CHAPTER XVII
THE SUBMARINE PERIL, TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY
Events were to prove that my period of command of the Grand Fleet was drawing to a close, my transfer to the Admiralty occurring at the end of November, 1917.
But before coming to that development something must be said in continuation of the narrative of the work of the Grand Fleet.
During the month of September, 1916, there was not much movement by the Fleet as a whole. On the 4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, swept towards the Naze, then down to the southward of the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. On the same day three divisions of destroyers from Scapa endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported by the _Talisman_ to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries. On the 7th a further unsuccessful search for a submarine was carried out in the same locality.
On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons left Rosyth and Scapa respectively to exchange bases, carrying out a search of the North Sea _en route_, and on the 20th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on the 4th.
On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the eastward made it necessary to move the patrol line of the 10th Cruiser Squadron temporarily farther west.
On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, _Campania_, and the destroyer flotillas left Scapa for a cruise between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the Norwegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. Battle exercises were carried out during the cruise. A submarine was reported on the intended track of the fleet on return, and the base was, therefore, approached by another route, the available local patrol vessels being employed to keep the submarine submerged during the entry of the fleet to Scapa.
Submarines were again active during the latter part of the month in the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the position of the squadron being shifted for that reason.
On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth to search the waters to the southward of the German North Sea mine-field, returning on the 28th.
On the same date the yacht _Conqueror II._, the patrol trawler _Sarah Alice_, and two British steamers were torpedoed in the Fair Island Channel by enemy submarines. On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, destroyers were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these waters.
Early on the 30th the _Lion_, with the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and accompanied by a destroyer escort, left Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, then turned to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.
During September the cruiser patrols were continuously maintained to the northward of the Shetlands and on the Archangel routes, each patrol consisting of a cruiser and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine patrol, consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the Horn Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols inconvenient, and German destroyers on several occasions during the month cruised at night in the area patrolled with a view to interrupting our submarines when recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent change of position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning from patrol on the 29th, sighted an enemy submarine on the surface, and, being unable to get into position to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.
The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla (the 10th Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the month, the base being the River Tees, and the parent ship the _Lucia_, with two attendant destroyers. The formation of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also commenced, this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers to 100.
On the 21st the new battle cruiser _Repulse_, heavily armed and of high speed, but with inadequate protection for a battle cruiser, joined the Fleet at Scapa to work up gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour protection of this ship was about equal to that of the _Australia_ and _New Zealand_, and she was greatly inferior in this respect to the _Lion_, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, experience during the War had demonstrated very clearly that our battle cruisers were at a marked disadvantage in engaging German vessels of the same class, unless they were provided with better protection than that given to the _Australia_ and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore, forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably to the deck protection of both the _Repulse_ and her sister ship, the _Renown_. These proposals were approved and the work carried out at the Fleet bases. Although the ships were much improved by the alteration, they were still far inferior in protection to the German battle cruisers.
On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built on the Tyne, for light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at Invergordon, and was a very useful addition to that most valuable refitting base.
The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser Squadron during September were:
No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on patrol, 15; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; No. on special service, 0.
The favourable weather and short nights, combined with the large number of vessels maintained on patrol were responsible for the increase in the number of ships intercepted.
The weather as a whole was good during the month. Fog or mist was prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th and 27th, and a gale occurred on the 18th. Otherwise the conditions were favourable.
In the early part of October, the activities of the enemy’s submarines in the White Sea, which had been considerable during the month of September, became more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness, and a British vessel and Russian steamer fell victims to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N., Long. 35.3 E. Some submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in Lat. 69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack was successful. The _Fearless_, now a submarine parent ship, and three submarines started for the White Sea on October 13th from Scapa to operate from Alexandrovsk against the hostile submarines. They arrived on the 20th and began operations at once. During their stay in the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any enemy submarines, but there was a marked decrease in enemy operations, possibly due to the cramping effect of the presence of our vessels in those waters. The _Fearless_, with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these waters before the ice began to form.
On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to the eastward, returning on the 4th.
On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and swept towards the Naze, thence proceeding to a position to the south-westward of the Little Fisher Bank, in which our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef patrol had reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours were found there by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; three were selected and sent in for examination, but were found to be in order.
On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left Scapa to meet at sea the airships stationed at Longside, near Peterhead, with a view to gaining experience in airships and light cruisers working together. The programme arranged could not be completed owing to bad weather, but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, and some useful hints were gained. This work was undertaken as a preliminary to the airships being detailed to accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, as the number of these craft completing in the near future justified such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of the Zeppelin type, it was felt that those of the smaller class might be able to carry out useful reconnaissance work ahead of the Fleet if moving south on the western side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German High Sea Fleet in this respect. That experience had fully confirmed the views put forward in 1913 on this subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval Air Service came under my supervision. These views were expressed on an occasion when the building of a fleet of Zeppelins was being urged on behalf of the Navy. It was then pointed out with emphasis how great would be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual conflict was proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin and heavier-than-air craft, but the views expressed were that whatever future there might be for the latter as development proceeded, there was no likelihood of their having the radius of action necessary for scouting work in a fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already possessed it. My apology for making mention of this fact is that it controverts the assertion so constantly made that the senior officers in the Navy were not alive to the value of air-craft before the War.
On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left Scapa to cruise to the eastward, returning on the 10th.
On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers left for a sweep, but were recalled on the 16th owing to bad weather.
On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth for a position to the westward of Ekersund, and thence swept down to the Little Fisher Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of interest.
On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers left the northern bases to spread on a line between Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. 4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, on a course approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order to search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was repeated during daylight hours on two successive days; no enemy vessels were sighted.
On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and the 14th and 15th Flotillas left Scapa for a watching and exercise cruise to the eastward, returning on the 24th.
During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried out during the month of October, the Flag officers were directed to carry out battle exercises based on the tactics employed by the enemy during the Jutland action, with a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from all Flag officers.
On October 24th a division of destroyers, together with sea-planes, was sent to the Fair Island Channel to operate against enemy submarines reported to be using this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during the patrol.
On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak to operate against an enemy decoy vessel reported in those waters. On the same day the _Kildonan Castle_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a submarine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., Long. 18.30 W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol line was consequently moved temporarily to the westward, and trawlers were despatched to the neighbourhood.
On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth to carry out a reconnaissance of the waters south of the German North Sea mine-field. They returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy vessels.
On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th Flotilla left Rosyth for an observation and exercise cruise in the central and northern positions of the North Sea, and returned without incident on November 3rd.
During the month the Northern patrol north of the Shetlands by one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer was continued, as were the patrol on the Archangel route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn Reef.
The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:--
No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on patrol, 12; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 12; No. on special service, 0.
Bad weather during the month interfered with the operations of the squadron; gales were experienced on the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. There was little fog or mist.
On November 1st I left the _Iron Duke_ at Cromarty and proceeded to the Admiralty at the request of the First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was the result of letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and the necessity for the adoption of most energetic measures to deal with this danger. It had been for some time my opinion that unless the Navy could devise effective means, first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, to protect our communications more successfully until the submarines could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of our being forced into making an unsatisfactory peace. From information furnished to me it was evident that the Germans were making special efforts to increase the number of their submarines very largely, and there did not seem to be much prospect, with the methods we were at the time employing, of destroying submarines at a rate at all approaching that of their construction.
So far as I was aware there was an insufficient reserve of food in the country to provide against the consequences of successful action by enemy submarines; and the construction of merchant-ships on an adequate scale to replace those lost had not been taken in hand, this being obviously an essential measure. I had written semi-officially for eighteen months before on the matter.[T] It seemed to me questionable whether our organisation at the Admiralty included a sufficiently numerous and important staff, having as its sole business the work of dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem which was assuming such very serious proportions. It did not appear that new proposals and inventions for dealing with the submarine campaign were being pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly because of the absence of such an organisation, of difficulties connected with labour and _matériel_; and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers confronting us would be successfully combated.
[T] The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food supplies or, at that time, for merchant-ship building.
I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, was alive to the danger, and that it caused him much anxiety. We had corresponded very freely on all subjects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty, and I was aware of his views on matters connected with the War, on which we had always been in complete agreement. His direction and assistance in connection with matters concerning the development and employment of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, and invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that in putting forward my views as to the new and serious danger confronting us, and the possible methods of dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance in combating the menace. One of my suggestions was the formation of a committee, or department, at the Admiralty under a senior officer, and composed of some of the clever and younger officers who had shown marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole object would be the development of arrangements for dealing with the submarine warfare against merchant shipping, and the production of the necessary material. I pointed out that our existing methods were not meeting with the success attained at an earlier period, and gave the reasons which, in my opinion, were responsible for this result.
I had also formed and expressed the opinion that the High Sea Fleet would not be risked again in a Fleet action, at any rate, until the submarine campaign against merchant shipping had been fully tried and had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I suggested to the Admiralty the desirability of reducing the number of destroyers in the Grand Fleet by one flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines in waters where such action had some chance of success. I pointed out, once again, that offensive action against submarines in the northern part of the North Sea (the only waters in which Grand Fleet destroyers could be used, and yet be available for work with the Fleet in an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results, as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water open to them, always dive and escape. The areas in which destroyers _could_ act more effectively against submarines were comparatively narrow and deep waters; in restricted localities, such as some parts of the English Channel, where the depth did not allow of their resting on the bottom, if hunted. My contention was that it was probably wise to reduce the number of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen the force required to deal with the submarine danger, even if this reduction necessitated sending the Grand Fleet to sea short of one battle squadron, should it have to deal with a grave emergency, such as attempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt _we could not face_, was to run the graver risk of serious disaster from successful submarine warfare on merchant shipping.
It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would _not_ risk a fleet action for some time, and even if this Fleet undertook an operation having as its objective some military advantage, I considered that with the 1st, 2nd and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be engaged with every prospect of success, provided always that it was well screened from submarine attack and carefully handled. The only direction, apart from an attack on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet could inflict any material damage on us and which the Grand Fleet could expect to be in a position to prevent, lay in attempted invasion. The bombardment of coast towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened to be at sea and in the right position at the right moment.
The objection which might be raised to this policy, which was otherwise to my mind correct, was the effect on the public mind of the High Sea Fleet being at sea without being brought to action, even if it could achieve no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised very fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility involved in disregarding it. On the other hand, the submarine danger to our shipping was most pressing and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with at all costs, and without delay, since the existence of the armies as well as that of the civil population depended on merchant shipping.
I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty on November 5th.
On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa to cruise eastward of the Shetland Islands, returning on November 4th.
On the 3rd the _Botha_, with four destroyers of the 14th Flotilla, left Scapa for a sweep northward along the Norwegian coast from a position near Udsire Lighthouse on the probable track of enemy submarines returning to their bases. On the same day the _Faulknor_ and six destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried out a similar sweep to the northward, starting from the vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla from Rosyth supported both forces.
At 1.20 P.M., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on patrol off the Horn Reef, sighted four enemy battleships of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6 N., Long. 6.53 E. A considerable sea was running, making it difficult to prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had a strong destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack were very difficult. But Commander Lawrence succeeded, in spite of these difficulties, in firing his four bow torpedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them took effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned to the southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable period, but unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently that the two damaged ships managed to reach port, but this fact does not detract from the great credit attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack under exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident showed, as in previous cases, the efficiency of the German system of underwater protection in their capital ships.
On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against enemy submarines on their expected tracks.
From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was experienced in northern waters; several merchant ships were disabled and assistance was rendered to them by the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by tugs from Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the 17th.
On the 18th the _Otway_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, intercepted the Norwegian steamship _Older_, which was found to be in charge of a prize crew from a German submarine. She had on board, in addition, survivors of an Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine. The _Otway_ recaptured her, but was not in time to prevent the Germans from exploding several bombs in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did not, however, succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.
During the period up to November 19th, the weekly average of work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:--
No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.
The weather throughout the period to the 19th November was very bad, and the figures showed a corresponding reduction in the number of ships intercepted.
Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 16th, 17th and 18th.
On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers proceeded to sea for a cruise in northern waters, during which battle exercises were carried out.
Shortly before the _Iron Duke_ slipped from her buoy, and whilst the remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its way out of harbour, I received a telegram from the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post of First Sea Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and he stated his opinion that I ought to accept the post in order to be in a position to put into practice the views I held as to the steps required to deal with the submarine menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since the outbreak of the War, for a position which I knew was the most difficult that a sailor could be called upon to fill in war time.
I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to do whatever was considered best for the Service, and in accordance with the wish expressed in his telegram, agreed to meet him at Rosyth.
I then followed the Fleet to sea in the _Iron Duke_, and having completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned over the Command of the Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (second in command), with directions that the ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded in the _Iron Duke_ to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning of the 27th.
I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the 27th, on the question of taking up the work at the Admiralty, and accepted the appointment. He intimated to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the Grand Fleet, and informed me also of the other changes in Flag appointments that would be effected. I made suggestions on some of these matters.
Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started my preparations for the change of duties and the transfer of command. I was under no delusion as to the difficulty of the task before me. The attacks already made upon the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses due to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids on our coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with the means existing, fully prepared me for what was to come.
I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the production of fresh material, could become effective for a period of at least six to twelve months. Indeed, I was so certain of the course that events would take, that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of the _Iron Duke_ (a very difficult task in view of the intense regret that I felt at leaving them), I said that they must expect to see me the object of the same attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor, Sir Henry Jackson, had been exposed. I was not wrong in this surmise. I left the _Iron Duke_ with a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet during my twenty-eight months’ service as Commander-in-Chief better than by quoting my farewell memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so well.
“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains, officers and men of the Fleet which it has been my privilege to command since the commencement of the War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all ranks for their loyal support during a period which I know must have tried their patience to the breaking-point.
“The disappointment which has so constantly attended the southern movements of the Fleet might well have resulted in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the strenuous efforts made to maintain the highest state of efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for testing the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.
“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to be able to say, with absolute confidence, that the spirit of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I am convinced that the Fleet gains in efficiency from day to day. We have benefited by experience, and we have turned that experience to good account.
“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men are imbued with that spirit which has carried their forefathers to victory throughout all ages, whenever and wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they will meet more than their match, ship for ship in all classes, and that the result will never be for one moment in doubt.
“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious victory resulting in a just and lasting peace!
“J. R. JELLICOE, “Admiral.”
Appendix I
BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH
_Iron Duke, 18th June, 1916._
No. 1395 H.F. 0022. The Secretary of the ADMIRALTY,
SIR,--
Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.
2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.
3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were as follows:
(_a_) Those in company with me:
_Iron Duke_--Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).
_Marlborough_--Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E. Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).
_Colossus_--Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).
_Hercules_--Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.
_Neptune_--Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.
_Collingwood_--Captain James C. Ley.
_Revenge_--Captain Edward B. Kiddle.
_Agincourt_--Captain Henry M. Doughty.
_St. Vincent_--Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.
_Bellona_--Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.
_King George V._--Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).
_Orion_--Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).
_Centurion_--Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.
_Conqueror_--Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.
_Erin_--Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.
_Thunderer_--Captain James A. Fergusson.
_Monarch_--Captain George H. Borrett.
_Ajax_--Captain George H. Baird.
_Boadicea_--Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.
_Benbow_--Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).
_Superb_--Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).
_Canada_--Captain William C. M. Nicholson.
_Bellerophon_--Captain Edward F. Bruen.
_Temeraire_--Captain Edwin V. Underhill.
_Vanguard_--Captain James D. Dick.
_Royal Oak_--Captain Crawford Maclachlan.
_Blanche_--Captain John M. Casement.
_Minotaur_--Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).
_Hampshire_--Captain Herbert J. Savill.
_Cochrane_--Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.
_Shannon_--Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.
_Defence_--Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).
_Duke of Edinburgh_--Captain Henry Blackett.
_Black Prince_--Captain Thomas P. Bonham.
_Warrior_--Captain Vincent B. Molteno.
_Invincible_--Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).
_Indomitable_--Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
_Inflexible_--Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.
_Calliope_--Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.
_Caroline_--Captain H. Ralph Crooke.
_Comus_--Captain Alan G. Hotham.
_Constance_--Captain Cyril S. Townsend.
_Royalist_--Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.
_Canterbury_--Captain Percy M. R. Royds.
_Chester_--Captain Robert N. Lawson.
_Active_--Captain Percy Withers.
_Castor_--Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.
_Tipperary_--Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.
_Broke_--Commander Walter L. Allen.
_Shark_--Commander Loftus W. Jones.
_Acasta_--Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.
_Spitfire_--Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny.
_Sparrowhawk_--Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.
_Achates_--Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.
_Ambuscade_--Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.
_Ardent_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.
_Fortune_--Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.
_Porpoise_--Commander Hugh D. Colville.
_Unity_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.
_Garland_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.
_Christopher_--Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.
_Contest_--Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.
_Owl_--Commander Robert G. Hamond.
_Hardy_--Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.
_Midge_--Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.
_Ophelia_--Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.
_Kempenfelt_--Commander Harold E. Sulivan.
_Ossory_--Commander Harold V. Dundas.
_Martial_--Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.
_Magic_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.
_Minion_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.
_Mystic_--Commander Claude F. Allsup.
_Mons_--Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.
_Mandate_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie.
_Michael_--Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.
_Marne_--Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.
_Milbrook_--Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.
_Manners_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.
_Moon_--Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.
_Mounsey_--Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.
_Morning Star_--Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.
_Faulknor_--Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling.
_Marksman_--Commander Norton A. Sulivan.
_Obedient_--Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.
_Mindful_--Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.
_Marvel_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.
_Onslaught_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.
_Mænad_--Commander John P. Champion.
_Narwhal_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.
_Nessus_--Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.
_Noble_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.
_Opal_--Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.
_Nonsuch_--Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.
_Menace_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.
_Munster_--Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.
_Mary Rose_--Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.
_Mischief_--Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.
_Oak_--Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.
_Abdiel_--Commander Berwick Curtis.
(_b_) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:
_Lion_--Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.
_Princess Royal_--Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).
_Tiger_--Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.
_Queen Mary_--Captain Cecil I. Prowse.
_New Zealand_--Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).
_Indefatigable_--Captain Charles F. Sowerby.
_Southampton_--Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.
_Nottingham_--Captain Charles B. Miller.
_Birmingham_--Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.
_Dublin_--Captain Albert C. Scott.
_Galatea_--Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.
_Inconstant_--Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.
_Phaeton_--Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.
_Cordelia_--Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.
_Falmouth_--Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.).
_Birkenhead_--Captain Edward Reeves.
_Gloucester_--Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.
_Yarmouth_--Captain Thomas D. Pratt.
“_Barham_”--Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).
_Warspite_--Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.
_Valiant_--Captain Maurice Woollcombe.
_Malaya_--Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.
_Champion_--Captain (D.) James U. Farie.
_Nestor_--Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.
_Nomad_--Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.
_Narborough_--Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.
_Obdurate_--Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.
_Petard_--Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.
_Pelican_--Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.
_Nerissa_--Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge.
_Onslow_--Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.
_Moresby_--Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.
_Nicator_--Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.
_Fearless_--Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.
_Acheron_--Commander Charles G. Ramsey.
_Ariel_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.
_Attack_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.
_Hydra_--Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.
_Badger_--Commander G. A. Fremantle.
_Goshawk_--Commander Dashwood F. Moir.
_Defender_--Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.
_Lizard_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.
_Lapwing_--Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.
_Lydiard_--Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.
_Liberty_--Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King.
_Landrail_--Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart.
_Laurel_--Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.
_Moorsom_--Commander John C. Hodgson.
_Morris_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.
_Turbulent_--Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.
_Termagent_--Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.
_Engadine_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.
4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas.
5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by the latter during the first hour of their action with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable advantage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the German Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and German battle cruisers in the matter of protection must not be forgotten. The German vessels are in this respect equal to powerful battleships, whereas our battle cruisers, particularly those of the 2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, are very lightly protected. The main difficulty with which our ships had to contend was the bad light. All reports mention the difficulty experienced in seeing the enemy vessels to the eastward, whilst remarking on the clearness of the western horizon. A photograph taken from _Malaya_ during the action indicates this fact very clearly.
During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged with the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting qualities of the personnel.
6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene:
“At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from _Galatea_ indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base.
“At 2.35 P.M. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 P.M. They appeared to be five battle cruisers.
“After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the battle cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the light cruiser squadrons was excellent and of great value.
“From a report from _Galatea_ at 2.25 P.M. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 P.M. I ordered _Engadine_ to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 P.M. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as Observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in _Engadine_ about 3.30 P.M. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.
“At 3.30 P.M. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.
“At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.
“Shortly after 4 P.M. _Indefatigable_, after a violent explosion, fell out of the line, turned over and sank.
“At 4.8 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen of enemy submarines. The destroyer _Landrail_ of 9th Flotilla, who was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of _Lydiard_ and _Landrail_ undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from closer submarine attack. _Nottingham_ also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.
“Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, _Nestor_, _Nomad_, _Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_, _Obdurate_, _Nerissa_, with _Moorsom_ and _Morris_ of 10th Flotilla, _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 P.M. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.
“_Nestor_, _Nomad_ and _Nicator_, gallantly led by Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of _Nestor_, pressed home their attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy’s secondary armament. _Nomad_ was badly hit and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ altered course to the S.E., and in a short time the opposing battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, _Nestor_ was badly hit and swung to starboard, _Nicator_ altering course inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. _Nicator_ made good her escape and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. _Nestor_ remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. _Moorsom_ also carried out an attack on the enemy’s battle fleet.
“_Petard_, _Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. _Petard_ reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while _Nerissa_ states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty’s Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions.
“From 4.15 to 4.43 P.M. the conflict between the opposing battle cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 P.M. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline of the ships very indistinct.
“At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in _Queen Mary_; she was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of her officers and men were subsequently picked up by _Laurel_.
“At 4.38 P.M. _Southampton_ reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 P.M. the enemy’s Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. _Southampton_ with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battle fleet and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. _Southampton’s_ reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy battle fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in _Barham_, this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.
“At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet. _Fearless_ with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. _Champion_ with 13th Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 P.M. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.
“The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 P.M. Between 5 and 6 P.M. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation and was corroborated by _Princess Royal_ and _Tiger_. Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 P.M. _Onslow_ and _Moresby_, who had been detached to assist _Engadine_ with the seaplane, rejoined the battle cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of _Lion_. At 5.10 P.M. _Moresby_, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the 6th ship in the line. _Moresby_ then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined _Champion_. In corroboration of this, _Fearless_ reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 P.M., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of _Queen Mary_ and _Indefatigable_.
“At 5.35 P.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide _Indomitable’s_ report). Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 P.M. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 P.M. the leading battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the ”König“ class.
“At about 6.5 P.M. _Onslow_, being on the engaged bow of _Lion_, sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. _Onslow_ at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. _Onslow_ then closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them; having started correctly, they must have crossed the enemy’s track. Damage then caused _Onslow_ to stop.
“At 7.15 P.M. _Defender_, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which damaged her foremost boiler, closed _Onslow_ and took her in tow. Shell were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1. P.M. 1st June, when _Onslow_ was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of _Onslow_, and Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of _Defender_, for special recognition. _Onslow_ was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, as follows:
“‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 P.M. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the _Derfflinger_ to attack her. The incident appeared so courageous that it seems desirable to investigate it further.’”
PROCEEDINGS OF BATTLE FLEET
7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and Destroyer Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested. Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet, was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in reckoning between _Lion_ and the _Iron Duke_, which was inevitable under the circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward, and it was not until 5.30 P.M. that this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the _Chester_ (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 P.M. The engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy odds, and although the ship suffered considerably in casualties her fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 P.M. she rejoined the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, and at 6.10 P.M. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking station ahead of the _Lion_ at 6.21 P.M. in accordance with the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He reports as follows:
“I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 P.M. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her, and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of the bearing and distance of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 P.M. _Invincible_ blew up.
“After the loss of _Invincible_, the squadron was led by _Inflexible_ until 6.50 P.M. By this time the battle cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 P.M., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority over them. The damage received by our ships during this period, excepting the destruction of _Invincible_, was slight. From the reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered severely, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron were also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.
“From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 P.M. attacked with the torpedo. _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. _Indomitable_ reports that about this time one of the _Derfflinger_ class fell out of the enemy’s line.”
8. Meanwhile, at 6 P.M., _Canterbury_ (Captain Percy M. R. Royds) had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat destroyer _Shark_ (Commander Loftus W. Jones), _Acasta_ (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and _Christopher_ (Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement the _Shark_ was sunk.
9. At 5.45 P.M. the report of guns had become audible to me, and at 5.55 P.M. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The difference in reckoning between _Iron Duke_ and _Lion_ mentioned in paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation.
10. Shortly after 5.55 P.M. some of the cruisers ahead, under Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were seen to be in action, and reports received show that _Defence_, Flagship (Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and _Warrior_ (Captain Vincent B. Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light cruiser at this time, which subsequently sank.
11. At 6 P.M. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers, were sighted by _Marlborough_ bearing before the starboard beam of the battle fleet.
At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at 6.14 P.M. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.
At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.
12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty’s report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers ahead of the battle fleet.
The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:
The Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt.
13. At 6.16 P.M. _Defence_ and _Warrior_ were observed passing down between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy fire. _Defence_ was seen to blow up and _Warrior_ passed to the rear disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy’s light cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy’s heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when _Black Prince_ (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, but as a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 P.M. reporting the position of a submarine, it is possible that her loss was the result of a torpedo attack. There is much strong evidence of the presence of a large number of enemy submarines in the vicinity of the scene of the action.
14. The First Battle Squadron, which was in the rear on deployment, became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire at 6.17 P.M. on a battleship of the “Kaiser” class. The centre squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König” class, and the van squadron commenced immediately afterwards.
At 6.6 P.M. the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron, then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of _Barham_, and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle fleet. An accident to _Warspite’s_ steering gear caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy’s line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.
Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy’s battle line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to twelve.
The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from 6.17 P.M. to 8.20 P.M. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from S.E. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations, of course, had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.
At 6.55 P.M. _Iron Duke_ passed the wreck of _Invincible_ with _Badger_ standing by. I was not aware of the loss of _Queen Mary_ and _Indefatigable_ until the following day.
15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line, and at least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.
THE BATTLE CRUISERS IN THE VAN
16. Sir David Beatty reports:
“Between 7 and 7.12 P.M. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 P.M. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the ‘König’ class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 P.M. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 P.M. my course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they undoubtedly turned away, and at 7.45 P.M. we lost sight of them.
“At 7.58 P.M. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy’s line, and at 8.20 P.M. we altered course to west in support. We soon located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by _Lion_ and turned away 8 points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. _Princess Royal_ set fire to a three-funnelled battleship; _New Zealand_ and _Indomitable_ report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and _Falmouth_ reported they were last seen at 8.38 P.M. steaming to the westward.
“At 8.40 P.M. all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel. This seems a very probable explanation in view of the condition in which the enemy was last seen.”
17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a “following” or “chasing” fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, but only one took effect (on _Marlborough_), and even in this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, in weather conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to the difficulty of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy. Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.
DETAILS OF BATTLE FLEET ACTION
18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, came into action at 6.15 P.M. with the enemy’s Third Battle Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and light cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of _Marlborough_ (Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This ship commenced at 6.17 P.M. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the “Kaiser” class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, but re-opened at 7.3 P.M. at a cruiser and at 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König” class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up, in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo, was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.
The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy’s return fire than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of the Fifth Battle Squadron. _Colossus_ was hit but not seriously damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.
In the Fourth Battle Squadron--in which squadron my Flagship _Iron Duke_ was placed--Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading one of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and some of the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was effective. _Iron Duke_, having previously fired at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König” class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo, and only ceased when the target ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organisation of the flagship so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.
The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.
The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the “Kaiser” or “König” classes between 6.30 and 7.20 P.M., and fired also at an enemy battle cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely damaged.
19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with the addition of _Duke of Edinburgh_ of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.
The attached cruisers _Boadicea_, _Active_, _Blanche_, and _Bellona_ carried out their duties as repeating ships with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.
The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 P.M. and again at 8.18 P.M. when they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore James R. P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The _Calliope_ was hit several times but did not sustain serious damage, although, I regret to say, she had several casualties. The light cruisers attacked the enemy’s battleships with torpedoes at this time, but were not able to observe the result; an explosion on board a ship of the “Kaiser” class was seen, however, at 8.38 P.M.
During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and destroyers.
NIGHT DISPOSITIONS
20. At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy’s heavy ships.
NIGHT ATTACKS BY FLOTILLAS
21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.
22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla occurred, including that of _Tipperary_ with the gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.
Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from _Spitfire_ (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the other from either _Ardent_ (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), _Ambuscade_ (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or _Garland_ (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).
23. The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers, comprised vessels of the “Kaiser” class, and were almost completely surprised. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later by _Mænad_ (Commander John T. Champion) on the five vessels still remaining resulted in the second ship in the line being also hit and blown up.
The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on reaching the rear of the line, but _Onslaught_ was the only vessel which received any material injuries. In _Onslaught_ Sub-lieutenant Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and reached Rosyth.
24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, _Castor_ (Commodore John R. P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank range.
The 13th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in _Champion_ took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At 0.30 A.M. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the _Petard_ and _Turbulent_, switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire which severely damaged _Petard_ and disabled _Turbulent_. At 3.30 A.M. _Champion_ was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. _Moresby_ reports four ships of “Deutschland” class sighted at 2.35 A.M. at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by _Moresby_ and _Obdurate_.
_Abdiel_, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.
There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them.
Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for about fifteen minutes at 10.20 P.M. with a squadron comprising one enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which period _Southampton_ and _Dublin_ suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. It is reasonable to suppose that they inflicted considerable damage on their opponents.
PROCEEDINGS ON 1ST JUNE
25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 A.M. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag from _Marlborough_ to _Revenge_, as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron. _Marlborough_ was detached by my direction to a base, being unsuccessfully attacked _en route_ by enemy submarines. The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and difficulty was experienced in meeting all ships, the torpedo-boat destroyers not rejoining until 9 A.M. The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the destroyers _Ardent_, _Fortune_, and _Tipperary_ were picked up, and the _Sparrowhawk_, which had been in collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 P.M., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for _Warrior_, which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of _Engadine_ on her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.
26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 P.M. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.
LOSSES
27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by the enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted, or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, particularly those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk it is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.
28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him, and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the water. I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the only gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British Battle Fleet, there appeared to be no desire on the part of the High Sea Fleet to continue the engagement. The battleships turned away on each occasion of being sighted soon after fire was opened, and although the British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 A.M. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft, the enemy made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as at 2.50 A.M. the fleet engaged a Zeppelin for quite five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British Fleet.
29. I deeply regret to report the loss of H. M. Ships mentioned in this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.
THE PERSONNEL OF THE FLEET
30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld--whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers--the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.
I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.
31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during action the officers and men of that department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Many ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and many instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships.
32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.
33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Commanding Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous throughout the day.
I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet. They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy battle fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.
Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He appreciated the situation at once on sighting first the enemy’s lighter forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manœuvred and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest value.
Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore William E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff:
“I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, The Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy’s discomfiture; my secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy’s fire.”
35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.
My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance in the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance to me during the action.
Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Commander Roger M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the two fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as observer aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action.
The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander Alexander R. W. Wood, assisted by the other signal officers, and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was also of much service to me throughout the action.
The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been invaluable throughout the war.
A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all ships.
My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and Victor H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the action. Their records have been of much assistance.
To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout the operations.
36. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of specially distinguishing themselves.
I am, Sir, Your obedient Servant, (_Signed_) J. R. JELLICOE, _Admiral_, _Commander-in-Chief_.
Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated 18th June, 1916.
LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK, 31st May–1st June, 1916.
_Battleships or Battle Cruisers._
2 Battleships, “Dreadnought” type Certain. 1 Battleship, “Deutschland” type Certain.
1 Battleship or Battle Cruiser Probable. 1 Battleship, “Dreadnought” type Probable.
_Light Cruisers._
4 Light Cruisers Certain. 1 Heavy ship or Light Cruiser Certain.
_Torpedo-boat Destroyers._
6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers Certain. 3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers Probable.
_Submarines._
1 Submarine Certain. 3 Submarines Possible.
Appendix II
ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY, 24th JANUARY, 1915
ADMIRALTY, _3rd March, 1915_.
The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of January, 1915:--
_H.M.S. Princess Royal, 2nd February, 1915._
SIR,--I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company:
The Battle Cruisers _Lion_, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O., flying my flag; _Princess Royal_, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide-de-Camp; _Tiger_, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; _New Zealand_, Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and _Indomitable_, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
The Light Cruisers _Southampton_, flying the broad pendant of Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; _Nottingham_, Captain Charles B. Miller; _Birmingham_, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and _Lowestoft_, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my port beam.
Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in _Arethusa_, _Aurora_, Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, _Undaunted_, Captain Francis G. St. John, M.V.O., _Arethusa_, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead.
At 7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly afterwards a report reached me from _Aurora_ that she was engaged with enemy’s ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to 22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas to chase S.S.E. to get in touch and report movements of enemy.
This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my wishes had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers, and reports almost immediately followed from _Southampton_, _Arethusa_, and _Aurora_ as to the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and _Blücher_, 6 Light Cruisers, and a number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.
The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme visibility. At 7.30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles.
Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E. parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the Engineer Staffs of _New Zealand_ and _Indomitable_--these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed.
At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear ship, the Battle Cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so that guns would bear, and _Lion_ fired a single shot, which fell short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light Cruisers ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard beam.
Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9 A.M. _Lion_ made her first hit on the _Blücher_, No. 4 in the line. The _Tiger_ opened fire at 9.20 A.M. on the rear ship, the _Lion_ shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes. The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 A.M. _Princess Royal_, on coming into range, opened fire on _Blücher_, the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards at 9.35 A.M. _New Zealand_ was within range of _Blücher_, which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. _Princess Royal_ shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.
Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our range with their smoke; but the enemy’s destroyers threatening attack, the _Meteor_ and “M” Division passed ahead of us, Captain the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous ability.
About 9.45 A.M. the situation was as follows: _Blücher_, the fourth in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gunfire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. _Lion_ was engaging No. 1, _Princess Royal_ No. 3, _New Zealand_ No. 4, while the _Tiger_, who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4.
The enemy’s destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed.
Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. _Lion_ and _Tiger_ opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume their original course.
The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter of the enemy’s line, enabling them to observe, and keep touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.
At 10.48 A.M. the _Blücher_, which had dropped considerably astern of enemy’s line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently ordered _Indomitable_ to attack enemy breaking northward.
At 10.54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our starboard bow. Immediately turned to port.
At 11.3 A.M. an injury to the _Lion_ being reported as incapable of immediate repair, I directed _Lion_ to shape course N.W. At 11.20 A.M. I called the _Attack_ alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11.35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the Squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W.
I boarded and hoisted my flag in _Princess Royal_ at about 12.20 P.M., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the _Lion_ fell out of the line, namely, that _Blücher_ had been sunk and that the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of _Blücher_.
The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S. _Attack_, in placing his vessel alongside the _Lion_ and subsequently the _Princess Royal_, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in the shortest possible time.
At 2 P.M. I closed _Lion_ and received a report that her starboard engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 P.M. I ordered _Indomitable_ to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 P.M.
The greatest credit is due to the Captains of _Indomitable_ and _Lion_ for the seamanlike manner in which the _Lion_ was taken in tow under difficult circumstances.
The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a conspicuous feature.
I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men who specially distinguished themselves.
Where all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men for special mention, and as _Lion_ and _Tiger_ were the only ships hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those ships.
I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, (_Signed_) DAVID BEATTY, Vice-Admiral.
INDEX
_Abdiel_, 289, 373, 433, 465, 484
Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed and sunk off, 209
_Aboukir_, loss of, 15, 37, 105, 132
_Acacia_, 233
_Acasta_, 9, 176, 464 in Jutland battle, 332, 333, 356, 387, 476
_Achates_, 9, 464
_Acheron_, 466
_Achilles_, 8, 88, 212, 419 accident on, 163 sinks a German raider, 276
_Acorn_, 9
_Active_, 9, 134, 144, 145, 318, 380, 381, 439, 464, 482
Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main Fleet Base, 15 Intelligence Division of, 187 naval policy of, 34, 302 vigorous mine-laying policy adopted by, 249
Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from, 303
Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 165
Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, 95 substituted for seaplanes, 222, 283
_Africa_, 8, 266
Agadir crisis, 91
_Agamemnon_, 10
_Agincourt_, 108, 152, 241, 308, 318, 463 in Jutland battle, 357, 360 joins 4th Battle Squadron, 121
Aircraft carriers, development of, 72 in warfare, 70, 153
Airships as scouts, 37, 450
_Ajax_, 8, 93, 98, 107, 135, 152, 241, 290, 318, 463
_Alarm_, 9, 142
_Albemarle_, 10, 93, 98, 212, 237, 249, 266
_Alcantara_, 272, 273 sinking of, 273
Alderson, Captain, 207
Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E. S., 203, 320, 466, 489
Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V., 466
Allen, Commander Walter L., 464
Allsup, Commander Claude F., 464
_Alsatian_, 73, 105, 107, 109, 127, 131, 135, 169 captures concealed Germans, 138
_Ambuscade_, 9, 176, 286, 464 in Jutland battle, 376, 483
America enters the War, 303
American battleships join Grand Fleet, 303
_Amethyst_, 10
Ammunition, for Army use, 114 ships, 84
_Amphion_, 10
_Amsterdam_, 217
_Andes_, 272, 273 rescues German survivors, 274
_Andromache_, 11
_Anglia_, 104
Anti-submarine defences, German, 30 obstructions, 144, 146 obstructions damaged by gales, 247, 267 operations, British, 146, 218 _et seq._, 282
_Antrim_, 8, 89, 138, 159, 211, 419, 424
_Apollo_, 11
_Arabis_, sinking of, 269
Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert, 8, 191, 334, 342, 410, 463, 477 death of, 335, 410, 487
_Ardent_, 9, 483 in collision, 250, 286 loss of, 376, 385, 485
_Arethusa_, 111 in action, 493, 494
_Argyll_, 8, 89, 223 aground off Scottish coast, 252
_Ariel_, 209, 466 sinks a submarine, 214
_Arlanza_, 253, 431
_Arley_, 233
Armour piercing shells, a new type of, 69, 417 Committees’ investigations on, 69 limitations of British, 306
Armour protection, improved, 417 question of, 394 _et seq._, 468
Arnot, Midshipman R. G., 484
Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., visits the Fleet, 237, 241
_Assistance_, 8, 80, 83, 105, 114, 116, 138, 143, 186, 197
Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P. S., 239, 240
Atlantic, Von Spee’s squadron in, 24, 157, 161
_Attack_, 466, 496
_Attila_, capture of, 108
_Audacious_, 8, 135, 149, 150, 151 loss of, 148 _et seq._
_Aurora_, 194, 493, 494
_Australia_, 24, 203, 204, 210, 290, 418 in collision, 285
Austrian steamer captured, 108
Back, Captain Eric, 260
Backhouse, Captain Oliver, 463
Backhouse, Commander Roger, 7
Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, 154
_Badger_, 467 rescues survivors, 338, 356, 479
Baird, Captain George H., 463
Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., becomes First Lord, 453 offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First Sea Lord, 458
Baltic, the, British submarines in, 434 proposed operations in, 129
_Barham_, 249, 320, 325, 328, 345, 348, 352, 360, 463, 472, 478 in collision, 258
Barron, Commander J. O., 333, 356, 464, 476
Bashmakoff, M., 275
Bate, Lieut.-Commander C. L., 465
Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to, 71 Instructions to, 53 organisation of, 203 title altered, 204
Battle Cruiser Fleet’s action, 316 _et seq._
Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation of, 418
Battle cruisers, function of, 304 question of armour, protection of, 305, 306
Battle Fleet, composition of, 7 aircraft provided for, 71
Battleships, “all-big-gun” type of, 34 and Battle Cruisers, British and German, 307 _et seq._
Battleships, British and German, 31 dummy, 171
_Bayano_ sunk by submarine, 210
Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, commands 1st Battle Squadron, 7, 85, 149 discusses question of blocking Zeebrugge, 154 exchange of command, 180, 182
Beamish, Captain Tufton P. H., 466
Bear Island, reported enemy base and wireless station at, 233
Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A., 466
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, 8, 111, 177, 178, 203, 285, 322, 466, 477, 494
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and Jutland battle, 320, 321, 325, 341, 345, 369, 440, 442, 468, 480 despatch on North Sea battle, 493 _et seq._ tribute to, 411, 489
Belgian coast, sweeping the, 170
Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R. M., 7, 359, 490
_Bellerophon_, 8, 110, 318, 463
_Bellona_, 7, 88, 94, 97, 98, 173, 202, 318, 442, 463, 482 in collision, 180
_Benbow_, 169, 173, 186, 318, 352, 355, 463
Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., 2, 7, 41, 465 tribute to, 489
Beresford, Lord, 35
_Berliner Tageblatt_, Captain Persius’ admissions in, 408
Bernard, Captain V. H. G., 463
Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R., 7, 490
Betty, Captain, 185
_Biarritz_, 292
Bingham, Commander the Hon. E. B. S., 324, 463, 470 awarded V. C., 325
Bircham, Lieutenant, 77
_Birkenhead_, 246, 251, 255, 319, 466
_Birmingham_, 8, 88, 178, 182, 203, 223, 319, 466, 493 sinks a submarine, 93, 119
_Black Prince_, 171, 187, 244, 290, 318, 336, 380, 463 uncertainty of her end, 336, 337, 478
Blackett, Captain Henry, 463
Blake, Lieut.-Commander C. P., 467
_Blanche_, 8, 88, 175, 202, 207, 272, 273, 318, 463, 482
Blockade, Ministry of, 76 work of the Fleet, 73 _et seq._, 96, 97, 189 [_see also_, Cruiser Squadron (10th)]
Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow entrances, 167
_Blonde_, 8, 88, 202, 290 goes ashore, 433
_Blūcher_, 152, 494, 495 sinking of, 195, 197, 496
Blunt, Captain W. F., 10, 466
_Boadicea_, 4, 8, 88, 202, 318, 438, 463, 482 damaged by heavy seas, 175
Boarding steamers, increased force of, 171
Bonham, Captain Thomas P., 463, 478 death of, 487
Borrett, Captain George H., 463
_Botha_, 225, 267, 457
Boxer campaign, 62, 63
Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., 465
Boyle, Captain the Hon. Algernon D. E. H., 466
Bradford, Vice-Admiral E. E., 8, 48, 108, 176, 179, 208 and Dogger Bank action, 196
_Brandenburg_, 132 interned by Norwegian Government, 133
_Brisk_, 9
_Britannia_, 8, 199 aground in Firth of Forth, 198
British Expeditionary Force, transport of, 22, 23, 37
British Fleet, anxiety for safety of, 28, 31
British Navy (_see_ Navy)
“Broad Fourteens,” patrolling the, 37, 127, 132
Brock, Rear-Admiral O. de B., 203, 319, 465, 489, 493, 496
_Broke_, 180, 293, 375, 387, 464
Brooke, Lieut.-Commander Edward, 467
Browning, Rear-Admiral M. E., 8
Bruen, Captain Edward F., 463
Bryce, Lord, 2
Bullen, Lieut.-Commander, 278
_Bulwark_, 10
Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, 60 clever device by, 61
Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil, 10, 16, 36, 207, 358, 459, 462, 477, 480 and Heligoland, 129 and Jutland battle, 319, 342, 343, 362, 381 exchange of command, 180, 181 flagship damaged, 355, 485 illness of, 182 joins Grand Fleet, 36 resumes command of 1st Battle Squadron, 185 tribute to, 410, 488
_Caldaff_, mining of, 150
Callaghan, Admiral Sir George, 55 gives up the command, 5 his Service record, 1 improvises defences at Scapa, 27 strikes his flag, 6
Callaghan, Lieut.-Commander Cyril, 496
_Calliope_, 227, 272, 277, 365, 464, 482
_Cambria_, 104, 114, 148
_Cameleon_, 9
Cameron, Captain John E., 466
_Campania_, 71, 221, 222, 229, 230, 231, 238, 282, 283, 428, 446
Campbell, Commander G. W. McC., 465
_Canada_, 308, 318, 463 joins Grand Fleet, 250
Canadian troops, a convoy for, 134, 136
_Canterbury_, 317, 318, 330, 332, 339, 464, 476
Cantlie, Lieutenant, 232
_Caribbean_, 211, 246 sinking of, 246
_Carnarvon_, 10
_Caroline_, 203, 464
Carpenter, Lieut.-Commander (N.) A. F. B., 2
Carter, Lieut.-Commander Eric Q., 465
Casement, Captain John M., 463
_Castor_, 374, 464
Cavendish, Lieut.-Commander J. R. C., 464
Cay, Captain Arthur L., 337, 338, 463 death of, 487
_Centurion_, 2, 8, 95, 140, 198, 318, 463
_Champion_, 319, 329, 378, 463, 472, 484
Champion, Commander J. P., 377, 465, 484
Channel Fleet, 15, 16, 36 change in command of, 182 squadrons manned with nucleus crews, 36 strengthened, 155
Chatfield, Captain A. E. M., 465, 493
_Chatham_, 443
_Cheerful_, 135
_Chester_, 317, 318, 330, 339, 415, 441, 464, 475 her boy hero, Jack Cornwell, 332, 410 in action, 330 _et seq._
China, conference of Allied naval officers in, 63
Christian, Rear-Admiral, 101, 105 his command, 105
_Christopher_, 9, 236, 245, 331, 332, 464, 476
Chukovsky, M., 275
Churchill, Right Hon. Winston, 3, 35 and Heligoland, 128 and position of Commander-in-Chief, 3 attends conference at Loch Ewe, 127 interview with Sir J. Jellicoe, 3
_Circe_, 9
_City of Oxford_, 171
_Clan McNaughton_, loss of, 205
_Cleopatra_, 279, 433
Clinton-Baker, Captain Lewis, 462
Coaling the Fleet, 83, 92, 104, 108, 109
Coal strike, a Welsh, 229, 230, 235
Coast lights, extinction of, 121, 136
Coast towns, enemy bombardment of, 25, 287, 456
Cobbe, Captain M. H., 11
_Cochrane_, 8, 88, 318, 419, 463
_Cockatrice_, 9, 173
Cole, Commander John F. H., 242
Coles, Lieut.-Commander G. A., 376, 464, 483
Colliers at the Fleet Base, 83 insufficient number of, 84, 92, 98
_Collingwood_, 7, 319, 361, 462
_Colossus_, 7, 38 (_note_), 60, 318, 319 and battle of Jutland, 351, 353, 357, 360, 381, 462, 481
_Columbella_, 233, 272
Colville, Commander Hugh D., 464
Colville, Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley, 81, 82, 122, 143, 159, 166, 231, 234, 243 assumes temporary command of 1st Battle Squadron, 182
_Comet_, 9, 107, 217
_Commonwealth_, 8, 186, 199
_Comus_, 272, 273, 277, 278, 342, 426, 464
_Conqueror_, 8, 31 (_note_), 152, 184, 193, 199, 318, 463
_Conqueror II._ torpedoed, 446
_Constance_, 426, 432, 464
_Contest_, 9, 464
_Cordelia_, 203, 319, 320, 466
Corlett, Lieut.-Commander Geoffrey, 466
_Cornwallis_, 10
Cornwell, Jack, of _Chester_, heroism of, 332, 410
Cowan, Captain Walter H., 465
Crabbe, Commander L. G. E., 464
Craig, Captain Arthur W., 466
_Crescent_, 11, 205, 255, 277
_Cressy_, loss of, 15, 37, 105
Cromarty, a fleet practice base at, 64, 65 a floating dock transferred to, 79, 80, 106, 122 and submarine menace, 64 Naval Base at, 28 Rear-Admiral Pears in charge of Base at, 97 rendered secure from submarine attacks, 77, 146
Crooke, Captain H. Ralph, 464
Cruiser Squadron (3rd), disbandment of, 245
Cruiser Squadron (6th), broken up, 210
Cruiser Squadron (10th) augmented, 181 blockade work of, 73, 158, 193, 201, 205, 214, 220, 228, 233, 243, 247, 253, 257, 261, 268, 275, 281, 288, 294, 427, 431, 444, 448, 452, 458 paid off, 163 patrol areas of, 96, 98, 103, 137, 145, 181, 192, 206, 213, 272, 283
Cruiser Squadrons, reorganisation of, 418, 419
Culme-Seymour, Captain Michael, 463
_Cumberland_, 198
Currey, Rear-Admiral Bernard, 10
Curtis, Commander Berwick, 373, 465, 484
Cuxhaven, enemy battleships at, 97
_Cyclops_, 7, 80, 83, 98, 117, 143
D’Aeth, Captain Arthur C. S. H., 464
_Dahlia_ strikes a mine, 245
Dampier, Captain, 149
Danehenko, M., 275
Dannreuther, Commander, 337
Dardanelles operations, kite balloons in, 71
“Dark night” patrols, 261, 264, 432
_Dartmouth_, 185
Day, Commander Selwyn, 276
De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley, 11, 73, 96, 169
Decoy ships (Q-ships), 262
_Defence_, 191, 318, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 463 loss of, 306, 336, 477
_Defender_, 340, 387, 467, 474
_Derfflinger_, 197, 357, 437, 474
Destroyer Flotilla (15th), formation of, 447
Destroyer flotillas, 9, 118 detailed orders for, 52 fine work in Jutland battle, 378
Destroyers, Battle Orders for, 52, 54 German, 29, 50, 62 German superiority in number of, 396–7 German _v._ British, 29 importance attached by Germany to attack by, 393 in action, 176, 323–5, 339, 340 inadequate number of British, 17, 18, 29, 175, 179, 200, 201, 397 in collision, 245, 246, 280, 286 used for mine-sweeping, 244 welcome additions to force of, 204 work of, 215
_Devonshire_, 8, 90, 135, 180, 282, 419, 424
Dick, Captain James D., 463
_Digby_, 233
Director-firing, system of, 66
Displacement, question of, 307
Dobson, Lieut.-Commander, 232
Dock accommodation, absence of, 315, 316 the Kaiser’s comments on, 315
Dockyard men, fine work by, 129, 417
Dogger Bank action, 187 _et seq._ Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493 _et seq._ battle cruiser fleet, composition of, 203 battle fleet engaged in, 199 (_See also_ North Sea Battle)
_Dominion_, 8, 108, 119, 217
Donaldson, Sir F., 421
_Donegal_, 198, 255, 256, 290, 292, 419, 424, 458
Doughty, Captain Henry M., 463
Dover, Straits of, mining the, 249
_Drake_, 10, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 108, 116, 131, 134, 159, 164, 198
_Dreadnought_, 8, 34, 93, 207, 208, 290, 308 rams a submarine, 207
Dreadnought Squadron, captains of, in conference, 114
Dreyer, Captain, 7 (_note_), 342, 416, 417, 462, 481 tribute to, 416, 481
_Dryad_, 166
_Dublin_, 319, 362, 375, 384, 436, 442, 466, 485
Duff, Captain A. A. M., 93, 466, 493
Duff, Rear-Admiral A. L., 60, 61, 62, 169, 318, 463, 477, 488 tribute to, 488
_Duke of Albany_, 223, 433
_Duke of Clarence_, 270, 433
_Duke of Cornwall_, 430
_Duke of Edinburgh_, 171, 318, 336, 368, 419, 463, 482
Dumaresq, Captain John S., 463
_Duncan_, 10
_Duncombe_, 262
Dundas, Commander Harold V., 464
_Dundee_, 270, 276, 432, 433
Dunnet Bay, a German mine ashore at, 266
Dutton, Captain Arthur B. S., 463
East Coast, bombardment of undefended towns on, 25 raids on, 156
_Ebro_, 267
_Edgar_, 11, 141
Edinburgh, Zeppelin attack on, 282
Edwards, Captain John D., 466
_Elbing_, 374
Ellershaw, Brigadier-General, 421
Ellis, Captain Stanley V., 463, 477 death of, 487
_Emperor of India_, 169, 173, 186
_Ems_ sunk by submarine, 426
_Endymion_, 11
_Engadine_, 71, 289, 320, 321, 386, 467, 469, 472, 485
England, possibility of invasion of, 23, 456 raids on south-east coast of, 287
English Channel, destroyers in, 455
_Erin_, 129, 152, 308, 318, 463
_Erne_, wreck of, 205
Esbjerg, enemy sighted from, 131
Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral H., 7, 320, 466 and Jutland battle, 326, 345, 349, 363, 369, 410, 467, 472, 476, 478 new command for, 243 tribute to, 488, 489
Everett, Commodore A. F., 7, 219
_Exmouth_, 10, 93, 135, 148, 150
Eyre, Lieut.-Commander Ralph V., 465
Falkland Islands battle, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205
_Falmouth_, 10, 16, 88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 104, 115, 134, 185, 319, 338, 466 and Jutland battle, 366, 441, 476, 479 sinking of, 441
Farie, Captain (D.) James U., 378, 466, 484
Faroe Islands, a search for enemy bases in, 96, 97
Farrington, Captain, 262
_Faulknor_, 208, 377, 457, 465
Faviell, Lieut.-Commander Douglas, 465
Fawckner, Rear-Admiral W. B., 228
_Fearless_, 10, 111, 132, 204, 245, 319, 449, 466 and Jutland battle, 328, 378, 381, 472, 473
Fergusson, Captain James A., 463
Field, Captain Frederick L., 463
Filleul, C., awarded D. S. M., 334
Fire control instruments, 68
Fire correction methods, improved, 417
_Firedrake_, 112
Fisher, Captain William W., 463
Fisher, Lieut.-Commander Leslie, 242
Fisher, Lord, becomes First Sea Lord, 34, 155 destroyer programme of, 408 energy as First Sea Lord, 187 improvements in Fleet organisation by, 35 Mr. Schwab’s visit to, 151 naval policy of, 34 supports Director System, 67
Fishermen’s bladders as “floating mines,” 126
Fishing areas, question of restriction of, 121, 136
Fishing vessels attacked by submarines, 228
FitzGerald, Colonel, 421
Fitzherbert, Lieut.-Commander Herbert, 2, 490
Flamborough Head, enemy mines off, 110
Fleet, the, a vital factor to existence of the Empire, 308 concentration of, at outbreak of War, 38 disposition of, 15 (_See also_ Grand Fleet, Navy)
Fletcher, Lieut.-Commander H. U., 465
Floating storage, advantages of, 84
Flotta, Island of, 81
_Flying Condor_, 148
Food question, the, 453
Forbes, Commander Charles M., 7 (_note_), 490
_Formidable_, 10
Forth, Firth of, obstructions against submarines in, 78 submarine activity in, 185
_Fortune_, 9, 267, 464, 485 in collision, 250 loss of, 376
_Forward_, 9
Foula Islands, 105
Fox, Captain C. H., 10
_Frauenlob_, loss of, 375
Fremantle, Commander G. A., 467
Fremantle, Rear-Admiral S., 254
_Fury_, 9, 150, 233
_Galatea_, 203, 290, 319, 430, 466 and Jutland battle, 319, 436, 443, 468, 469
Gamble, Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas, 8, 205
_Garland_, 9, 286, 376, 464, 483
_Garry_ engages a submarine, 169
Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E. F. A., 61, 319, 462, 477, 488 relieves Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, 243 tribute to, 488
General Cruiser Instructions, the, 53
_Gentian_, 293
George V., King, messages to the Fleet, 89, 234, 288 visits the Fleet, 204, 234, 426
German account of Jutland battle, 363 bombardment of East Coast, 25 breach of international law, 18 disguised raiders, 273, 274 fleet (_see_ High Sea Fleet) gunnery, efficiency of, 348 merchant steamer intercepted and sunk, 291 mines and submarines, 221 _et seq._ (and _passim_) submarine menace, 13, 16, 28, 37, 100, 113, 115 _et seq._
German Bight, British submarine lays mines in, 426
Germans fire on British rescuers, 112 proclaim British waters unsafe for shipping, 201 rescue British crews, 325, 486 thoroughness of defences of their naval bases, 30
Germany, destroyer force of, 392, 396, 397 mutinies in Navy of, 39 naval strength of, in early days of War, 32, 33
_Ghourko_, 86
_Gibraltar_, 11
_Glen Isla_, 262
Glossop, Lieutenant Francis G., 467
_Gloucester_, 185, 203, 290, 320, 466
Goff, Lieut.-Commander R. S., 376, 464, 483
_Goldfinch_, 9 loss of, 205
Goldsmith, Commander Malcolm L., 467
Goodenough, Commodore W. E., 8, 95, 112, 194, 203, 320, 326, 341, 344, 466, 489, 493 and Dogger Bank battle, 195 engages the enemy, 178
_Good Hope_, 10 loss of, 307
Gorleston, hostile battle cruisers sighted at, 157
_Goshawk_, 467
_Gossamer_, 9
Gough-Calthorpe, Rear-Admiral the Hon. S., 8
_Grafton_, 11
Graham, Lieut.-Commander E. S., 467
Grand Fleet, a series of misfortunes, 152 a watching policy decided upon, 14 all-round improvement in fighting efficiency of, 70 and its bases, 26, 28, 34 _et seq._, 76 _et seq._, 144 arrival of additional seamen ratings for, 109 at end of November, 1914, 168 at end of 1914, 185 attempts to entice enemy to action, 264 _et seq._ bases: conditions for leaving and returning to, 295 _et seq._ battle exercises, 258 Battle Orders, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408 battle tactics exercises, 47 blockade work [_see_ Blockade, Cruiser Squadron (10th)] compared with High Sea Fleet, 31 composition of, 7 _et seq._ condenser and boiler troubles of, 103, 108, 121, 129, 139, 152, 156, 159, 167, 172, 174, 185, 187, 190 constitution of, in May, 1916, and a parallel, 300 _et seq._ countering retiring battle tactics, 50 cruising formation and deployment, 47, 271 destroyer force of, 396 development of, 36 disposition and movements of, after declaration of war, 90 _et seq._ efficiency of engine-room departments of, 140, 387 Fleet movements: a month’s work, 216 gunnery practice of, 64 _et seq._ inception of, 34 kite balloons provided for, 71, 72 lectures, system of, 86 measures against invasion and raids, 23, 24 messages from the King to, 89, 234, 388 naval instruction and education problem, 188 new Submarine Flotilla, 447 peace and war conditions compared, 55 personnel and welfare of, 85 _et seq._, 410, 487 pre-Dreadnought Squadron of, 47, 48 problem of tactics in Fleet actions, 391 Royal visits to, 204, 233, 426 Russian gentlemen’s visit to, 275 sea-plane reconnaissances of, 221 ships fitted with Director-firing system, 67 signalling by, and why reduced, 56 _et seq._ spirit of comradeship in, 87 sports, 86 submarines attached to, 303 tables showing armament, protection and displacement of capital ships in, 308–310 the Staff Organisation, 39 _et seq._ training of, 55 _et seq._ work of medical officers, 488
Grant, Captain E. P. F. G., 462
Grant, Rear-Admiral W. L., 10, 96, 97 in command of 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 210
Great War, declaration of, 88 first reports of enemy movements, 90 naval strategy in home waters, 12 _et seq._ opening of, 1 _et seq._
Green, Captain J. F. E., 466
Greene, W. Graham, 414
_Grief_, 274
Griffin, W. C. R., a D. S. M. for, 334
Grubb, Lieut.-Commander Reginald W., 465
Gun power, question of, 306
Gun, range of, 38 (and _note_)
Gunfire, correction of, 68
Gunnery efficiency: a new departure, 235 work of German High Sea Fleet, 62, 64
Gye, Lieut.-Commander Alex. H., 467
Haddock, Commodore, 149, 171, 172
Haldane, Lord, 2
Halsey, Commodore Lionel, 7 (_note_), 219, 411
_Hamburg_, 374
Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick, becomes Second Sea Lord, 3
Hamond, Commander Robert G., 464
_Hampshire_, 198, 230, 257, 259, 420, 463 Kitchener and staff sail for Archangel in, 421 strikes a mine and sinks, 422 survivors of, 422
_Hannibal_, 93, 95, 205
Hardman-Jones, Lieut.-Commander E., 2
_Hardy_, 9, 176, 464
Harris, Lieut.-Colonel Gerald N. A., 82
Harrison, Lieut.-Commander G. C., 465
Harrison, Lieut.-Commander Julian, 464
Hartford, Lieut.-Commander G. B., 465
Harwich, mined areas near, 110
Harwich Force, 9, 385 provided with aircraft, 71
_Hawk_ sinks a submarine, 225
_Hawke_, 11 loss of, 21, 141
Hawksley, Commodore J. R. P., 9, 374, 384, 463, 477, 482
Heath, Rear-Admiral H. L., 334, 367, 368, 463, 477, 482
Heaton-Ellis, Captain E. H. F., 464
Heligoland, a comprehensive mining policy urged, 248 fortifications of, 128 proposals for bombardment and capture of, 128
Heligoland Bight, British submarines followed by German trawlers, 105 dispositions for sweeping, 123 enemy light forces in action, 111 mining policy in, 248, 249, 264 projected operations in, 109
_Hercules_, 7, 281, 318, 360, 462
_Hibernia_, 8, 127, 254
High Sea Fleet, a comparison with Grand Fleet, 31, 302 changes in commands of, 200 defensive rôle of, 39 destroyer force of, 396 efficiency of, ix, 62, 63 position of, in Jutland battle, 341 probable tactics of, correctly anticipated, 401 superiority of protection in, 307 surrender of, ix, 39, 70 tables showing armament, protection and displacement of, 308–310 under repair, 428
_Hindustan_, 8
Hobart, Lieut.-Commander F. E. H. G., 467
Hodgson, Commander John C., 467
_Hogue_, sinking of, 15, 37, 105, 132
_Hollyhock_, 236, 242
Holtzendorff, Admiral von, 63
Homan, Lieut.-Commander Edwin A., 465
Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace, 219, 327, 330, 332, 337, 410, 463, 474, 475, 489 goes down with _Invincible_, 338, 487
_Hope_, 9, 184
Hope, C. C., awarded D. S. M., 334
Hopkins, Lieut.-Commander Sydney, 464
Hotham, Captain Alan G., 273, 342, 464
Howell, T. O. G., awarded D. S. M., 334
Hudson, Lieut.-Commander H. V., 465
Hutchinson, Commander Reginald B. C., 464
_Hydra_, 467
_Illustrious_, 114, 146, 157
_Iltis_ and her commander, 63
_Impérieuse_, 83
_Implacable_, 10
_Inconstant_, 203, 319, 466
_Indefatigable_, 203, 204, 466 loss of, 306, 323, 326, 370
_India_ torpedoed and sunk, 241
_Indomitable_, 24, 191, 199, 203, 330, 332, 338, 418, 464, 476, 480, 493, 494, 495, 496 and Jutland battle, 330, 332, 338 joins Grand Fleet, 183 takes _Lion_ in tow, 196
_Inflexible_, 24, 119, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 157, 203, 228, 330, 418, 442, 464 and Jutland battle, 332, 338, 339, 475 joins the Fleet, 228 mined in Dardanelles, 314 loss of, 306
Ingenohl, Admiral von, 63, 200
International law, German disregard of, 18
_Intrepid_, 11
Invergordon as repairing base, 80 exercise and recreation at, 200 floating docks at, 79, 80, 448
_Invincible_, 24, 105, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 136, 157, 191, 203, 204, 213, 219, 290, 330, 332, 463 loss of, 306, 337–338, 475 survivors rescued by _Badger_, 356
_Iphigenia_, 11
Irish mail packets as armed boarding steamers, 171
Irish Sea, submarine activity in, 198, 209
_Iron Duke_, 5, 6, 7, 88, 94, 96, 98, 100, 101, 106, 108, 122, 132, 143, 144, 146, 152, 164, 168, 174, 187, 194, 197, 212, 219, 220, 267, 317, 318, 345, 357, 373, 462, 479 Confirmation by Archbishop of York on, 228 disconcerting discovery on, 139 in action, 349, 352, 353, 357, 481 refitting at Invergordon, 200, 252 Staff of, 39 _et seq._ the King’s speech to Fleet, 426, 427
_Irresistible_, 10
Irvin, Commander (Acting) W. D., 465
Italy enters Great War, 219
Jackson, Admiral Sir Henry, 78, 460 and the submarine menace, 454 becomes First Sea Lord, 219, 249
James, Lieut.-Commander C. H. N., 466
_Jason_, 9
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J. R. (Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa), 318, 462 accepts command of Home Fleets, 1 and Kaiser’s criticism of dock accommodation, 315 and raids on unfortified towns, 287, 288 and the value of aircraft in war, 450 appointed Commander-in-Chief of Grand Fleet, 5 as First Sea Lord, 417, 459 Battle Orders of, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408 bids farewell to Fleet, 460 Birthday message to the King, 388 confers with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, 219 confers with Premier and Chancellor of Exchequer, 241 despatches on Jutland battle, 304, 388, 462 embarrassing interview with Sir G. Callaghan, 4 entertains Lord Kitchener, 419 extensive mining policy of, 249 memorandum to Fleet from, 412, 460 objections to change of Command, 3, 4 proposals for handling Fleet in action approved by Admiralty, 302 proposes blocking of Zeebrugge, 154 reorganises his Staff, 39 _et seq._ selects his Staff, 2 suggested scheme of submarine obstructions by, 78 tribute to personnel of Fleet, 410, 411, 487 visits the Admiralty, 453 wounded in China, 63
Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H. Martyn, 316, 318, 367, 410, 463, 477, 482 relieves Admiral Warrender, 261 tribute to, 488
Jones, Commander Loftus W., 464, 476 gallantry of, 333 posthumous award of V. C. to, 332, 333
Jutland, Battle of, 304 _et seq._ Admiral Jellicoe’s memorandum to Fleet, 412 area covered by different engagements, 381 battle cruiser fleet’s action, 316 _et seq._, 479 battle fleet in action, 341 _et seq._, 474, 480 battle opens, 322 despatches on, 304, 388, 462 Director System in use at, 67 disposition of Fleet, 318 _et seq._ enemy losses, 486, 492 enemy sighted, 320, 342, 374 German version of, 363, 408, 409 Grand Fleet congratulated by Admiralty, 414 inferiority of British armour-piercing shell in, 69 night attacks by flotillas, 483 night dispositions, 483 proceedings on 1st June, 485 reflections on, 390 _et seq._ repairing and altering ships damaged in, 415 results of, 409 retiring tactics of enemy, 362, 407, 408 the night action, 370 _et seq._
_Kaiser_, 310
Kemmis, Sub-Lieutenant H. W. A., 484
_Kempenfelt_, 265, 266, 464
Kennedy, Captain Francis W., 464, 493
Kennedy, Captain Theobald W. B., 493
Kerr, Lieut.-Commander Fairfax M., 464, 476
Keyes, Commodore, 105, 196 rescues enemy crews, 112
Kiddle, Captain E. B., 462
Kiel, 2nd Battle Squadron’s visit to, 91
Kiel Bay, gunnery exercises in, 64
_Kildonan Castle_, 452
King, Lieut.-Commander Philip W. S., 467
_King Alfred_, 10, 106, 109, 159
_King Edward VII._, 8, 107, 108, 119 mined and sunk, 264, 265
_King George V._, 8, 167, 168, 173, 185, 190, 318, 463 and battle of Jutland, 345, 354, 357, 368
_King Orry_, 246, 432
_King Stephen_ sights sinking Zeppelin, 269
Kitchener, F.-M. Lord, 2, 3 at Scapa, 419 death of, 422 sails on _Hampshire_, 421
Kite Balloon Section, Roehampton, 72
Kite balloons, 71, 283
Knorr, Korvetten-Kapitän von, 240
_Köningen Luise_, 99
_Kristianiafiord_ intercepted by _Teutonic_, 255
_Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, 90
Kullen, the, a German merchant-steamer sunk off, 291
Lamlash, as pre-War practice base, 147
_Lancaster_, 210
_Landrail_, 467, 470
Lans, Vice-Admiral von, 63
_Lapwing_, 467
_Larne_, 9
_Lassoo_, 278 sinking of, 433
_Latona_, 11
_Laurel_, 467, 471
_Laverock_, 27
Lawrence, Commander, 457
Lawrie, Lieut.-Commander E. McC. W., 464
Lawson, Captain R. N., 7, 331, 464, 475
Leake, Captain F. M., 276
Leatham, Captain Eustace La T., 463
Lecky, Lieut.-Commander A. M., 464
_Leda_, 9, 143
Legge, Lieut.-Commander Montague C. B., 466
Leggett, Captain Oliver E., 491
Leith, Zeppelin attack on, 282
Le Mesurier, Commodore, 227, 268, 361, 365, 464, 482
Lerwick, coaling base at, 105
Leveson, Rear-Admiral A. C., 60, 61, 62, 191, 318, 463, 477, 488 tribute to, 488
_Leviathan_, 10, 159, 169, 171, 191, 198, 210
Ley, Captain J. C., 462
_Liberty_, 467
Light Cruiser Squadrons, new, 184, 226
Light Cruisers, British deficiency of, 396
_Lilac_ strikes a mine, 242
Lion, 8, 24, 195, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204, 213, 242, 245, 250, 254, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 327, 329, 418, 442, 443, 446, 465, 472, 474, 475, 480, 493, 494, 495, 496 and Jutland battle, 322, 323, 329, 480, 495 taken in tow by _Indomitable_, 496
_Liverpool_, 10, 16, 88, 94, 97, 98, 104, 113, 138, 148, 150, 165, 168, 174, 200, 203, 228, 251, 255
_Lizard_, 467
Loch Ewe, a conference at, 128 as coaling base, 96 submarine activity at, 138
Loch-na-Keal, base at, 144 base abandoned, 57 improvised obstructions at, 77
_London_, 10
“Long Forties,” the, 275
Long Hope, anchorage at, 81
_Lord Nelson_, 10
Lough Swilly, anti-submarine obstructions at, 146 base at, 144 Battle Squadrons at, 146 diversion at, 147 improvised obstructions at, 77, 146
_Louise_ (Danish steamer), 263
_Lowestoft_, 8, 90, 203, 493
Lowestoft, enemy bombardment of, 286
Lowry, Admiral Sir Robert, 77, 208, 219
_Lucia_, 447
_Lutzow_, 310 (_note_), 357 loss of, 314, 408
Lyddite shell, suspected, 163
_Lydiard_, 467, 470
_Lynx_, 9, 176 sunk by a mine, 238
Lyon, Lieut.-Commander H. I. N., 465
_Lyra_, 9
Maclachlan, Captain, 265, 266, 463
Madden, Rear-Admiral Charles E., 7, 40, 128, 411, 459, 490
_Mænad_, 376, 377, 465, 484
_Mafeking_, 232
_Magic_, 274, 353, 374, 464
_Magnificent_, 93, 95, 205
Mahan, Admiral, vii, 12, 302
_Mainz_ disabled in action, 111 her survivors rescued, 112
_Majestic_, 136
Makin, Lieut.-Commander Robert, 464
_Malaya_, 270, 328, 362, 380, 466, 468
_Manchester Commerce_, sinking of, 150
_Mandate_, 250, 464
_Manners_, 465
_Mantua_, 73, 109, 127, 131, 135
_Marksman_, 383, 465
Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant W. P., 263
_Marlborough_, 7, 180, 181, 207, 318, 319, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 351, 354, 358, 376, 381, 382, 386, 415, 434, 462, 477, 480, 481, 485 in action at Jutland battle, 351, 354, 358 torpedoed, 316, 355
_Marne_, 266, 353, 374, 465
Marsden, Lieut.-Commander, 376, 464, 483
_Martial_, 464
_Martin_, 9
_Marvel_, 362, 465
_Mary Rose_, 465
Master, Lieut.-Commander E. G. H., 464
_Matchless_ strikes a mine, 255
McKenna, Mr., as First Lord, 35 visits the Fleet, 237, 241
McPherson, 2nd-Lieutenant, 421
Meade, Captain the Hon. Herbert, 464, 495
Mediterranean, ships in the, 300
_Medusa_ rammed and sunk, 278
_Melita_, 265
_Menace_, 465
_Menelaus_ (kite balloon ship), 71
Merchant-ships attacked by submarines, 237, 241 camouflaged, 171 commissioned for blockade work, 73 convoying, 46, 433 instructions for safety of, 47 serious loss of, 201, 210 squadron disbanded, 172 submarine peril to, 446 _et seq._
_Meteor_, 495 damaged in Dogger Bank battle, 197
_Meteor_ (German mine-layer) abandoned and sunk, 239 number of mines laid by, 247
_Michael_, 280, 465
_Michigan_, 171
_Midge_, 9, 237, 464
Milford Haven, Marquis of, 3, 391 succeeded by Lord Fisher, 155
_Millbrook_, 465
Miller, Captain Charles B., 436, 466, 493
Miller, Rear-Admiral Francis S., 80, 81, 95, 117, 122
Minches, the, submarines reported in, 145
_Mindful_, 362, 465
“Mine Bumping Squadron,” the, 100
Minelayer Squadron, 11
Mine-layers, increased activity of British, 248 Instructions to, 54
Mines, British, defective pattern of, 248 experiments to counter, 60 German, 18, 38, 96, 99, 113, 120, 150, 192, 214, 221 _et seq._ success of new type of, 249 the Northern Barrage, 249
Minesweepers, 9, 19, 60, 118, 202, 223, 266 chase submarine, 161 in collision, 218 inadequacy of force of, 19, 170 maximum speed of, 19 withdrawn for service abroad, 209, 434
Mine-sweeping force strengthened, 434
Mine-sweeping trawler rams submarine, 165
_Minion_, 464
Ministry of Blockade, establishment of, 76
_Minotaur_, 198, 257, 272, 318, 334, 367, 419, 438, 463
_Minstrel_, 9
_Mischief_, 465
Mocatta, Lieutenant Jack E. A., 466
_Moewe_ lays extensive minefield off Scottish coast, 265
Moir, Commander Dashwood F., 467
Molteno, Captain, 335, 463, 477
_Moltke_, 310
_Monarch_, 8, 31 (_note_), 93, 148, 184, 193, 310, 318, 463
Monitors, work of, on Belgian coast, 128
_Monmouth_, loss of, 306
_Mons_, 464
_Moon_, 465
Moore, Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon, 169, 171, 191, 493 and Dogger Bank battle, 193 succeeded by Rear-Admiral Pakenham, 210
_Moorsom_, 324, 325, 467, 470
Moray Firth, a submarine hunt in, 209 gunnery practice in, 65
_Moresby_, 329, 379, 466, 472, 474
Morley, Lord, dinner party at United Services Club, 2
_Morning Star_, 259, 353, 465
_Morris_, 324, 467, 470
Morton, Lieutenant, 232
_Mounsey_, 465
Muckle Skerry, surrender of U 18 at, 166
Munro, Captain Donald S., 127 devises system of submarine obstruction, 77, 146
_Munster_, 465 rescues crew of _Alcantara_, 273
_Musketeer_, 266, 431
_Mystic_, 464
Nabakoff, Vladimir, 275
_Naiad_, 11
Napier, Rear-Admiral Trevylyan, 185, 203, 338, 383, 466, 476, 489 engages a Zeppelin, 382
Napoleonic wars, work of the Navy in, 13
_Narborough_, 324, 366, 370
Narvik, iron ore trade of, 276, 292
_Narwhal_, 465
_Natal_, 8, 88, 199 blown up in Cromarty harbour, 260 court-martial on loss of, 260
Naval instructors, reduced number of, 189
Naval manœuvres of 1912, 392
Naval policy, in peace conditions, ix.
Naval situation in May, 1916, 300 _et seq._
Navigation lights, extinction of, 121, 136
Navy Acts, German, 35
Navy League, the, formation of, 12
Navy, the, a lesson for the future, 33 composition of, at opening of Great War, 7 _et seq._ disposition of, in early days of Great War, 19 _et seq._ grief of, at Kitchener’s fate, 424 partition of, 36 use and purpose of, 12
Naylor, Lieutenant Charles G., 465
_Negro_, 441
_Nemesis_, 9, 206, 217
_Neptune_, 7, 168, 207, 211, 318, 360, 462 in collision, 286
_Nerissa_, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471
_Nessus_, 266, 465
_Nestor_, 323, 324, 466, 470, 471
Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, 75
_New Zealand_, 8, 24, 101, 105, 126, 152, 169, 191, 203, 285, 290, 319, 339, 418, 466, 493, 494 and Jutland battle, 480 and North Sea action, 495
_Nicator_, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471
Nicholson, Captain William C. M., 463
Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., 493
Nicholson, Lieut.-Commander R. L., 2, 491 organises wireless school, 188 signalling system of, 58 tribute to, 59, 491
Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Stuart, 10
_Noble_, 465
_Nomad_, 323, 324, 466, 470
_Nonsuch_, 356, 387, 465
North American Squadron joined by _Princess Royal_, 161
North east coast, Zeppelins on, 290
North Rona Island, a reported enemy base on, 107
North Sea, area of, 14 controlling the, 249 _et seq._ cruiser patrol areas in, 20 drifting German mines in, 199 Fleet in, 15 northern and central areas of, 102, 103 proclaimed a dangerous area, 157 reported mooring of oil drums in, 208 submarine and mine menace in, 17, 96, 116 _et seq._, 209 _et passim_ sweeps, 15, 88–9, 99, 116 _et seq._, 127, 158, 163, 171, 175, 194, 201 _et seq._, 211, 217, 219, 221, 223, 241, 246, 249 _et seq._, 264, 267 _et seq._, 435, 445 _et seq._, 462 _et seq._ the Northern Barrage mine-field, 249
North Sea battle, 187 _et seq._ Admiral Beatty’s despatch on, 493 (_cf._ Dogger Bank)
Norway, German Fleet’s peace-time visits to, 91
Norwegian coast, British patrol of, 193 British submarines’ operations against enemy on, 258 reported German bases on, 91, 95, 107 steamers sunk, 449 sweeping, 277, 429, 432
_Nottingham_, 8, 88, 134, 203, 223, 224, 319, 435, 466, 470, 493 torpedoed and sunk, 437
Nugent, Captain R. A., 254
_Nymphe_, 9 in collision, 206 rams a submarine, 142
_Oak_, 7, 90, 113, 233, 355, 419, 465 King George V. on, 426
_Obdurate_, 325, 466, 470, 485
_Obedient_, 361, 465
O’Beirne, Mr., 421
Observation mine-fields, 228
_Oceanic_, 110 loss of, 73, 127
_Older_, German crew on, 458
Oliver, Rear-Admiral Henry F., 186
_Olympic_, 149, 151
_Onslaught_, 362, 436, 464, 484
_Onslow_, 340, 387, 472 heroism of captain and crew of, 340, 473, 474
Onslow, Lieut.-Commander A. G., 465
_Opal_, 465
_Ophelia_, 330, 332, 364
_Oracle_, 336
_Orcoma_, 253, 256
_Orion_, 8, 93, 103, 105, 119, 121, 152, 191, 318, 357, 463
Orkneys and Shetlands, defences of, 81, 82, 122 submarine activity in, 166 wireless stations in, 110
_Oropesa_ in collision, 244
_Orotava_, 206
_Orvieto_, 217
_Oscar II._, loss of, 233
_Ossory_, 464
_Otway_, 458
_Owl_, 9, 464
Pakenham, Rear-Admiral, W. C., 8, 203, 319, 466, 489 succeeds Sir Gordon Moore, 210
Palmer, Lieut.-Commander, 340, 467, 474
_Paragon_, 9
Parker, Captain Edmond Hyde, 463
Parker, Captain Henry Wise, 463
Parsons, Lieutenant G., 245
_Pasley_, 441
Patey, Vice-Admiral, proceeds to West Indies, 210
_Patia_, 245, 271
_Patrol_ engaged by battle cruisers, 177
_Patuca_, 233
Peace manœuvres, unreality of, 37
Pears, Rear-Admiral Edmund R., 80, 97, 127
Peking Legations, relief Expedition for, 63
_Pelican_, 324, 441, 466, 470
Pelly, Captain Henry B., 465, 493
_Penn_, 436
_Penshurst_, 262
Pentland Firth, approaches patrolled, 110, 252 gunnery practice in, 65, 281
Persius, Captain, an admission by, 409
_Petard_, 324, 325, 378, 470, 471, 484
Peterhead, good work of patrol at, 225 patrol sinks a submarine, 293 trawlers sunk by enemy, 430
_Phaeton_, 217, 320, 442, 466 attacks a Zeppelin, 290
Phillpotts, Captain Edward M., 350, 466, 478
Phipps, Lieutenant W. D., 7
Piercy, Lieut.-Commander, 207
Pitt, Captain Stanley Dean, 82
_Plover_, 147
Plowden, Commander Richard A. A., 464
Plunkett, Flag-Commander the Hon. Reginald A. R., 489
Pohl, Admiral von, 63, 200
Poignand, Lieut.-Commander C. A., 465
Pollard, Fleet-Paymaster C. F., 7
_Pommern_, loss of, 314, 376, 379
_Porpoise_, 9, 259, 464 rams a submarine, 442
Portrush, German wreckage ashore at, 191
Pound, Captain A. D. P. R., 462
Pratt, Captain Thomas D., 466
Preston, Commander L. G., 9, 242, 251
_Prince Charles_, 262, 263 sinks a U-boat, 263
_Prince of Wales_, 10
_Princess Louise_, 232 attacked by submarine, 232
_Princess Margaret_, 255, 289
_Princess Royal_, 8, 135, 186, 190, 195, 198, 418, 473 convoys Canadian troops, 134, 136, 137 in Dogger Bank battle, 203, 493, 494, 495, 496 in Jutland battle, 320, 322, 466, 480 joins North American Squadron, 161, 168
_Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_, 134
Prisoners of war, German courtesy to, 240
Prowse, Captain Cecil I., 465 death of, 487
_Prudentia_, loss of, 267
Purefoy, Rear-Admiral Richard P. F., 96
“P. Z. Exercises,” 391
“Q” ships (_see_ Decoy ships)
_Queen_, 10
_Queen Elizabeth_, 219, 442
_Queen Mary_, 8, 24, 194, 198, 203, 310, 465 loss of, 306, 325, 471
Ramage, Commander G. N., 434
_Ramexo_, 437, 443
Ramsey, Commander Charles G., 466
_Ramsey_ sunk by disguised mine-layer, 239
Range of gun and torpedo, 38
Range-finders, improved, 418
Range-finding experiments, 68
_Rattler_, 185
Rawlings, Lieut.-Commander H. C., 464
_Redpole_, 9, 184
Reeves, Captain Edward, 466
_Rena_, 273
_Renown_, her deck protection improved, 448
_Repulse_, her deck protection improved, 448 joins the Fleet, 447
Retiring tactics, advantages of, 401
_Revenge_, 318, 354, 357, 360, 363, 381, 462, 486
Ridley, Lieut.-Commander John J. C., 465
_Rifleman_, 9, 107, 218
Rivett-Carne, Lieut. J. W., 68
Robertson, Mr., 421
Robinson, Lieut.-Commander Charles G., 385, 467
_Rohilla_, wreck of, 153
Roper, Captain (D.) Charles D., 466
Rosehearty, a submarine attack on a merchant-ship at, 237
_Rosemary_ torpedoed, 430
Ross, Captain George P., 355, 462, 481
_Rostock_, 379, 409
Rosyth, a conference at, 78 base at, 28 conditions for leaving and returning to base at, 299 development of base at, 79 German prisoners landed at, 113 interview with Mr. Balfour at, 459 submarine obstructions for, 77 the coal difficulty at, 84 3rd Battle Squadron at, 24, 156
_Roxburgh_, 8, 88, 199, 223, 277, 282, 420, 425 hit by torpedo, 224
_Royal Arthur_, 11, 205
Royal Naval Service, anti-aircraft work of, 72
_Royal Oak_, 318, 358, 463
_Royal Sovereign_, 442
_Royalist_, 217, 435, 464
Royds, Captain Percy M. R., 464, 476
_Ruby_, 9, 184
_Russell_, 10, 93, 237
Russell, Lieut.-Commander Spencer F., 465
Russian steamer sunk, 449
Russians relay their mine-fields, 284 visit Grand Fleet, 275
Russo-Japanese War, advances in technique in, viii
Rutland, Flight-Lieutenant F. S., 321, 469
_St. Clair_, 110
St. John, Captain F. G., 493
_St. Vincent_, 7, 318, 357, 362, 463
Salmond, Lieut.-Commander J. S., 7
Sams, Lieut.-Commander Cecil H. H., 466
_Sapphire_, 105
_Sappho_, 7, 107, 122, 136, 137, 171, 181, 193, 217, 218, 251, 258
_Sarah Alice_ torpedoed, 446
Savill, Captain, 422, 463
Scapa Flow, a floating dock placed at, 80 a wireless school established at, 59, 188 adopted as main Fleet Base, 15, 26 arrival of _Campania_ at, 71 arrival of air- and sea-planes at, 100 blocking the channels, 77, 167 defenceless nature of base at, 92, 114, 143 entrances to, 26, 28, 159, 298 gunnery and torpedo practice at, 65, 70, 160 recreation and occupation at, 85–7 reinforcing gun defences of, 82 situation of, 27 submarine menace, 139 submarine obstruction pierced, 181 submarine obstructions at, 144, 170
Scarborough, bombardment of, 176
Schwab, Mr., interviews Sir J. Jellicoe, 151
Schwann, Captain O., 283
Scott, Captain Albert C., 466
Scott, Sir Percy, and Director-firing system, 66, 67
Scottish coast, _Moewe_ lays minefield on, 265 submarines on, 153
_Seagull_, 9
Sea-plane carriers, orders to, 54 sheds wrecked by gale, 160
Seaplanes as scouts, 469 difficulties of, 71, 221, 222, 282–3, 290 first reconnaissance work with Fleet, 321 replaced by aeroplanes, 222, 283
_Sea Ranger_, 443
Searchlights, 162 excellence of German, 379 signalling by, 57
Second Fleet, 10
Selborne, Earl of, 34
Seven Years’ War, 39
_Seydlitz_, 197, 310, 409
Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, 1, 63
Seymour, Lieut.-Commander Ralph W., 489
_Shamrock_, 241
Shan-hai-Kwan forts, capture of, 63
_Shannon_, 8, 88, 168, 318, 368, 419, 463
Share, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet H., 2, 491
_Shark_, 9, 176, 330, 368, 419, 463 heroism of captain and crew, 333 loss of, 332, 476 survivors awarded D. S. M., 334
_Sheldrake_, 9
Shetland Patrol Force, 9
Signalling by searchlight, 57
_Skipjack_, 9, 166
Smith, C. H., awarded D. S. M., 334
Smoke screens, 69, 325, 357, 359, 362, 363, 366, 408, 479
_Soudan_, 148
South Atlantic, von Spee’s Squadron in, 24, 157, 161, 204
_Southampton_, 8, 88, 95, 178, 182, 203, 290, 319, 320, 326, 442, 466, 493, 494 and Jutland battle, 362, 375, 471, 472, 485
South-east coast, raids on, 287
Sowerby, Captain Charles F., 466 death of, 487
_Sparrowhawk_, 9, 205, 464 rammed, 375 sinking of, 383, 485
“Special Service Squadron,” the, 171
Spee, Admiral von, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205
_Speedwell_, 9
_Speedy_, loss of, 120
Spickernell, Frank T., 489
_Spitfire_, 9, 176, 375, 464, 483
Spithead, Naval Review at, 3
Spitzbergen, reported German submarine base and wireless station at, 233
Stadlandet, patrols off, 276, 292
_Stag_, 135
Stanistreet, Lieutenant Henry D. C., 467
Stanley, Captain the Hon. Victor A., 463
Star shells, 378, 379
_Staunch_, 9, 233
Stavanger, Zeppelin destroyed at, 290
Stileman, Rear-Admiral H. H., 73
Stirling, Captain A. J. B., 377, 378, 465, 483
Stoddart, Rear-Admiral A. P., 10
Stuart, Lieut.-Commander Dudley, 467
Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton, 207, 318, 410, 463, 477, 488 destroys von Spee’s squadron, 204 in Jutland battle, 482 kite balloon experiments of, 71 succeeds Sir D. Gamble, 205 tribute to, 488
Submarine activity in White Sea, 449 attack under difficulties, 457 C 27 sinks a German U-boat, 232 flotilla, organised as a unit of Grand Fleet, 294 flotillas, Instructions to, 54 menace, 76, 115, 434, 445, 453 _et passim_ obstructions (system of), 28, 77, 159, 170, 220, 225 patrols, 225, 426 peril to merchant shipping, 445 _et seq._ screens, question of, 45 sinks German steamship, 426 surrender of a German, 166
Submarine Flotilla (10th), formation of, 447
Submarines, attached to Grand Fleet, 54, 425 comparative strength of British and German, 11, 17 defences against, at Scapa Flow, 27 German, 17 in collision, 289 (_note_) reason for suppressing news of engagements with, 387 sunk by Navy, 93, 165, 166, 207, 214, 225, 226, 246, 263
Sule Skerry, a suspicious steamer at, 152
Sulis-Ker Rock, target practice at, 182
Sulivan, Commander Harold E., 464
Sulivan, Commander Norton A., 465
Sumner, Lieut.-Commander Charles G. C., 150, 465
_Superb_, 7, 192, 199, 244, 318, 463
Swan, T. W., awarded D. S. M., 334
Swarbachs Minn, as coaling base, 73, 162, 220 defences of, 232 evacuation of, 162
_Swift_, 9, 141, 142
Symonds, Captain Loder, rams enemy destroyer, 280
Taku forts, capture of, 63
_Talisman_, 267, 294, 445
_Taranaki_, 232
Tarbet Ness, a submarine reported at, 291
Tay, River, submarines off entrance to, 187
Taylor, Engineer Captain, killed in action, 197
Telephonic communications, establishment of, 214
_Temeraire_, 8, 318, 463
_Termagant_, 324, 325, 467, 470, 471
Terry, Lieut.-Commander F. G., 375, 464
_Teutonic_, 131, 137 intercepts a Norwegian-American liner, 255
_Theseus_, 11, 21, 135, 141, 277
Thesiger, Captain Bertram S., 466
_Thetis_, 11, 120
Third Fleet, 11
Thomson, Lieut.-Commander E. C. O., 466
_Thornhill_, 148, 149
_Thunderer_, 8, 172, 175, 318, 352, 354, 463
_Tiger_, 24, 174, 199, 203, 204, 308, 420, 467 in Dogger Bank battle, 196, 493, 494, 495 in Jutland action, 322, 325, 472 joins 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 158
_Tipperary_, 376, 463, 485 loss of, 483
Tippet, Lieut.-Commander Arthur G., 466
Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von, 63
_Titania_, 294
Tolstoy, Count Alexis, 275
Tondern, Zeppelin sheds at, 278, 289
Torpedo attacks: caution required in, 399 practices at Scapa Flow, 70 range of, 38 warfare: element of chance in, 393, 395 importance attached by Germany to, 393 measures for combating, 359, 399 work of German Navy, 62
Torpedoes, influence of, on tactics, 51 reports on, at battle of Jutland, 360
Tothill, Captain Hugh H. D., 463
Tottenham, Rear-Admiral, succeeds Rear-Admiral Waymouth, 213
Tovey, Lieut.-Commander J. C., 340, 467, 475 heroism of and tribute to, 340, 374–5
Townsend, Captain Cyril S., 464
Trafalgar, Battle of, 302
Trawlers, German, engaged and destroyed, 278 support marine obstructions at Scapa Flow, 82 suspicious, 106, 124, 224
Trelawny, Lieut.-Commander C. W. E., 375, 465, 483
Trewin, Assistant-Paymaster G. S., 321, 469
_Trident_, 294
Trondhjem, _Brandenburg_ at, 132
_Turbulent_, 325, 326, 379, 467, 470, 471, 484 rammed and sunk, 378–80
Turkish battleships, purchase of, 108, 129
Tynemouth, minefields off, 110
Tyrwhitt, Commodore R. Y., 10, 191, 198, 229, 239, 249, 251, 259, 271, 278, 279, 286, 385, 386, 436, 440, 442, 493 a successful haul of German trawlers, 249 chases a destroyer, 111 orders sinking of _Medusa_, 278
U-boat losses, 93, 164, 165, 207, 214, 225, 226, 246, 262
_Undaunted_, 157, 279, 280, 493
Underhill, Captain Edwin V., 463
United Services Club, dinner party at, 2
United States enters the War, 303
_Unity_, 9, 176, 464
Usborne, Commander Cecil V., 60, 61
Usedom, Admiral von, 63
Utvoer Lighthouse, 133, 270
_Vala_, 262
_Valiant_, 275, 328, 362, 466 in collision, 434
_Vanguard_, 7, 115, 318, 463
_Venerable_, 10
_Vengeance_, 10
_Victor_, 9
Victoria Cross awards, 325, 332
_Victorious_, 83, 417
_Viknor_, 192 loss of, 193
_Vindex_, 71, 289
Visual signalling, 57
_Von der Tann_, 310
Wales, Prince of, visits Scapa, 243
Walney Island, submarine attack on, 198
Ward, Lieut.-Commander the Hon. C. A., 465
Wardle, Captain T. E., 272
Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, in command of 2nd Battle Squadron, 7, 41, 91, 94, 148, 177, 178, 179 terminates his command, 261
_Warrior_, 171, 290, 318, 334, 335, 336, 463 abandoned and sunk, 306, 386, 387, 485 in Jutland battle, 385, 477
_Warspite_, 213, 256, 336, 466 in collision, 258, 434 in Jutland battle, 328, 349, 350, 478
Waymouth, Rear-Admiral Arthur W., 198 breakdown in health, 213
Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T., 7 (_note_), 491
Welsh coal-fields, strike in, 229, 235
White Sea, enemy submarines in, 448, 449 protecting the trade route, 256, 257
Whitfield, Lieut.-Commander Paul, 466
_Wiesbaden_ badly crippled, 335, 340
William II., Emperor, criticises British dock accommodation, 315
Wilson, Commander W. W., 169
Wintour, Captain Charles J., 9, 376, 464 death of, 380, 483, 487 unpleasant experience of, 142
Wireless school at Scapa, 59, 188
Wireless signalling, and why restricted, 56, 57
Wireless telegraphy, 38, 56 _et seq._, 110 improved system of, 58, 59, 188
Withers, Captain Percy, 464
_Wolf_ intercepted and sunk, 276
Woods, Commander A. E., 188
Woods, Commander Alexander R. W., 7, 490
Woollcombe, Captain Louis C. S., 463
Woollcombe, Captain Maurice, 466
Wynter, Lieut.-Commander Gerald C., 464
_Yarmouth_, 185, 203, 320, 430, 466 in Jutland battle, 338, 476
Yegoroff, M., 275
_Yorck_, sinking of, 157
York, Archbishop of, visits the Fleet, 228
Yorkshire coast mined by enemy, 180
Young, Captain G. B., 272
Young, Captain, of Liverpool Salvage Association, 187
_Zaza_, 231
_Zealandia_, 8, 254, 255
Zeebrugge, blocking of, discussed and considered impracticable, 154
Zeppelin activity, 436, 437, 442, 443 bombs rescuers, 496 engaged by Fleet in Jutland battle, 486 shed, Tondern, attack on, 278, 289
Zeppelins as scouts, 32, 451 destruction of, 169, 290 raids by, 282
Zigzagging, procedure of, 46
[Illustration:
_Diagram I._
PLAN OF JUTLAND BATTLE BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT
The position of our Battle Cruisers at 6.0. P.M. is fixed by a report from the Marlborough and confirmed at 6.4. P.M. by a report from the Rear-Admiral 1st Battle Squadron in the Colossus.
The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by a report from the Marlborough at 6.5. P.M. taken in conjunction with the reports of the Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron.
The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from the report of the Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet and from the Lion and Indomitable.
The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6.7. P.M. is fixed by a report from the Lion received at 6.6. P.M.; this gave the bearing; the distance is obtained by a consideration of the ranges at which the Lion was firing.
The position of the Enemy Battle Fleet is fixed at 6.14. P.M. from the Lion and at 6.15. P.M. from the Barham; the latter being signalled by wireless, an interval of four minutes being allowed between transmission and receipt.
Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Cruisers are fixed by the bearings on which our Battle Cruisers were firing and the ranges given, and by a consideration of the German reports which show a 32 point turn between 6.6. and 6.15. P.M.
Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are fixed by bearings and ranges given by the Marlborough at 6.17. P.M., Iron Duke at 6.31. P.M. and Monarch at 6.33. P.M.
The movements of the Defence, Warrior and Warspite are fixed by reports and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron.
_Note._--In studying this diagram it should be borne in mind that only a few of the German ships were visible at a time due to the smoke and mist.]
[Illustration:
_Diagram II._
DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT HAVE ARISEN HAD THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYED ON THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN.
It should be borne in mind that no information as to the position of the Enemy Battle Fleet was received until 6.14. P.M., and that the only reports received had been one at 6.6. P.M., giving a bearing of the Enemy Battle Cruisers from the “Lion”, and a report at 5.50. P.M. from the “Southampton” to the effect that the Enemy Battle Fleet bore north-east from his Battle Cruisers (and were therefore presumably ahead of them and right ahead of our Battle Fleet.)
There had therefore been no sufficient information on which to re-dispose the guides of columns; deployment on the starboard wing column to meet an enemy before the starboard beam would necessarily be an awkward manoeuvre as it would involve a considerable alteration of the starboard wing column to port and a very large alteration of course of the remaining columns when coming into line astern of it.
A torpedo attack during deployment would under these conditions throw the British Battle Fleet into great confusion and a concentration of gunfire on the turning point would be very effective; our own gunfire, owing to the large alterations of course and the consequent difficulty of obtaining correct fire control data would be correspondingly ineffective: our own destroyers had been spread ahead of the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen until 6.8 P.M. and were moving across the front in an unformed condition to the two flanks.
The movements that would probably have resulted and the number of ships on each side in action are shown in the diagram for each 3-minute interval from 6.16 to 6.28 P.M.
The three ships of the 5th. Battle Squadron would eventually have come into line ahead of the 6th. division, but would possibly have masked the fire of that division during the movement.]
[Illustration:
_Diagram III._
DIAGRAM SHOWING ORDER OF THE BATTLEFLEET
BATTLE OF JUTLAND
31^{st.} MAY 1916
_“Minotaur’s” track chart records that at 8 p.m. “King George V” bore N 10 E (true) from her, distant about 5 miles.
It also records that “Lion” bore W by S (true) from her, distant about 5 miles.
If these records are reliable “Lion’s” 8 p.m. position would be at X, and her track between 7.20 and 8 p.m., presumably as shewn thus:----
“Minotaur’s” records however, do not profess to give exact distances._]
[Illustration:
_Diagram IV._
TRACK OF SQUADRONS DURING NIGHT OF May 31st. to June 1st. and Forenoon of June 1st. 1916.
BATTLE FLEET.
During night, Battle Fleet in 3 columns, 1 mile apart, disposed abeam.
From 2.45 A. M. to 3.30 A. M., in single line.
From 3.30 A. M. onward, in 6 columns, 1 mile apart, disposed abeam.
POSITIONS OF CRUISERS ETC.
Dublin at 4.30 A. M. in Lat. 55° 30′ N., Long. 6° 36′ E. Commodore of Flotillas at 5.0 A. M. in Lat. 55° 48′ N., Long. 6° 22′ E.
Vice Admiral 1st Battle Squadron with 6th Division at 6.40 A. M. in Lat. 55° 55′ N., Long. 5° 15′ E. steering S. SE. 19 knots.
3 Submarines off Vyl Light Ship on bearing 270°, 4 miles, 12 miles and 20 miles respectively from Lightship.]
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between paragraphs and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook that support hyperlinks, the page references in the List of Illustrations lead to the corresponding illustrations.
Footnotes, originally at the bottoms of the pages that referenced them, have been collected, sequentially renumbered, and placed at the end of the book.
The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.
Original text uses two forms of the following words; both retained here:
“moral” and “morale”
“underwater” and “under-water”
“minefield” and “mine-field”
“seaplanes” and “sea-planes”
Redundant book title on page 1 has been removed by Transcriber.
Page 316: The times in the illustration's heading use a mix of Roman and Arabic numerals.
Page 360: The time shown as “7.8” was printed that way. It may mean “8 minutes after 7”. Similar times appear on other pages.