CHAPTER XIII.
1. Having spoken of the powers and acts of the mind, both cognitive and motive, considered in every man by _himself, without relation to others_; it will fall fitly into _this_ chapter, to speak of the effects of the same power _one upon another_; which effects are also the signs, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and intendeth. Of these signs, _some_ are such as _cannot_ easily be _counterfeited_; as actions and gestures, especially if they be sudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for example, look in chapter IX.) with the several passions whereof they are signs: _others_ there are which _may_ be _counterfeited_; and those are _words_ or _speech_; of the use and effects whereof, I am to speak in this place.
2. The first use of language, is the _expression_ of our _conceptions_, that is, the begetting in one another the same conceptions that we have in ourselves; and this is called _teaching_; wherein, if the _conception_ of him that teacheth continually accompany his words, _beginning_ at something true in _experience_, then it begetteth the like evidence in the hearer that understandeth them, and maketh him to _know_ something, which he is therefore said to _learn_: but if there be _not such evidence_, then such teaching is called _persuasion_, and begetteth no more in the hearer, than what is in the speaker’s bare _opinion_. And the _signs_ of two opinions contradictory one to another; namely, _affirmation_ and _negation_ of the same thing, is called _controversy_: but _both affirmations_, or both _negations, consent in opinion_.
3. The _infallible_ sign of _teaching exactly_, and without error, is this, that _no man_ hath _ever taught_ the _contrary_: not that few, how few soever, if any; for commonly truth is on the side of a few, rather than of the multitude: but when in opinions and questions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not any one of the men that so discussed them differ from another, then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to them that have considered the divers subjects wherein they have exercised their pens, and the divers ways in which they have proceeded, together with the diversity of the success thereof: for, those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but the comparison of _magnitudes_, _numbers_, _times_, and _motions_, and how their proportions are to one another, have thereby been the authors of all those excellencies by which we differ from such savage people as now inhabit divers places in America; and as have been the inhabitants heretofore of those countries where at this day arts and sciences do most flourish: for, from the studies of these men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by _navigation_, and whatsover we have beneficial to human society by the _division_, _distinction_, and _portraiting the face of the earth_; whatsoever also we have by the _account of times_, and _foresight of the course of heaven_; whatsoever by _measuring distances_, _planes_, and _solids_ of all sorts; and whatsoever either _elegant_ or _defensible_ in _building_: all which supposed away, what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians? Yet to this day was it never heard of, that there was any _controversy_ concerning any conclusion in this subject; the science whereof hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the conclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. The _reason_ whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their writings; for they proceed from most _low_ and _humble_ principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on _slowly_, and with most _scrupulous ratiocination_; viz. from the imposition of names, they infer the truth of their _first_ propositions; and from two of the first, a _third_; and from any two of the three, a _fourth_; and so on, according to the steps of science, mentioned chapter VI. section 4. On the other side, those men who have written concerning the faculties, passions, and manners of men, that is to say, of _moral philosophy_, and of _policy_, _government_, and _laws_, whereof there be infinite volumes, have been so _far from removing doubt_ and controversy in the questions they have handled, _that_ they have very much _multiplied the same_: _nor_ doth any man at this day so much as pretend to _know_ more than hath been delivered two thousand years ago by Aristotle: and yet every man thinks that in this subject he knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no study but that accrueth unto them by natural wit; though they play, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or place. The reason whereof is no other, than that in their writings and discourses they take for principles those opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal of _difference_ between _teaching_ and _persuading_; the sign of _this_ being _controversy_; the sign of the _former_, _no controversy_.
4. There be _two sorts_ of men that commonly be called _learned_: one is that sort that proceedeth _evidently_ from humble principles, as is described in the last section; and those men are called _mathematici_: _the other_ are they that _take up_ maxims from their _education_, and from the _authority_ of men, or of custom, and _take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination_; and these are called _dogmatici_. Now seeing in the last section those we call _mathematici_ are absolved of the crime of breeding controversy, and they that pretend not to learning cannot be accused, the fault lieth altogether in the _dogmatics_, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to have their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any evident demonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation.
5. The expression of those conceptions which _cause_ in us the _experience_ of good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our expectation of evil, is that which we call _counselling_, and is the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we ourselves are to do or not to do. The _consequences_ of our actions are our _counsellors_, by _alternate succession_ in the mind. So in the counsel which a man taketh from _other_ men, the _counsellors alternately_ do _make appear the consequences_ of the action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is counselled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.
6. Another use of speech is _expression_ of _appetite_, _intention_, and _will_; as the appetite of knowledge by _interrogation_; appetite to have a thing done by another, as _request_, _prayer_, _petition_: expressions of our purpose or intention, as _promise_, which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in the future: _threatening_, which is the promise of evil; and _commanding_, which is that speech by which we signify to another our _appetite_ or desire _to have_ any _thing done_, or _left undone_, for reasons contained in the will itself: for it is not properly said, _Sic volo, sic jubeo_, without that other clause, _Stet pro ratione voluntas_: and when the command is a sufficient reason to move us to action, then is that command called a _law_.
7. Another use of speech is _instigation_ and appeasing, by which we increase or diminish one another’s passion: it is the same thing with _persuasion_; the difference not being real; for, the begetting of _opinion_ and _passion_ is the _same_. But whereas in _persuasion_ we aim at _getting opinion from passion_; _here_, the end is, _to raise passion from opinion_. And as in raising an opinion from passion, any premises are good enough to enforce the desired conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no matter whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration historical or fabulous; for, _not_ the _truth_, but the _image_, maketh passion: and a tragedy, well acted, affecteth no less than a murder.
8. Though words be the _signs_ we have of one another’s _opinions_ and intentions, because the _equivocation_ of them is so _frequent according_ to the _diversity of contexture_, and of the company wherewith they go, which, the presence of him that speaketh, our _sight_ of his _actions_, and _conjecture_ of his _intentions_, must help to discharge us of; it must therefore be _extremely hard_ to find the _opinions_ and meaning of those _men_ that are _gone from us long ago_, and have left us no other signification thereof than their books, which cannot possibly be understood without _history_, to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great prudence to _observe_ them.
9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto two _contradictory_ opinions, whereof the _one_ is _clearly_ and directly _signified_, and the _other_ either _drawn_ from that by _consequence_, or not known to be contradictory to it; then, when he is not present to explicate himself better, we are to take the _former_ for his opinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly; whereas the other might proceed from error in the deduction, or ignorance of the repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two contradictory expressions of a man’s intention and will, for the same reason.
10. Forasmuch as whosoever _speaketh_ to another, intendeth thereby to _make_ him _understand_ what he saith, if he speak unto him either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth, he _intendeth also not_ to make him understand what he saith; which is a _contradiction_ of himself. It is therefore always to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.
11. _Silence_, in him that _believeth_ that the same shall be taken for a _sign of his intent_, _is_ a sign thereof indeed: for, if he did not consent, the labour of speaking so much as to declare the same, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.
CONCLUSION.
Thus have we considered the nature of man so far as was requisite for the finding out the first and most simple elements wherein the compositions of politic rules and laws are lastly resolved; which was my present purpose.
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DE CORPORE POLITICO:
OR THE
ELEMENTS OF LAW,
MORAL AND POLITIC,
WITH DISCOURSES UPON SEVERAL HEADS:
AS
OF THE LAW OF NATURE; OF OATHS AND COVENANTS; OF SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENT;
WITH
THE CHANGES AND REVOLUTIONS OF THEM.
TO THE READER.
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READER,
You may be pleased to take notice, that the first part of this work depends upon a former treatise of Human Nature, written by Mr. Hobbes, and by a friend of his committed to the press for the benefit of mankind. It was thought fit, that nothing of so worthy an author should be left unprinted, especially considering, that this piece is most useful for the society of reasonable creatures, being the grounds and principles of policy, without which there would be nothing but confusion in the world. I am confident, if men’s minds were but truly fixed upon the centre of this discourse, they would not prove such weathercocks, to be turned about with the wind of every false doctrine, and vain opinion. We should then be free from those disorders which threaten distraction to the soul, and destruction to the commonwealth. But let others write never so well, if our practice do not second their instructions, we may be wise enough to foresee our misery, but never know how to prevent it. What pity is it, that such rare conclusions as these are, should produce no other effect, to inform our knowledge, and confute our conversation, whilst we neglect the truth that is apprehended. Yet there is some hope, that such observers, whose wisdom hath received the stamp of goodness, will improve their skill to a real advancement of those benefits, which lie hoarded up in this curious cabinet. To whose use and behoof, these excellent notions are commended, as the best that ever were writ in this kind, and may serve for a general ground and foundation to all regular conceptions, that concern the essence and existence of man, the government of kingdoms and commonwealths, and by consequence our eternal salvation.
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DE CORPORE POLITICO.
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PART THE FIRST.
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