CHAPTER II

THE 2ND BATTALION TAKES ITS SHARE

I. RETURNS TO ENGLAND

The opening of hostilities found the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion at Wellington in India. It was, like most units which have been some time abroad, a very fine body of men, in spite of the fact that Wellington is not exactly a training centre and that three detachments were provided by the battalion. Very early in the war it was called upon to send home, to the assistance of the new armies in course of formation, some of the most useful members of the battalion staff and many of the very best sergeants. Training was, however, continued, and in November orders arrived to sail for England on being relieved by Territorial troops, who had quite forgotten apparently that they were home service soldiers only, directly England wanted them abroad.

On leaving the East the Buffs had to leave behind a depot which consisted of a few men passed unfit, all the women and children, and the property of the messes, regimental institutes, Army Temperance Association and rifle ranges; this was under the command of Captain Howard Smith. The only things that went home with the fighting men were the Colours and the mess silver.

The battalion embarked at Bombay on the 16th November on the Cunard ship _Ultonia_, which was old, slow and dirty, and fearfully overcrowded owing to the 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire regiment being also on board. The ship was under convoy together with thirty-three others, and the whole made Plymouth instead of Southampton on the 23rd December, after making a wide detour in the Atlantic to avoid submarines. The Buffs were bundled off their ship in great haste and without their kits; they got off somehow to Winchester, where they found themselves on a cold, bleak down, in pouring rain and with but very meagre equipment--cooking-pots being one of the very many items that were deficient. An Army Service wagon or two ultimately came along and threw some blankets upon the wet ground, and some bread and meat on top of them, and went away; but of course their drivers were not responsible for cooking-pots. Christmas, 1914, may have been a merry one in many places, even in the trenches to a certain extent, but it is doubtful if the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs ever spent a more miserable one. Certainly Captain Tomlinson’s company got plum puddings, but that was the one bright spot.

The battalion, together with the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, 2nd East Surrey and the 3rd Middlesex, all from India, found itself in the 85th Infantry Brigade under Br.-General A. J. Chapman, C.B., who had Captain C. J. Deverell for brigade major. The brigade was part of the 28th Division--Major-General Bulfin, C.V.O., C.B. Captain L. Fort, and afterwards Lieut. the Hon. P. G. Scarlett, was appointed staff captain to the 85th Brigade.

Military exercises of an intensive kind were, of course, the daily lot of the men while at Winchester, particularly so because the latest pattern rifle (not used in India) had just been issued to them. A furlough of three clear days to 25 per cent of the soldiers at a time was, however, granted, so that those just returned from India, after a foreign tour of nearly ten years, might get a glimpse of their friends before starting for a new and sterner foreign service. A few drafts of new men arrived, but it must be understood that these reinforcements for each and all of the battalions during the four years under consideration were of such frequent occurrence as to render constant reference to them both tiresome and superfluous. It may easily be understood that the strength of a unit must constantly be varying. A hard-fought action would reduce the numbers enormously, as well as did the regular drain by death, wounds and disease during the weary trench work.

The only events worthy of record during the stay at Winchester were a violent squall which did great damage to the tents on the 28th December, and a grand inspection of the division by His Majesty the King accompanied by Lord Kitchener on the 12th January, 1915. The battalion moved into billets in the city on the 6th January, the officers being accommodated in Winchester College.[7]

It is only fair to note here that the newly issued boots were not of proper quality: the heels came off and the nails went through. Later on, in France, the men experienced a good deal of quite unnecessary hardship on account of their boots, which to an infantry soldier are only of second importance to his weapons. Some one was to blame, of course, presumably the contractor, and it seems that in every war these men must make their fortunes at the expense of the soldier.

Most judges agree that English soldiers are seldom seen to such perfection of training and physique as in India, and the infantry of the 28th Division was entirely composed of units from that country, so that all who saw these troops prior to embarkation for France agreed that no finer body of infantry had ever taken the field.

The start was made on the 16th January, on which day the division marched to Southampton, and a trying march it was; though well timed and arranged by the staff, sufficient consideration was not given to the length of the journey by foot, the state of the weather nor the weight each soldier had to carry.

II. ARRIVES ON WESTERN FRONT

Next day the Buffs embarked for Havre, for the Channel ports were safe enough by this time. On the 21st they detrained at Hazebrouck and marched to Rouge Croix (4½ miles N.E.), after one of those terrible French railway journeys, during which sanitary arrangements are non-existent. The battalion now became a fighting unit in the great struggle that was raging round Ypres.

It is good in winter time to have plenty of warm clothing and protection from the weather, but the kits at this period were terribly heavy to carry. Later on regular parties were told off to take what was required from the billets to the trenches and so on, but at first the soldier, in addition to his regular sixty-two pounds’ weight of kit, was burdened with a fur coat, gum boots and spare sandbags, all very excellent things to have with one, but a bit of a job to get over the ground with.

On the 28th January the brigade was inspected by the Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by the Prince of Wales. During the month of February the Germans made several more or less determined attempts to pierce the British line near Ypres, and sometimes with partial success. On the 4th of the month the 85th Brigade, being at Ouderdom, received news that their comrades of the 83rd were being attacked south-west of the city, so two battalions started at once to the rescue, and these were followed two hours later by the Buffs and Middlesex, who entered the place and remained in readiness in the cavalry barracks.

The 5th February brought some counter-marching. At 4.30 a.m. the battalion started to march back again to Ouderdom as being not wanted and was then told to stand by in readiness to move again, as the 84th Brigade was now in trouble to the south of Ypres. This march, however, was not performed till the following day, by the evening of which both the Buffs and East Surreys were back in the cavalry barracks, and from there they went into the trenches, the Buffs’ Headquarters being at Ferme Chapelle.

The experience of the next few days was a terrible one; the trenches, which had just been taken over from the French, were in very bad condition indeed: they were knee-deep in water, and with parapets so rotten as not to be bullet proof. Very soon this state of things had its effect and numbers of the men were suffering from swollen feet and frost-bite.

III. “O” TRENCH

The brigade front at this time was intersected at right angles by the Ypres-Comines Canal, which divided it into what were known as the Right and Left Sections of Defence. Immediately north of the canal the Left Section of Defence was entrusted to the Buffs and 3rd Royal Fusiliers, these battalions relieving each other as ordered; and the south or the Right Section of Defence to the 2nd East Surrey and the 3rd Middlesex. Each section had its own battalion headquarters. A small part of the southern section was also held by one company of the Buffs (Captain Worthington). The other battalions of the brigade were in somewhat similar conditions to the Buffs, and were daily and rapidly being reduced in fighting strength and efficiency, chiefly through frost-bite and sickness. So serious had things become owing to this reduction in fighting strength that, by the 13th February, it was decided to relieve the brigade, and to withdraw it to recoup and refit as soon as other troops were available to replace it in the line.

It had already been decided by the higher command that a part of the line then being held by the 3rd Middlesex and the 2nd East Surrey, south of the canal, was to be shortened by the construction of new trenches a little in rear of trenches “O” and “P.” This work had already been started, and was, on the night of the 14th February, being continued by the 3rd Middlesex, which temporarily withdrew the garrisons from “O” and “P” trenches for the purpose of digging, leaving those trenches in charge of small covering parties only.

The Germans, who up till then had been showing very little local activity, unexpectedly raided and captured “O” trench and prevented its reoccupation by the Middlesex; without delay they reversed the parapet, wired the front on our side and took all necessary steps for resisting any attempts at recapture.

During the night 14th/15th February the Buffs were relieved by the 3rd Royal Fusiliers from their unenviable position in the trenches as recorded above, and were withdrawn a short distance to Chateau Rosenthal (Bedford House), on the Ypres-St. Eloi road, to rest. By the time the reliefs had been completed and the battalion had settled down to rest the night was far spent.

Shortly before dawn alarming rumours reached Battalion H.Q. that the enemy had broken through the Middlesex and were advancing on Ypres. Colonel Geddes reported accordingly to Brigade H.Q., and the battalion was at once turned out in readiness for any eventuality. Soon after daybreak orders were received to move out and hold the canal bank south-east of Langhof. Although fairly heavily shelled _en route_, the battalion crossed the canal without loss and assembled on the north side, under cover of the canal embankment. Here it was subsequently joined by the brigadier and some of the brigade staff and remained awaiting developments throughout the rest of the morning.

About 2.30 p.m. the 2nd East Surrey, assisted by as many of the Middlesex as it had been possible to collect, were ordered to recapture “O” trench. No arrangements had apparently been made for artillery support, and moreover this attack had to be made over ground deep in mud, devoid of any cover and without any previous reconnaissance or guides. From the Buffs’ rendezvous nothing could be seen of what was taking place on the far side of the embankment, where the attack had been launched. About 4.30 p.m. the Buffs (less one company which remained with the brigadier in reserve) were ordered to reinforce the East Surrey, who, owing to extremely heavy losses, were reported to be held up and unable to make further progress. As the leading company of the Buffs broke cover it came under artillery fire which caused many casualties, including its commander, Major F. S. Reeves, wounded, and Lieut. R. M. Heywood, killed. Neither the whereabouts of the East Surreys nor the direction of the objective were known, and by this time darkness was fast approaching. However, the three companies continued the advance in the dusk and by good fortune came up with some of the East Surreys, who, having reached a point some five hundred yards from the objective, were unable to advance any further. The Buffs passed through them and continued to advance until they reached a point about three hundred yards from the objective, which by this time, however, was completely hidden in the darkness which had by now intervened. At this point a subaltern of the East Surrey Regiment, who had lost his platoon, was met, and he volunteered to act as guide. The leading company again pushed on, but, owing to the difficulty of keeping touch and maintaining direction in the dark, a part of the battalion found itself held up by wire and suffering heavy losses from fire from more than one direction. At this juncture Colonel Geddes wisely determined to withdraw the battalion, which was only done with the greatest difficulty.

Whilst the above operations were in progress, half a battalion of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, sent from the 84th Brigade, had arrived in the dark at the rendezvous on the canal bank, where the brigadier and the reserve company of the Buffs (Major R. E. Power) were waiting. As nothing was known of the military situation, nor of the whereabouts of the Buffs nor of the East Surrey Regiment, from whom no reports had been received since dark, the brigadier ordered the reserve company of the Buffs to go out and find the rest of the battalion. He himself started with them. After going a short distance they came across a building full of wounded which was found to be the Battalion H.Q. of the Right Section of Defence, then occupied by the headquarters of the 3rd Middlesex Regiment. Here a guide was procured, and the company proceeded in the direction in which the remainder of the battalion and the 2nd East Surrey had gone. Before it had gone far, however, it luckily met Colonel Geddes returning. The battalion (less half Major Power’s company, detached to occupy a front-line trench) reached the canal about 10.30 p.m., and was sent back at 1 a.m. to Chateau Rosenthal to get a meal and rest.

During the morning of the 15th February, 1915, a conference was held at Brigade H.Q., and it was decided to renew the attack on the lost trench “O” on that night. The brigadier at first decided to carry out this operation with the Buffs and East Surrey Regiment only, but these two battalions had together only about three hundred men available, owing to the casualties of the previous day and the losses sustained during the recent tour in the trenches. Two companies of the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers (84th Brigade) were, therefore, added to this small force, which was placed under command of Colonel Geddes. In the written orders issued to units it was stated that “O” trench was to be retaken at all costs and held until reliefs arrived. The G.O.C. 28th Division stated that the 85th Brigade, which, owing to the severe losses from fire and sickness already incurred, was to have been at once withdrawn from the line and sent back to recoup and refit, would not be relieved until the lost trench “O” had been recaptured.

At 7 p.m. the Buffs (less half D Company)[8] and 2nd East Surrey Regiment (less one and a half companies) assembled at the place ordered, that is, on the road junction on the Ypres-St. Eloi road, 620 yards south of the canal. From this point the column, led by the Buffs, marched via the road leading east towards Oosthoek, as far as the Battalion H.Q. of the Right Sections of Defence, where the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers (less two companies) joined and followed in reserve. Leaving here at 7.40 p.m. and moving in file, closed up, the column was skilfully guided some two thousand yards across country by Lieut. J. A. H. Wood, 2nd East Surrey, to the position of deployment (the north-east end of a spinney about 150 yards north of “O” trench), which was reached without opposition or casualties at about 8.40 p.m. On reaching the position of deployment the Buffs, under Major L. I. B. Hulke, having previously fixed bayonets, silently deployed into line to the left, in single rank, without extending, and lay down in the deep mud. The East Surreys, acting in a similar manner, formed a second line twenty yards in rear with the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers some fifty yards behind them. Selected scouts of the Buffs were sent out to reconnoitre and cut the enemy’s wire and to report on the intervening ground, which was quite unknown to all those about to take part in this attack. Such complete silence had been maintained during the advance and deployment that the presence of the column was unknown to the enemy until a prearranged artillery bombardment of his trenches commenced at 8.55 p.m. The shells all appeared to take effect against the main German position, and consequently well beyond the immediate objective. They unfortunately had the undesired effect of putting the defenders on the _qui vive_, for they at once manned the trench “O,” sent up flares, which revealed the position of the attacking force, and opened on it a withering fire from rifles, machine guns and trench mortars.

The time ordered for the assault was 9 p.m., and the right of the Buffs was detailed to direct. Immediately the enemy opened fire it was apparent from the shells which, following one another in quick succession, burst immediately behind and close to the Buffs, that the enemy had the exact range. Realizing this, Major Hulke at once gave the order to advance. Just in front of the Buffs the ground sloped somewhat steeply downwards towards the objective for about fifty yards. Nothing could have been finer than the dash and the steady determination with which the whole line, like one man, arose and went forward down this slope. The configuration of the ground, and the unhesitating manner in which the order to advance was carried out, undoubtedly saved the battalion from serious losses at this stage, as the more quickly the advance down the slope was made the higher above the men’s heads rained the storm of shells and bullets on to, and beyond, the position which the battalion had just vacated.

From the bottom of the slope the advance had to be made across heavy ground, ankle deep in mud and devoid of cover, for a distance of about 120 yards, the last part of which was up a steep incline. Except for the enemy’s flares it was pitch dark. Against the heavy frontal fire from the trench, and enfilade machine-gun fire from the left flank, the battalion forged ahead with magnificent determination, and in spite of serious casualties, most of which were sustained when the level ground at the foot of the first slope was reached, fought its way through the wire and finally assaulted and gained a footing in the trench. The enemy, who had kept up a heavy fire until the Buffs were within ten yards of the trench, disappeared in the dark, apparently down a communication trench and also towards the western end of “O” trench.

Major C. L. Porter was wounded and many other ranks killed and wounded during the attack, but ten officers and about sixty other ranks succeeded in entering the trench. Major Hulke immediately reorganized and distributed these along the trench, starting from the extreme left, and arranged for the protection of the right flank by the construction of a sandbag traverse, which was built, under fire from rifle and bombs, under Captain Morgan’s supervision, assisted by Lieut. Laing. A considerable number had already been wounded; parties had to be employed in repairing and strengthening the parapet, whilst others had to be told off to assist those detailed to man the parapet, in clearing the jammed rifles and supplying them with cleaned ammunition. When all these deductions from the sixty odd other ranks who had succeeded in gaining a footing in the trench had been made, it was found that only sufficient men remained to hold about fifty out of a probable two hundred yards of trench. Whilst the above arrangements were in progress the enemy started sniping and throwing bombs, apparently from a communication trench and from the western end of “O” trench, which was still in their hands. Bombs at that time were weapons of warfare of which the 28th Division had had no previous experience whatever, and owing to the darkness, the non-provision of maps and lack of previous information about, or knowledge of, the trench, it was very difficult to locate the places from which the enemy were throwing them and sniping. However, Captain F. W. Tomlinson, Captain L. Fort and 2nd Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell discovered the whereabouts of a party of the enemy’s bombers and rushed it; demolished the sandbag wall, from under cover of which bombs were being thrown, and cleared the enemy out of the trench. Captain Tomlinson seized the bayonet of one of the enemy, who turned tail. Captain L. Fort, who a few days previously had shown the greatest courage and resource whilst in charge of an officers’ reconnoitring patrol, was killed, and 2nd Lieut. E. F. D. Strettell was severely wounded in this gallant enterprise, which undoubtedly saved many lives and further casualties in the battalion, as the enemy afterwards ceased bombing and apparently withdrew.

Owing to the mud, with which everybody and everything was smothered, a large number of the rifles became jammed and unserviceable. After holding on for three hours, as the promised support had not arrived the position of the Buffs was by now (midnight) somewhat critical. Major Hulke therefore sent 2nd Lieut. J. A. Wood (2nd East Surrey), accompanied by No. 9522 Pte. W. J. White, to report the situation to Colonel Geddes, and eventually the former returned, guiding a company of the 2nd Suffolk Regiment. He reported that both the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers and 2nd East Surrey had lost their way in the dark, and that the former had been now ordered to follow the 2nd Suffolk Regiment. They did not, however, arrive at “O” trench before the Buffs were relieved.

As soon as the company of the Suffolks had taken over the portion of the trench the Buffs were holding, they had to work their surplus men along the trench beyond the sandbag traverse which the battalion had built, and extend them further to the right. In trying to do this they met with considerable opposition from parties of the enemy, who were in the western part of the trench. As the officer in command of this company appeared to meet with some difficulty in overcoming this opposition, Major Hulke offered to remain with his handful of men until it got sufficiently light to see what the real situation was. This offer, however, was refused, and, in accordance with the orders issued, Major Hulke therefore withdrew the Buffs, leaving in charge of the Suffolks any wounded who were unable to be removed without stretchers--of which there were none available. Great difficulty was experienced in carrying out the withdrawal over the fire-swept morass which had to be crossed, lit up, as it was, by almost incessant star-shell and flares. By crawling through the mud between the flares, a few yards at a time, and by lying down as flat as possible whilst any light remained, was the only way of proceeding, but many lives, including Sgt. Rosam, were lost during the first part of the withdrawal: although the distance was not more than 150 yards, it took half an hour to reach the original place of deployment.

After a few hours’ rest in the cavalry barracks in Ypres the battalion marched into scattered billets in and around Reninghelst. On the same afternoon the services of 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing were asked for to act as guide to another brigade detailed on that night to recapture “O” trench, which the enemy had again taken possession of very shortly after the Buffs had been relieved. In spite of his arduous experiences of the previous night’s fighting and want of rest, 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing undertook this hazardous enterprise, and carried it out successfully.

IV. TRENCH WARFARE NEAR YPRES

On the 19th February the battalion was attached to the 3rd Division and went into billets at Locre, marching to Westoutre for baths and clean clothes. There was a regular system in working this necessary ablution arrangement. Men cast off their filthy underclothing, which was taken from them, and after a bath, clean underclothes, which had once belonged to other people, were provided and the old ones were never seen again by the original owners. At first this caused a certain amount of grumbling amongst careful men, who were liable to become possessed of somewhat more ragged articles than they handed in, but it was soon found that things generally came right in the long run.

A new line of trenches were occupied on the 22nd, and these were found to be much preferable and more desirable in every way than those last occupied. There is no doubt that the French were more careless as regards the cleanliness as well as the general efficiency of their trenches than were our own people, and it seems that the 2nd Buffs were rather unfortunate in very frequently relieving our Allies instead of other British troops. These new and better works were at Kemmel, and the battalion alternated between this place and Locre till the 23rd March, when it was billeted at Dickebusch. Captain A. S. Cresswell was killed by a sniper on the 12th March.

On the 10th April, after a trying turn at St. Eloi, the battalion marched to Zonnebeke and relieved the 153rd French Regiment, the 85th Brigade having three battalions in the front line, with the Buffs in the centre, three companies in the fire trenches and one in support. About the middle of the line was the Broodseinde cross-roads, where the enemy’s trenches approached very close to our own, at one point to within five feet. This portion of the field is upon a plateau which commands the Ypres road, and was of great tactical importance. Forward of a trench which lay to the south-west of the cross-roads, the enemy had that morning rushed a parallel in which the French had laid a mine that was to have been fired before they handed over. After blocking this mine up, the enemy had retained possession of that part of the work in which it had been laid. Of this fact the French were either ignorant or, at any rate, they made no report of it. Two attempts were made to dislodge them, in which Captain Hood, Lieut. Whitaker (both of whom were wounded) and 2nd Lieut. Chapman did good work.

In the meantime the Germans had established a heavy trench mortar in a position, secure from our artillery, from which they brought a merciless fire to bear on our lines, especially on B Company which was on the cross-roads. This was the 2nd Battalion’s first experience of this weapon. Serious damage was done to the parapets and many casualties resulted. During this four days’ tour 1 officer and 22 other ranks were killed and 4 officers and 62 other ranks wounded. The battalion was relieved by the 3rd Royal Fusiliers on the morning of the 14th and marched back to billets at St. Jean, about one mile east of Ypres. A and D Companies were sent into the reserve dug-outs west of Zonnebeke, but rejoined at St. Jean the next day. After another short turn in the trenches the battalion on the 21st found itself bivouacked in open fields near St. Jean, where shelters and dug-outs were arranged for, because the town of Ypres was now being too heavily shelled for troops to make use of billeting accommodation there, or, in fact, to pass through the town at all.

V. SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

The second battle of Ypres has brought more obloquy and ill-fame on the German nation than even Marathon brought glory to the Athenians. It appears to have been well understood by scientific men that a noisome and poisonous gas could be so carried down wind that no man could breathe its suffocating fumes and live for long, and further that he must die in agony. At the ineffectual conference at the Hague it had been arranged between the representatives of the several nations, including Germany, that the use of such a disgusting and brutal weapon should be barred between civilized enemies, and nobody thought any more about it, but the German beast is not a gentleman and he ruled that the brave old days when foeman fought with a chivalrous regard for his opponent were to cease, at any rate as far as the much-vaunted Fatherland was concerned, and so this battle which we are now to consider goes down in history as the first great combat in which unfair and blackguardly methods were adopted.

[Illustration:

_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_

YPRES FROM NEAR MENIN GATE]

The commencement of this tremendous battle is best described in Sir John French’s own words, which are here quoted from his despatches: “It was at the commencement of the Second Battle of Ypres on the evening of the 22nd April that the enemy first made use of asphyxiating gas.

“Some days previously I had complied with General Joffre’s request to take over the trenches occupied by the French, and on the evening of the 22nd the troops holding the lines east of Ypres were posted as follows:--

“From Steenstraate to the east of Langemarck, as far as the Poelcappelle road, a French division.

“Thence, in a south-easterly direction towards the Passchendaele-Becelaere road, the Canadian division.

“Thence, a division took up the line in a southerly direction east of Zonnebeke to a point west of Becelaere, whence another division continued the line south-east to the northern limit of the corps on its right.

“Of the 5th Corps there were four battalions in Divisional Reserve about Ypres; the Canadian Division had one battalion in Divisional Reserve and the 1st Canadian Brigade in Army Reserve. An infantry brigade, which had just been withdrawn after suffering heavy losses on Hill 60, was resting about Vlamertinghe.

“Following a heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked the French division at about 5 p.m., using asphyxiating gases for the first time. Aircraft reported that at about 5 p.m. thick yellow smoke had been seen issuing from the German trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. The French reported that two simultaneous attacks had been made east of the Ypres-Staden railway, in which these asphyxiating gases had been employed.

“What follows almost defies description. The effect of these poisonous gases was so virulent as to render the whole of the line held by the French division mentioned above practically incapable of any action at all. It was at first impossible for anyone to realize what had actually happened. The smoke and fumes hid everything from sight, and hundreds of men were thrown into a comatose or dying condition, and within an hour the whole position had to be abandoned, together with about 50 guns.

“I wish particularly to repudiate any idea of attaching the least blame to the French division for this unfortunate incident.

“After all the examples our gallant Allies have shown of dogged and tenacious courage in the many trying situations in which they have been placed throughout the course of this campaign, it is quite superfluous for me to dwell on this aspect of the incident, and I would only express my firm conviction that, if any troops in the world had been able to hold their trenches in the face of such a treacherous and altogether unexpected onslaught, the French division would have stood firm.

“The left flank of the Canadian division was thus left dangerously exposed to serious attack in flank, and there appeared to be a prospect of their being overwhelmed and of a successful attempt by the Germans to cut off the British troops occupying the salient to the east.

“In spite of the danger to which they were exposed the Canadians held their ground with a magnificent display of tenacity and courage, and it is not too much to say that the bearing and conduct of these splendid troops averted a disaster which might have been attended with the most serious consequences.

“They were supported with great promptitude by the reserves of the divisions holding the salient and by a brigade which had been resting in billets.”

* * * * *

Now, of course, the commander-in-chief of a large army cannot possibly in his reports home go into details concerning brigades and battalions, but as the reader will see later this “brigade resting in billets” comprised amongst others the 2nd Battalion of the Buffs. The story as far as the Buffs are concerned is as follows:--The 1st Battalion was still twelve miles or so south of Ypres, but the 2nd was, as has been seen, on the afternoon of the 22nd of April, bivouacked in fields at St. Jean, which village was about four miles back from the front British line of trenches. The Middlesex and Buffs were that night to relieve the rest of the brigade in the trenches about Zonnebeke. Considerable Canadian forces were in the immediate vicinity of the Buffs.

About 5 o’clock on the evening of the 22nd April there was a sudden very sharp outburst of the enemy’s artillery, and a cloud of greenish vapour was noticed away on the left of the line. Heavy machine-gun firing was heard, evidently coming from the enemy, a very long way inside what was the British line, and bullets came spattering into St. Jean, which place ought to have been safe enough from this kind of fire. Half an hour after the commencement of the bombardment many French soldiers were observed retiring rapidly and in a disordered manner. These men were mostly Turcos and Zouaves and, poor fellows, had been taken entirely by surprise by the new and horrible methods of the enemy. They had, of course, no protection against gas at that time, and they simply fled as if the Devil were after them. It was thought by the English at first that the gas attack was nothing, and preparations were at first continued for carrying out the relief alluded to above, but it soon became evident that something very serious indeed had occurred and, at 8.30 p.m., Colonel Geddes was placed in command of all troops in St. Jean, Major Power taking over the Buff battalion.

Geddes soon received another battalion from Ypres, and at first he had his old adjutant, Lieut. Hon. P. G. Scarlett, with him as staff officer, but the latter was relieved the same night and rejoined the details of the 85th Brigade, of which he was staff captain, and which were soon fighting hard at Zonnebeke. Geddes was later joined by detachments of two other battalions, and his force during the next few days was destined to play an extraordinarily fine rôle. These troops were all there was between the Canadians left near Wieltje and the Canal, and it became theirs to guard an otherwise open road to Ypres.

The Canadians with whom Geddes’ Detachment, as it was officially nominated, was soon ordered to act, immediately stood to, as did the Buffs and Middlesex, as well as the 4th King’s Own Royal Lancasters, the battalion which had come from Ypres.

Meanwhile, the French troops were streaming down the road towards Ypres, while the Englishmen were standing nonchalantly in the streets of St. Jean, and the Canadians calmly marching north and north-east in the direction from which the foreign troops were retiring. The Buffs took up a position covering St. Jean, facing north and north-east, with the Middlesex on their left and the King’s Own in reserve.

At night it was found that the Canadian left flank was turned and the 3rd Canadian Brigade requesting that a company should be sent up to St. Julien to help and support them, Captain Tomlinson with B Company was sent, though the Englishmen were themselves hardly pressed. At 2 a.m. on the 23rd, Geddes received instructions that he was to act under orders of the Canadian Division, and was told by that unit to co-operate on the Canadian left. At 3.30 the Buffs, less B Company, was ordered to Wieltje and thence in a northerly direction to get touch with the 3rd Canadian Brigade. The men took some time to collect for the counter-attack, and it was after 4 o’clock and broad daylight when the battalion moved off, preceded by an advance guard under Captain Barnard.

[Illustration:

_Imperial War Museum_ _Crown Copyright_

BATTLEFIELD NEAR ST. JULIEN]

About eight hundred yards north of Wieltje some dug-outs and trenches were reached, which were occupied by Canadians. These trenches were screened by a hedge, under cover of which the Buffs closed up. Beyond was open country, so the battalion at once deployed and was immediately subjected to furious machine-gun and rifle fire from the enemy, who were entrenched in two parallel lines about 1,200 and 900 yards distant on rising ground sloping to the north. Moving at the double, platoon followed platoon in quick succession in the open, many casualties occurring. Two companies soon reached a farm four hundred yards on, while the remaining company took advantage of the frail cover afforded by a fence, 150 yards behind the farm, around which were a few Canadians, from whom Major Power ascertained that there was a space of about a quarter of a mile to the east, only lightly held by the French. On it were three parallel lines of trenches facing north with their right resting on the G.H.Q. wire. Major Power, seeing the danger of this, ordered the battalion to advance half-right and occupy the forward of the three trenches. In it were found a few men of the 1st Zouaves. The Buffs therefore advanced by rushes across the open and lost heavily: Captain J. McB. Ronald being killed, Lieut. D. A. Wilkins severely wounded and some eighty casualties of other ranks occurring. Two companies occupied the front line, while the third (D) was in a trench facing east along the G.H.Q. wire, which is the last fortified line back from the enemy, and the fact that our troops were now practically defending that meant, of course, that the enemy had penetrated all defences but one on this northern flank of the Ypres salient. The rest of the day the battalion was subjected to heavy shelling and rifle fire. The remainder of the Zouaves withdrew, and the Buffs then completely occupied the gap between the Canadian companies.

The 24th April proved an unfortunate day. D Company was moved at the urgent request of the 3rd Canadian Brigade to a position across the Wieltje-St. Julien road, but at 7 a.m. Captain Tomlinson’s B Company, which had been detached late on the 22nd to the succour of the Canadians, was completely surrounded by the enemy, and after losing very heavily, practically all the survivors were made prisoners. Among the killed were Lieut. W. G. Jackson and 2nd Lieut. C. W. Laing. The Canadians and others who saw this company attack stated that this little force was entirely responsible for the saving of the Canadian left, and also that practically the whole company was killed, wounded or taken prisoner, including Tomlinson, who had again shown great gallantry. On this 24th of April, as well as the two following days, the shelling was most severe, and the men suffered much from the poisonous fumes given off on the bursting of the shells. D Company was relieved by the Canadians on the morning of the 25th and resumed its old place, thrown back at an angle from A’s right flank.

The battalion being relieved by the 4th Battalion Rifle Brigade, got back to dug-outs at St. Jean on the 27th, but the constant and persistent shelling continued there all day and, on the 28th, the Buffs received orders to rejoin the 85th Brigade at Verlorenhoek, Geddes’ detachment having been broken up.

Colonel Geddes had thus again shown his worth; he combined experience and valour with a strong understanding and much intellectual power, and had, it would seem, a fine future before him. His brilliant handling of the critical situation so suddenly forced on him undoubtedly prevented the Germans from pressing home the attack so successfully begun on the 22nd. To the great loss of his regiment and his country, a shell entered the room in which he was sitting on the morning of the 28th and killed him instantly.[9]

Although the 29th and 30th of April proved quiet days for the regiment at Verlorenhoek this was but a lull in the awful and pitiless storm. The most marked feature of the next few days was the failure of the artillery to support the overdriven foot soldiers. This, of course, was in no possible way the fault of the glorious gunners, but gun fire cannot be kept up without an adequate supply of material. Throughout the whole period since the first break in the line on the night of the 22nd April all the troops in this area had been constantly subjected to violent artillery bombardment from a large mass of guns with an unlimited supply of ammunition. It proved impossible, whilst under such a vastly superior fire of artillery and gas, to dig efficient trenches or properly reorganize the line after the confusion and demoralization caused by the first great gas surprise; consequently a withdrawal to a new line some little way further back became imperative, and this was carried out successfully during the first four days of May.

Meantime, they were doing their duty in England; drafts were coming out to replace those who had fallen, and the hard-tried battalion was pulling itself together for the further upholding of the great cause and for the honour of the corps.

On the 1st May a fresh draft of men had arrived from England. There was no time to allot them to companies, so, for the time being, they were kept together and put entire into a new support trench in front of a wood, and the very next day they came under really extraordinarily heavy shell fire, to which our gunners were unable to reply. It was the most trying initiation into warfare that young soldiers ever had to undergo, and the shelling was renewed at dawn on the 3rd of the month, so that Captain Archer Houblon, who commanded, reported many casualties, his parapet blown in and the situation critical. During the whole of this day the shelling was quite abnormal in intensity and our gunners could make hardly any reply. In the afternoon the bombardment is described as sounding like machine-gun fire, being, as it was, so rapid and incessant. The enemy meanwhile rushed a trench called D.5, there being few, if any, Buffs to resist them. It had been occupied by Captain Howard Smith, Lieut. G. R. Howe and some eighty men of C Company. The whole party was reported missing, and it was believed nearly all were killed or wounded. There were during these days no communication trenches and the firing was too hot to permit of men moving from one work to another, so that parties were completely isolated.

The following is an extract from the official diary, a document which deals only with the plainest facts, related in the simplest language. There is never any exaggeration in the official diaries: “The Germans now occupied the woods behind D.5, a movement which made D.4 quite untenable; they were held up, however, by a small party of Buffs under 2nd Lieut. Backhouse and a company of Royal Fusiliers under Captain Ford, who gallantly held on to the new support trench despite fearsome enfilade fire from heavy howitzers and other artillery. Captain Houblon and Lieut. Sharp and remainder of D Company who were still holding D.4, were now being enfiladed by Germans from D.5 and taken in reverse from the wood. Captain Houblon, therefore, was compelled to retire along the trench line, a movement which was carried out steadily. The Germans were still pressing forward and soon occupied a portion of the new support trench where it joined D.4. Our men and the enemy were now only a few yards apart, unfortunately the enemy were in greater numbers and a far stronger situation. Many of the enemy were shot, especially when they filed out of the wood in front of D.5. In the retirement we also lost heavily.

“The two last men in D.4 were Company Sergt.-Major Port and No. 7852 Pte. F. Campbell, both of C Company. These two bravely kept the enemy off while the others got away, and were able eventually both to follow under very heavy fire.

“Lieut. Sharp was wounded, but was able, with the survivors of Captain Houblon’s party, to reach D.3 and later D.1, held by Captain Barnard with A Company. When the musketry and machine-gun fire opened in the wood, Major Power instantly decided to send up the support company to the ridge south-west of the wood with the object of checking the enemy’s advance and of reinforcing Captain Ford’s company of Fusiliers in the new support trench. The exact situation at the time was unknown. On the way up Major Power was wounded in the chest.”

* * * * *

From about 3.45 p.m. to 6 p.m. the enemy plastered, bombarded and searched the ridge with a storm of artillery fire, but the Royal Fusiliers and a few of the 2nd East Yorkshire stood their ground and the enemy showed no inclination to advance from the wood. Any moment our people hoped to hear our artillery open, but hoped in vain. If only our guns could have got on to the wood, the enemy must have suffered heavily. As it was the contest was an unequal one. It was our infantry alone against the enemy’s infantry in force and a most powerful combination of the enemy’s artillery. Fortunately for us the attack of the enemy’s infantry lacked push and determination. Things quieted down towards dusk, the enemy contenting himself with remaining where he was, enabling our retirement, which was ordered for the night 3rd/4th May, to be carried out quite steadily with a minimum of loss, all wounded men, spare ammunition and tools being brought away. The remnants of the battalion moved back to bivouacs in a wood near Poperinghe on the 4th of the month, where it was congratulated by General Plumer on the excellent work it had done and where it remained till the 8th. There is no doubt that the Buffs had been fortunate in having in Major Power a worthy successor to their late colonel. That officer was, however, now on the sick list from a severe wound in the chest, and the command had fallen to Captain Jackson, who held it for a few days until the arrival of a very senior captain, Worthington, who was given the temporary rank of lieut-colonel.

The total casualties from 22nd April to 4th May were:--

_Officers killed_ 6:

Colonel A. D. Geddes, Captain J. McB. Ronald, Lieuts. E. H. U. Buttanshaw and W. G. Jackson, 2nd Lieuts. C. W. Laing and P. T. Featherstonhaugh-Frampton.

_Officers wounded_ 9:

Major R. E. Power, Lieuts. A. D. Wilkins, J. B. Sharp and D. V. Thomas, 2nd Lieuts. L. M. S. Essell, E. B. Backhouse, R. M. Watson, G. Seath and S. Rivers.

_Wounded and Missing_ 2:

Captain F. W. Tomlinson and Lieut. G. R. Howe.

_Missing_ 2:

Captain L. Howard Smith and Lieut. A. L. D. Ryder.

The other rank casualties are most difficult to account for, particularly in respect of the 150 men of the two drafts that arrived on the 30th April and the 1st May respectively. These men’s names were not known. Also many men were buried in the trenches and it was impossible to obtain identity discs. The following figures are approximate; it is certain, however, that many others were killed, including the majority of the above-mentioned drafts:--

Killed 67 Wounded 259 Wounded and missing 13 Missing 363

A total of 17 officers and 702 other ranks.

* * * * *

It may be conceived and understood from this list of losses that the old “Contemptible” army had by now disappeared. A few officers, including promoted N.C.O.’s, and some veteran soldiers, still existed; many of them, having partially recovered from wounds and sickness, were now in military employment in England, but, roughly speaking, the soldiers fighting in France were new men, who, a year before, never thought it possible that they would be fighting the battles of their Country; but still the drafts arrived and still the men composing them were called upon to die or be maimed. It was a sad thing in the case above recorded for the poor lads of the drafts who had just left Kent full of life, zeal and enthusiasm to be obliterated immediately on reaching their long-desired goal, their regiment, and even before they had been allotted to companies.

At daylight on the 8th May very heavy bombardment was heard, and at 8.30 a.m. the Buffs, still under the command of Captain Jackson, were ordered to a camp west of Ypres on the Zonnebeke road. Here were found very poor and dilapidated trenches with demolished parapets, but these were ordered to be held at all costs, and here the battalion was shelled all day. B Company set to work to dig itself into a new support trench about two hundred yards behind the main fire one. Towards midnight on the 12th, after almost continuous shelling during the preceding days, the battalion was relieved by the Life Guards and moved back to Poperinghe.

The next night the Buffs, with the Northumberland Fusiliers, Cheshire Regiment and 1st Battalion York and Lancasters were formed into a temporary composite brigade under Br.-General Bols, and told to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice, but on the 19th the 85th Brigade took over this duty from Bols’ men, the Buffs having in the interval received a large draft of 5 officers and 350 men.

On the 20th the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, made a speech to the 85th Brigade, as well as to others, of which the following is an extract:--

“I came over to say a few words to you and to tell you how much I, as Commander-in-Chief of this Army, appreciate the splendid work that you have all done during the recent fighting. You have fought the Second Battle of Ypres, which will rank amongst the most desperate and hardest fights of the war. You may have thought because you were not attacking the enemy that you were not helping to shorten the war. On the contrary, by your splendid endurance and bravery, you have done a great deal to shorten it. In this, the Second Battle of Ypres, the Germans tried by every means in their power to get possession of that unfortunate town. They concentrated large forces of troops and artillery, and further than that they had recourse to that mean and dastardly practice, hitherto unheard of in civilized warfare, namely, the use of asphyxiating gases. You have performed the most difficult, arduous and terrific task of withstanding a stupendous bombardment by heavy artillery, probably the fiercest artillery fire ever directed against troops, and warded off the enemy’s attacks with magnificent bravery. By your steadiness and devotion, both the German plans were frustrated. He was unable to get possession of Ypres--if he had done this he would probably have succeeded in preventing neutral Powers from intervening--and he was also unable to distract us from delivering our attack in conjunction with the French in the Arras-Armentieres district. Had you failed to repulse his attacks, and made it necessary for more troops to be sent to your assistance, our operations in the south might not have been able to take place, and would certainly not have been so successful as they have been. Your Colours have many famous names emblazoned on them, but none will be more famous or more well-deserved than that of the Second Battle of Ypres. I want you one and all to understand how thoroughly I realize and appreciate what you have done. I wish to thank you, each officer, non-commissioned officer and man, for the services you have rendered by doing your duty so magnificently, and I am sure that your Country will thank you too.”

* * * * *

At 2.45 a.m. on the 24th May the Germans attacked as a final effort the whole front from Wieltje to the Menin road. This began with gas for four and a half hours and a very heavy bombardment with gas shells, combined with “Flammenwerfen,” a terrible implement for ejecting liquid fire, new at this time. Then the enemy advanced in very heavy masses and gained the snipers’ line, but was repulsed in each attempt to get further. Two companies of the 8th Middlesex and one company East Surrey immediately north of the railway gave way in consequence of the gas. There was cavalry on the right of the 85th Brigade and these were at the same time heavily attacked, so that the O.C. Buffs, which was the right battalion of the G.H.Q. line, was asked for help. The message came at 4.30 a.m. and was from Captain Court, 9th Lancers, who said that his men were “on their knees,” but holding out. Captain Barnard with A Company followed by half of C, under Lieut. Swayne, at once started for the rescue to reinforce the trenches north and south of the Menin road, and thus on this day the Buffs fought in two separate parties. At 6.30 orders came to reinforce the 3rd Royal Fusiliers, who meant to retake their lost trench, and B Company, with the remaining half of C, went up, leaving for the present D Company in the G.H.Q. line. Directly it left the reserve line this party came under very heavy shell fire and lost badly. Major Johnstone of the Fusiliers, however, organized his counter-stroke, but it was beaten off, he himself being wounded, Lieut. D. W. Hammond of the Buffs killed and many men of both regiments lost.

The enemy appeared to be in great strength, so the remainder of the Buffs was ordered up to assist the Royal Fusiliers at a level crossing on the railway, but all this time the enemy’s shell fire was terrific and the crossing became merely a death-trap. However, about 1 p.m. D Company issued from the G.H.Q. lines and tried to come on, though it was almost an impossibility. It was a terrible undertaking and only about thirty men, under 2nd Lieut. Mantle, managed the journey. The situation was most critical as the enemy were working round the right. About 5 p.m. a counter-attack by the 84th Brigade, though held up, relieved matters somewhat. At nightfall the attack was continued by 84th and 80th Brigades, but was not successful owing to the terrific rifle and machine-gun fire directed upon it by the enemy. There were many casualties. Numbers of Cheshire, Welsh, K.S.L.I. and other regiments retired into the road cutting held by the Buffs and 3rd Royal Fusiliers.

Referring to the other party of the battalion which, under Captain Barnard, had been sent to assist the cavalry who were holding their own so well, the following extract from the official diary describes its adventures:--

“Captain Barnard having received orders to reinforce the 9th Lancers, moved east along the Menin road under shrapnel fire, meeting on the way scores of gassed and wounded men retiring from trenches north of the Menin-Ypres road. Eventually about 150 men of A Company filed into the Hooge trenches, the occupants of which were suffering badly from the gas--especially the officers. Besides the 9th Lancers, there were portions of the 18th Hussars, 4th Yorkshires, York and Lancasters and 5th D.L.I. Captain Grenfell, V.C., 9th Lancers, was in command. A Company spread all along the five hundred yards of trenches. The enemy were found to be enveloping our left or north flank and had pushed on one thousand yards west of it. A Company then swung round and formed a new firing line facing north to meet the new menace.”

For three days, until the night of the 26th to 27th, the company maintained its position and accounted for several of the enemy. The men were subjected to continuous fire from the enemy’s artillery, snipers and large trench mortars. It was a case of digging in all day and night. Some of the trenches were knee deep in water. No rations were received for two days and the company was in great difficulties, and a trying situation for the whole period up to the night of 26th/27th, when it was relieved and moved back to G.H.Q. line. The 25th of the month was devoted to the collection and reorganization of what was left of B, C and D Companies under difficulties owing to the many stragglers from other corps. The enemy fortunately slackened his fierce attacks and at nightfall many wounded were collected, and after a couple of comparatively quiet days in the trenches the battalion marched back to billets east of Poperinghe.

After the narration of such terrible scenes as have been described it is pleasant to record a happy social event which, though a civilian reader may possibly regard it as of trivial importance, bears a very different aspect in the eyes of the English soldier. In all or nearly all foreign armies the battalions of a regiment are parts of the same tactical unit, but this does not obtain in our Army. The nature of our military duties causes the necessity of one battalion being abroad while the other remains at home, and it is almost unheard of that two battalions should serve together. There are old and retired Buffs who remember the meeting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions at Singapore about the year 1885. The occasion was celebrated then in what might now be considered almost too jovial a manner, but its rare occurrence made it very memorable. Again, after the Boer War when the 2nd Battalion, recently home from South Africa, was quartered in Dover, the 1st, back from Aden, was sent there also. These meetings are still remembered by the survivors of those who served in 1885 and 1904. On the 2nd June, then, in the midst of a tremendous war, it so happening that both the old units were resting at the same time and near the same place, the 2nd Battalion made a route march to Wittenhoek to visit its sister battalion which was in bivouac there. It was an historical event as far as the old regiment was concerned, though, alas, the two portions of it were not the same men that wore the Dragon on their collars a year before. Still, there were certain old friendships to renew and the Buffs were still the Buffs after all.

[Illustration: YPRES]