CHAPTER XII

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

On May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet fought the action which has become known as the Battle of Jutland. The despatch[G] describing the battle, as published some weeks later, was not quite in its original form as written by me. After a conference held at the Admiralty, early in June, modifications were made: some of them because it was considered that certain passages might convey useful information to the enemy, and others because it was thought to be undesirable to draw attention to certain features of British design. Amongst the latter was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our earlier battle cruisers.

[G] See Appendix.

Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause our battle cruisers, with their attendant light cruisers, to occupy when at sea an advanced position, often at a considerable distance from the Battle Fleet. Battle cruisers were designed and built in order that they might keep in touch with the enemy and report his movements when he had been found; hence the heavy guns which they carried. They were intended to find the enemy for the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy’s strength in order to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not been adopted the enemy’s battle cruisers could not have been brought to action on such occasions as the engagement of January 24th, 1915. And in the cases of raids on our coast, the battle cruisers were always sent ahead at full speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy battle cruisers.

Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the middle of 1916 and the heavier armaments carried by our ships, the real risk involved in this policy was that of our battle cruisers being drawn on to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, and one or more of our vessels being disabled. Provided that our ships were not disabled, they would, owing to their higher speed, have no difficulty in clear weather in keeping out of range of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if it were sighted, whilst still maintaining touch with it, and driving off lighter vessels. With the added support of the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been grouped with the Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to the absence of the 3rd Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow, the tactical advantage of our ships was even stronger, provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an excess of speed over the fastest enemy’s Battle Squadron.

In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch, I had felt it necessary on the highest grounds, as well as only just to the officers and men of our battle cruisers, to give some explanation of the heavy losses incurred by our ships in the early part of the action, when we were opposing six battle cruisers (supported, though at long range, by four battleships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, comprising the 5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy battle cruisers, which were not then supported by the German Battle Fleet. Inquiry into this matter showed that one explanation was that our ships were very inadequately protected by armour as compared with the German vessels of the battle cruiser type. It was considered undesirable to draw attention to this publicly while the war was in progress.

The relative values of protection and gun power had frequently engaged my serious attention. It was also a subject of much discussion amongst writers on naval matters, some of whom went to the length of suggesting that all available weight should be put into gun power and that ships should be left practically without armour. Their views were based on the argument that “the best defense is a powerful offensive.” Although this argument is very true when applied to strategy, the War has shown its fallacy as applied to _matériel_. The loss of the _Good Hope_, _Monmouth_, _Queen Mary_, _Indefatigable_, _Invincible_, _Defence_, and _Warrior_, and the considerations to which these losses gave rise, convinced naval officers afloat, even if they did not convince others less intimately associated with the Fleet during the War, that ships with inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those which possess them to a considerably greater degree, even if the former are superior in gun power. The conviction was strengthened by the knowledge we obtained, that German ships, far more frequently hit by gunfire, torpedo, or mine than many of our ships that sank, were yet taken safely into port owing, partly, to their defensive qualities, but, partly, to the limitations of our armour-piercing shell at that time.

There has been in the past a tendency in some quarters, when comparing the relative strength of the British and German Fleets for the purpose of future provision of large vessels in the Navy Estimates, to make comparison only on the basis of the _gun power_ of the vessels of the two Navies. Great superiority in fighting qualities on the part of the British Fleet was suggested by this blindness to other considerations. During my pre-War service at the Admiralty this question was often under discussion, and I consistently demurred to this line of argument as being very misleading, and pointed out that the true comparison lay between the _displacement_ of the ships of the various classes, because if we assumed, as War experience has since shown that we were justified in assuming that the German naval designers and constructors were not inferior in ability to our own, it was obvious that, taking ships of equal displacement and equal speed, and about contemporary date, if our vessels possessed superiority in gunfire, the Germans must possess superiority in some other direction. It was well known at the Admiralty that their superiority lay in greatly increased protection, combined with heavier torpedo armament.

We were also aware that the German vessels were fitted with small tube boilers, which were very economical in weight for a given horse-power, and, consequently, the German vessels obtained thereby a further advantage, the weight saved being presumably utilised in giving the ships additional protection. In other words, they adopted a different disposition of the weight available in each ship.

The tables on pp. 308–11 give particulars of the armament, protection, and displacement of the capital ships of the two Navies engaged in the Battle of Jutland, so far as they are known to me.

The main facts revealed by an examination of these tables are:

BATTLESHIPS

1. The German ships of any particular period were of considerably greater displacement as compared with contemporary British ships.

2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of armour than their British contemporaries.

TABLE I

BRITISH BATTLESHIPS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- | | | | | | | ARMOUR | | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | “Royal Sovereign” Class (5)| 1913–14 | 25,750 | 21.5 | 3,400 | 8, 15″ | 4 | 13″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 13″ | 1″ to 4″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 14, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Queen Elizabeth” Class (5)| 1912–13 | 27,500 | 25.0 | 3,400 | 8, 15″ | 4 | 13″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 13″ | 1″ to 3″ | Ditto | | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Iron Duke” Class (4) | 1911–12 | 25,000 | 21.0 | 4,300 | 10, 13″.5 | 4 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 11″ | 1½″ to 2½″ | Ditto | | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “King George V.” Class (3) | 1910–11 | 23,000 | 21.0 | 4,000 | 10, 13″.5 | 2 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Orion” Class (4) | 1909–10 | 22,500 | 21.0 | 4,100 | 10, 13″.5 | 2 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Ditto | | | | | 13, 4″ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _Canada_ | Emergency | 28,000 | 22.75 | 3,800 | 10, 14″ | 4 | 9″ | 7″ and 4½″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 10″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up | War | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and | Programme | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _Erin_ | Ditto | 23,000 | 21.0 | 2,800 | 10, 13″.5 | 3 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 11″ | 1½″ to 3″ | Ditto | | | | | 16, 6″ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _Agincourt_ | Ditto | 27,500 | 22.0 | 3,800 | 14, 12″ | 3 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 12″ | 1″ to 1½″ | Ditto | | | | | 20, 6″ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Hercules” Class (3) | 1909–10 | 20,000 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 11″ | 8″ | 2½″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to main deck only. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “St. Vincent” Class (2) | 1907–8 | 19,250 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 10″ | 8″ | 2″ | 2″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto | | | | | 13, 4″ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Bellerophon” Class (3) | 1906–7 | 18,600 | 21.0 | 3,500 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 10″ | 8″ | 6″ | 5″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _Dreadnought_ | 1905–6 | 17,900 | 21.0 | 4,000 | 10, 12″ | 4 | 11″ | 8″ | 6″ | 4″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto | | | | | 20, 12 pds.| | | | | | | | | ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

TABLE II

BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- | | | | | | | ARMOUR | | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | _Tiger_ (1) | 1911–12 | 28,500 | 29.0 | 6,800 | 8, 13″.5 | 2 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 9″ | 1″ to 3″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Lion” Class (3) | 1909–10 | 26,350 | 28.0 | 4,600 | 8, 13″.5 | 2 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | nil | 9″ | 1″ to 2½″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 15, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “New Zealand” Class (3) | | 18,800 | 26.0 | 4,000 | 8, 12″ | 2 | 6″ | | 4″ | 4″ | nil | 7″ | 1″ to 2½″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 14, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to main deck. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Inflexible” Class (3) | 1905–6 | 17,250 | 25.0 | 3,800 | 8, 12″ | 4 | 6″ | | 4″ | nil | nil | 7″ | ¾″ to 2½″ | Ditto | | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

TABLE III

GERMAN BATTLESHIPS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- | | | | | | | ARMOUR | | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | “König” Class (4) | 1911–12 | 25,390 | 23.0 | 4,200 | 10, 12″ | 5 | 14″ | 10″ | 6″ | 6″ | 8″ | 14″ | 2½″ to 3″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Kaiser” Class (5) | 1909–11 | 24,410 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 5 |13″.75 | 9″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 11¾″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Ditto, but at | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | after end side | | | | | | | | | | | | | | only armoured | | | | | | | | | | | | | | up to main deck. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Heligoland” Class (4) | 1908–9 | 22,440 | 20.5 | 3,100 | 12, 12″ | 6 |11″.75 | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 11¾″ | 1½″ to 2¾″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to main deck and | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | “Nassau” Class (4) | 1907–8 | 18,600 | 20.0 | 2,800 | 12, 11″ | 6 |11″.75 | 7¾″ | 6″ | 4″ | 6½″ | 11″ | 2″ to 4¾″ | Ditto | | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

TABLE IV

GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+------------------- | | | | | | | ARMOUR | | | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | | Designed | | Fuel | Main and | Submerged | | | | | Secondary | | | Ships | Programme | load | Speed | capacity | secondary | torpedo | Main | Upper | Belt | Belt | gun | Turret | Protective | REMARKS | | displacement | | | guns | tubes | belt | belt | at | at | battery | front | decks | | | | | | | | | | bow | stern | armour | plates | | ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+------------------- | Year | Tons | Knots | Tons | | | | | | | | | | “Derfflinger” Class[H] | 1911–12 | 26,180 | 28.0 | 5,600 | 8, 12″ | 4 | 12″ | 8″ | 5″ | 5″ | 7″ | 11″ | 1″ to 3.2″ | Side armoured up | | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to upper deck with | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | above that. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _Seydlitz_ | 1910–11 | 24,610 | 26.75 | 3,700 | 10, 11″ | 4 | 11¾″ | 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 10″ | 1″ to 3¼″ | Ditto | | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | _Moltke_ | 1908–9 | 22,640 | 27.25 | 3,200 | 10, 11″ | 4 | 11″ }| tapering | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 10″ | ? same as | Ditto | | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | }| | | | | | _Seydlitz_ | | | | | | | | }| | | | | | | _Von der Tann_ | 1907–8 | 19,100 | 26.0 | 2,900 | 8, 11″ | 4 | 9¾″}| | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 9″ | ? same as | Side armoured up | | | | | 10, 5″.9 | | }| | | | | | _Seydlitz_ | to main deck with | | | | | | | | | | | | | | secondary battery | | | | | | | | | | | | | | armoured to upper | | | | | | | | | | | | | | deck. ---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

[H] _Lutzow_ was similar.

TABLE V

Comparison of weight of armour in British and German ships of the same date. N. B.--The German figures are approximate.

-----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+-------- | | Weight of | Weight of deck | | Length | | Displacement | armour | protection | Total | of ship | Beam -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+-------- BATTLESHIPS-- | | Tons | Tons | Tons | Feet | Feet _Monarch_ British | 22,500 | 4,560 | 2,010 | 6,570 | 545 | 88½ _Kaiser_ German | 24,410 | 5,430 | 3,130 | 8,560 | 564 | 95 | | | | | | BATTLE CRUISERS-- | | | | | | _Queen Mary_ British | 27,000 | 3,900 | 2,300 | 6,200 | 660 | 89 _Seydlitz_ German | 24,610 | 5,200 | 2,400 | 7,600 | 656 | 93½ -----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+--------

_Note._--Similar comparisons between other ships of the same date would show similar results.

3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side armour _to the upper deck_, whilst nine of the earliest British Dreadnoughts were provided with armour protection to the _main deck only_, thus rendering them far more open to artillery attack. The “Orion” class of battleship and the “Lion” class of battle cruiser, designed during my service at the Admiralty as Controller, were the first of our Dreadnoughts armoured to the upper deck.

4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships was in nearly all cases thicker than in their British contemporaries, whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in _all cases_ considerably greater in the German ships.

5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually greater than in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision more complete.

6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo tubes than the British vessels.

BATTLE CRUISERS

1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater displacement than their British contemporaries.

2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than their British contemporaries.

3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without protection above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels being provided with protection to the upper deck.

4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all positions, including deck protection, as well as more complete watertight subdivisions.

5. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo tubes than the British ships.

As against the additional protection of the German ships our vessels of contemporary design were provided in all cases with heavier turret guns, whilst the German ships carried heavier secondary armaments.

A point of considerable interest, which should also be mentioned because it was to prove important, was that the Germans possessed a delay-action fuse which, combined with a highly efficient armour-piercing projectile, ensured the burst of shell taking place _inside_ the armour of British ships instead of _outside_, or whilst passing through the armour, which was the case with British shells of that date fired against the thick German armour.

The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was not widely different, although the British ships, as a rule, were fitted to carry more fuel. Although I arranged, after the first few months of war, to reduce the amount of fuel carried by our ships very considerably--in fact, by more than 25 per cent.--I was unable to reduce it further in coal-burning ships without sacrificing some of the protection afforded by the coal, since in our case it was necessary to be prepared to do a considerable amount of steaming at high speed, involving expenditure of coal, before obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have been unwise to contemplate meeting the Germans with coal below what I may call the “safety line.” On the other hand, it was well known that, as the Germans had no intention of fighting an action far from their bases, they had effected a very much greater reduction in the quantity of fuel carried with consequently a corresponding advantage in speed.

There was yet one other matter of great importance, namely, the vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies in regard to under-water attack. Here the Germans possessed a very real advantage, which stood them in good stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes:

1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside the ships, and in many cases its greater thickness.

2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer skin of the ship and the consequent additional protection to under-water attack afforded thereby.

In regard to the first point, the great majority of our ships only carried partial internal protection, that is, protection over a portion of the length of the ship. The protection was usually confined to the region of the magazine and shell-rooms. In the German ships it ran throughout the length of the vessel.

As to the second point, it was possible to place the protective bulkhead farther “inboard” in the German ships without cramping machinery and magazine spaces, because the ships themselves were of much greater beam. Consequently the explosion of a mine or a torpedo against the hull of the ship was far less likely to injure the protective bulkhead and so to admit water into the vitals of the ships than was the case with a British vessel. The result was that, although it is known that many German capital ships were mined and torpedoed during the war, including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans have not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre-Dreadnought battleship _Pommern_ and the battle cruiser _Lutzow_, whose injuries from shell fire were also very extensive.

On the other hand, British capital ships, mined or torpedoed, rarely survived. The recorded instances of escape are the _Inflexible_ (mined in the Dardanelles) and the _Marlborough_ (torpedoed at Jutland), and in the latter case, although the torpedo struck at about the most favourable spot for the ship, she had some difficulty in reaching port.

The question will be asked why it was that British ships were under this disadvantage. The reply is that the whole of our Dreadnought battleships, designed before the War, were hampered by the absence of proper dock accommodation. The German Emperor once remarked to me at Kiel on this subject, that we had made the mistake of building our ships before we had proper dock accommodation for them, whilst in Germany they had provided the dock accommodation first and had designed the ships subsequently. He was quite right, although, since docks took a long time to construct, the German policy involved delay in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of a type, and hence our margin of superiority in 1914. As each successive type of Dreadnought was designed, our constructive staff were faced with the fact that if they went beyond a certain beam the number of docks available would be insufficient; and it was always a matter of great difficulty to obtain money with which to construct adequate docks. Docks make no appeal to the imagination of the public and cost a great deal of money. The result was that August, 1914, found us with a superiority in ships, but woefully lacking in dock accommodation; and for this reason alone a Fleet action early in the War, resulting in considerable damage to heavy ships, would have produced embarrassing results.

It is only just to our very able constructive staff at the Admiralty to point this out; it was one of the reasons which led to the German ships being much better equipped to withstand under-water attack than were our own. It is devoutly to be hoped that this lesson will be borne in mind in the future, and adequate dock accommodation provided for the Fleet.

The matter is one of which I have considerable personal knowledge, since it came within my province as Controller in 1909–11 and was also given to me to examine whilst Second Sea Lord in 1913. It is needless to say that on both occasions the necessities were pointed out with emphasis. These remarks are not out of place, as will be shown, as an introduction in a consideration of the Battle of Jutland, if that action is to be rightly judged.

In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essential to bear in mind that the time of receipt of signals, especially of reports emanating from the bridge of a ship, is not a true indication of the time at which the officer making the report began his task. A varying but considerable interval is bound to elapse; this includes the time taken to write out the report, transmit it to the wireless office or signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode it on board the receiving ship, write it out and transmit it to the bridge. The interval is greater with wireless than with visual signals.

I.--THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET’S ACTION

The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea. The orders from me under which the Fleet acted were as follows:

Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle Squadron from Cromarty, was directed to pass through a position in Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.0 E., and to meet the remainder of the Battle Fleet at 2 P.M. on the 31st at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron, was directed to proceed to a position in Lat. 56.40 N., Long. 5 E., economising fuel in the destroyers as much as possible; it was expected that he would be in that position by about 2 P.M. on the 31st, after which he was directed to stand to the northward to get into visual touch with the Battle Fleet.

[Illustration:

Operations of BATTLE CRUISER FLEET II·00 p.m to VI·15 p.m. 31^{st}. May.]

The _Iron Duke_ and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, together with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the newly commissioned light cruisers _Chester_ and _Canterbury_, which had been carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of May 30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E., having met the 2nd Battle Squadron _en route_ at 11.15 A.M. in Lat. 58.13 N., Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed before sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards the Horn Reef from the position in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.

At 2 P.M. on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about 18 miles to the north-westward of the position (A), being actually in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 3.45 E., in organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been slightly delayed for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary practice of examining trawlers and other vessels met with _en route_ to be carried out without causing the examining vessels to expend unnecessary fuel in regaining station. We had to be on our guard against scouts. The divisions were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard in the order: 1st–6th Divisions (screened by the 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas) with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were stationed 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six miles apart on a line of direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.; the cruisers being eight miles apart and their positions being in the order from east to west:

(F.) (F.) _Cochrane_ _Shannon_ _Minotaur_ _Defence_ _Duke of Edinburgh_ _Black Prince_ . . . . . _Warrior_ . . _Hampshire_ (linking ship 6 miles astern of the _Minotaur_)

The attached cruisers, the _Active_, _Boadicea_, _Blanche_, and _Bellona_, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers _Chester_ and _Canterbury_, about 20 miles ahead, the whole steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the speed of _advance_ being 14 knots.

The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below:

Line of Advance. ^ | |

1st Div. 2nd Div. 3rd Div. 4th Div. 5th Div. 6th Div. _King George V._(F.) _Orion_ (F.) _Iron Duke_ (F.F.) _Benbow_ (F.) _Colossus_ (F.) _Marlborough_ (F.) _Ajax_ _Monarch_ _Royal Oak_ _Bellerophon_ _Collingwood_ _Revenge_ _Centurion_ _Conqueror_ _Superb_ (F.) _Temeraire_ _Neptune_ _Hercules_ _Erin_ _Thunderer_ _Canada_ _Vanguard_ _St. Vincent_ _Agincourt_

F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship.

It may be added in further explanation that the flagships of the Battle Fleet were:

_Iron Duke_, Fleet-Flagship.--Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (Commander-in-Chief).

_King George V._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram, Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron.

_Orion._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in the 2nd Battle Squadron.

_Superb._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in the 4th Battle Squadron.

_Benbow._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Commanding the 4th Battle Squadron.

_Colossus._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral in the 1st Battle Squadron.

_Marlborough._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding 1st Battle Squadron and second in command of the Grand Fleet.

The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, with destroyers, were at 2 P.M. in Lat. 56.46 N., Long. 4.40 E., and had turned to the northward, steering N. by E., speed 19½ knots, in the order:

The _Lion_ and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead, screened by the light cruiser _Champion_ and 10 destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead three miles E.N.E. of the _Lion_, screened by six destroyers.[I] The 5th Battle Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W. of the _Lion_, being screened by the light cruiser _Fearless_ and nine destroyers of the 1st Flotilla. The Light Cruiser Squadrons formed a screen eight miles S.S.E. from the _Lion_, ships spread on a line of direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to east:

2nd Light Cruiser 3rd Light Cruiser 1st Light Cruiser Squadron Squadron Squadron _Southampton_ (F.) _Nottingham_ _Falmouth_ (F.) _Birkenhead_ _Inconstant_ _Galatea_ (F.) _Birmingham_ _Dublin_ _Gloucester_ _Cordelia_ _Phaeton_

[I] These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but happened to be at Rosyth.

It should be added that the flagships were:

_Lion._--Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty.

_Princess Royal._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, commanding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

_New Zealand._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, commanding 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.

_Barham._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding 5th Battle Squadron.

The _Engadine_, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between the light cruisers _Gloucester_ and _Cordelia_, and the light cruiser _Yarmouth_ acted as linking ship between the _Lion_ and the light cruiser screen.

The first report of enemy vessels was received from the _Galatea_, the flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, who, at 2.20 P.M., sighted two enemy vessels to the E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possibilities of the situation, immediately turned his fleet to the S.S.E., the course for the Horn Reef, so as to get between the enemy and his base.

At 2.35 P.M. the _Galatea_ reported a large amount of smoke “as from a fleet” bearing E.N.E., followed by a report that the vessels were steering north. The course of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered to the eastward and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 P.M. and identified as five battle cruisers accompanied by destroyers.

Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, judging the situation accurately, spread to the east without waiting for orders, forming a screen in advance of the heavy ships. Our Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels of a similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore W. E. Goodenough, with his broad pendant in the _Southampton_, came in at high speed towards the battle cruisers and formed ahead of them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 P.M. sighted enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E.

On receipt of the _Galatea’s_ report, Sir David Beatty ordered the _Engadine_ to send up a sea-plane to scout to the N.N.E. This was the first time that sea-planes had been used for reconnaissance work with a fleet in an action, and the event is notable for that reason. The low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea-plane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. S. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was able, by flying low under the clouds, to identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the report being received on board the _Lion_ at 3.30 P.M. The sea-plane was under heavy fire from the light cruisers during the observation. By this time the line of battle was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station ahead. The course was E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, the speed 25 knots, and the range 23,000 yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on a line of bearing in order to clear the smoke.

The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the movements of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the weather was favourable, the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E., and the visibility good.

Meanwhile the wireless reports from the _Galatea_ to the _Lion_ had been intercepted on board the _Iron Duke_, and directions were at once given to the Battle Fleet to raise steam for full speed, the ships being at the time at short notice for full speed. The cruisers had been ordered to raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 P.M. the Battle Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 P.M. I directed Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships of the situation. The earliest reports from the _Galatea_ had indicated the presence of light cruisers and destroyers only, and my first impression was that these vessels, on sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels and were consequently not in so much danger of being cut off as if they turned to the southward. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well placed for cutting the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place, was ordered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 P.M., on the receipt of the information of the presence of enemy battle cruisers, it was directed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. About 3.40 P.M. I received a report from Sir David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers and a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the same time.

As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was reported, course was altered in the Battle Fleet to close our battle cruisers, and speed increased as rapidly as possible. By 4 P.M. the “Fleet Speed” was 20 knots, being higher than had previously been obtained. Zigzagging was abandoned on receipt of the _Galatea’s_ first report. The battleships were also directed to keep clear of the wake of the next ahead in order to prevent loss of speed from the wash.

At 3.48 P.M. the action between the battle cruisers began at a range of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened by the two forces practically simultaneously. At the commencement the fire from the German vessels was rapid and accurate, the _Lion_ being hit twice three minutes after fire was opened, and the _Lion_, _Tiger_ and _Princess Royal_ all receiving several hits by 4 P.M.; observers on board our own ships were also of opinion that our fire was effective at that stage.

At about 4 P.M. it was evident by the accuracy of the enemy’s fire that he had obtained the range of our ships, which was then about 16,000 yards. The enemy bore well abaft the beam, and course was altered slightly to the southward to confuse his fire control. Course was altered two or three times subsequently for the same purpose. The German ships frequently zigzagged for the purpose of confusing our fire control.

At this period the fire of the enemy’s ships was very rapid and accurate; the _Lion_ received several hits, the roof of one of her turrets being blown off at 4 P.M. At about 4.6 P.M. the _Indefatigable_ was hit, approximately at the outer edge of the upper deck level in line with the after turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an explosion followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell out of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit by another salvo forward, turned over and sank.

About this time (4.8 P.M.) the 5th Battle Squadron came into action, opening fire at a range between 19,000 and 20,000 yards. This slower squadron was some distance astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason partly of the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and partly of the light to the eastward having become less favourable, difficulty was experienced in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time. At 4.12 P.M. the range of the enemy’s battle cruisers from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was altered from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire had slackened owing to the increase in range.

The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing the line of our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the periscopes of enemy submarines were also made by more than one ship.

In accordance with the general directions given by Sir David Beatty to the destroyers to attack when a favourable opportunity occurred, the _Nestor_, _Nomad_, _Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_, _Obdurate_, _Nerissa_, _Moorsom_, _Morris_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_ moved out at 4.15 P.M.; at the same time a similar movement took place on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser and 15 destroyers. Both sides first steered to reach an advantageous position at the van of the opposing battle cruiser lines from which to deliver their attack, and then turned to the northward to attack. A fierce engagement at close quarters between the light forces resulted, and the enemy lost two destroyers, sunk by our vessels; and, in addition, his torpedo attack was partially frustrated; some torpedoes were fired by the enemy, two of which crossed the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been turned away to avoid the attack.

During this action, which reflected the greatest credit on our destroyers, several of our attacking vessels, owing to their having dropped back towards the rear of our line, were not in a good position to attack the enemy’s battle cruisers with torpedoes. The _Nestor_, _Nomad_, and _Nicator_, most gallantly led by Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham in the _Nestor_, were able to press home their attack, causing the enemy’s battle cruisers to turn away to avoid their torpedoes. The _Nomad_ was damaged and forced to haul out of line before getting within torpedo range of the battle cruisers, but the _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ succeeded in firing torpedoes at the battle cruisers under a heavy fire from the German secondary armaments. The _Nestor_ was then hit, badly damaged by the fire of a light cruiser, and remained stopped between the lines. She was sunk later by the German Battle Fleet when that force appeared on the scene, but not before she had fired her last torpedo at the approaching ships. The _Nomad_ was also sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but this vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached. In both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most trying circumstances was shown by the officers and men. It is gratifying to record that a considerable proportion of the ship’s company of both destroyers was picked up by German destroyers as the German Battle Fleet passed the scene. After completing her attack upon the battle cruisers, the _Nicator_ was able to rejoin her flotilla. The _Moorsom_ also attacked the enemy’s Battle Fleet and returned. In the meantime, the _Petard_, _Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_ succeeded in firing torpedoes at long range (7,000 yards) at the enemy’s battle cruisers. For his gallantry on the occasion of this destroyer attack Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, who was rescued from the _Nestor_ and taken prisoner by the Germans, received the Victoria Cross.

Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships had become very fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle cruisers began to be noticeable, the third ship in the line being observed to be on fire at 4.18 P.M., whilst our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were also inflicting and receiving some punishment. The accuracy and rapidity of the fire from the enemy’s vessels was deteriorating at this period; our own ships were much handicapped by the decreasing visibility, due partly to the use by the enemy of smoke screens, under cover of which he altered course to throw out our fire.

The flagship _Barham_, of the 5th Battle Squadron, received her first hit at 4.23 P.M.

At about 4.26 P.M. a second disaster befell the British battle cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy’s battle cruisers hit the _Queen Mary_ abreast of “Q” turret and a terrific explosion resulted, evidently caused by a magazine blowing up. The _Tiger_, which was following close astern of the _Queen Mary_, passed through the dense cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and a great deal of material fell on her decks, but otherwise the _Queen Mary_ had completely vanished. A few survivors from this ship and from the _Indefatigable_ were afterwards rescued by our destroyers. The loss of these two fine ships with their splendid ships’ companies was a heavy blow to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the instantaneous nature of the disaster adding to its magnitude.[J]

[J] I was not aware of the loss of the _Queen Mary_ and _Indefatigable_ until the morning of June 1st.

At 4.38 P.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the _Southampton_, Flagship of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been scouting ahead of the Battle Cruisers, reported that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in sight bearing S.E., and steering to the northward, and gave its position. Sir David Beatty recalled his destroyers, and on sighting the Battle Fleet at 4.42 P.M. turned the battle cruisers 16 points in succession to starboard. This movement was followed by the enemy’s battle cruisers, and Sir David Beatty directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn his ships in succession 16 points to starboard. Commodore Goodenough led the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron to a favourable position from which to observe the movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, within 13,000 yards’ range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very heavy fire, clung tenaciously to these ships and forwarded several reports of their position and movements; the skilful manner in which the Commodore, aided by his captains, handled the squadron under this fire undoubtedly saved the ships from heavy loss. Owing to the constant manœuvring of the ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron during the engagement, the position of the _Southampton_, as obtained by reckoning, was somewhat inaccurate, as was to be expected. This fact detracted from the value of the reports to me; the position of the enemy by latitude and longitude, as reported from time to time to the _Iron Duke_, was consequently incorrect. This discrepancy added greatly to the difficulty experienced in ascertaining the correct moment at which to deploy the Battle Fleet, the flank on which to deploy, and the direction of deployment. Such discrepancies are, however, inevitable under the conditions.

The necessary move of the battle cruisers to the southward in their pursuit of the enemy, at a speed considerably in excess of that which the Battle Fleet could attain, resulted in opening the distance between the two forces, so that at the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty’s force to the northward, the _Iron Duke_ and the _Lion_ were over 50 miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles per hour.

As soon as the position of the _Lion_ was known after the receipt of the report of enemy battle cruisers being in sight, Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. S. Hood was directed to proceed immediately to reinforce Sir David Beatty’s force, whose position, course and speed was signalled to the Rear-Admiral. The latter officer reported his own position and gave his course and speed as S.S.E., 25 knots. At the same time the Battle Fleet was informed that our battle cruisers were in action with the enemy’s battle cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company with Sir David Beatty, a reply in the affirmative being received, with a report that his squadron was in action.

At this time I was confident that, under the determined leadership of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our best and fastest battleships and six battle cruisers, very serious injury would be inflicted on the five battle cruisers of the enemy if they could be kept within range.

The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet, which was communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not cause me any uneasiness in respect of the safety of our own vessels, since our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were credited with a speed of 25 knots. I did not, however, expect that they would be able to exceed a speed of 24 knots; the information furnished to me at this time gave the designed speed of the fastest German battleships as 20.5 knots only. Even after making full allowance for the fact that our ships were probably carrying more fuel and stores proportionately than the Germans, and giving the Germans credit for some excess over the designed speed, no doubt existed in my mind that both our battleships and our battle cruisers with Sir David Beatty could keep well out of range of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if necessary, until I was able to reinforce them. I learned later, as an unpleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squadron, _when going at its utmost speed_, found considerable difficulty in increasing its distance from the enemy’s 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the “König” class, and on return to Scapa I received a report from the Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron with a speed of _23 knots_ for a short period, this being the first intimation I had received of such a speed being attainable by them.

To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between the battle cruisers was renewed during the retirement of our ships to the northward, and the two leading ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, the _Barham_ and _Valiant_, supported our battle cruisers by their fire, whilst the two rear ships of that force, the _Warspite_ and _Malaya_, engaged the leading ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet as long as their guns would bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards.

The light cruiser _Fearless_, with destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, and the light cruiser _Champion_, with destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle Squadron. The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in the rear during the southerly course, now took up a position on the starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. During this northerly run the fire from our ships was very intermittent, owing to the weather thickening to the eastward, although the enemy was able at times to fire with some accuracy.

From 5 P.M. until after 6 P.M. the light was very much in favour of the enemy, being far clearer to the westward than to the eastward. A photograph taken on board the _Malaya_ at 5.15 P.M. towards the western horizon established this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000 yards distant.

Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 minutes after 5.12 P.M. owing to the enemy’s ships being invisible, fire being reopened at about 5.40 P.M. on the enemy’s battle cruisers, three or four of which could be seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of some 14,000 yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed to be effective, the _Lion_ alone firing some 15 salvoes during this period.

At 5.10 P.M. the destroyer _Moresby_, which had rejoined the Battle Cruiser Fleet after assisting the _Engadine_ with her sea-plane, fired a torpedo at the enemy’s line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000 yards from a favourable position--two points before the beam of the enemy’s leading battle cruiser.

At 5.35 P.M. the _Lion’s_ course was gradually altered from N.N.E. to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled movements and resulting position of the British Battle Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also gradually hauled to the eastward, being probably influenced in this movement by reports received from their light cruisers, which were by this time in contact with the light cruiser _Chester_ and in sight of our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hood.

The proceedings of these vessels will now be described.

At 4 P.M., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, proceeded at full speed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5 P.M. the squadron, comprising the _Invincible_ (Flag), _Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_, in single line ahead in that order, with the destroyers _Shark_, _Christopher_, _Ophelia_, and _Acasta_, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had the light cruiser _Canterbury_ five miles ahead and the light cruiser _Chester_ bearing N. 70° W., and was steering S. by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was rapidly decreasing. According to the _Indomitable’s_ report, objects could be distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings, and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then onwards, according to the same report, the visibility varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards, although other reports place it higher at times.

At 5.30 P.M. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard to the south-westward, and the _Chester_ turned in that direction to investigate, and, at 5.36 P.M., sighted a three-funnelled light cruiser on the starboard bow, with one or two destroyers in company. The _Chester_ challenged and, receiving no reply, altered course to west to close, judging from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel was hostile.

As the _Chester_ closed, course was altered to about north in order to avoid being open to torpedo attack by the destroyer on a bearing favourable to the latter. This turn brought the enemy well abaft the port beam of the _Chester_ and on an approximately parallel course. During the turn the _Chester_ sighted two or more light cruisers astern of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser opened fire on the _Chester_, the latter replying immediately afterwards, at a range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility at this time, judging by the distance at which the enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the _Chester_, could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth salvo hit the _Chester_, put No. 1 gun port out of action, and killed and wounded a large proportion of the gun crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 port guns. The light cruisers sighted by the _Chester_ undoubtedly belonged to one of the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the starboard bow of their battle cruisers.

Captain Lawson of the _Chester_, in view of the superior force to which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. and towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing the enemy’s light cruisers, all of which had opened a rapid and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy vessels turned after the _Chester_, and during the unequal engagement, which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully manœuvred his ship with a view to impeding the accuracy of the hostile fire, realising that she was in no condition to engage such superior forces successfully in her damaged state.

The _Chester_ closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and took station N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at a later phase of the action. The ship suffered considerable casualties, having 31 killed and 50 wounded; three guns and her fire control circuits were disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above the water line. It was on board the _Chester_ that the second Victoria Cross of the action was earned, posthumously, by Jack Cornwell, Boy 1st Class, who was mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad, whose age was less than 16½ years, nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the guns’ crew, dead and wounded, all round him.

Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at 5.40 P.M., and Rear-Admiral Hood turned his ships to starboard and brought the enemy light cruisers, which were engaging the _Chester_, and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his port bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port quarter of the squadron. As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood made out his position he led his squadron with the _Canterbury_ between the enemy and the _Chester_, on a course about W.N.W., and at 5.55 P.M. opened an effective fire on the German light cruisers with his port guns, at a range of about 10,000 to 12,000 yards. The enemy vessels turned away from this attack and fired torpedoes at the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were seen later from the _Indomitable_. At about 6.10 P.M. the _Invincible_ and _Indomitable_ turned to starboard to avoid these torpedoes, three of which passed very close to the latter ship, and ran alongside within 20 yards of the vessel. The _Inflexible_ turned to port.

Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted astern of the first group, and the four British destroyers, _Shark_, _Acasta_, _Ophelia_ and _Christopher_, attacked them and the large destroyer force in company with them, and were received by a heavy fire which disabled the _Shark_ and damaged the _Acasta_. On board the _Shark_ the third V.C. of the action was earned by her gallant captain, Commander Loftus Jones, this award also being, I regret to say, posthumous.

The attack of the British destroyers was carried out with great gallantry and determination, and having frustrated the enemy’s torpedo attack on the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones turned his division to regain his position on our battle cruisers. At this moment three German vessels came into sight out of the mist and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the _Shark_ and causing many casualties on board; Commander Loftus Jones was amongst those wounded. Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, commanding the _Acasta_, came to the assistance of the _Shark_, but Commander Loftus Jones refused to imperil a second destroyer, and directed the _Acasta_ to leave him. The _Shark_ then became the target for the German ships and destroyers. Commander Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only undamaged gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be placed in the tube and fired; but whilst this was being done the torpedo was hit by a shell and exploded, causing many casualties. Those gallant officers and men in the _Shark_ who still survived, continued to fight the only gun left in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The captain was now wounded again, his right leg being taken off by a shell; but he still continued to direct the fire, until the condition of the _Shark_ and the approach of German destroyers made it probable that the ship would fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders for her to be sunk, countermanding this order shortly afterwards on realising that her remaining gun could still be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit by two torpedoes, and sank with her colours flying. Only six survivors were picked up the next morning by a Danish steamer. In recognition of the great gallantry displayed, the whole of the survivors were awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin, Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C. C. Hope, A.B.; C. H. Smith, A.B.; T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; T. W. Swan, Stoker.

At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of our advanced cruiser line, which at 5 P.M. was about 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, the latter being at that time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 5.12 E., steering S.E. by S. at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to decreasing visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard flank had closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 P.M. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was about 16 miles due east of the advanced cruiser line, but was steering more to the southward on a converging course at a speed of about five knots faster.

At 5.40 P.M. firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, and shortly afterwards ships were seen from the _Minotaur_ to be emerging from the mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the senior officer of the cruiser line, had recalled the ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing and had ordered them to form single line ahead on the _Minotaur_. He then made the signal to engage the enemy, namely, the ships in sight ahead; but before fire was opened they replied to his challenge and were identified as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers and steering to the westward.

At 5.47 P.M. the _Defence_, with the _Warrior_ astern, sighted on a S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard bow) three or four enemy light cruisers, and course was altered three points to port, bringing them nearly on a beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in the _Defence_, then signalled “Commence fire.” Each ship fired three salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The salvoes fell short, and the _Defence_ altered course to starboard, brought the enemy first ahead, and then to a bearing on the port bow, evidently with the intention of closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1 P.M., and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers were falling in close proximity to the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_. These ships opened fire with their port guns at 6.5 P.M. and shortly afterwards passed close across the bows of the _Lion_ from port to starboard. One light cruiser, probably the _Wiesbaden_, was hit by the second salvoes of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and nearly stopped. Our ships continued to close her until within 5,500 yards. From about 6.10 P.M. onwards they had come under fire of guns of heavy calibre from the enemy’s battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evidently bent on finishing off his opponent, and held on, probably not realising in the gathering smoke and mist that the enemy’s heavy ships were at fairly close range. At about 6.16 P.M. the _Defence_ was hit by two salvoes in quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up and the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an officer as Sir Robert Arbuthnot and so splendid a ship’s company as the officers and men of the _Defence_ was a heavy blow. The _Warrior_ was very badly damaged by shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain Molteno was able to bring his ship out of action, having first seen the _Defence_ disappear. From diagrams made in the _Warrior_ it appears that the German battle cruisers turned 16 points (possibly with a view either to close their Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled _Wiesbaden_), engaged the _Defence_ and _Warrior_, and then turned back again. This supposition is confirmed by sketches taken on board the _Duke of Edinburgh_ at the same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist, however, it was difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the observations on board the _Warrior_ it is certain that the visibility was much greater in her direction from the enemy’s line, than it was in the direction of the enemy from the _Warrior_. Although the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ were being hit frequently, those on board the _Warrior_ could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, and it is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert Arbuthnot not realising that he was at comparatively short range from the German battle cruisers until he was already under an overwhelming fire.

The _Warrior_ passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron at the period when the steering gear of the _Warspite_ had become temporarily disabled.[K]

[K] _Cf._ page 350.

The _Duke of Edinburgh_, the ship next to the westward of the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ in the cruiser screen, had turned to close these ships when they became engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers in accordance with a signal from the _Defence_. The _Duke of Edinburgh_ joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on her starboard bow, did not follow the other ships across the bows of the battle cruisers, as to do so would have seriously incommoded these vessels; she turned to port to a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.

The _Black Prince_ was observed from the _Duke of Edinburgh_ to turn some 12 points to port at the same time that the _Duke of Edinburgh_ turned, but her subsequent movements are not clear; the German accounts of the action stated that the _Black Prince_ was sunk by gunfire at the same time as the _Defence_, but she was not seen to be in action at this time by any of our vessels, and, moreover, a wireless signal, reporting a submarine in sight and timed 8.48 P.M., was subsequently received from her. It is probable that the _Black Prince_ passed to the rear of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 P.M., and that during the night she found herself close to one of the German battle squadrons, and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In support of this theory, the German account mentions that a cruiser of the “Cressy” type was sunk in that manner during the night. None of the ships of this class was present during the engagement, but the _Black Prince_ might well have been mistaken for a ship of this type in the circumstances.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, AS DEPICTED DY A GERMAN ARTIST, SHOWING THE “WIESBADEN” SINKING BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES

The print from which this was reproduced was found in a German dug-out between Ostend and Zeebrugge, on November 4, 1918]

We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about 6.10 P.M. at the termination of their engagement with enemy light cruisers, turning to avoid torpedoes fired at them. At about this time Rear-Admiral Hood sighted the _Lion_ and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at about 6.16 P.M. hoisted the signal to his squadron to form single line ahead, and turned to take station ahead of the _Lion_ and to engage the hostile battle cruisers, which at 6.20 P.M. were sighted at a range of 8,600 yards.

A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and the fire of the squadron was judged by those on board the _Invincible_ to be very effective. Rear-Admiral Hood, who was on the bridge of the _Invincible_ with Captain Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer in the fore control, at about 6.30 P.M., saying, “Your firing is very good. Keep at it as quickly as you can; every shot is telling.” At about 6.34 P.M. the _Invincible_, which had already been hit more than once by heavy shell without appreciable damage, was struck in “Q” turret. The shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion followed immediately, evidently caused by the magazine blowing up, and the ship broke in half and sank at once, only two officers, including Commander Dannreuther, and four men being subsequently picked up by the destroyer _Badger_. The British Navy sustained a most serious loss in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, one of the most distinguished of our younger flag officers, and in Captain Cay and the officers and men of his flagship. The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships even at the close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact that the officers in the _Invincible_ and _Indomitable_ were under the impression that they were engaging battle cruisers, whilst officers in the _Inflexible_, stationed between these two ships in the line, reported that her fire was being directed at a battleship of the “Kaiser” or “König” class, and that only one ship could be seen.

Just before the loss of the _Invincible_, the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier, had carried out an effective torpedo attack on the enemy’s battle cruisers; both the light cruisers _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ fired torpedoes at the leading battle cruiser. It was thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark as a heavy under-water explosion was felt at this time.

After the loss of the _Invincible_, the _Inflexible_ was left as leader of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the _Invincible_ had been passed, course was altered two points to starboard to close the enemy ships, which were disappearing in the mist. A further turn to starboard for the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 P.M., the battle cruisers being clear of the leading battleships (which were bearing N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the _Inflexible_ and _Indomitable_ took station astern of the _New Zealand_.

The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. The _Chester_ with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which by 5.40 P.M. had got ahead of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser screen, encountered some of the light cruisers composing the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing so, drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which, with the _Canterbury_ and destroyers, turned to about W.N.W. to assist the _Chester_ and to engage the enemy vessels.

In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was made by four British destroyers on the enemy’s light cruisers. This attack was apparently thought by the Germans to come from the flotillas with the Battle Fleet, as far as can be judged from their report of the action; the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly mistaken by their vessels for the van of our Battle Fleet, since mention is made in the German report of the British Battle Fleet having been sighted at this time by the German light forces, steering in a westerly or north-westerly direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of the High Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard.

So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at this time, the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly course before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, gradually hauling round afterwards, first through south to south-west, and, then, to west, _but it was not until_ 8 P.M. _that a westerly course was being steered_.

The only point that is not clear is the identity of the light cruiser engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The ship engaged by the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ was apparently the _Wiesbaden_. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have been another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two engagements took place at almost the same time, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening fire at 5.55 P.M., and the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ (the 1st Cruiser Squadron) commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at about 5.50 P.M. and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 P.M. It is hardly possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed, that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel.

Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer _Onslow_, commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. Tovey, which at 6.5 P.M. sighted an enemy’s light cruiser in a position on the bows of the _Lion_ and favourable for torpedo attack on that ship. The _Onslow_ closed and engaged the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged by shell fire, succeeded in closing a German battle cruiser to attack with torpedoes; she was struck by a heavy shell before more than one torpedo could be fired. Lieut.-Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all torpedoes had been carried out, and finding that this was not the case, closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, and then sighting the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes at battleships. The _Onslow’s_ engines then stopped, but the damaged destroyer _Defender_, Lieut.-Commander Palmer, closed her at 7.15 P.M. and took her in tow under a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night and the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought her back to home waters, transferring her on June 1st to the care of a tug.