Chapter 27 of 32 · 7696 words · ~38 min read

CHAPTER XIII

[1\13: Pl., _Ap._ c. 32 f. (40 C ff.).]

[2\13: _Ap._ 41 C D.]

[3\13: _Ap._ 29 A B, 37 B.]

[4\13: Xen. _Cyrop._ 8, 7, 17, makes the dying Kyros justify his faith that the soul survives the body rather on the lines of popular belief and the cult of souls than from would-be-philosophical considerations (§ 20; see above, chap. v, n. 178). In spite of this he allows the question to remain undecided--as though of little importance--whether, in fact, the soul then leaves the body and lives on or whether ~me/nousa hê psuchê\ en tô=| sô/mati sunapothnê/skei~, § 21. In either eventuality he will after death ~mêde\n e/ti kako\n pathei=n~, § 27.--Arist., _SE._ xvii, p. 176b, 16, ~po/teron phthartê\ ê\ atha/natos hê psuchê\ tô=n zô/|ôn, ou diô/ristai toi=s polloi=s~--in this question they ~amphidoxou=si~.]

[5\13: Pl., _Phd._ 70 A, 77 B, 80 D. This belief of the ~polloi/~ and ~pai=des~ looks indeed much more like a piece of superstition than a denial of the continued life of the ~psuchê/~ (in which light Pl. represents it). We have already met with the soul as a wind-spirit more than once: when it leaves the body the other wind-spirits carry it off and away with themselves (cf. above, chap. i, n. 10), esp. when a high wind is blowing (cf. the German popular belief that when a man hangs himself a storm arises: Grimm, p. 635: cf. Mannhardt, _Germ. Myth._ 270 n. In other words, the "furious host", the personified storm-spirits--Grimm, p. 632; cf. Append. vii--come and carry away with them the poor unquiet soul).]

[6\13: Cf. Pl. _Rp._ 330 D E. There is more about these matters in the speech against Aristogeiton, [D.] 25, 52-3. In spite of the popular form in which it is put such an opinion is not to be claimed at once as a popular and generally held belief: the author of this speech is a follower of Orpheus, a fact which he himself betrays in § 11.]

[7\13: Pl. _Rp._ 608 D.]

[8\13: It is probable that in the ~Politei/a~ two essentially distinct stages of Platonic doctrine are found side by side with only an external bond of union, and that in particular what is said in Bk. v, 471 C ff., to the end of Bk. vii about the ~philo/sophoi~, their education and position in the state (and outside politics), is an extraneous addition to the completed picture of the ~kalli/polis~ which is given in Bks. ii--v, 471 C: an afterthought not originally included in the plan of the whole book and not anticipated in the beginning of it. This seems to me to emerge unmistakably from a careful and unprejudiced study of the whole work and to have been completely demonstrated by Krohn and Pfleiderer. That Plato himself regarded the first sketch of an ideal state as a separate work (which may even have been actually published separately: Gellius, 14, 3, 3), is shown by the beginning of the _Timaeus_. Here--with the implication of quite a different staging of the dialogue and a different introduction from what we now read in _Rp._, Bk. i, c. 1--ii, c. 9--we have an exact recapitulation of the subject of the inquiry in the ~Politei/a~ from ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 460 C, with the definite statement (19 AB) that thus far and no farther had the discussion gone "yesterday". The stages in which the whole work was composed seem then to be divisible as follows: (1) Sketch of the state of the {478} ~phu/lakes~ (in brief) embodied in a dialogue between Sokrates, Kriton, Timaios, Hermokrates, and another companion: in subject matter agreeing (apart from the introduction) substantially with _Rp._ ii, 10, 367 E, to v, 460 C. (2) Continuation of this sketch in the story of ancient Athens and the people of Atlantis. Its completion is transferred elsewhere because in the meantime the ~Politei/a~ itself has been extended and into the empty framework of the ~Ti/m.~ thus left available the account of the creation of the world given by Timaios is very loosely inserted: the frame-narratives of the ~Ti/maios~ and ~Kriti/as~ never being completed. (3) Continuation of the first sketch (still virtually along the lines originally laid down) in _Rp._ v, 460 D-471 C (in which 466 E ff. is a brief account of the behaviour of the state in time of war--a substitute for the longer and more detailed statement on the same subject in _Tim._ 20 B f.), and in viii, ix (the greater part), and x, second half (608 C ff.). (4) Finally the whole work receives its crown and completion in a section that was, however, not foreseen in the older parts of the design, for it disturbs part of that original design's independence and validity and does more than merely supplement it--the introduction of the ~philo/sophoi~ and their special type of "virtue", v, 471 C-vii fin.; ix, 580 D-588 A; x, part 1 (to 608 B).--Then came the final editing of the whole: insertion of the new introduction, i, 1-ii, 9 (not necessarily left until the completion of the whole; necessary bringing into harmony of the divergent elements by a few excisions, qualifications, etc.; and probably a literary revision and polishing of the whole book.--The whole thus finally produced reveals its origin clearly enough in the outgrowing of a first plan and its replacement by a second that has naturally suggested itself in the course of the author's own continued development. At the same time Plato could claim that the whole edifice, in spite of much extension and rebuilding in a different style of architecture, should be considered as a unity in the form in which he finally left it (as a noteworthy monument, too, of his own alteration of view). He himself in the sublimest moments of his mystic flight in Bks. vi and vii in no sense rejects the groundwork of the ~kalli/polis~ of ii-v (though not, indeed, designed originally as such), but merely reduces it to the position of a substructure which remains a necessary and sole foundation even for the mystic pinnacle and preserves its absolute validity for the great majority of the citizens who inhabit the ~kalli/polis~ (for the ~philo/sophoi~ are still regarded as very few in number) for whom it is a school for the exhibition of political virtue.--In the first sketch, then, there is no trace of a doctrine of immortality that can be properly so called, and the popular belief in a continued life of the soul after death has for Plato, at this stage at least, no serious weight or importance. The ~phu/lakes~ are not to trouble about what may follow death (iii, 1 ff.); the main purpose in view is to show that ~dikaiosu/nê~ is its own reward, and the rewards which are anticipated for it after death are only ironically alluded to (ii, 363 CD; cf. 366 AB); Sokrates means to do without such hopes (366 E ff.). The ~athanasi/a psuchê=s~ is only introduced as a paradox in x, 608 D (in the continuation of the first sketch) for which proof is sought; whereupon the importance of the question as to what may await the soul after death emerges (614 A ff.) as well as the necessity of taking thought not for this short life but ~hupe\r tou= ha/pantos chro/non~ (608 C), of which nothing had been said or could have been said in iii-v. Finally in vi-vii the indestructibility of the soul is implied in its sublimest form. It is evident that Plato's own views on these matters had undergone changes in the course of time, and that these {479} changes are reflected in the various strata of the ~Politei/a~ even after its final editing. (Cf. Krohn, _Platon. Staat_, p. 265; Pfleiderer, _Platon. Frage_, p. 23 f., 35 ff., 1888.)]

[9\13: The Appearance ~bou/letai, ore/getai, prothumei=tai ei=nai~ what its Idea _is_: _Phd._ 74 D, 75 AB. The Ideas are thus teleological causes like the divine ~nou=s~ of Aristotle which, unmoved itself, ~kinei= hôs erô/menon~ (just as matter has a desire for form, potentiality for actuality). Plato it is true did not keep to this method of illustrating rather than explaining the relation between the Appearance and the unmoved Idea.]

[10\13: ~noê/sei meta\ lo/gou perilêpto/n~, _Tim._ 27 D. ~hou= ou/pot' a\n a/llô| epila/boio ê\ tô=| tê=s dianoi/as logismô=|~, _Phd._ 79 A. ~autê\ di' hautê=s hê psuchê\ ta\ koina\ phai/netai peri\ pa/ntôn episkopei=n~, _Tht._ 185 D.]

[11\13: The _prius_ in the case of man is really the perception of his own mental activity in ~no/êsis meta\ lo/gou~ as being a process essentially different from ~do/xa met' aisthê/seôs alo/gou~. It is inference from the former alone that leads to the conclusion that the ~noou/mena~ exist: _Tim._ 51 B-52 A. It is the Ideas that we grasp in abstract thought: ~autê\ hê ousi/a hê=s lo/gon di/domen kai\ erôtô=ntes kai\ apokrino/menoi~, _Phd._ 78 D.]

[12\13: The ~epistê/mê~ which ~dialektikê/~ alone can give (_Rp._ 533 DE is ~anama/rtêtos~ (_Rp._ 477 E.]

[13\13: Of the three ~ei/dê~ or ~ge/nê~--the ~o/n~, the ~gigno/menon~ and the ~en hô=| gi/gnetai~ (the ~chô/ra~) of _Tim._ 48 E f., 52 ABD)--the third at any rate is quite foreign to the soul. Like the World-Soul (_Tim._ 35 A, along with which it is "mixed" (41 D), the individual soul also is a middle term between the ~a/meres~ of the Idea and the ~kata\ ta\ sô/mata meristo/n~, having a share in both.]

[14\13: True, unalterable Being belongs only to the ~aeide/s~ and therefore also to the soul: _Phd._ 79 A f.]

[15\13: _Phd._ c. 54-6 (105 B-107 B).]

[17\13: ~age/nêton~, _Phdr._ c. 24, 245 D (~aï/dios~ simply, _Rp._ 611 B). The creation of the souls in _Tim._ is only intended to represent the origin of the spiritual from the ~dêmiourgo/s~ (not the coming into being of the soul _in time_): see Siebeck, _Ges. d. Psychol._ i, 1, 275 ff. Still, it remains impossible to say whether Plato whenever he speaks of the pre-existence of the soul always means that the soul existed without beginning.]

[18\13: As to the relation of the individual soul to the soul of the universe, neither the mythical account in _Timaeus_ nor the briefer allusion in _Phileb._ 30 A allows us to conclude that the soul of our body is "taken from" the soul of the ~sô=ma tou= panto/s~. In reality the fiction of a "World-Soul" is intended to serve quite other purposes than the derivation of the individual soul from a single common source.]

[19\13: _Tim._ 34 C; _Lg._ 891 A-896 C.]

[20\13: Acc. to the account in _Phdr._ 246 C, the soul suffers its downfall into the earthly existence if ~ho tê=s ka/kês hi/ppos~, i.e. the ~epithumi/a~ in the soul, tends towards the earth--247 B. It must, therefore, be the result of the preponderance of the appetitive impulses. This, however, can only happen if the ~logistiko/n~ of the soul has become too weak to drive the soul-chariot any longer as its duty was. Hence the supporting wings, i.e. the ~no/êsis~, of the soul-horse fall off. It is thus a weakening of the cognitive part of the soul that causes its downfall into materiality (just as it is the measure of their capacity for knowledge that determines {480} the character of the ~ensôma/tôsis~ of the souls, and their return to the ~to/pos huperoura/nios~ is equally determined by their recovery of the purer form of knowledge: 248 C ff., 249 AC). Thus it is not, as in Empedokles, a religio-moral transgression that leads to the incarnation of the souls, but a failure of intellect, an intellectual fall in sin.]

[21\13: The soul is, acc. to the account in _Tim._, created in order that by animating and governing a body, it may complete the sum of creation: without the ~zô=|a~ the ~ourano/s~ (the universe) would be ~atelê/s~, _Tim._ 41 B ff. Acc. to this teleological motivation of the being and the ~ensôma/tôsis~ of the soul, this latter, the ~ensôma/tôsis~, would have belonged to the original plan of the ~dêmiourgo/s~ and there would be no purpose in the creation of the souls (by the ~dêmiourgo/s~ and the inferior gods) unless they were destined to the animation of the ~zô=|a~ and conjunction with ~sô/mata~. But it is obviously inconsistent with all this that the _object_ of the soul's endeavour should be to separate itself as soon as possible and as completely as possible from the body and everything material in order to get back again to immaterial life without any body--42 BD. This is a relic of the original _theological_ view of the relation between body and soul. In _Phd._ (and usually in Plato) it displays itself unconcealed; but it was far too closely bound up with the whole of Plato's ethic and metaphysics not to make its illicit appearance even when as in _Tim._ he wished to keep the physiological side to the fore.]

[22\13: _Phdr._ 245 C-246 A. The soul is ~to\ hauto\ kinou=n~, and indeed continually, ~aeiki/nêton~, it is ~toi=s a/llois ho/sa kinei=tai pêgê\ kai\ archê\ kinê/seôs~ (the body only _seems_ to move itself, but it is really the soul within which moves it--246 C). If the soul were to perish, ~pa=s ourano\s pa=sa/ te ge/nesis~ would be at a standstill. The conception of the "soul" as the ~aeiki/nêton~ was already well and long established in Plato's time (see above, chap. xii, n. 150). In the form in which he introduces it here (as a proof of the imperishability of the soul) he may have modelled his conception on that of Alkmaion (Arist., _An._ 405a, 29): see Hirzel, _Hermes_, xi, 244. But Plato here and throughout _Phdr._ is speaking of the individual soul (~psuchê/~ collective singular). So too in _Lg._ 894 E ff., 896 A ff. (~lo/gos~ of the soul: ~hê duname/nê autê\ hautê\n kinei=n ki/nêsis~. It is the ~aiti/a~ and the issue of all movement in the world, the source of life; for life belongs to that which ~auto/ hauto\ kinei=~ 895 C.) As distinguished from the ~psuchê\ enoikou=sa en ha/pasi toi=s kinoume/nois~ we do not hear of the (double World-Soul until 896 E. There is in fact ~ki/nêsis~ in plenty in the world besides that of the animated organisms.]

[23\13: _Phd._ 93 B (c. 43) and often.]

[24\13: ~psuchê/~ on the one side, ~pa=n to\ a/psuchon~ on the other. _Phdr._ 246 B and so generally.]

[25\13: _Tim._ 86 B ff. (c. 41).--In brief: ~kako\s hekô\n oudei/s, dia\ de\ ponêra\n he/xin tina\ _tou= sô/matos_ kai\ apai/deuton trophê\n~ (education of the soul) ~ho kako\s gi/gnetai kako/s~, 86 E.]

[26\13: ~to\ sômatoeide\s ho\ tê=| psuchê=| hê homili/a te kai\ xunousi/a tou= sô/matos . . . enepoi/êse xu/mphuton ktl.~ _Phd._ 81 C, 83 D.]

[27\13: Pythagoreans, see above (chap. xi, n. 55); hardly Demokritos (_Dox._, p. 390, 14). The trichotomy can exist very well side by side with the dichotomy (which also appears) into ~logistiko/n~ and ~alo/gistikon~, the last being simply divided again into ~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~.]

[28\13: In the first sketch of the Republic (ii-v). Here it is admittedly bound up with the three classes or castes of the state, but it has not been invented for the benefit of these classes. On the contrary, the {481} trichotomy of the soul is original and the division of the citizen body into three parts is derived and explained from it; cf. 435 E.--The view that Plato was never quite serious about the threefold division of the soul but always spoke of it as something semi-mythical or as a temporarily adopted hypothesis, will not appear plausible on an unprejudiced study of the passages in the Platonic writings that deal with the threefold division of the soul.]

[29\13: _Rp._ x, 611 A-E (c. 11), shows clearly that the reason which made Plato abandon his conception (given in the first sketch of the _Rep._ and still maintained in the _Phaedrus_) of the natural trichotomy of the soul into parts or divisions was the consideration of its immortality and vocation to intercourse with the ~thei=on kai\ atha/naton kai\ aei\ o/n~.--The emotions and passions by which the soul is "fettered" ~hupo\ tou= sô/matos~, explain its tendency to clothe itself in another body after death, _Phd._ 83 C ff. If the emotions and passions were indissolubly linked to the soul the latter could never escape from the cycle of rebirths.--On the other hand, if only the ~logistiko/n~, as the only independently existing side of the soul, goes into the place of judgment in the other world there would seem to be no reason that should tempt this simple uncompounded soul to renewed ~ensôma/tôsis~, a process which implies materiality and desire. (This difficulty troubled Plotinos too.) Plato takes into view the possibility of an inner corruption of the pure and undivided intellectual soul which makes a future state of punishment and purgatory possible and intelligible and explains the existence (until a complete return to purity is achieved) of a tendency or constraint to renewed ~ensôma/tôsis~ even without a permanent association with the ~thumoeide/s~ and the ~epithumêtiko/n~.]

[30\13: ~tê=| alêthesta/tê| phu/sei~ the soul is ~monoeide/s~, _Rep._ x, c. 11 (611 B, 612 A). Hence it is ~to\ para/pan adia/lutos ê\ eggu/s ti tou/tou~, _Phd._ 80 B.]

[31\13: The intellect-soul ~atha/naton archê\n thnêtou= zô/|ou~ is the creation of the ~dêmiourgo/s~; the other faculties of the soul, ~thumo/s~, ~epithumi/a~ (and ~ai/sthêsis~ therewith), ~psuchê=s ho/son thnêto\n~ (_Tim._ 61 C), are all added to the soul at the moment of its union with the body by the subordinate deities: _Tim._ 41 D-44 D; 69 A-70 D (c. 14, 15, 31). The same idea appears in _Rp._ x, 611 BC. ~to\ aeigene\s me/ros tê=s psuchê=s~ is distinguished from the ~zôogene/s~: _Polit._ 309 C.]

[32\13: ~to\ sô=ma kai\ hai= _tou/tou_ epithumi/ai~, _Phd._ 66 C. The soul moved by passion suffers ~hupo\ sô/matos~, 83 CD. In death the soul is ~kathara\ pa/ntôn tô=n peri\ to\ sô=ma kakô=n kai\ epithumiô=n~, _Crat._ 404 A.]

[33\13: _Tim._ 43 C. It is only as a result of this violent and contradictory excitement through the physical perception of Becoming that the soul _becomes_ ~a/nous~ (which is **originally foreign to it) ~ho/tan eis sô=ma endethê=| thnêto/n~, 44 A. (It will in time become ~e/mphrôn~ once more and can become wise, 44 BC. In the case of the animals, which can be inhabited by the same soul, it will remain always ~a/phrôn~--one may suppose.)]

[34\13: ~. . . smikro\n chro/non, oude\n me\n ou=n pro\s to\n ha/panta (chro/non)~. _Rp._ 498 D.]

[35\13: In accordance with popular thought (but obviously also in perfect seriousness and without any special concession) death is regarded as ~tê=s psuchê=s apo\ tou= sô/matos apallagê/~, _Phd._ 64 C; _Gorg._ 524 B. Hence, it usually happens that the soul ~mêde/pote eis Ha/idou katharô=s aphike/sthai, all' aei\ tou= sô/matos anaple/a exie/nai~, _Phd._ 83 D. (--~aei\~, i.e. with the exception of the few complete ~philo/sophoi~ that do not need further purification in Hades, and this is, in fact, the doctrine of the _Phd._ itself; cf. 114 C, 80 E, 81 A.)]

[36\13: Purgatory, punishment and rewards in the other world: _Gorg._ {482} 523 ff.: _Rp._ x, c. 13 ff., 614 A ff. (vision of Er, son of Armenios in the continuation of the first version of the ~politei/a~); _Phd._ 110 B-114 C. We must not here go into the details of the individual myths in which it is still perhaps possible to distinguish what parts Plato has taken out of ancient poetry and popular legend and what comes from theological and

## particularly Orphic doctrinal poetry--or even (_Rp._ x) from

Oriental fables--and how much he has added independently on his own account. (A few remarks will be found in G. Ettig, _Acherunt.,_ _Leipz. Stud._ xiii, 305 ff.; cf. also Döring, _Arch. Ges. Phil._ 1393, p. 475 ff.; Dieterich, _Nekyia_, 112 ff.) He usually distinguishes three classes among the souls (only apparently two in _Phdr._ 249 A): those who are affected with curable faults, the hopelessly and incurable guilty (who are condemned to _eternal_ punishment in Tartaros without rebirth: _Gorg._ 525 C ff.; _Rp._ 615 D; _Phd._ 113 E); and, thirdly the ~hosi/ôs bebiôko/tes, di/kaioi kai\ ho/sioi~. This is the system of _Gorg._ 525 BC, 526 C; _Rp._ 615 BC. (With these come also the ~a/ôroi~, 615 C, who neither deserve punishment nor reward--of them Er said ~a/lla, ouk a/xia mnê/mês~. Perhaps older theologians had already concerned themselves with these, not being satisfied with the fate assigned by popular mythology to the ~a/ôroi~--see Append. vii--it would have been a natural subject for the professional attention of these Schoolmen of popular superstition.) In _Phd._ 113 D ff. the question is even more minutely dealt with. Here we have (1) ~hoi me/sôs bebiôko/tes~ (che visser' senz' infamia e senza lode), (2) ~hoi ania/tôs e/chontes~, (3) ~hoi ia/sima hêmartêko/tes~, (4) ~hoi diaphero/ntôs hosi/ôs bebiôko/tes~, and (5) the élite of these ~ho/sioi~, the real philosophers, ~hoi philosophi/a| hikanô=s kathera/menoi~--these are not born again. To the other classes are assigned their appropriate purgation, reward or punishment. Here classes 2, 3, and 4 correspond to the three classes of _Rp._ and _Gorg._ (which may perhaps be modelled on the divisions popularized by older theological poetry--see above, chap. xii, n. 62). Novelties are the ~me/sôs bebiôko/tes~ and the true philosophers. For these last the abode upon the ~maka/rôn nê=soi~ (_Gorg._ 526 C), or, what comes to the same thing, upon the surface of the earth (_Phd._ 114 BC), is no longer sufficient. They go ~es maka/rôn tina\s eudaimoni/as~ (115 D), which means that they are really freed entirely from temporal existence and enter into the unchanging "Now" of eternity. (As far as the complete escape of the ~philo/sophoi~ is concerned the account in _Rp._ x, c. 13 [614 A-615 C] does not contradict that of _Phd._ The only reason why this is not mentioned in _Rp._ is that these absolutely enfranchized souls could not appear upon the ~leimô/n~ there mentioned: 614 E.)--Of these various accounts that of _Phd._ seems to be the latest. In _Lg._ there is yet another indefinite allusion to the necessity of undergoing a judgment after death: 904 C ff.]

[37\13: _Choice_ of their new state of life by the souls in the other world, _Rp._ 617 E ff.; _Phdr._ 249 B. The purpose of this arrangement is made clear by _Rp._ 617 E; ~aiti/a helome/nou; theo\s anai/tios~ (cf. _Tim._ 42 D). It is, in fact, a theodicy and at the same time secures the complete responsibility of every man for his own character and deeds (cf. 619 C). There is no idea of founding a determinist theory upon it.--The choice is guided by the special character of the soul (which it has developed in its previous life) and its tendencies (cf. _Phd._ 81 E; _Lg._ 904 BC). For the same reason there is no choice on the occasion of the soul's first ~ensôma/tôsis~ (_Tim._ 41 E): after that, in later births, a definite descent in well-marked stages _in peius_, can be observed, each conditioned by the degree of corruption attaching to the soul (_Tim._ 42 B ff.). {483} All of which can very well co-exist with a choice of its own fate by the soul conditioned by its own nature.]

[38\13: ~xummetri/a~, _Tim._ 87 D.]

[39\13: At least three (as in Pi., _O._ ii, 75 ff.), acc. to _Phdr._ 249 A. Between each two births there is an intervening period of 1,000 years (_Rp._ 615 A; _Phdr._ 249 AB). This cuts away the ground from such myths as that of the various "lives" of Pythagoras (see Append. x).]

[40\13: Incarnation in animals, _Phdr._ 249 B; _Rp._ 618 A, 620 ff.; _Phd._ 81 E; _Tim._ 42 BC. That this part was any less seriously meant than any other part of his doctrine of metempsychosis is not in the least suggested by Plato himself. Acc. to _Tim._ 91 D-92 B, _all_ the animals have souls that had once inhabited the bodies of men (see Procl., _in Rp._ ii, 332 Kroll; he is trying to harmonize _Tim._ and _Phdr._). In fact, the idea that a man's soul might inhabit an animal was precisely the great difficulty in Plato's doctrine of the soul. If, as is said in _Phdr._ 249 BC, a real animal-soul cannot enter into a human body because it does not possess ~no/êsis~ or the power of "dialectic" which constitutes the essential part of the human soul's activity, how can a real human soul enter into an animal's body when it is obvious that as an animal it can make no use of its ~no/êsis~? (For this very reason many Platonists--those who were not satisfied with ingenious or artificial interpretations: cf. Sallust., _de Dis_ 20; Procl., _in Tim._ 329 DE--denied the entrance of the human soul into animals; cf. Aug. _CD._ X, 30, and partic. Nemes., p. 116 Matth. Lucr. iii, 760, already seems to have such Platonists in mind.) The ~logistiko/n~ of the soul seems to be absent from animals or to be present but undeveloped as in children: _Rp._ iv, 441 A B (or does it remain permanently bound in ~aphrosu/nê~? see above, this chap., n. 33. Just such a theory put forward by exponents of ~metempsu/chôsis~ who would make the ~psuchê/~ always the same but not always equally active, is attacked by Alex. Aphr., _de An._, p. 27 Br.). But acc. to the later doctrine of Plato the ~logistiko/n~ comprises the whole contents of the soul before it enters a body; if the animals do not possess it then they do not strictly speaking possess a soul (~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~ in themselves are not the soul; they are only added to the soul when it first enters into a body). It seems certain that Plato adopted the view that the soul migrates into the bodies of animals from the theologians and Pythagoreans, while he still believed that the soul was not pure power of thought but also (as still in _Phdr._) included ~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~ in itself. Later, because it was difficult to do without the migration-theory of the soul on account of its ethical importance, he allowed the idea to remain side by side with his reorganized and sublimated doctrine of the soul. (On the other hand, metempsychosis into plants--which are certainly also ~zô=|a~, though they only have to ~to\ epithumêtiko/n~, _Tim._ 77 B--was never adopted by him from Empedokles; cf. Procl., _in Rp._ ii, 333 Kr., and for the same reason: this idea was unimportant and indifferent from an ethical point of view.)]

[41\13: ~tê\n eis to\n noêto\n to/pon tê=s psuchê=s a/nodon~, _Rp._ 517 B.]

[42\13: ~epeidê\ de\ age/nêto/n esti, kai\ adia/phthoron auto\ anagkê ei=nai~, _Phdr._ 245 D--the ancient argument from the fact that the individual soul (and of this Plato is speaking) has no beginning to the conclusion that its life can have no end.]

[43\13: This much may be conceded to Teichmüller's observations. "The individual, and the individual soul, is not an independent principle but only a resultant of the compounding of the Idea and the principle of Becoming"--though this is not how Plato regards the {484} matter; hence in Plato--"the individual is not eternal (i.e. not necessarily), and the eternal Principles are not individual", _Stud. z. Ges. d. Begr._, p. 115, 142 (1874). But all that Teichmüller has to say under this head is in reality only a _criticism_ of the Platonic doctrine of the soul and does not help us to determine what exactly that doctrine was. Plato speaks always of the immortality, i.e. the eternity, of the individual soul; nowhere does he confine indestructibility to the "common nature" of the soul; and this fact is not even remotely explained by appealing as Teichmüller does to an alleged "orthodoxy" to which Plato is supposed to be accommodating his words. If from no other passage we should be obliged to conclude definitely from _Rp._ 611 A that Plato believed in the existence of a plurality of souls and in their indestructibility: ~aei\ a\n ei=en hai autai/ (psuchai/). ou/te ga\r a/n pou ela/ttous ge/nointo mêdemia=s apollume/nês, ou/te hau= plei/ous~. Here the predicate of the first sentence is indubitably ~ei=en~ only; it is affirmed that always the same souls will exist, not that ~hai autai\ ei=en~ ("the souls are always the same ones") as Teichmüller supposes, _Platon. Frage_, 7 ff., and it is asserted with all possible plainness that the plurality of individual souls, of which a definite number exist, is indestructible.]

[44\13: E.g. appeal made to ~teletai/, palaioi\ lo/goi en aporrê/tois lego/menoi~, and particularly to Orphic doctrine, in those places where he is speaking of the inward difference between the soul and all that is corporeal, of the soul's "death" in earthly life, of its enclosure in the ~sô=ma~ as its ~sê=ma~ in punishment of its misdeeds--of punishment and purification after death in ~Ha/idês~, of the migration of the soul, its imperishability, dwelling of the pure in the neighbourhood of the gods (_Phd._ 61 BC, 63 C, 70 C, 81 A, 107 D ff.; _Gorg._ 493 A; _Crat._ 400 BC; _Men._ 81 A; _Lg._ 870 DE, 872 E). This also is the origin of the tendency to compare the highest philosophical activity, or the beholding of the Ideas before all time, with the ~epoptei=ai~ of the mysteries: _Phdr._ 250 B; cf. Lob., _Agl._ 128.]

[45\13: Nine (an ancient sacred number) stages from the ~philo/sophos~ downwards to the ~tu/rannos~, _Phdr._ 248 DE.]

[46\13: This is frequently stated in individual myths; cf. also _Phd._ 85 CD.]

[47\13: _Phdr._ 250 C (~o/streon~): _Rp._ 611 CD (Glaukos).]

[48\13: ~tê\n tou= o/ntos thê/ran~, _Phd._ 66 C (~ho/tan autê\ kath' hautê\n pragmateu/êtai hê psuchê\ peri\ ta\ o/nta~, _Tht._ 187 A. ~autê=| tê=| psuchê=| theate/on auta\ ta\ pra/gmata~, _Phd._ 66 D).]

[49\13: ~xunai/tia~, _Tim._ 46 C ff. ~nou=s kai\ ana/gkê~, 47 E ff. (~ho theo/s~ is ~pollô=n anai/tios~, namely ~tô=n kakô=n~, _Rp._ 379 AC).]

[50\13: The ~sô=ma~ with which the soul is bound up is a ~kako/n~, _Phd._ 66 B (~desmoi/~ of the soul, 67 D). The ~kaka/~ in the world are regularly said to come from matter until in _Lg._, side by side with the ~**euerge/tis psuchê/~ of the world, there appears an evil World-Soul that works evil.]

[51\13: Particularly in _Phd._, ~kathareu/ein--ka/tharsis--hoi philosophi/a| hikanô=s kathêra/menoi~ in contrast with the ~aka/thartoi psuchai/~, 67 A ff., 69 BC, 80 E, 82 D, 108 B, 114 C. Katharsis of the soul through dialectic Soph. 230 C ff. Express allusion to the analogous requirement of ~ka/tharsis~ by ~hoi ta\s teleta\s hêmi=n katastê/santes~, _Phd._ 69 C.]

[52\13: ~_ka/tharsis_ ei=nai tou=to xumbai/nei, to\ chôri/zein ho/ ti ma/lista apo\ tou= sô/matos tê\n psuchê\n kai\ ethi/sai autê\n kath' hautê\n pantacho/then ek tou= sô/matos sunagei/resthai/ te kai\ hathroi/zesthai, kai\ oikei=n kata\ to\ dunato\n kai\ en tô=| nu=n paro/nti kai\ en tô=| e/peita mo/nên kath' hautê=n, ekluome/nên hô/sper ek desmô=n ek tou= sô/matos~, _Phd._ 67 C. Thus ~dikaiosu/nê~ and {485} ~andrei/a~, and more particularly ~phro/nêsis~, are ~katharmo/s tis~, 69 BC. ~lu/sis te kai\ katharmo/s~ of ~philosophi/a~, 82 D.]

[53\13: ~philosophi/a~ teaches the soul ~eis hautê\n xulle/gesthai kai\ hathroi/zesthai~ and to ~anachôrei=n~ from the ~apa/tê~ of the senses ~ho/son mê\ ana/gkê autoi=s chrê=sthai~, _Phd._ 83 A.--~ea\n kathara\ hê psuchê\ apalla/ttêtai . . . pheu/gousa to\ sô=ma kai\ sunêthroisme/nê autê\ eis hautê/n~, 80 E, 76 C.]

[54\13: ~. . . katharoi\ apallatto/menoi tê=s tou= sô/matos aphrosu/nês . . . gnôso/metha di' hêmô=n autô=n pa=n to\ eilikrine/s, mê\ katharô=| ga\r katharou= epha/ptesthai mê\ ou themito\n ê=|~, _Phd._ 67 AB.]

[55\13: For the ~agatho/n, hê tou= agathou= ide/a, aiti/a~ both of ~alê/theia~ and of ~epistê/mê~ but identical with neither (they are only ~agathoeidê=~) and ~e/ti meizo/nôs timête/on~--cause of the ~gignôsko/mena~ and not only of ~gignô/skesthai~, of both ~ei=nai~ and ~ousi/a, ouk ousi/as o/ntos tou= agathou= all' e/ti epe/keina tê=s ousi/as presbei/a| kai\ duna/mei hupere/chontos~--see _Rp._ vi, c. 19 (508 A ff.), 517 BC. Here ~to\ agatho/n~, as the reason and

## active cause of all Being is itself placed beyond and above Being

(as it is regularly with the Neoplatonics) and identified with Godhead (the ~thei=os nou=s~, _Phil._ 22 C); this last is, however, in _Tim._ set side by side with the Ideas, of which ~to\ agatho/n~ is now the highest.]

[56\13: ~hê tou= agathou= ide/a me/giston ma/thêma~, _Rp._ 505 A.]

[57\13: The ~periagôgê/~ of the soul, _Rp._ vii init.]

[58\13: The philosopher, ~exista/menos tô=n anthrôpi/nôn spoudasma/tôn kai\ pro\s tô=| thei/ô| gigno/menos, _enthousia/zôn_ le/lêthe tou\s pollou/s~, _Phdr._ 249 D.]

[59\13: ~ho ga\r sunoptiko\s dialektiko/s~, _Rp._ 537 C. ~eis mi/an ide/an sunorô=nta a/gein ta\ pollachê=| diesparme/na~ (and again ~kat' ei/dê te/mnein~ what is unified)--this is the business of the ~dialektiko/s~, _Phdr._ 265 D. ~ek pollô=n aisthê/seôn eis he\n logismô=| xunairou/menon (ie/nai~, _Phdr._ 249 B.]

[60\13: Gradual ascent of dialectic upwards to ~auto\ ho\ e/stin agatho/n~, _Rp._ 532 A f., 511 BC, 534 B ff. to ~auto\ to\ kalo/n~, _Smp._ c. 28-9 (211 B). Its aim is ~epanagôgê\ tou= belti/stou en psuchê=| pro\s tou= ari/stou en toi=s ou=si the/an~, _Rp._ 532 C.]

[61\13: The philosophic ~erôtiko/s~ at the end of the dialectic ascent ~_exai/phnês_ kato/psetai/ ti thaumasto\n tê\n phu/sin kalo/n ktl.~, _Smp._ 210 E--exactly as in the ~te/lea kai\ epoptika\ mustê/ria~, 210 A. ~holo/klêra kai\ hapla= kai\ eudai/mona pha/smata muoumenoi/ te kai\ epopteu/ontes en augê=| kathara=|~, _Phdr._ 250 C.--it is a visionary and a suddenly acquired apprehension of the world-order, not one obtained in discursive thought. We may compare the way in which Plotinos, with a recollection of such Platonic passages, describes the arrival of ~e/kstasis--ho/tan hê psuchê\ _exai/phnês_ phô=s la/bê| ktl.~ (5, 3, 17; cf. 5, 5, 17).]

[62\13: The soul ~e/oike tô=| thei/ô|~, _Phd._ 80 A. It is ~xuggenê\s tô=| te thei/ô| kai\ athana/tô| kai\ tô=| aei\ o/nti~, _Rp._ 611 E--~sugge/neia thei/a~ of men; _Lg._ 899 D. The eternal and immortal is, as such, divine. The real _Ego_ of man, the ~atha/naton, psuchê\ eponomazo/menon~, after death goes ~para\ theou\s a/llous~, _Lg._ 959 B.]

[63\13: The ~thei=on, athana/tois homô/numon~, part of the soul is ~atha/natos archê\ thnêtou= zô/|ou~, _Tim._ 41 C, 42 E. The ~phro/nêsis~ of the soul (its "wing" _Phdr._ 246 D) ~tô=| thei/ô| e/oiken~, _Alc._^1 133 C.--In _Tim._ 90 A C this ~kuriô/taton tê=s psuchê=s ei=dos~ is actually called the _~dai/môn~_ which man has ~xu/noikon en hautô=|~.]

[64\13: The eye is ~hêlioeide/staton tô=n peri\ ta\s aisthê/seis orga/nôn~, _Rp._ 508 B.--Goethe is alluding either to these words or to the phrase of Plotinos taken from them, 1, 6 (~peri\ tou= kalou=~), 9.]

[65\13: ~epistê/mê kai\ alê/theia~ are both ~agathoeidê=~, _Rp._ 509 A--the soul something ~theoeide/s~, _Phd._ 95 C.] {486}

[66\13: From the ~philosophi/a~ of the soul and from the question ~hô=n ha/ptetai kai\ hoi/ôn ephi/etai homiliô=n~ its real nature can be discerned as one which is ~xuggenê\s tô=| thei/ô| kai\ athana/tô| kai\ tô=| aei\ o/nti~, _Rp._ 611 DE; _Phd._ 79 D. With the ~xuggene/s~ of the soul we achieve contact with the ~o/ntôs o/n~, _Rp._ 490 B. If the Ideas are everlasting, so must our soul be, _Phd._ 76 DE. By its power of ~phronei=n atha/nata kai\ thei=a~ the ~anthrôpi/nê phu/sis~ has itself a share ~kath' ho/son ende/chetai~ (i.e. with ~nou=s~) in ~athanasi/a~, _Tim._ 90 BC. This thinking "part" of the soul ~pro\s tê\n en ouranô=| xugge/neian apo\ gê=s hêma=s ai/rei, hôs o/ntas phuto\n ouk e/ggeion all' oura/nion~, _Tim._ 90 A.]

[67\13: ~_lu/ein_ tê\n psuchê\n~ from the body and from sense-perception, _Phd._ 83 AB, 65 A, 67 D. ~lu/sis~ and ~katharmo/s~ of the soul by ~philosophi/a~, _Phd._ 82 D. ~lu/sis kai\ i/asis tô=n desmô=n~ (of the body) ~kai\ tê=s aphrosu/nês~, _Rp._ 515 C.]

[68\13: ~thei=os eis to\ dunato\n anthrô/pô| gi/gnetai~--said of the true philosopher, _Rp._ 500 D; ~atha/natos~, _Smp._ 212 A. The ~philo/sophos~ is perpetually in contact with the ~o\n aei\~ and the ~thei=on~, which last is with difficulty recognizable by the eyes of ~tê=s tô=n pollô=n psuchê=s~, Soph. 254 A.--~kai/ moi dokei= theo\s me\n~ (as e.g. Empedokles called himself) ~anê\r oudamô=s ei=nai, _thei=os_ mê/n; pa/ntas ga\r egô\ tou\s philoso/phous toiou/tous prosagoreu/ô~ _Soph._ 216 B (where ~thei=os~ is used in quite a different sense from that it has in other passages where Plato speaks of ~chrêsmô|doi\ kai\ theoma/nteis~ as ~thei=oi~, _Men._ 99 C, and of the insight and virtue of the unphilosophic as coming ~thei/a| moi/ra| a/neu nou=~).]

[69\13: _Rp._ 519 C, 540 B.--~tê=s tou= o/ntos the/as, hoi/an _hêdonê\n_ e/chei, adu/naton a/llô| gegeu=sthai plê\n tô=| philoso/phô|~, _Rp._ 582 C (cf. _Phileb._).]

[70\13: The flight ~enthe/nde ekei=se~ produces ~homoi/ôsin theô=| kata\ to\ dunato\n~, _Tht._ 176 B. ~homoiou=sthai theô=|~, _Rp._ 613 A (~to\ katanooume/nô| to\ katanoou=n exomoiô=sai~, _Tim._ 90 D).]

[70a\13: The soul that has through philosophy become completely "pure" is withdrawn from the cycle of Rebirth and from the whole material world. Even as early as _Phdr._ the souls of the ~philosophê/santes~ after a third ~ensôma/tôsis~ are exempt for the remainder of the ~peri/odos~ of 10,000 years, while the real and unwavering (~aei/~) philosopher remains _for ever_ free from the body. That at least must be the meaning of 248 C-249 A. The subject is then treated in more detail in _Phd._: Release of the ~philosophi/a| hikanô=s kathêra/menoi~ for ever from life in the body (~a/neu sôma/tôn zô=si to\ para/pan eis to\n e/peita chro/non~, 114 C)--entry of the pure soul to its kin (~eis to\ xuggene/s~, 84 B) and its like (~eis to\ ho/moion autê=|, to\ aeide/s~, 81 A), and ~eis theô=n ge/nos~, 82 B--and to the ~tou= thei/ou te kai\ katharou= kai\ monoeidou=s xunousi/a~, 83 E. Still more mythologically expressed--_Tim._ 42 BD (~ho tô=n kakô=n katharo\s to/pos~ _Tht._ 177 A). Throughout we have the release theory of the theologians re-expressed in a philosophical and more elevated manner (Orphic: ~memuême/noi~, _Phd._ 81).]

[71\13: ~. . . ou rha/|dion dêlô=sai . . .~ , _Phd._ 114 C.]

[72\13: To the ~aï/dios ousi/a, to\ _e/sti_ mo/non kata\ to\n alêthê= lo/gon prosê/kei~ _Tim._ 37 E.]

[73\13: It is true that not until it becomes associated with the body does the soul, by obtaining ~ai/sthêsis~, ~epithumi/a~, ~thumo/s~, and all the other faculties that bring it into touch with Becoming and Changing, obtain what can strictly be called its individual personality. The perfectly adequate comprehension in thought of the ever-Unchanging by the bodiless and free soul would have no individualized content. We must not, however, (with Teichm., _Pl. Fr._ 40), conclude from this that Plato knew nothing of an immortality of the individual and of {487} individuality. He did not distinctly raise the question of the seat and origin of individuality in the soul. He is content to suppose that a plurality of individual souls was living before their entanglement with Becoming, and to conclude from this that in eternity, too, after their last escape from ~ge/nesis~, the same number of individual souls will still be living. Numerical distinctness (which affects in a scarcely intelligible manner the spaceless and immaterial) has to do duty with him for qualitative distinctness which would alone be able to account for the self-consciousness of this plurality. Acc. to the picture given in _Tim._ c. 14 (41 D ff.) the souls created by the ~dêmiourgo/s~ are evidently all alike (hence also is ~ge/nesis prô/tê tetagme/nê mi/a pa=sin~, 41 E), and only when they are in the ~sô=ma~, and bound up with mortal portions of soul, do they react in different ways to what affects them from without--and so become different. (This is so, however, in the pre-existent period, too, acc. to _Phd._: but in that account ~thumo/s~ and ~epithumi/a~ are also bound up with the soul in pre-existence.) The influence of the lower soul-partners and of the ~trophê\ paideu/seôs~ (_Tim._ 44 B) makes the ~logistika/~ also of the souls differ among themselves. This acquired individual characterization, the fruit of differing ~paidei/a kai\ trophê/~--something quite the reverse of the "common nature" of "soul" in general which Teichmüller supposes to be meant here: _Stud._ 143--is taken with it by the soul to the place of judgment, i.e. Hades, _Phd._ 107 D. When, however, by the best ~trophê\ paideu/seôs~ it has become completely pure and free from all the trammels of the physical and perishable and departs into bodiless existence in the ~aeide/s~--then in truth all individual distinctness has been dissolved out of it. Still, it must endure for ever as a self-conscious personality; for that this is what Plato meant cannot be doubted.]

[74\13: _Phd._ 83 D.]

[75\13: ~chôri/zein ho/ti ma/lista apo\ tou= sô/matos tê\n psuchê\n~, _Phd._ 67 C. ~anachôrei=n~, 83 (quite in the manner of genuine mysticism--it is the "separateness" of the man who is to behold god, of which Eckhart speaks).]

[76\13: _Phd._ 64 A ff., 67 E.]

[77\13: _Phd._ 114 C.]

[78\13: ~tou= sô/matos pto/êsis kai\ mani/a~, _Crat._ 404 A.]

[79\13: ~tô=| xuggenei= plêsia/sas kai\ migei\s tô=| o/nti o/ntôs~, _Rp._ 490 B.]

[80\13: The soul ~eô=sa chai/rein to\ sô=ma kai\ kath' ho/son du/natai ou koinônou=sa ore/getai tou= o/ntos~, _Phd._ 65 C. In the same way the Appearance yearns after the Idea; see above, this chap., n. 9.]

[81\13: ~tê=s phronê/seôs ktê=sis~, _Phd._ 65 A ff.]

[82\13: ~peira=sthai chrê= enthe/nde ekei=se pheu/gein ho/ti ta/chista. phugê\ de homoi/ôsis theô=| kata\ to\ dunato/n~, _Tht._ 176 AB.]

[83\13: _Rp._ 523 A-524 D.]

[84\13: Beyond all other things it is the ~ka/llos~ of the world of Appearance that awakes the memory of that which has once been seen in the world of Ideas: _Phdr._ 250 B, 250 D ff.; _Smp._ c. 28 ff. (210 A ff.). Plato gives a peculiar reason for this, but in reality it is due to a vigorous re-emergence of the fundamental artistic sense--the aesthetic element in his philosophic speculation and enthusiasm--which the thinker had so violently suppressed in obedience to his theory that the ~aisthê/seis~ and all the arts are merely imitations of deceptive imitations of the only true Reality.]

[85\13: Not ~ma/thêsis~--only ~ana/mnêsis~, _Phdr._ 249 BC; Men. c. 14 ff. (80 D ff.); _Phd._ c. 18 ff. (72 E ff.). (This theory occurs regularly in Plato in close connexion with the theory of the soul's migrations; {488} and it appears that he did as a matter of fact derive it from the anticipations and suggestions of earlier teachers of metempsychosis: see above, chap. xi, n. 96.)]

[86\13: _Rp._ vii init.]

[87\13: ~homoi/ôsis de\ theô=| di/kaion kai\ ho/sion meta\ phronê/seôs gene/sthai~, _Tht._ 176 B.]

[88\13: ~eis agora\n ouk i/sasi tê\n hodo/n ktl.~, _Tht._ 173 D ff.]

[89\13: _Tht._ 172 C-177 C. The philosopher is unskilled in the life of the everyday world and its arts, and is quite indifferent towards them. Commonplace people, if he is at any time drawn into the affairs of the market place or the law courts, regard him as ~euê/thês, ano/êtos, geloi=os~. Sometimes ~do/xan para/schoint' a\n (hoi o/ntôs philo/sophoi) hôs panta/pasin e/chontes manikô=s~, _Soph._ 216 D; _Rp._ 517 A--passages from the later writing of Plato. Even as early as _Phdr._ 249 D ~exista/menos tô=n anthrôpi/nôn spoudasma/tôn kai\ pro\s tô=| thei/ô| gigno/menos nouthetei=tai hupo\ tô=n pollô=n hôs parakinô=n ktl.~]

[90\13: ~idiôteu/ein alla\ mê\ dêmosieu/ein~ is the injunction made to the philosopher, _Ap._ 32 A; at least, in ~po/leis~ as they are, _Rp._ 520 B. After death comes the reward ~andro\s philoso/phou ta\ hautou= pra/xantos kai\ ou polupragmonê/santos en tô=| bi/ô|~, _Gorg._ 526 C. ~hô/sper eis thêri/a a/nthrôpos empesô/n~ the true philosopher will ~hêsuchi/an e/chein kai\ ta\ hautou= pra/ttein~, _Rp._ 496 D.]

[91\13: ~ta\ tô=n anthrô/pôn pra/gmata mega/lês me\n spoudê=s ouk a/xia~, _Lg._ 803 B.]

[92\13: _Gorg._ 521 D. ~ho hôs alêthô=s kubernêtiko/s~, _Rp._ 488 E (cf. also _Men._ 99 E, 100 A).]

[93\13: Not ~dia/konos kai\ epithumiô=n paraskeuastê/s~ but rather an ~iatro/s~, _Gorg._ 518 C, 521 A; cf. 464 B ff.]

[94\13: _Gorg._ 519 A. All these worldly matters seem to him ~phluari/ai~: just as all the Appearances in the world of Becoming are for him but ~phluari/ai~, _Rp._ 515 D.]

[95\13: _Gorg._ c. 78 ff. (522 B ff.).]

[96\13: ~hou=tos ho tro/pos a/ristos tou= bi/ou~, _Gorg._ 527 E--(this is the real subject of the _Gorg._, viz. ~ho/ntina chrê\ tro/pon zê=n~, 500 C, and not the nature of ~rhêtorikê/~--and it is this which gives its special emotional tone to the dialogue).]

[97\13: _Gorg._ 515 C ff., 519 A ff. Summary: ~oude/na hêmei=s i/smen a/ndra agatho\n gegono/ta ta\ politika\ en tê=|de tê=| po/lei~, 517 A.]

[98\13: ~ouch hôs kalo/n ti all' hôs anagkai=on pra/ttontes~, _Rp._ 540 B.]

[99\13: It is now the ~skopo\s en tô=| bi/ô|~--inaccessible to the ~apai/deutoi--hou= stochazome/nous dei= ha/panta pra/ttein~, _Rp._ 519 C.]

[100\13: The ~a/llai aretai\ kalou/menai~ (even including ~sophi/a~ regarded as practical shrewdness: _Rp._ 428 B ff.) as ~eggu\s ou=sai tô=n tou= sô/matos~ become of secondary importance compared with the virtue of ~phro/nêsis~, i.e. of dialectic and the contemplation of the Ideas, _Rp._ 518 DE. This alone is ~theio/teron~, something ~mei=zon~ than those bourgeois virtues, _Rp._ 504 D--philosophy stands high above ~dêmotikê/ te kai\ politikê\ aretê/, ex e/thous te kai\ meletê=s gegonui=a a/neu philosophi/as te kai\ nou=~, _Phd._ 82 BC.--This, too, rightly understood, is the real point of the inquiry in _Meno_. Explicitly, indeed, the dialogue only concerns itself with that ~aretê/~ which is commonly so regarded and is based on ~alêthê\s do/xa~, coming into existence by instinct (~thei/a moi=ra~); which, however, to the philosopher is not ~aretê/~ in the proper sense of the word; that name he would only give to ~epistê/mê~, the only sort of knowledge that can be learnt and acquired as a permanent possession, depending as it does upon the doctrine of Ideas. To ~epistê/mê~ he this time only makes distant allusion.] {489}

[101\13: _Rp._ vii, c. 15 (535 A, 536 D); cf. vi, c. 2, 5 (485 B, 487 B; 489 D, 490 E.]

[102\13: ~kai\ tou= me\n (do/xês alêthou=s) pa/nta a/ndra mete/chein phate/on, _nou=_ de\ theou/s, anthrô/pôn de\ ge/nos brachu/ ti~, _Tim._ 51 E.]

[103\13: ~philo/sophon plê=thos adu/naton ei=nai~, _Rp._ 494 A. ~phu/seis~ of a completely philosophical kind, ~pa=s hêmi=n homologê/sei oliga/kis en anthrô/pois phu/esthai kai\ oli/gas~, _Rp._ 491 B.]

[104\13: "That into which I sink myself--that becomes one with me: when I think on Him I _am_ as God that is the Fount of Being"--the true mystic note. For the mystics, knowledge of an object is real oneness with the thing known; knowledge of God is union with God.]

[105\13: _Rp._ 540 B.]