chapter IV. section 3, which is joined with _curiosity_ of comparing
the things that come into the mind, one with another: in which comparison, a man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected _similitude_ of things, otherwise much unlike, in which men place the excellency of _fancy_, and from whence proceed those grateful similies, metaphors, and other tropes, by which both _poets_ and _orators_ have it in their power to make things please or displease, and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in discerning suddenly _dissimilitude_ in things that otherwise appear the same. And this virtue of the mind is that by which men attain to exact and perfect _knowledge_; and the pleasure thereof consisteth in continual instruction, and in distinction of places, persons, and seasons, and is commonly termed by the name of _judgment_: for, to judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: and both _fancy_ and _judgment_ are commonly comprehended under the name of _wit_, which seemeth to be a tenuity and agility of spirits, contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those that are dull.
5. There is another defect of the mind, which men call _levity_, which betrayeth also _mobility_ in the spirits, but in excess. An example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious discourse, have their minds diverted to every little jest or witty observation; which maketh them depart from their discourse by a parenthesis, and from that parenthesis by another, till at length they either lose themselves, or make their narration like a dream, or some studied nonsense. The passion from whence this proceedeth, is _curiosity_, but with _too much equality_ and indifference: for when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally throng to be expressed.
6. The virtue opposite to this defect is _gravity_, or steadiness; in which the end being the great and master-delight, directeth and keepeth in the way thereto all other thoughts.
7. The _extremity_ of dullness is that _natural folly_ which may be called _stolidity_: but the extreme of _levity_, though it be natural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every man’s observation, I know _not_ how to call it.
8. There is a fault of the mind called by the Greeks Ἀμαϑια, which is _indocibility_, or _difficulty_ of being taught; the which must needs arise from a _false opinion_ that they _know already_ the truth of that is called in question: for certainly men are not otherwise so unequal in capacity as the _evidence_ is unequal between what is taught by the mathematicians, and what is commonly discoursed of in other books: and therefore if the minds of men were all of white paper, they would almost equally be disposed to acknowledge whatsoever should be in right method, and by right ratiocination delivered to them: but when men have once acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such men, than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over. The immediate _cause_ therefore of _indocibility_, is _prejudice_; and of prejudice, false opinion of our own knowledge.
9. Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men call _madness_, which appeareth to be nothing else but some _imagination_ of some such _predominancy_ above the _rest_, that we have _no passion but from it_; and this conception is nothing else but excessive _vain glory_, or _vain dejection_; which is most probable by these examples following, which proceed in appearance every one of them from _pride_, or some _dejection_ of mind. As first, we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside from a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ, which was _spiritual_ pride or madness. We have had also divers examples of learned madness, in which men have manifestly been distracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of their own ability. Amongst the learned men, may be remembered, I think also, those that determine of the time of the world’s end, and other such the points of prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain glory as reading of _romance_ may produce in pusillanimous men. Also rage and madness of love, are but great indignations of them in whose brains is predominant contempt from their enemies, or their mistresses. And the _pride_ taken in _form_ and _behaviour_, hath made divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of fantastic.
10. And as these are the examples of extremities, so also are there examples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well accounted follies; as it is a degree of the _first_, for a man, without certain evidence, to think himself to be _inspired_, or to have any other effect of God’s holy spirit than other godly men have. Of the _second_, for a man continually to speak his mind in a _cento_ of other men’s Greek or Latin sentences. Of the _third_, much of the present gallantry in love and duel. Of _rage_, a degree is _malice_; and of _fantastic_ madness, _affectation_.
11. As the former examples exhibit to us madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from the excess of self-opinion; so also there be other examples of madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding from _too much vain fear_ and _dejection_; as in those melancholy men that have imagined themselves brittle as glass, or have had some other like imagination: and degrees hereof are all those exorbitant and causeless fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy persons.
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