Turks once more, about a mile and a half further back than their original position. They were apparently in force, and so heavily shelled the 28th Brigade on the left of the 35th that it had to withdraw. The patrols of the latter brigade also met with strong opposition. Orders were issued for the Buffs to attack in the middle of the night, but these were cancelled, as the enemy was found to have vacated his position.

There was a good deal of jealous anxiety in the Mesopotamian Army at this time as to which unit was to first enter the city of Baghdad, and it seemed now that the honour must fall to some portion of Cobbe’s force on the right bank of the Tigris. It will be remembered that the 35th Brigade, of which the Buffs was the British or white unit, was only temporarily attached to the 7th Division of Cobbe’s Force. The divisional general on the morning of the 10th sent round a circular note to his units directing that the 7th Division should make sure that they should be first into the city. By some error on the part of the messenger (presumably) this note was also taken round to the Buffs, and Colonel Body promptly reminded his men that they, by their position closest to the river, were actually the nearest soldiers to Baghdad.

During the coming night the brigadier, being really much fatigued after a strenuous day or two, was urged to take his rest, and the Buffs, with their Indian comrades, pushing out patrols and following them up, somehow by daylight found themselves a couple of miles further up stream at the bend of the river opposite Garabah Island and only three miles from the city.

That day, the 11th March, the brigade advanced to the Iron Bridge in two lines of platoons in fours, the Buffs on the right, the 102nd Grenadiers on the left, with the 2/4th Ghurkas and 37th Dogras in rear. They met with no opposition, but just as the bridge was approached the 21st Brigade of the 7th Division appeared, coming up rapidly from the westward with a view to entering the place. Now “Let all things be done decently and in order,” as St. Paul says, and the whole party or whole of the parties were halted at the site of the Iron Bridge at 8.35 a.m. Then the welcome order came that the 35th Brigade was to enter the city first, the Buffs to lead the column. The crossing was no easy matter and was carried out by means of _goofahs_, which each contained about twenty men. The Turkish flag was hauled down from the citadel and the Union Jack[17] hoisted in its place by Captain G. K. Harrison of the Buffs at 9.40 a.m.

The city of Baghdad was found to be in a most extraordinary state, and fires were bursting out everywhere. There are no more determined and persistent looters in the world than Arabs, and these and the Kurds had seized the opportunity of their lives with avidity. The Turk for the moment was too busy to protect his property, and until the English entered the city anarchy prevailed and the thieves were in paradise, and so it came about that our reception approached the cordial by the regular inhabitants. Guards, prepared beforehand, were quickly mounted and a few looters shot. The flotilla anchored opposite the British residency. The Buffs marched through the city and bivouacked in the compound opposite the American consulate and things soon began to quiet down generally.

An immense amount of booty was found in Baghdad, though the enemy had been removing stores and so on for over a fortnight; still many guns, machine guns, rifles, ammunition, machinery and other things were left behind, and in the arsenal were found Townsend’s guns which had been taken at Kut, after having been rendered useless before the surrender.

The hoisting of the flag on the citadel would seem a natural point at which to leave for a while the history of the 5th Battalion and turn our attention to the doings of others, but Sir Stanley Maude ends his despatch on the campaign, which included the fall of the great Turkish city, three weeks later, on the 31st March, and, though the Buffs had no very stirring adventures during this period, it may be as well to finish the record for the present at the end of the month.

A junction with our Russian allies, who appeared to be advancing from the direction of Persia, caused Maude to stretch out a hand, so to speak, in that direction: that is, up the River Dialah. Another matter that required arranging was that the Tigris is protected from overflowing by means of banks (or “bunds,” as they are called), and if the enemy cut these up stream of the city disastrous floods would result. Another river, the Shatt el Adhaim, flows into the Tigris above Baghdad and runs roughly parallel to the Dialah, which enters the Tigris below the city, and on this river the enemy made attempts at a stand. Altogether during March there was fighting on these rivers and some gallant work was done, notably by the Manchesters on the 25th. Taking it all round, however, further opposition on the enemy’s part was but feeble. The most notable event of this period was perhaps the occupation of Feluja on the Euphrates river on the 19th March, giving the English, as it did, the control of both the great rivers of Mesopotamia. The Buffs spent most of the latter end of March in camp at Hinaidi, just south of Baghdad, and in the careful preparation and excavations for a permanent camp to be occupied during the rapidly approaching hot season.

[Illustration: VICINITY OF KUT]