CHAPTER III.

1. That men stand to their covenants. 2. Injury defined. 3. That injury is done only to the covenantee. 4. The signification of those names, just, unjust. 5. Justice not rightly divided into commutative, and distributive. 6. It is a law of nature, that he that is trusted, turn not that trust to the damage of him that trusteth. 7. Ingratitude defined. 8. It is a law of nature, to endeavour to accommodate one another: 9. And that man forgive upon caution for the future: 10. And that revenge ought to respect the future only: 11. That reproach and contempt declared, is against the law of nature: 12. That indifference of commerce is of the law of nature: 13. That messengers employed to procure or maintain peace, ought to be safe by the law of nature.

[Sidenote: That men stand to their covenants.]

1. It is a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain. And it is most certain, that as the truth of a conclusion, is no more but the truth of the premises that make it; so the force of the command, or law of nature, is no more than the force of the reasons inducing thereunto. Therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former chapter, section 2, namely, _That every man should divest himself of the right_, &c. were utterly vain, and of none effect, if this also were not a law of the same nature, _That every man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those covenants he maketh_. For what benefit is it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given?

[Sidenote: Injury defined.]

2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call _injury_, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore called _unjust_. For it is action or omission, without _jus_, or right, which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a great similitude between that we call _injury_, or _injustice_ in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called _absurd_ in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, which is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice; and there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called. For he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come. And he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time contained in the covenant. And therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time, which is a plain contradiction. And so _injury_ is an _absurdity_ of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

[Sidenote: That injury is done only to the covenantee.]

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not, though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury. For injury consisteth in violation of covenant by the definition thereof.

[Sidenote: The signification of those names, just and unjust.]

4. The names of _just_, _unjust_, _justice_, _injustice_, are equivocal, and signify diversly. For justice and injustice, when they be attributed to actions, signify the same thing with _no injury_, and _injury_, and denominate the action _just_, or _unjust_, but not the man so. For they denominate him _guilty_, or _not guilty_. But when justice or injustice, are attributed to men, they signify _proneness_, and affection and inclination of nature, that is to say, passions of the mind, apt to produce just and unjust actions. So that when a man is said to be just, or unjust; not the action, but the passion and aptitude, to do such actions, is considered. And therefore a just man may have committed an unjust act; and an unjust man may have done justly, not only one, but most of his actions. For there is an _oderunt peccare_ in the unjust, as well as in the just, but from different causes. For the unjust man who abstaineth from injuries for fear of punishment, declareth plainly, that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civil constitution, from whence punishments proceed, which would otherwise in the estate of nature be unjust, according to the fountain from whence they spring. This distinction therefore of _justice_, and _injustice_, ought to be remembered, that when injustice is taken for guilty, the action is unjust, but not therefore the man; and when justice is taken for _guiltlessness_, the actions are just, and yet not always the man. Likewise when justice and injustice are taken for habits of the mind, the man may be just, or unjust, and yet not all his actions so.

[Sidenote: Justice not rightly divided into commutative, and distributive.]

5. Concerning the justice of actions, the same is usually divided into two kinds, whereof men call the one _commutative_, and the other _distributive_; and are said to consist, the one in proportion _arithmetical_; the other in _geometrical_: and _commutative_ justice, they place in permutation, as buying, selling, and bartering; _distributive_, in giving to every man according to their deserts. Which distinction is not well made, inasmuch as injury, which is the injustice of action, consisteth not in the inequality of the things changed, or distributed, but in the inequality that men, contrary to nature and reason, assume unto themselves above their fellows. Of which inequality, shall be spoken hereafter. And for _commutative_ justice placed in buying and selling, though the thing bought be unequal to the price given for it, yet forasmuch as both the buyer and the seller are made judges of the value, and are thereby both satisfied, there can be no injury done on either side, neither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for _distributive_ justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits, seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure, it can be no injury to any man, though our liberality be farther extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution.

[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, that he that is trusted, turn not that trust to the damage of him that trusteth]

6. It happeneth many times that man benefitteth, or contributeth, to the power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby he may procure a greater, or no less benefit, and assistance to himself. For by necessity of nature, every man doth in all his voluntary actions intend some good unto himself. In this case it is a law of nature, _That no man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his charity, or good affection towards him, to be in the worse estate for his trusting_. For if he shall so do, men will not dare to confer mutually to each other’s defence, nor put themselves into each other’s mercy upon any terms whatsoever, but rather abide the utmost and worst event of hostility; by which general diffidence, men will not only be enforced to war, but also afraid to come so much within the danger of one another, as to make any overture of peace. But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their benefits (as I have said) upon trust only, and not for triumph or ostentation. For as when they do it upon trust, the end they aimed at, namely to be well used, is the reward; so also when they do it for ostentation, they have the reward in themselves.

[Sidenote: Ingratitude defined.]

7. But seeing in this case there passeth no covenant, the breach of this law of nature is not to be called _injury_. It hath another name, to wit, _ingratitude_.

[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, to endeavour to accommodate one another.]

8. It is also a law of nature, _That every man do help and endeavour to accommodate each other as far as may be, without danger of their persons, and loss of their means, to maintain and defend themselves_. For seeing the causes of war and desolation proceed from those passions, by which we strive to accommodate ourselves, and to leave others as far as we can behind us, it followeth, that that passion by which we strive mutually to accommodate each other, must be the cause of peace. And this passion is that charity defined