CHAPTER V.
1. Of marks. 2. Names or appellations. 3. Names positive and privative. 4. Advantage of names maketh us capable of science. 5. Names universal and singular. 6. Universals not in _rerum natura_. 7. Equivocal names. 8. Understanding. 9. Affirmation, negation, proposition. 10. Truth, falsity. 11. Ratiocination. 12. According to reason, against reason. 13. Names causes of knowledge, so of error. 14. Translation of the discourse of the mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence proceeding.
[Sidenote: Of marks.]
1. Seeing the _succession_ of conceptions in the _mind_ are caused, as hath been said before, by the succession they _had_ one to another when they were produced by the _senses_, and that there is no conception that hath not been produced immediately before or after innumerable others, by the innumerable acts of sense; it must needs follow, that one _conception_ followeth _not_ another, according to our election, and the need we have of them, _but_ as it _chanceth_ us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind. The experience we have hereof, is in such brute beasts, which, having the providence to hide the remains and superfluity of their meat, do nevertheless want the remembrance of the place where they hid it, and thereby make no benefit thereof in their hunger: but man, who in this point beginneth to rank himself somewhat above the nature of beasts, hath observed and remembered the cause of this defect, and to amend the same, hath imagined or devised to set up a visible or other sensible mark, the which, when he seeth it again, may bring to his mind the thought he had when he set it up. A _mark_ therefore is a _sensible object_ which a man erecteth voluntarily to himself, to the end to _remember_ thereby somewhat past, when the same is objected to his sense again: as men that have passed by a rock at sea, set up some mark, thereby to remember their former danger, and avoid it.
[Sidenote: Names or appellations.]
2. In the number of these _marks_, are those _human voices_, which we call the _names_ or appellations of things sensible by the ear, by which we recall into our mind some conceptions of the things to which we gave those names or appellations; as the appellation _white_ bringeth to remembrance the quality of such objects as produce that colour or conception in us. A _name_ or appellation therefore is the _voice_ of a man _arbitrary_, imposed for a _mark_ to bring into his mind some conception concerning the thing on which it is imposed.
[Sidenote: Names positive and privative.]
3. Things named, are either the _objects_ themselves, as a man; or the _conception_ itself that we have of man, as shape and motion: or some privation, which is when we conceive that there is something which we conceive, not in him; as when we conceive he is not just, not finite, we give him the name of unjust, of infinite, which signify privation or defect; and to the privations themselves we give the names of injustice and infiniteness: so that here be _two sorts_ of names; one of _things_, in which we conceive something; or of the conceptions themselves, which are called _positive_: the other of things wherein we conceive _privation_ or defect, and those names are called _privative_.
[Sidenote: Advantage of names maketh us capable of science.]
4. By the advantage of _names_ it is that we are capable of _science_, which beasts, for want of them are not; nor man, without the use of them: for as a beast misseth not one or two out of many her young ones, for want of those names of order, one, two, and three, and which we call _number_; so neither would a man, without repeating orally or mentally the words of number, know how many pieces of money or other things lie before him.
[Sidenote: Names universal and singular.]
5. Seeing there be _many_ conceptions of _one_ and the same thing, and for _every_ conception we give it a _several_ name; it followeth that for one and the same thing, we have many names or attributes; as to the same man we give the appellations of _just_, _valiant_, &c. for divers _virtues_; of _strong_, _comely_, &c. for divers _qualities_ of the _body_. And again, because from divers things we receive like conceptions, many things must needs have the same appellation: as to all things we _see_, we give the same name of _visible_; and to all things we _see moveable_, we give the appellation of _moveable_: and those names we give to _many_, are called _universal_ to them all; as the name of man to every particular of mankind: such appellation as we give to _one_ only thing, we call _individual_, or singular; as Socrates, and other proper names: or, by circumlocution, he that writ the _Iliads_, for Homer.
[Sidenote: Universals not in _rerum natura_.]
6. The universality of _one name_ to many things, hath been the cause that men think the _things_ are themselves universal; and so seriously contend, that besides Peter and John, and all the rest of the men that are, have been, or shall be in the world, there is yet something else that we call _man_, viz. _man in general_, deceiving themselves, by taking the universal, or general appellation, for the thing it signifieth: for if one should desire the painter to make him the picture of a man, which is as much as to say, of a man in general; he meaneth no more, but that the painter should choose what man he pleaseth to draw, which must needs be some of them that are, or have been, or may be, none of which are _universal_. But when he would have him to draw the picture of the king, or any particular person, he limiteth the painter to that one person he chooseth. It is plain therefore, that there is _nothing universal_ but _names_; which are therefore called _indefinite_; because we limit them not ourselves, but leave them to be applied by the hearer: whereas a singular name is limited and restrained to one of the many things it signifieth; as when we say, this man, pointing to him, or giving him his proper name, or by some such other way.
[Sidenote: Equivocal names.]
7. The appellations that be _universal_, and common to many things, are _not_ always given to all the _particulars_, (as they ought to be) for like conceptions, and like considerations in them all; which is the cause that many of them are _not_ of _constant_ signification, but bring into our mind other thoughts than those for which they were ordained, and these are called equivocal. As for example, the word faith signifieth the same with belief; sometimes it signifieth particularly that belief which maketh a Christian; and sometime it signifieth the keeping of a promise. Also all _metaphors_ are by profession _equivocal_: and there is scarce any word that is not made _equivocal_ by divers contextures of speech, or by diversity of pronunciation and gesture.
[Sidenote: Understanding.]
8. This _equivocation_ of names maketh it _difficult_ to recover those conceptions for which the name was ordained; and that not only in the language of other men, wherein we are to consider the _drift_, and _occasion_, and _contexture_ of the speech, as well as the _words_ themselves; but also in our discourse, which being derived from the custom and common use of speech, representeth unto us not our own conceptions. It is therefore a great ability in a man, out of the words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself from _equivocation_, and to find out the true meaning of what is said: and this is it we call _understanding_.
[Sidenote: Affirmation, negation, proposition.]
9. Of two _appellations_, by the help of this little verb _is_, or something equivalent, we make an _affirmation_ or _negation_, either of which in the Schools we call also a _proposition_, and consisteth of two appellations joined together by the said verb _is_: as for example, man is a living creature; or thus, man is not righteous: whereof the former is called an _affirmation_, because the appellation, living creature, is _positive_; the latter a _negative_, because not righteous is _privative_.
[Sidenote: Truth, falsity.]
10. In _every proposition_, be it affirmative or negative, the latter appellation either comprehendeth the former, as in this proposition, charity is a virtue, the name of virtue comprehendeth the name of charity, and many other virtues beside; and then is the proposition said to be _true_, or _truth_: for, _truth_, and a _true proposition_, is all one. Or _else_ the _latter_ appellation comprehendeth _not_ the former; as in this proposition, every man is just; the name of just comprehendeth not every man; for unjust is the name of the far greater part of men: and the proposition is said to be _false_, or falsity: _falsity_ and a _false proposition_ being also the same thing.
[Sidenote: Ratiocination.]
11. In what manner of two propositions, whether _both_ affirmative, or _one_ affirmative, the _other_ negative, is made a _syllogism_, I forbear to write. All this that hath been said of names or propositions, though _necessary_, is but _dry_ discourse: and this place is not for the whole art of logic, which if I enter further into, I ought to pursue: besides, it is not needful; for there be few men which have not so much natural logic, as thereby to discern well enough, whether any conclusion I shall make in this discourse hereafter, be well or ill collected: only thus much I say in this place, that _making of syllogisms_ is that we call _ratiocination_ or _reasoning_.
[Sidenote: According to reason, against reason.]
12. Now when a man _reasoneth_ from _principles_ that are _found_ indubitable by experience, all deceptions of sense and equivocation of words avoided, the conclusion he maketh is said to be _according to right reason_: but when from his conclusion a man may, by good ratiocination, derive that which is _contradictory_ to any evident truth whatsoever, then he is said to have concluded _against reason_: and such a conclusion is called _absurdity_.
[Sidenote: Names causes of knowledge, so of error.]
13. As the _invention_ of _names_ hath been _necessary_ for the drawing men _out of_ ignorance, by calling to their remembrance the necessary _coherence_ of one conception to another; so also hath it on the other side precipitated men into _error_: insomuch, that whereas by the benefit of _words_ and ratiocination they exceed _brute beasts_ in knowledge, and the commodities that accompany the same; so they exceed them also in _error_: for _true_ and _false_ are things not incident to beasts, because they adhere not to propositions and language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another, as men have.
[Sidenote: Translation of the discourse of the mind into the discourse of the tongue, and of the errors thence proceeding.]
14. It is the _nature_ almost of every _corporal_ thing, being _often moved_ in one and the same manner, to receive continually a _greater_ and _greater easiness_ and aptitude to the _same_ motion, insomuch as in time the same becometh so _habitual_, that, to _beget_ it, there needs no more than to _begin_ it. The _passions_ of man, as they are the beginning of _voluntary_ motions; so are they the beginning of _speech_, which is the motion of the tongue. And men desiring to shew others the knowledge, opinions, conceptions, and passions which are in themselves, and to that end having invented _language_, have by that means transferred all that _discursion_ of their _mind_ mentioned in the former chapter, by the _motion_ of their _tongues_, into _discourse_ of _words_: and _ratio_ now is but _oratio_, for the most part, wherein custom hath so great a power, that the mind suggesteth only the first word; the rest follow _habitually_, and are not followed by the mind; as it is with beggars, when they say their _paternoster_, putting together such words, and in such manner, as in their education they have learned from their nurses, from their companies, or from their teachers, having _no images_ or _conceptions_ in their mind, answering to the words they speak: and as they have learned themselves, so they teach posterity. Now, if we consider the power of those _deceptions_ of the sense, mentioned chapter II. section 10, and also how _unconstantly_ names have been settled, and how subject they are to _equivocation_, and how _diversified_ by _passion_, (scarce two men agreeing what is to be called good, and what evil; what liberality, what prodigality; what valour, what temerity) and how subject men are to paralogism or fallacy in reasoning, I may in a manner conclude, that it is impossible to _rectify_ so many errors of any one man, as must needs proceed from those causes, without beginning _anew_ from the very first grounds of all our knowledge and sense; and instead of books, reading over orderly one’s own conceptions: in which meaning, I take _nosce te ipsum_ for a precept worthy the reputation it hath gotten.
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