chapter VII. section 2.

[Sidenote: Hope, despair, diffidence.]

8. _Hope_ is _expectation_ of _good_ to come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our mind; if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute _privation_ of hope is _despair_, a degree whereof is _diffidence_.

[Sidenote: Trust.]

9. _Trust_ is a passion proceeding from the _belief of_ him from whom we _expect_ or _hope_ for good, so _free_ from _doubt_ that upon the same we pursue no other way to attain the same good; as _distrust_ or diffidence is _doubt_ that maketh him endeavour to provide himself by other means. And that this is the meaning of the words trust and distrust, is manifest from this, that a man never provideth himself by a second way, but when he mistrusteth that the first will not hold.

[Sidenote: Pity and hardness of heart.]

10. _Pity_ is _imagination_ or _fiction_ of _future_ calamity to _ourselves_, proceeding from the sense of _another_ man’s calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence it is also, that men pity the vices of some persons at the first sight only, out of love to their aspect. The contrary of pity is _hardness of heart_, proceeding either from _slowness_ of imagination, or some extreme great _opinion_ of their own _exemption_ from the like calamity, or from hatred of all or most men.

[Sidenote: Indignation.]

11. _Indignation_ is that _grief_ which consisteth in the conception of _good success_ happening to them whom they think _unworthy_ thereof. Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good fortune they have, but also of their own virtues. And of all the passions of the mind, these two, indignation and pity, are most raised and increased by eloquence: for, the _aggravation_ of _the calamity_, and _extenuation_ of the _fault_, augmenteth _pity_; and the _extenuation_ of the _worth_ of the person, together with the magnifying of his success, which are the parts of an orator, are able to turn these two passions into _fury_.

[Sidenote: Emulation and envy.]

12. _Emulation_ is _grief_ arising from seeing _one’s self exceeded_ or excelled by his _concurrent_, together with _hope_ to _equal_ or exceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But, _envy_ is the same _grief_ joined with _pleasure_ conceived in the imagination of some _ill_ fortune that may befall him.

[Sidenote: Laughter.]

13. There is a passion that hath _no name_; but the sign of it is that distortion of the countenance which we call _laughter_, which is always _joy_: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth in _wit_, or, as they call it, in the _jest_, experience _confuteth_: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein there lieth no wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same thing is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it be that moveth laughter, it must be _new_ and _unexpected_. Men laugh often, especially such as are greedy of applause from every thing they do well, at their own actions performed never so little beyond their own expectations; as also at their own _jests_: and in this case it is manifest, that the passion of laughter proceedeth from a _sudden conception_ of some _ability_ in himself that laugheth. Also men laugh at the _infirmities_ of others, by comparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and illustrated. Also men laugh at _jests_, the _wit_ whereof always consisteth in the elegant _discovering_ and conveying to our minds some _absurdity_ of _another_: and in this case also the passion of laughter proceedeth from the _sudden_ imagination of our own odds and eminency: for what is else the recommending of ourselves to our own good opinion, by comparison with another man’s infirmity or absurdity? For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of whose dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but _sudden glory_ arising from some sudden _conception_ of some _eminency_ in ourselves, by _comparison_ with the _infirmity_ of others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any present dishonour. It is no wonder therefore that men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over. Laughter _without offence_, must be at _absurdities_ and infirmities _abstracted_ from persons, and when all the company may laugh together: for laughing to one’s-self putteth all the rest into jealousy and examination of themselves. Besides, it is vain glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of another, sufficient matter for his triumph.

[Sidenote: Weeping.]

14. The passion opposite hereunto, whose signs are another distortion of the face with tears, called _weeping_, is the _sudden falling out with_ ourselves, or sudden conception of defect; and therefore _children_ weep often; for seeing they think that every thing ought to be given them which they desire, of necessity every repulse must be a check of their expectation, and puts them in mind of their too much weakness to make themselves masters of all they look for. For the same cause _women_ are more apt to weep than men, as being not only more accustomed to have their wills, but also to measure their powers by the power and love of others that protect them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their adversary; and such are the tears of _reconciliation_. Also revengeful men are subject to this passion upon the beholding those men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping in men proceedeth for the most part from the same cause it proceedeth from in women and children.

[Sidenote: Lust.]

15. The appetite which men call _lust_, and the fruition that appertaineth thereunto, is a _sensual_ pleasure, but _not only_ that; there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth of two appetites together, to _please_, and to _be pleased_; and the delight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have so much to please. But the name _lust_ is used where it is condemned; otherwise it is called by the general word _love_: for the passion is one and the same indefinite desire of different sex, as natural as hunger.

[Sidenote: Love.]

16. Of _love_, by which is understood the joy man taketh in the fruition of any _present_ good, hath been already spoken of in the first section, chapter VII. under which is contained the _love_ men bear to one _another_, or pleasure they take in one another’s company; and by which nature, men are said to be sociable. But there is another kind of love, which the Greeks call Ἔρως, and is that which we mean, when we say that a man is in love: forasmuch as this passion cannot be without diversity of sex, it cannot be denied but that it _participateth_ of that indefinite _love_ mentioned in the former section. But there is a great difference betwixt the desire of a man _indefinite_, and the same desire _limited ad hunc_; and this is that _love_ which is the great theme of poets: but notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word _need_: for it is a conception a man hath of his need of _that one person_ desired. The cause of this passion is _not_ always _nor_ for the most part _beauty_, or other quality in the beloved, unless there be withal _hope_ in the person that loveth: which may be gathered from this, that in great difference of persons, the _greater_ have often fallen in love with the _meaner_; but not contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have much better fortune in love, whose hopes are built upon something _in_ _their person_, than those that trust to their _expressions_ and _service_; and they that _care less_, than they that _care more_: which not perceiving, many men cast away their services, as one arrow after another, till, in the end, together with their hopes, they lose their wits.

[Sidenote: Charity.]

17. There is yet another passion sometimes called _love_, but more properly _good will_ or _charity_. There can be no greater argument to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to _assist_ other men in theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth _charity_. In which, first, is contained that _natural affection_ of parents to their children, which the Greeks call Στοργὴ, as _also_, that affection wherewith men seek to _assist_ those that adhere unto them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their benefits on _strangers_, is not to be called charity, but either _contract_, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or _fear_, which maketh them to purchase peace. The opinion of Plato concerning honourable love, delivered according to his custom in the person of Socrates, in the dialogue intituled _Convivium_, is this, that a man full and pregnant with wisdom and other virtues, naturally seeketh out some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom he may, without sensual respects, engender and produce the like. And this is the _idea_ of the then noted _love_ of Socrates wise and continent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful: in which, love is not the sought honour, but the issue of his knowledge; contrary to the common love, to which though issue sometimes follows, yet men seek not that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore this charity, or desire to assist and advance others. But why then should the wise seek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the beautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the use of that time: in which matter though Socrates be acknowledged for continent, yet the _continent_ have the passion they _contain_, as _much_ and more than they that _satiate_ the appetite; which maketh me suspect this _platonic_ love for merely sensual; but with an honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young and beautiful.

[Sidenote: Admiration and curiosity.]

18. Forasmuch as all _knowledge_ beginneth from _experience_, therefore also _new experience_ is the beginning of _new knowledge_, and the increase of experience the beginning of the increase of knowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth him matter of _hope_ of _knowing_ somewhat that he knew _not before_. And this hope and expectation of future knowledge from anything that happeneth new and strange, is that passion which we commonly call _admiration_; and the same considered as appetite, is called _curiosity_, which is appetite of knowledge. As in the discerning of faculties, _man leaveth_ all community with _beasts_ at the faculty of _imposing names_; so also doth he surmount their nature at this _passion_ of _curiosity_. For when a beast seeth anything new and strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas man, who in most events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun, looketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new unto him. And from this passion of admiration and curiosity, have arisen not only the invention of names, but also supposition of such causes of all things as they thought might produce them. And from this beginning is derived all _philosophy_; as _astronomy_ from the admiration of the course of heaven; _natural philosophy_ from the strange effects of the elements and other bodies. And from the degrees of curiosity, proceed also the degrees of knowledge amongst men: for, to a man in the chase of riches or authority, (which in respect of knowledge are but sensuality) it is a diversity of little pleasure, whether it be the motion of the sun or the earth that maketh the day, or to enter into other contemplations of any strange accident, otherwise than whether it conduce or not to the end he pursueth. Because _curiosity_ is _delight_, therefore also _novelty_ is so, but especially that novelty from which a man conceiveth an _opinion_ true or false of _bettering_ his own estate; for, in such case, they stand affected with the hope that all gamesters have while the cards are shuffling.

[Sidenote: Of the passion of them that flock to see danger.]

19. Divers other passions there be, but they want names: whereof some nevertheless have been by most men observed: for example; from what passion proceedeth it, that men take _pleasure_ to _behold_ from the shore the _danger_ of them that are at sea in a tempest, or in fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one another in the field? It is certainly, in the whole sum, _joy_; else men would never flock to such a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in it both _joy_ and _grief_: for as there is novelty and remembrance of our own security present, which is _delight_; so there is also _pity_, which is grief; but the delight is so far predominant, that men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the misery of their friends.

[Sidenote: Of magnanimity and pusillanimity.]

20. _Magnanimity_ is no more than _glory_, of the which I have spoken in the first section; but _glory well grounded_ upon certain experience of a power sufficient to attain his end in open manner. And _pusillanimity_ is the _doubt_ of that. Whatsoever therefore is a sign of _vain glory_, the same is also a sign of _pusillanimity_: for sufficient power maketh glory a spur to one’s end. To be _pleased_ or _displeased_ with _fame true_ or _false_, is a _sign_ of that same, because he that relieth on fame hath not his success in his own power. Likewise _art_ and _fallacy_ are signs of pusillanimity, because they depend not upon our own power, but the ignorance of others. Also _proneness_ to _anger_, because it argueth difficulty of proceeding. Also _ostentation_ of _ancestors_, because all men are more inclined to make shew of their own power when they have it, than of another’s. To be at _enmity_ and contention with _inferiors_, is a sign of the same, because it proceedeth from want of power to end the war. To _laugh_ at others, because it is an affectation of glory from other men’s infirmities, and not from any ability of their own. Also _irresolution_, which proceedeth from want of power enough to contemn the little difficulties that make deliberations hard.

[Sidenote: A view of the passions represented in a race.]

21. The comparison of the life of man to a race, though it hold not in every part, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose, that we may thereby both see and remember almost all the passions before mentioned. But this _race_ we must suppose to have no other _goal_, nor other _garland_, but being foremost, and in it:

To endeavour, is _appetite_. To be remiss, is _sensuality_. To consider them behind, is _glory_. To consider them before, is _humility_. To lose ground with looking back, _vain glory_. To be holden, _hatred_. To turn back, _repentance_. To be in breath, _hope_. To be weary, _despair_. To endeavour to overtake the next, _emulation_. To supplant or overthrow, _envy_. To resolve to break through a stop foreseen, _courage_. To break through a sudden stop, _anger_. To break through with ease, _magnanimity_. To lose ground by little hindrances, _pusillanimity_. To fall on the sudden, is disposition to _weep_. To see another fall, is disposition to _laugh_. To see one out-gone whom we would not, is _pity_. To see one out-go whom we would not, is _indignation_. To hold fast by another, is to _love_. To carry him on that so holdeth, is _charity_. To hurt one’s-self for haste, is _shame_. Continually to be out-gone, is _misery_. Continually to out-go the next before, is _felicity_. And to forsake the course, is to _die_.

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