CHAPTER XIV

## PART I

[1\14: At first the philosophy of Plato's old age lived on in spirit in the Academy. Just as his pupils carried on his Pythagorean speculations about numbers, reduced his imaginative suggestions as to a daimonic nature intermediate between that of God and man to pedantic system, and elaborated the theological strain in his thought to a gloomy and burdensome _deisidaimonia_ (witness esp. the _Epinomis_ of Philippos of Opos and in addition all that we know of Xenokrates' speculations)--so too they retained and respected for a time the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the ascetic tendency in his ethical teaching. For Philippos of Opos the aim of all human endeavour is a final and blessed emancipation from this world (which, however, is only possible for a few of those who are, in his special manner, "wise"--973 C ff., 992 C). He is a mystic for whom this earth and its life fall away into nothing: all serious interest is confined to the contemplation of divine things such as are revealed in mathematics and astronomy. Again, the Platonic doctrine of the soul, in its mystic and world-renouncing sense, lies at the bottom of the fabulous narratives of Herakleides Pontikos (in the ~A/baris, Empedo/timos~, etc.). This, too, accounts for the youthful attempts in this direction of Aristotle himself (in the ~Eu/dêmos~ and probably also in the ~Protreptiko/s~). This side of his doctrine was as it seems systematized from the standpoint of the latest stage of Platonism by Xenokrates in particular. It may be merely accident that we do not hear very reliably of anything indicating an ascetic tendency or an "other-worldly" effort after **emancipation of the soul in connexion with Xenokrates. Krantor (in his much-read book ~peri\ pe/nthous~) was already capable of employing the Platonic doctrine of the soul and the imaginative fancies that could be attached to it simply as a literary adornment. And before him his teacher Polemon betrays a turning aside from the true Platonic mysticism. With Arkesilaos the last vestige of this whole type of thought disappears completely.]

[2\14: ~toi=s _eleuthe/rois hê/kista_ e/xestin ho/ ti e/tuche poiei=n, alla pa/nta ê\ ta\ plei=sta te/taktai~, Arist., _Meta._ 1075a, 19 (in maxima fortuna minima licentia est, Sall., _C._ 51, 13). Freedom in _this_ sense indeed was a thing of the past.]

[3\14: Not that such hopes or fears were entirely absent. The reader will remember the case of Kleombrotos of Ambrakia (Call., _Ep._ 25), who by reading the _Phaedo_ of Plato (and completely misunderstanding the meaning of the prophet, as not unfrequently happens) was led to seek an immediate entrance into the life of the other world by a violent break with this one--and committed suicide. This is an isolated example of a mood to which Epiktetos bears witness as common in his own much later time--the desire felt by many young men of ardent temperament to escape from the distracted life of humanity and return as quickly as possible to the universal life of God by the destruction of their own individual existence: Epict. 1, 9, 11 ff. But in the earlier period such violent manifestations of other-worldly fanaticism were of rare occurrence. Hedonism was {509} capable of leading to the same result as we may see from the ~Apokarterô=n~ of Hegesias the Cyrenaic, called ~ho peisitha/natos~, whom Cicero mentions together with this same Kleombrotos: _TD._ i, 83-4.]

[4\14: ~to\ sô=ma/ pôs tê=s psuchê=s he/neken (ge/gonei)~, as ~ho pri/ôn tê=s pri/seôs he/neka~--and not vice versa: _PA._ 1, 5, 645b, 19.]

[5\14: The ~psuchê/~ is related to the body as ~o/psis~ is to the eye, i.e. as the effective power residing in the ~o/rganon~ (not like ~ho/rasis~, the individual act of vision). It is the ~_prô/tê_ entele/cheia~ of its body _de An._ ii, 1, 412a, 27. There is no ~su/nthesis~ of ~sô=ma~ and ~psuchê/~: they are simply "together" like the wax and the ball formed out of the wax: _Top._ 151a, 20 ff.; _GA._ 729b, 9 ff.; _de An._ 412b, 7.]

[6\14: ~apelthou/sês gou=n (tê=s psuchê=s) ou/keti zô=|o/n estin, oude\ tô=n mori/ôn oude\n to\ auto\ lei/petai, plê\n tô=| schê/mati mo/non katha/per ta\ mutheuo/mena lithou=sthai~, _PA._ 641a, 18.]

[7\14: _Meta._ 1026a, 5: ~peri\ psuchê=s eni/as theôrê=sai tou= phusikou=, ho/sê mê\ a/neu tê=s hulê=s esti/n.--oude\ ga\r pa=sa psuchê\ phu/sis, alla/ ti mo/rion autê=s~, _PA._ 641b, 9. The subject of ~to\ kechôrisme/non~ of the soul is studied by ~ho prô=tos philo/sophos~: _de An._ 403b, 16.]

[8\14: ~le/gô de\ nou=n, hô=| dianoei=tai kai\ hupolamba/nei hê psuchê/~, _de An._ 429a, 23.]

[9\14: The ~nou=s~ and its ~theôrêtikê\ du/namis e/oike psuchê=s ge/nos he/teron ei=nai kai\ tou=to mo/non ende/chetai chôri/zesthai, katha/per to\ aï/dion tou= phthartou=, ta\ de\ loipa\ mo/ria tê=s psuchê=s ouk e/sti chôrista/ ktl.~, _de An._ 413b, 25.]

[10\14: There can be no doubt that Aristotle's opinion was that ~nou=s~ was uncreated and existed without beginning from eternity: see Zeller, _Sitzb. Berl. Ak._ 1882, p. 1033 ff.]

[11\14: ~thu/rathen epeise/rchetai~ into the man as he is being made, _GA._ 736b, 28; cf. ~ho thu/rathen nou=s~, 744b, 21.]

[12\14: ~nou=s~ is ~apathê/s, amigê/s, ou me/miktai tô=| sô/mati~--it has no physical ~o/rganon~, _de An._ iii, 4. ~oude\n autou= (tou= nou=) tê=| energei/a| koinônei= sômatikê\ ene/rgeia~, _GA._ 736b, 28.]

[13\14: ~mo/rion tê=s psychê=s~, _de An._ 429a, 10 ff. ~psuchê\ ouch ho/lê, all' hê noêtikê/~, 429a, 28. ~hê psuchê\ . . . mê\ pa=sa all' ho nou=s~, _Meta._ 1070a, 26.]

[14\14: The ~zô=|on~ a ~mikro\s ko/smos~, _Phys._ 252b, 26.]

[15\14: ~nou=s, theio/tero/n ti kai\ apathe/s~, _de An._ 408b, 29.--~to\n nou=n thei=on ei=nai mo/non~, _GA._ 736b, 28 (737a, 10). ~ei/te thei=on ho/n ei/te tô=n en hêmi=n to\ thei/otaton~, _EN._ 1177a, 15. ~nou=s~ is ~to\ suggene/staton~ to the gods, 1179a, 26.--~to\ anthrô/pôn ge/nos ê\ mo/non mete/chei tou= thei/ou tô=n hêmi=n gnôri/môn zô/|ôn ê\ ma/lista pa/ntôn~, _PA._ 656a, 7.]

[16\14: ~e/rgon tou= theiota/tou to\ noei=n kai\ phronei=n~, _PA._ 686a, 28.]

[17\14: _Meta._ ~L~ 7, 9.]

[18\14: _EN._ 1178b, 7-22; _Cael._ 292b, 4 ff.]

[19\14: So too ~epikalu/ptetai ho nou=s eni/ote pa/thei ê\ no/sô| ê\ hu/pnô|~, _de An._ 429a, 7.]

[20\14: ~thigga/nein~ is the term often applied to the activity of ~nou=s~, i.e. a simple and indivisible act of apperceiving the ~asu/ntheta~. This act not being composite (of subject and predicate), like judgment, leaves no room for error: the act simply occurs or does not occur--~alêthe/s~ or ~pseu=dos~ does not enter into the question with it. _Meta._ 1051b, 16-26 (~thigei=n~, 24-5), 1027b, 21.]

[21\15: ~ta\ alêthê= kai\ prô=ta kai\ _a/mesa_ kai\ gnôrimô/tera kai\ pro/tera kai\ ai/tia tou= sumpera/smatos~, _An. Po._ i, 2, This ~ame/sôn epistê/mê anapo/deiktos~ (72b, 19) belong to ~nou=s~. There is only a ~nou=s~--not an ~epistê/mê~ (as being a ~he/xis apodeiktikê/~, _EN._ 1139b, 31)--~tô=n _archô=n_, tê=s archê=s tou= epistêtou=~, _EN._ vi, 6. Thus also ~nou=s~ is ~epistê/mês archê/~, _An. Po._ 100b, 5-17. ~tô=n akinê/tôn ho/rôn kai\ prô/tôn nou=s esti\ kai\ ou lo/gos~, _EN._ 1143b, 1 (cf. _MM._ 1197a, 20 ff.).] {510}

[22\14: ~to\ ku/rion~, _EN._ 1178a, 3, and frequently. ~nou=s dokei= archei=n kai\ hêgei=sthai~, 1177a, 14. It rules esp. over ~o/rexis~ (as ~hê psuchê/~ does over the ~sô=ma~), _Pol._ 1254b, 5 (cf. _EN._ 1102b, 29 ff.).]

[23\14: A man is called ~egkratê/s~ or ~akratê/s, tô=| katei=n to\n nou=n ê\ mê/; hôs tou/tou heka/stou o/ntos~, _EN._ 1168b, 35. ~do/xeie d' a/n kai\ ei=nai he/kastos tou=to (nou=s)~, 1178a, 2. ~tô=| anthrô/pô| dê\ (kra/tiston kai\ ê/diston) ho kata\ to\n nou=n bi/os, ei/per tou=to ma/lista a/nthrôpos~ (here only in so far as the possession of ~nou=s~ distinguishes men in general from the other ~zô=|a~), 1178a, 6.]

[24\14: Cicero makes a distinction of this kind between _ratio_ and _animus_. _Off._ i, 107 (after Panaetius): intellegendum est, duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo quod omnes participes sumus rationis . . . ; altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa.]

[25\14: ~ha/panta ta\ gino/mena kai\ phtheiro/mena phai/netai~, _Cael._ 279b, 20. ~to\ geno/menon ana/gkê te/los labei=n~, _Ph._ 203b, 8. But ~ha/pan to\ aei\ o/n haplôs a/phtharton. homoi/ôs de\ kai\ age/nêton~, _Cael._ 281b, 25. ~ei to\ age/nêton a/phtharton kai\ to\ a/phtharton age/nêton, ana/gkê kai\ to\ "aï/dion" hekate/rô| akolouthei=n, kai\ ei/te ti age/nêton, aï/dion, ei/te ti a/phtharton, aï/dion ktl.~, _Cael._ 282a, 31 ff. Thus too ~nou=s~ (~apathê/s~) as uncreated is everlasting and imperishable (see Zeller, _Sitzb. B. Ak._ 1882, p. 1044 f.). It belongs to the imperishable ~ousi/ai~, which as such are ~ti/miai kai\ _thei=ai_~, _PA._ 644b, 22 ff.]

[26\14: ~ho nou=s hupome/nei~ at the separation, _Meta._ 1070a, 25-6. More strictly this applies to the ~nou=s apathê/s (poiêtiko/s)~. While the ~nou=s pathêtiko/s~ (whose relation to the ~nou=s poiêtiko/s~ remains most obscure) is ~phtharto/s~, we hear of the ~nou=s poiêtiko/s~ that it is ~_chôristhei\s_ mo/non tou=to ho/per eti/, kai\ tou=to mo/non atha/naton kai\ aï/dion~, _de An._ 430a, 10-25.]

[27\14: _de An._ 408b, 18 ff.: ~nou=s ou phthei/retai~, nor ~hupo\ tê=s en tô=| gê/ra| amaurô/seôs . . . to\ noei=n kai\ to\ theôrei=n marai/netai~ (in old age) ~a/llou tinos e/sô phtheirome/nou~ (? nothing perishes within ~to\ noei=n~--read ~en hô=|~ as in l. 23 and understand: ~a/llou tino\s en hô=| to\ noei=n = ho nou=s, e/nesti~, i.e. the whole living man), ~auto\ de\ apathe/s estin~ (just as ~nou=s~ is always ~analloi/ôton~, even its ~no/êsis~ is no ~ki/nêsis~, and the ~lê=psis tê=s epistê/mês~ makes no ~alloi/ôsis~ for it: _de An._ 407a, 32; _Ph._ 247a, 28; b, 1 ff.; 20 ff.), ~to\ de\ dianoei=sthai~ (thinking and judging) ~kai\ philei=n ê\ misei=n ouk e/stin ekei/nou pa/thê, alla\ tou=de tou= e/chontos ekei=no, hê=| ekei=no e/chei. dio\ kai\ tou/tou phtheirome/nou ou/te mnêmoneu/ei ou/te philei=, ou ga\r ekei/nou ê=n, alla\ tou= koi/nou~ (that which had once been associated with the ~nou=s~), ~ho\ apo/lôlen; ho de\ nou=s i/sôs theio/tero/n ti kai\ apathe/s estin~. In its separate existence ~nou=s~ has no memory--this at least is meant by ~ou mnêmoneu/omen~, _de An._ 430a, 23, however we may be inclined to interpret the rest of the sentence.]

[28\14: Particularly in the ~Eu/dêmos~ (_frr._ 31-40 [37-44]), probably also in the ~Protreptiko/s~.]

[29\14: For this must be the meaning of _fr._ 36 = 44 (~Eu/d.~)--the ~dai/môn~ is the soul itself; cf. 35 [41].]

[30\14: _de An._ 407b, 13-26; 414a, 19-27.--And yet it must be admitted that the ~nou=s~ of Aristotle is itself a ~tucho/n~ within another ~tucho/n~--not indeed as a separate entity with any qualities set in a fortuitous vessel of perhaps discordant qualities that do not fit it (which acc. to the ~Puthago/reios mu=thos~ was true of the ~psuchê/~ in the ~sô=ma~)--but at any rate set within an animated individual with quite definite qualities as a stranger, itself devoid of all definite quality and therefore not capable of having a character specially fitting that individual in which it is placed. Thus, after all, the Aristotelian ~mu=thos~ about the ~nou=s~ betrays its origin from the ~mu=thoi~ of old theology.] {511}

[31\14: It is only as an argumentum ad hominem that the view is suggested on one occasion, that ~be/ltion tô=| nô=| mê\ meta\ sô/matos ei=nai (katha/per ei/ôthe/ te le/gesthai kai\ polloi=s sundokei=)~, _de An._ 407b, 4.]

[32\14: _EN._ x, 7-9.--~dokei= hê philosophi/a thaumasta\s hêdona\s e/chein kathario/têti kai\ tô=| bebai/ô|. eu/logon de\ _toi=s eido/si_ tô=n zêtou/ntôn hêdi/ô tê\n diagôgê\n ei=nai~, 1177a, 26. The ~sopho/s~ requires no ~su/nergoi~ (as the ~sô/phrôn~ and the ~andrei=os~ do, and is ~autarke/statos~ in himself. The activity of ~nou=s~ is the most valuable as being ~theôrêtikê/~ and because ~par' hautê\n oude/nos ephi/etai te/lous~. A sufficiently long life of the theoretic activity of ~nou=s~ is ~telei/a eudaimoni/a anthrô/pou~--indeed, this is no longer an ~anthrô/pinos bi/os~, but rather ~krei/ttôn ê\ kat' a/nthrôpon~--a ~thei=os bi/os~ as ~nou=s thei=o/n ti en anthrô/pô| hupa/rchei~. Therefore man must not ~anthrô/pina phronei=n~ but ~eph' ho/son ende/chetai athanati/zein~ (be immortal already in this life) ~kai\ pa/nta poiei=n pro\s to\ zê=n kata\ to\ kra/tiston tô=n en hautô=|~ (1177b, 31 ff.). This ~telei/a eudaimoni/a~, as a ~theôrêtikê\ ene/rgeia~, brings the thinkers near to the _gods_ whose life does not consist in ~pra/ttein~ (not even virtuous) or ~poiei=n~ but in pure ~theôri/a~, and this can be so with the life of man (alone among the ~zô=|a~) ~eph' ho/son homoi/ôma/ ti tê=s toiau/tês (theôrêtikê=s) energei/as hupa/rchei~ (1178b, 7-32). Nowhere do we meet with so much as the shadow of an idea that the ~eudaimoni/a~ of the ~theôrêtiko\s bi/os~ can only become ~telei/a~ in "another" world, or is conceivable as existing elsewhere than in the life on earth. The only condition for ~telei/a eudaimoni/a~ that is made is ~mê=kos bi/ou te/leion~ (1177b, 25)--nothing lying outside or beyond this life. The ~theôrêtiko\s bi/os~ has its complete and final development here upon earth.--~te/leios bi/os~ is mentioned as necessary for the obtaining of ~eudaimoni/a~, _EN._ 1100a, 5; 1101a, 16. But ~eudaimoni/a~ is completely confined within the limits of earthly life: to call a dead man ~eudai/mona~ would be ~pantelô=s a/topon~, for he lacks the ~ene/rgeia~ which is the essence of ~eudaimoni/a~--only a mere shadow of sensation can belong to the ~kekmêko/tes~ (almost the Homeric conception) 1100a, 11-29; 1101a, 22-b, 9.--Since it is impossible for the individual to enjoy an unending permanence and share in ~to\ aei\ kai\ thei=on~, it follows that the continuation of the individual after death consists only in the continuance of the ~ei/dos~--not of the ~auto/~ (which perishes) but only of the ~hoi=on auto/~ which persists in the series of creatures propagated on earth: _de An._ 415a, 28-b, 7; _GA._ 731a, 24-b, 1. (Borrowed from the observations of Plato, _Smp._ 206 C-207 A; cf. also _Lg._ 721 C, 773 E; Philo, _Incor. Mund._ 8, ii, p. 495 M., after Kritolaos.) It was much easier for Aristotle to take this conception seriously than it was for Plato with his particular outlook: only for the passing requirements of his dialogue does Plato adopt the Herakleitean view and expand it: see above, chap. xi, n. 16.]

[33\14: ~oi=mai de\ tou= ginô/skein ta\ o/nta kai\ phronei=n aphairethe/ntos _ou bi/on alla\ chro/non_ ei=nai tê\n athanasi/an~, Plu., _Is. et Os._ i, fin., p. 351 E. Origen (_Cels._ iii, 80, p. 359 Lom.) draws a clear distinction between the ~athanasi/a tê=s psuchê=s~ of Platonic doctrine and the Stoic ~epidiamonê\ tê=s psuchê=s~ on the one hand--and this Aristotelian doctrine of the ~tou= nou= athanasi/a: hoi peisthe/ntes peri\ tou= thu/rathen nou= hôs _athana/tou_ (thana/tou~ Edd.) ~_kai\ mo/nou_ (kainou=~ Edd.) ~diagôgê\n (= bi/on) e/xontos~ (--this is how the passage should be read).]

[34\14: Theophrastos discussed (by the method of ~apori/ai~ fashionable with the school) the obscurities and difficulties inherent in the doctrine of ~nou=s~, particularly of the reduplicated ~nou=s~, the ~poiêtiko/s~ and the ~pathêtiko/s~. True to his character, however, he adheres to the fixed dogma of his school of the ~nou=s chôristo/s~ which ~e/xôthen ô\n kai\ hô/sper {512} epi/thetos~ is ~ho/môs su/mphutos~ with man and being ~age/nnêtos~ is also ~a/phthartos~: _Frag._ 53b, p. 226 ff.; 53, p. 176 Wim. (~theôri/a~ belongs to ~nou=s, thigo/nti kai\ hoi=on hapsame/nô|~, and is therefore without ~apa/tê~, _fr._ 12, § 26. The ~nou=s~ is ~krei=tto/n ti me/ros [tê=s psychê=s] kai\ theio/teron~, _fr._ 53. To the ~nou=s~ and its ~theôri/a~ we must suppose the ~kata\ du/namin homoiou=sthai theô=|~ to refer--for this is the teaching of Thphr. also: Jul., _Or._ vi, p. 185 A.) Nowhere is there any indication that for him the immortality of ~nou=s~ had the slightest importance for this life and its conduct. Nor has it any in the ethical doctrine of the very theologically inclined Eudemos. Here the aim of life--the ~aretê\ te/leios~ which is ~kalolagathi/a~--is said to be ~hê tou= theou= theôri/a~ which is carried on by the ~nou=s, to\ en êmi=n thei=on~, 1248a, 27; in this process it is best ~hê/kista aistha/nesthai tou= a/llou me/rous tê=s psuchê=s~, 1249b, 22. For the sake of ~to\ gnôri/zein~ man wishes ~zê=n aei\~, 1245a, 9--but upon earth and in the body: there is no thought of the other world. (This would have been quite natural and to be expected of this semi-theological thinker who, e.g. speaks quite seriously of the separability of ~nou=s~ from the ~lo/gos~--the ~a/llo me/ros tê=s psuchê=s~--in bodily life and of its higher intuition in _enthousiasmos_ and veracious dreaming: 1214a, 23; 1225a, 28; 1248a, 40.)--To this first generation of Peripatetics belong also Aristoxenos and Dikaiarchos who did not recognize _any_ peculiar substance of the "soul" apart from the "harmony" brought about by the mixture of bodily material. Dik. ~anê/|rêke tê\n ho/lên hupo/stasin tê=s psuchê=s~: Atticus ap. Eus., _PE._ xv, 810 A. Aristox. and Dik. nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt Cic. _TD._ 1, 51: 21; 41, etc.; Dik. (in the ~Lesbiakoi\ lo/goi~) expressly controverted the doctrine of immortality, _TD._ i, 77. (It remains very remarkable that Dik. who naturally knew nothing of a _separabilis animus_, _TD._ i, 21, nevertheless, believed not merely in _mantic_ dreams--that would be just intelligible, ~e/chei ga/r tina lo/gon~, Arist., _P. Nat._ 462b ff.--but also in the prophetic power of ~enthousiasmo/s~, Cic., _Div._ i, 5; 113; _Dox._ 416a, which invariably presupposes the dogma of a special substance of the "soul" and its separability from the body.)--Straton "the naturalist" (_d._ 270), for whom the soul is an undivided force, inseparable from the body and the ~aisthê/seis~, gave up completely the belief in the ~nou=s chôristo/s~ of Aristotle: he cannot possibly have held any doctrine of immortality in any form or under any limitations.--Then follows the period of pure scholarship when the Peripatetic school almost gave up philosophy. With the return to the study of the master's writings (from the time of Aristonikos) they gained a new lease of life. The problems of the parts of the soul, the relation of ~nou=s~ to the soul (and to the ~nou=s pathêtiko/s~) were discussed once more. It became more and more common, however, to set aside the ~nou=s thu/rathen epeisiô/n~ (cf. the definition of the soul given by Andronikos ap. Galen ~p. t. tê=s psuchê=s êthô=n~, iv, 782 f., K.; Themist., _de An._ ii, 56, 11; 59, 6 Sp.). This meant the denial of immortality (which belonged to ~nou=s~ only): e.g. by Boëthos: Simp., _de An._ p. 247, 24 ff. Hayd. [_Sto. Vet._ iii, 267 Arn.]. A different view again, and one which even went beyond Aristotle, was held by Kratippos, the contemporary of Boëthos: Cic., _Div._ i, 70; cf. 5; 113. Alexander of Aphrodisias the great ~exêgêtê/s~ absolutely banished the ~nou=s poiêtiko/s~ from the human soul. (This is the divine ~nou=s~, which is perpetually ~nou=s~ and ~noêto\n energei/a|~, and that, too, already ~pro\ tou= noei=sthai~ by the ~huliko\s nou=s~ of man. It enters into the latter ~thu/rathen~--though not locally, for it is incapable of change of place, p. 113, 18 f.--with the individual act of ~noei=n~ by the ~nou=s huliko/s~, but it never becomes a ~mo/rion kai\ du/nami/s tis tê=s {513} hêmete/ras psuchê=s~: Alex. _de An._, p. 107-9; p. 90 Br.). For him ~nou=s~ is ~chôristo/s~ and ~atha/natos, apathê/s~, etc., whereas the human soul exactly like the ~ei=dos~ of its ~sô=ma~ from which it is ~achôristo/s~ perishes at death together with its ~nou=s huliko/s~, completely: ~sumphthei/retai tô=| sô/mati~, _de An._, p. 21, 22 f.; p. 90, 16 f. The individual soul thus perishes: the imperishable ~nou=s~ had not communicated itself to the individual.--The indestructibility of the individual ~nou=s~ of man (and this was indubitably what Aristotle himself taught), a doctrine derived not from experience but from pure logical inference, had in reality no serious significance for the general teaching of the Peripatetics so long as they preserved their independence. Finally, indeed, they too were swallowed up in the ferment of Neoplatonism.]

[35\14: ~he/xis, phu/sis, a/logos psuchê/, psuchê\ lo/gon e/chousa kai\ dia/noian~, Plu., _Virt. Mor._ 451 BC and A. Through all these and all things in which these are--~diê/kei ho nou=s~, D.L. vii, 138 f. [ii, p. 192 Arn.].]

[36\14: Our soul an ~apo/spasma~ of the ~e/mpsuchos ko/smos~, D.L. vii, 143 [ii, 191 Arn.]. We often find the soul of man called an ~apo/spasma tou= theou= (Dio/s), thei/a apo/moira, apo/rroia~ (see Gataker on M. Ant., pp. 48, 211; Ed. 1652)--and often even ~theo/s~ (see Bonhöffer, _Epiktet u. d. Stoa_, p. 76 f.).]

[37\14: ~(hê psuchê\) araio/teron pneu=ma tê=s phu/seôs kai\ leptome/resteron . . . ~ Chrysipp. ap. Plu., _Stoic. Rep._ 41, p. 1052 F [ii, 222 Arn.]. "Nature" is ~pneu=ma~ that has become moist, soul the same ~pneu=ma~ which has remained dry (Galen, iv, 783 f. K. [p. 218 Arn.]).]

[38\14: The ~bre/phos~ is created as a ~phu/ton~, and only afterwards becomes a ~zô=|on~ by ~peri/psuxis~ (derivation of ~psuchê/~ hence!). Chrysipp. ap. Plu., _Stoic. Rep._ 1052 F [p. 222 Arn.]. Thus comes ~ek phu/seôs psuchê/~, Plu., _Prim. Frig._ ii, p. 946 C.]

[39\14: It would almost be possible to employ the semi-Stoic language of Philo to describe the soul as conceived by this Stoic Pantheism: ~tê=s thei/as psuchê=s apo/spasma _ou diaireto/n_ (te/mnetai ga\r oude\n tou= thei/ou kat' apa/rtêsin, alla\ mo/non ektei/netai)~, _Q. Det. Pot. Insid._, 24, i, p. 209 M. But in orthodox Stoic doctrine the idea prevails that the individual ~apospa/smata~ are completely detached from the universal ~thei=on~--but at the same time without denial of ultimate connexion with the "All" and the "One".]

[40\14: Acc. to the older Stoical doctrine as systematized by Chrysippos the soul is absolutely simple and unified, having sprung from the universal Reason of God which contains no ~a/logon~. Its impulses (~hormai/~) must on this view be rational just as much as its willed decisions (~kri/seis~): it is affected from without by ~phu/sis~, which, being itself a development of the highest reason, God, can only be good and rational. It is quite impossible to conceive how, on the principles of the older Stoicism, erroneous judgment or excessive and evil impulses could arise. ~hê tê=s kaki/as ge/nesis~ is rendered unintelligible as Poseidonios maintains in opposition to the subtle observations of Chrysipp. on this head (see Schmekel, _Phil. d. mittl. Stoa_, p. 327 ff.).]

[41\14: ~akolou/thôs tê=| phu/sei zê=n~ (but our ~phu/seis~ are ~me/rê tê=s tou= ho/lou~), i.e. in harmony with the ~koi/nos no/mos ho/sper esti\n ho ortho\s lo/gos ho dia\ pa/ntôn ercho/menos, ho auto\s ô\n tô=| Dii/, kathêgemo/ni tou/tô| tê=s tô=n ho/lôn dioikê/seôs o/nti~, Chrysipp. ap. D.L. vii, 87-8 [iii, 3 Arn.]. This obedience to the rational order and governance of the world--the _deum sequere_, Sen., _VB._ 15, 5; _Ep._ 16, 5; ~he/pesthai theoi=s~, Epict. i, 12, 5, etc.--is more often regarded as a passive attitude of self-abandonment adopted consciously and with ~sugkata/thesis: chrô= moi loipo\n eis ho\ a\n the/lê|s. homognômonô= soi, so/s eimi ktl.~, Epict. ii, 16, 42. ~the/le gi/nesthai ta\ {514} gino/mena hôs gi/netai, kai\ euroê/seis~ (this sounds very like "make God's will your own will"), _Ench._ 8. Much the same idea occurs already in the lines of Kleanthes ~a/gou de/ m' hô= Zeu= kai\ su/ g' hê Peprôme/nê ktl.~ [i, 118 Arn.]. But such "affirmation of the universe", understood in the full pantheistic sense (cf. Kleanthes ~tê\n koinê\n mo/nên ekde/chetai phu/sin hê=| dei= akolouthei=n, ouke/ti de\ kai\ tê\n epi\ me/rous~, D.L. vii, 89 [i, 126 Arn.]), could not lead to an ethical teaching of active character and concrete substance.]

[42\14: The ~sopho/s~ is ~eleu/theros; ei=nai ga\r tê\n eleutheri/an exousi/an autopragi/as~, D.L. vii, 121. Laws and constitutions do not apply to him: Cic., _Ac. Pri._ ii, 136.]

[43\14: Enemies and strangers are ~mê\ spoudai=oi~ to one another--~poli=tai kai\ phi/loi kai\ oikei=oi hoi spoudai=oi mo/non~. Zeno, ~en tê=| Politei/a|~, ap. D.L. vii, 32-3 [i, 54 Arn.].]

[44\14: ~ho par' heka/stô| dai/môn~ which one must keep in harmony ~pro\s tê\n tou= tô=n ho/lôn dioikêtou= bou/lêsin~, D.L. vii, 88, after Chrysipp. [iii, 4 Arn.]. In the later Stoic literature, the only part of it which has come down to us, we often hear of this ~dai/môn~ of the individual--sacer intra nos spiritus (Sen., Epict., M. Ant.: see Bonhöffer, _Epiktet_, 83). It is generally spoken of in language that seems to regard it as something _separable_ from the man or his soul, including the ~hêgemoniko/n~; Zeus ~pare/stêsen _epi/tropon_ heka/stô| to\n heka/stou dai/mona kai\ pare/dôke phula/ssein auto\n autô=| ktl.~, Epict. i, 14, 12. ~ho dai/môn o\n heka/stô| _prosta/tên_ kai\ hêgemo/na ho Zeu\s e/dôken~, M. Ant. v, 27. ~ana/krinon to\ daimo/nion~, Epict. iii, 22, 53 (one can ask questions of it, as Sokrates did of his ~daimo/nion~, as something other and different from oneself). This ~dai/môn~ then does not seem to be simply identifiable with the "soul" of man like the daimon in man of which the _theologians_ speak. It is conceived and spoken of in language that suggests rather the "protecting spirit" of a man as known to popular belief (cf. now Usener, _Götternamen_, 294 ff.). ~ha/panti dai/môn andri\ sumpari/statai euthu\s genome/nô| mustagôgo\s tou= bi/ou~, Menand. 550 K. (where the idea of _two_ daimonic partners in the life of man is already rejected: Eukleides Socr. had spoken of such, cf. Censor., _DN._ iii, 3, and in a different way again Phocyl., _fr._ 15). Plato himself speaks (with a ~le/getai~) of the ~dai/môn ho/sper zô=nta eilê/chei~ (and guides the departed soul into Hades): _Phd._ 107 D. The idea, however, must have been much older: it appears fairly clearly expressed in Pindar's words, _O._ xiii, 28 ~(Zeu= pa/têr), Xeno/phôntos eu/thune dai/monos ou=ron~, where the transition to the meaning "fate" for the word ~dai/môn~ has not yet been completed. Later (with the Tragedians and other poets) this use became very common, but even then still presupposes the belief in such personal daimonic partners in the life of man: the use would have been quite impossible otherwise. (~dai/môn = po/tmos~, Pi., _P._ v, 121 f., and already in Thgn. 161, 163. When Herakleitos says ~ê=thos anthrô/pô| dai/môn~, _fr._ 121 By., 119 D. he uses ~dai/môn~ in the sense of fortune in life. The word means both ~ê=thos~ and condition of life at the same time in Pl., _Rp._ 617 E, ~ouch huma=s dai/môn lê/xetai, all' humei=s dai/mona hairê/sesthe~, where the derivation of the metaphorical use of the word ~dai/môn~ from a belief in a special daimon belonging to the individual man can still be seen plainly. See also [Lys.] _Epit._ (2), 78. But the metaphorical use comes as early as ~Th~ 166, ~pa/ros toi dai/mona dô/sô = po/tmon ephê/sô~.)--The personal existence of the daimon is still far removed from all danger of such abstraction in a very remarkable case: in Halikarnassos Poseidonios and his ~e/kgonoi~ decide that on the first day of the month they will offer ~Dai/moni agathô=| Poseidôni/ou . . . krio/n~ (_Gr. Ins. in Br. Mus._ {515} iv, 1, n. 896, p. 70, l. 35. The inscr. seems to date from the third century B.C.). Here then offering is made to the ~agatho\s dai/môn~ (see above, chap. v, n. 133) of the _living_, just as offering was made on birthdays, and at other times also, to the _genius_ of Romans; ~ag. d.~ is here clearly equivalent to _genius_. Apollo whose advice had been sought at his oracle had expressly enjoined (ib., l. 9) ~. . . tima=n kai\ hila/skesthai kai\ agatho\n dai/mona Poseidôni/ou kai\ Go/rgidos~ (the latter, P.'s mother, seems to have been already dead: l. 34).--This special ~dai/môn~ attached to individuals with whom it can be contrasted (as Brutus can be with his ~dai/môn kako/s~: Plu., _Brut._ 36) is distinct from the individual's ~psuchê/~, though it is natural to suppose that it may have arisen from the projection of the ~psuchê/~--conceived as very independent--outside the man himself, in which it would again resemble the Roman _genius_. (The daimonic ~phu/lakes~ of Hesiod [cf. above, p. 67 ff.], belong to quite a different range of ideas.) At any rate the Stoics had this analogous popular conception in mind when they spoke of the ~par' heka/stô| dai/môn~ as something different from the man himself and his ~hêgemoniko/n~. They use it, however, only as a figure of speech. The ~dai/môn~ of the individual really means for them "the original, ideal personality as contrasted with the empirical personality" (as Bonhöffer very rightly puts it: _Epikt._ 84)--the character the man already _is_ ideally but must _become_ actually (~ge/noi' hoi=os essi/ . . .~). Thus the ~dai/môn~ is distinct from the ~psuchê/ (dia/noia)~ and yet identical with it. It is a semi-allegorical play upon the idea of the ~dai/môn~ as individual genius and at the same time as crown or summit of the human personality--just as Plato had used the word already incidentally, _Tim._ 90 A. Finally--for the Stoics did not seriously wish to establish the existence of an independent protecting deity that enters man from without and rules over him--the ~hêgemoniko/n~ is the same as the ~dai/môn~. Thus in M. Ant. iv, 27, the ~dai/môn~ is completely identical with the ~apo/spasma Dio/s~, and the ~heka/stou nou=s kai\ lo/gos~ (cf. also iii, 3 fin.; ii, 13; 17; iii, 7, ~to\n heautou= nou=n kai\ dai/mona~). The fact, however, that this ~apo/spasma tou= theou=~ can be called a ~dai/môn~ bears witness to a tendency to conceive the soul-spirit as something independent and more cut off and separated from the common and original source of divinity than was possible for Stoic pantheism of the stricter sort (to which the terms ~apo/spasma, apo/rroia tou= theou=~ were more apt). A decided approximation was thus made to the theological idea of the "soul" as an individual daimon which persists in its separate existence. To this view Poseidonios went over completely: he regards the individual ~dai/môn~ that lives in man as ~suggenê\s ô\n tô=| to\n ho/lon ko/smon dioikou=nti~ (Pos. ap. Gal. v, 469), and no longer as the dependent ~apo/spasma~ of the latter, but as one of many independent and individually characterized spirits that have lived from all time in the air and enter into man at birth. (See Bonhöffer, _Epikt._ 79-80, and also Schmekel, _Phil. d. mittl. Stoa_, 249 ff., 256.)]

[45\14: ~ho tha/natos esti chôrismo\s psuchê=s apo\ sô/matos . . .~ Chrysipp. ap. Nemes., _NH._, p. 81 Matth.; Zeno and Chrysipp. ap. Tert., _An._ 5 [ii, 219 Arn.].]

[46\14: Everything comes into being and perishes, including the gods, ~ho de\ Zeu\s mo/nos aï/dio/s esti~, Chrysipp. ap. Plu., _Sto. Rep._ 38, p. 1052 A; _Comm. Not._ 31, p. 1075 A ff. [ii, 309 Arn.].--~epidiamonê\~ but not ~athanasi/a~ of the human soul [ib., 223].]

[47\14: ~_Klea/nthês_ me\n ou=n pa/sas (ta\s psucha\s) epidiame/nein (le/gei) me/chri tê=s ekpurô/seôs, _Chru/sippos_ de\ ta\s tô=n sophô=n mo/non~, D.L. vii, 157. {516} A statement often repeated without mention of the two authorities: Arius Did. ap. Eus., _PE._ 15, 20, 6, p. 822 **A-C (the ~psuchai\ tô=n aphro/nôn kai\ alo/gôn **zô/|ôn~ perish immediately with the death of the body, C) and others [ii, 223 Arn.]. Chrysippos' doctrine comes also in Tac., _Agr._ 46, si ut sapientibus placet non cum corpore extinguuntur magnae animae (~hai mega/lai psuchai/~, Plu., _Def. Or._ 18, p. 419 f.); cf. omnium quidem animos immortalis esse sed fortium bonorumque divinos, Cic., _Leg._ ii, 27, not quite accurately put.]

[48\14: The ~_astheneste/ra_ psuchê/ (hau/tê de/ esti tô=n apaideu/tôn)~ perishes sooner, ~hê de\ _ischurote/ra_, hoi=a esti\ peri\ tou\s sophou/s~ remains ~me/chri tê=s ekpurô/seôs~, [Plu.] _Plac. Phil._, 4, 7 ap. _Dox._ 393a.]

[49\14: The predominance of the materialistic point of view is remarkable in those _Stoici_ who acc. to Seneca, _Ep._ 57, 7, existimant animum hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber (which reminds us of the popular belief that the soul of one who has died in a high wind ~euthu\s diapephu/sêtai kai\ apo/lôlen~, Pl., _Phd._ 70 A, 80 D, see above, chap. xiii, n. 5).]

[50\14: ~ou ta\ sô/mata ta\s psucha\s sune/chei all' hai psuchai\ ta\ sô/mata, hô/sper kai\ hê ko/lla kai\ heautê\n kai\ ta\ ekto\s kratei=~, Poseidon. ap. Ach. Tat., _Isag._, p. 133 E Petav., borrowed from Arist. (_de An._ 1, 5, 411b, 7), but a thoroughly Stoic idea as contrasted with Epicurean doctrine (see Heinze, _Xenokrates_, 100 f.).]

[51\14: S.E., _M._ ix, 71-3. The naive but quite plain statements go back to Poseid. as has often been pointed out (e.g. by Corssen, _de Pos. Rhod._, p. 45, 1878, and others). So, too, do the similar remarks in Cic., _TD._ i, 42. Poseid. does not appear to be uttering heterodox opinions in this case, so far as we can see.]

[52\14: ~--kai\ ga\r oude\ ta\s psucha\s e/nestin huponoê=sai ka/tô pherome/nas. leptomerei=s ga\r ou=sai eis tou\s a/nô ma=llon to/pous kouphophorou=sin~, S.E., _M._ ix, 71. This physical reason was in itself enough to make it impossible for the Stoics to believe in a subterranean region of the souls: ~oudei\s Ha/idês, oud' Ache/rôn, oude\ Kôkuto/s ktl.~, Epict. iii, 13, 15. It is the regular Stoic doctrine: see Bonhöffer, _Epikt._ 56 f.; cf. Cic., _TD._ i, 36 f.; Sen., _C. ad Marc._ 19, 4. When Stoics speak occasionally of _inferi_ or ~ha/|dês~ as the abode of the souls, they are only using metaphorical language. When the word is not a mere conventionalism, they mean the regions nearer the earth, the cloud regions and lower levels of the air, ~ho pachumere/statos kai\ prosgeio/tatos aê/r~ (Corn., _ND._ 5, p. 4, 17 L; other exx. in Heinze, _Xenokr._ 147, 2). Here the "unwise" souls (the moister, less buoyant ones) are supposed to remain after death (_circa terram_ as Tert., _An._ 54 says, alluding to Stoic doctrine--and this is obviously where the _inferi_ mentioned at the end of the same chapter are situated). This ~aê/r~ (distinguished from the higher regions of the air) = ~ha/|dês~, must have been what Zeno referred to when he spoke of the _loca tenebrosa_ where the souls of the unwise have to expiate their folly (quoted and varied by Lact., _Inst._ 7, 7, 13, in a Platonic sense [i, 40 Arn.]).]

[53\14: Abode of the souls in the air: S. E., _M._ ix, 73; Cic., _TD._ i, 42-3, both probably after Poseid. Cf. sapientum animas in supernis mansionibus **collocant (Stoici), Tert., _An._, 54. Generally: ~eis to\n ae/ra methi/stasthai~ said of the departed souls, M. Ant. iv, 21. ~en tô=| perie/chonti . . . diame/nein ta\s tô=n apothano/ntôn psucha/s~, Ar. Did. ap. Eus., _PE._ xv, 822 A [ii, 225 Arn.]. (Gradual ascent to ever higher regions, Sen., _C. ad Marc._ 25, 1--hardly orthodox Stoic doctrine.--The conception may possibly belong to the older Stoicism, and may underlie the opinion of Chrysipp.: ~sphairoeidei=s~--as fiery ~mete/ôra--ta\s psucha\s {517} meta\ tha/naton gi/nesthai~, ap. Eust., _Il._ 1288, 10 f. [224 Arn.]. Poseid. seems to have worked it out further, probably making use also of Pythagorean and Platonic fancies to which he was distinctly inclined. The Pythagoreans had fancies about the souls hovering in the air (see above, chap. xi, n. 35), of the sun and moon as places where the souls lived (chap. x, n. 76). Acc. to Poseid. the souls inhabit ~to\n hupo\ selê/nên to/pon~ (S.E., _M._ ix, 73) as suitable for divine but not perfect creatures. It is the souls who are meant when people speak of ~dai/mones~ (S.E. § 74), or ~hê/rôes~ (Stoic in this use D.L. vi, 151 [ii, 320 Arn.]); cf. _heroes et lares et genii_, Varro using Stoic language (ap. Aug., _CD._ vii, 6, p. 282, 14 Domb.). The whole air is full of them: Pos. ap. Cic., _Div._ i, 64. Something very similar given as Pythag. doctrine by Alex. Polyh. ap. D.L. viii, 32; see above, chap. xi, n. 35. But Poseidonios (esp. if he is really the source of the Ciceronian _Somn. Scip._) seems to have emulated more particularly the imaginative efforts of Herakleides Pont. and his story of Empedotimos' vision (see above, chap. ix, n. 111). Herakl. contributed largely to popularizing the idea that the souls inhabit the air and giving it shape; the interest with which his fancies were studied is shown by the quotations from his book so common from Varro down to Proclus and Damascius. He must have been led to make the souls, on being freed from the body, float upwards (and occupy the stars or the moon--which are inhabitable heavenly bodies: _Dox._ 343, 7 ff.; 356a, 10) by the view--just as the Stoics after him were--that the soul is an ~aithe/rion sô=ma~ (Philop.)--~phôtoeidê/s~, a _lumen_, Tert., _An._ 9. In this he is following an idea that had been common in the fifth century (held by Xenophanes, Epicharmos, Eurip.: see above, p. 436 ff.), and had even attained popular vogue. This idea from the very first led to the conclusion that the soul, when ready for it, enters ~eis to\n ho/moion aithe/ra~ and ascends to the upper regions (of the aether). Herakleides carried this idea further and embellished it with philosophical and astronomical fancies. (On another occasion he seems to have denied substance and consistency to individual "souls": Plu., _Mor._ v, p. 699 Wytt.--a view to which his doctrine of the ~o/gkoi~ might easily have led him.) Poseidonios then took up this idea of Herakl. In this way, or at least not uninfluenced by this semi-philosophical literature, the belief in the abode of the "souls" in the aether attained the popularity that grave inscriptions witness for it (see below, ch. xiv, 2, n. 135).]

[54\14: Cicero, following Poseid., imagines a blissful observation of the earth and the stars by the souls in the air: _TD._ i, 44-7 (cf. Sen., _C. ad Marc._ 25, 1-2); and similarly in _Somn. Sci._; in both cases the idea certainly comes from Herakl. Pont.]

[55\14: ~apo/spasma tou= theou=~ [i, 36 Arn.].]

[56\14: A frequently repeated Stoic dogma (stated with particular fullness by Senec., _Ep._ 93): see Gataker on M. Ant. (iii, 7), p. 108-9. The happiness of the (Stoic) wise man does not require ~mê=kos bi/ou te/leiou~ as Aristot. had maintained (see above, n. 32). In this point Stoic and Epicurean doctrine fully agreed: magni artificis est clusisse totum in exiguo: tantum sapienti sua, quantum deo omnis aetas patet (Sen., _Ep._ 53, 11, and see below, n. 92).]

[57\14: Acc. to Panaitios there are _duo genera_ in the soul which he calls _inflammata anima_ (Cic., _TD._ i, 42). It is at any rate very probable that Panaitios (and Boëthos--roughly contemporary with Pan.: see Comparetti, _Ind. Stoic._, p. 78 f.--acc. to Macr., _in S. Scip._ 1, 14, 20) regarded the soul as compounded of two elements, _aer et ignis_, not {518} as a single and uncompounded ~pneu=ma e/nthermon~ as the older Stoa had taught (see Schmekel, _Philos. d. mittl. Stoa_, 324 f.).]

[58\14: ~phu/sis~ and ~psuchê/~: Pan. ap. Nemes., _NH._, p. 212 Matth. This clearly shows a tendency to a psychological dualism: Zeller, _Stoics and Epicureans_, p. 542 f. What further suggestions were made by Pan. about the division of the soul remains very problematical. The only more precise statement is Cicero's, _TD._ i, 80 (speaking of Pan.), aegritudines iras libidinesque semotas a mente et disclusas putat.]

[59\14: Panaitios denied not merely the immortality but even the ~diamonê/~ of the soul after death: Cic., _TD._ i, 78-9. Two reasons are there given: everything that has come into being (like the soul of man at birth) must also perish--the Aristotelian principle: see above, n. 25; what can feel pain (as the soul does) must become diseased and what is diseased must eventually perish. (Here the **destruction of the soul from its own inward decay is asserted--not from the effect of external force at the world conflagration, the periodic occurrence of which Pan. at least called in question.) Acc. to Schmekel (_mittl. Stoa_, p. 309) it follows from Cic., _TD._ i, 42, that Panaitios also added a third argument: that the soul being composite must suffer the dissolution of its parts in death which change into other elements. This does not indeed at all follow from the passage, but such a view would almost have been inevitable with Panaitios' doctrine of the soul and had already been suggested by Karneades in his polemic against the indestructibility of the divine and of every ~zô=|on~--an argument to which Pan. on the whole yielded.]

[60\14: Poseidonios distinguished in the human soul not three parts but three ~duna/meis mia=s ousi/as ek tê=s kardi/as hormôme/nês~ (Gal. v, 515), namely, the Platonic three, the ~logistiko/n, thumoeide/s, epithumêtiko/n~ (Gal. v, 476). The last two are the ~duna/meis a/logoi~ (they only give ~phantasi/ai~ the special forms taken by their impulses: Gal. v, 474, 399). The ~pa/thê~ are not judgments nor the consequences of judgment but the motions (~kinê/seis~) of these ~duna/meis a/logoi~ (Gal. v, 429; cf. 378). In this way alone is it possible to understand how passion or wrong-doing can arise in man; it is because soul is not (as Chrysipp. had taught) pure reasoning power (cf. also Gal. iv, 820). There exists then in man an ~a/logon kai\ kako/daimon kai\ _a/theon_~ in addition to the ~dai/môn suggenê\s tô=| to\n ho/lon ko/smon dioikou=nti~: Gal. v, 469 f. How, indeed, this is possible when the soul is a single ~ousi/a~ and in its nature nothing but divine ~pneu=ma~ it is difficult to say.--Pos. too was quite ignorant of an evil principle in the world, not the divine or contrary to the divine principle. The ethical teaching of Stoicism had always contained a dualism which is here transferred to the physical doctrine where it was originally unknown. From the time of Pos. there is an ever growing tendency to emphasize the contrast (which was, however, always familiar to the older Stoics as well) between "soul" and "body", the _inutilis caro ac fluida_, Pos. ap. Sen., _Ep._ 92, 10. In view of this contrast the "soul" too is no longer said to come into being with the body or with the physical conception of the individual (cf. ~gegone/nai tê\n psuchê\n kai\ metageneste/ran ei=nai [tou= sô/matos]~, Chrysipp. ap. Plu., _Sto. Rep._ 1053 D [ii, 222 Arn.]), but rather to have been living before that, in the separate life of the divine. It is nowhere expressly or authoritatively stated that Poseidonios held the "pre-existence" of the "soul"; but that view has been rightly attributed to him, fitting in as it does with his other ideas, and because it is often introduced and taken for granted in those passages where {519} Cicero or Seneca are following Pos. (see Corssen, _de Pos. Rhod._, p. 25 ff. But we may not read the doctrine of pre-existence into S.E., _M._ ix, 71, as Heinze, _Xenok._ 134, 2, does). If the soul-~dai/môn~ was in existence before its incarnation it can presumably only enter the body with the conception of the individual life ~thu/rathen~, _tractus extrinsecus_ as Cic. puts it, _Div._ ii, 119; a passage obviously related (as Bonhöffer, _Epikt._ 79 remarks) to the statement in _Div._ i, 64, where he is speaking of the _immortales animi_ of which the air is full--and there Pos. is mentioned by name as the authority. From its pre-existent life in the air the "soul" enters into man. The multitude of individual bodiless souls--not only the one impersonal soul-substance of the world--were thus living before their ~ensôma/tôsis~, and the Stoic pantheism thus turns into a rather questionable "pandaemonism". On the other hand, Poseidonios in opposition to his teacher, Panaitios, adheres to the doctrine of the periodic extinction of all life in the one Soul of the World, the original Fire: cf. _Dox._ 388a, 18; b, 19. Holding this view he cannot very well have put the origin of each of the individual soul-daimones before the beginning of the

## particular world-period in which they live. Nor can the survival of

the souls after their separation from the body be prolonged beyond the next ~ekpu/rôsis~ (which makes Cicero's _immortales animi_ inexact: _Div._ i, 64, after Pos.). Thus, although the survival which Panaitios had denied is reaffirmed it does not go beyond the qualified doctrine of immortality which the older Stoics had held. At the same time Pos. could hold, with Chrysipp. and other Stoics, that there was a ~periodikê\ paliggenesi/a~ (M. Ant. xi, 1) after the world-conflagration and even that each individual man of the previous world-period would be restored again in precisely the same place (Chrysipp. ap. Lact., _Inst._ 7, 23, 3, etc.; ii, 189 Arn.; cf. the Orphico-Pythagorean fantasy: above, chap. x, n. 47). But this would not amount to an ~athanasi/a~ for the individual: the individual life has been interrupted and is separated from its ~apokata/stasis~ by a long interval of time.--There is no satisfactory reason for assigning to Pos. the belief in a series of ~metensômatô/seis~ of the soul--as Heinze does, _Xen._ 132 ff.--though such an idea would not have been hard to arrive at, even while holding fast to the doctrine of the final ~ekpu/rôsis~. But the dubious accounts given by many ~doxogra/phoi~ of Stoic teaching on the question of the ~metaggismo\s psuchô=n~ need not necessarily refer to Poseidonios: nor are we bound to draw this conclusion because they reappear in Plutarch. Plu. does indeed here and there follow Poseidonios, but he never hesitates to add Platonic ideas or fancies of his own invention, a fact which makes it most risky to attempt to fix an exact source for any particular detail in his variegated mosaic.]

[61\14: Schmekel (_Phil. d. mittl. Stoa_, 1892) maintains convincingly that Panaitios was led to his view of the nature and fate of the soul chiefly by the polemic of Karneades against the dogmatic philosophers and particularly the Stoics. It is less certain that Poseidonios and his heterodox views are influenced by respect for Karneades. It is certain, however, that Pos. differs from Chrysipp., and still more from Panaitios. There is thus an indirect connexion between him and Karneades, to whose criticisms Panaitios had in the most essential points given way.]

[62\14: That Pos. is being used in the first book of _Tusc. Disp._ is admitted on all hands (as to the extent of that use conjecture may indeed be various). It is at least very possible in the case of _Somn. Scip._ (see Corssen, _Pos._ 40 ff.).--The attraction of such theories of immortality {520} remained an aesthetic one with Cicero (and probably among all the cultured of his age and social circle). Where he is not speaking rhetorically or in pursuance of a literary pose--in his letters esp.--he shows no trace of the conviction that he defends at other times with so much ardour (see Boissier, _Rel. rom. d'Aug. aux Ant._ i, 58 f.).]

[63\14: ~ou kata\ psilê\n para/taxin, alla\ lelogisme/nôs kai\ semnô=s~ though not always quite ~atragô/|dôs~ (M. Ant. xi, 3).]

[64\14: Julius Kanus when condemned to death by Gaius only attempts to _enquire_ whether there is any truth in the belief in immortality: Sen., _Tr. An._ 14, 8-9. De natura animae et dissociatione spiritus corporisque inquirebat Thrasea Paetus, before his execution, with his instructor Demetrius the Cynic: Tac., _A._ xvi, 34. They have no firm conviction in these matters that might serve to explain or account for their heroism (Cato reads the _Phaedo_ before his suicide: Plu., _Cat. min._ 68, 70).]

[65\14: nos quoque felices animae et aeterna sortitae says the soul of her father to Marcia: Sen., _C. ad Marc._ 26, 7, in antiqua elementa vertemur at the ~ekpu/rôsis~.]

[66\14: Sen., _Ep._ 88, 34.]

[67\14: _bellum somnium_, Sen., _Ep._ 102, 2.]

[68\14: Where Seneca admits more positive conceptions of a life after death he never goes beyond a fortasse, si modo vera sapientium fama est (_Ep._ 63, 16); a deliberate concession to the consensus hominum (_Ep._ 117, 6) or the opiniones magnorum virorum rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium (_Ep._ 102, 3). Following the conventional style of consolatory discourses he gives such expressions a more vivid turn in the _Consolationes_: e.g. _Marc._ 25, 1 ff.; _Helv._ 11, 7; _Polyb._ 9, 8. But even there the idea of _personal_ immortality hardly seems to be taken seriously. In the same pieces death is commended simply as putting an end to all pain, and, in fact, to all sensation: _Marc._ 19, 4-5. In death we become again as we were before being born, _Marc._ 19, 5; cf. _Ep._ 54, 4, mors est non esse, id quale sit iam scio. hoc erit post me quod ante me fuit; and _Ep._ 77, 11, non eris: nec fuisti. So that whether death is a _finis_ or a _transitus_, (_Prov._ 6, 6; _Ep._ 65, 24), it is equally welcome to the wise man who has made the most of his life, however short it may have been. Whether he goes then to the gods or whether on the other hand nothing is left of the mortal creature after death aeque magnum animum habebit (_Ep._ 93, 10); cf. nunquam magis divinum est (pectus humanum) quam ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat, et scit in hoc natum hominem ut vita defungeretur cet., (_Ep._ 120, 14); ipsum perire non est magnum, anima in expedito est habenda (_QN._ 6, 32, 5); to be ready is everything.--Of the old Stoic dogmas the only one that seems to remain certain for Seneca is that of ~paliggenesi/a~ at the new creation of the world, _Ep._ 36, 10-11: mors intermittit vitam, non eripit: venit iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies; but that is not in any way a consolation: multi recusarent nisi oblitos reduceret. Consciousness ceases with the coming of death in this world-period.]

[69\14: It is very rarely that the utterances of the Emperor on the subject of what happens after death resemble those of a convinced Stoic of the old school. The souls are all parts of the one ~noera\ psuchê/~ of the world which though extended over so many individual souls yet remains a unity (ix, 8; xii, 30). After death the individual soul will survive for a period in the air until it is merged into the universal soul ~eis to\n tô=n ho/lôn spermatiko\n lo/gon~ (iv, 21). This implies the survival of the personal self for an undefined period, but it is {521} not a fixed conviction of M. Ant. As a rule he allows the choice between ~sbe/sis ê\ meta/stasis~, i.e. immediate extinction and merging of the individual soul (Panait.) or its removal into a temporary abode of the souls in the air (~hai eis to\n ae/ra methista/menai psuchai/~, iv, 21; cf. v, 53). Or else the choice is between ~sbe/sis, meta/stasis~ (both in agreement with the Stoic doctrine of the ~he/nôsis~ of the soul) or ~skedasmo/s~ of the soul-elements, in case the atomists are right (vii, 32; viii, 25; vi, 24)--a dilemma which really comes down to ~skedasmo/s~ or ~sbe/sis (= lêphthê=nai eis tou\s ko/smou spermatikou\s lo/gous~); and ~meta/stasis~ falls out. This is probably the meaning also of x, 7: ~ê/toi skedasmo\s stoichei/ôn ê\ _tropê/_~ (in which ~to\ pneumatiko/n~ disappears ~eis to\ aerô=des~) and ~tropê/~ only of the last ~pneumatiko/n~ that man preserves in himself: for here (at the end of the chapter) the identity of the individual soul with itself is given up in the Herakleitean manner (see above, p. 370). Sometimes the choice is presented between ~anaisthêsi/a~ or ~he/teros bi/os~ after death (iii, 3) or ~ai/sthêsis heteroi/a~ in an ~alloi=on zô=|on~ (viii, 58). This is no allusion to metempsychosis (in which the envelope into which the soul goes is another but its ~ai/sthêsis~ does not become ~heteroi/a~): it means the turning of the _soul-pneuma_, exhaled in death, to new forms of life united to the previous forms by no identity of soul-personality. In this case we can indeed say ~tou= zê=n ou pau/sê|~: but there can be no idea of the survival of the personal ego. ~hê tô=n ho/lôn phu/sis~ exchanges and redistributes its elements; all things are changing (viii, 6; ix, 28). The Emperor never seriously thinks of the survival of personality; he seeks rather to inquire why things are as they are; but he never doubts that as a matter of fact even the noblest of mankind must also "go out" completely with death (xii, 5). Everything changes and one thing perishes to make way for another (xii, 21); and so each man must say to himself ~met' ou polu\ oudei\s oudamou= e/sê|~ (xii, 21; viii, 5). The wise man will say it with calmness: his soul is ~he/toimos ea\n ê/dê apoluthê=nai de/ê| tou= sô/matos . . .~ xi, 3. Living among men to whom his way of thought is strange (~en tê=| diaphôni/a| tê=s sumbiô/seôs~) he sighs at times ~tha=tton e/lthois, ô= tha/nate . . .~ ix, 3; cf. Bonhöffer, _Epikt. u. d. Stoa_, 59 ff.]

[70\14: I shall die without resisting God ~eidô\s ho/ti to\ geno/menon kai\ phtharê=nai dei=. ou ga/r eimi aiô\n all' a/nthrôpos, me/ros tô=n pa/ntôn hôs hô/ra hême/ras; enstê=nai/ me dei= hôs tê\n hô/ran kai\ parelthei=n hôs hô/ran~, Epictet. ii, 5, 13. The present must make way for the future ~hi/n' hê peri/odos anu/êtai tou= ko/smou~, ii, 17-18; iv, 1, 106. Death brings with it not complete destruction, ~ouk apô/leian~, but ~tô=n prote/rôn eis he/tera metabola/s~, iii, 24, 91-4. But the personality of the now living individual does indeed perish completely in death.--Cf. Bonhöffer, _Epiktet_, 65 f.; cf. also the same author's _Ethik des Epiktet_, p. 26 ff., 52 (1894).]

[71\14: Cornutus ap. Stob., _Ecl._ i, 383, 24-384, 2 W.]

[72\14: The ~psuchê/~ a ~sô=ma~ (the only ~asô/maton~ is empty space which is merely a passage way for the ~sô/mata~), D.L, x, 67 [p. 21 Us.]. It is a ~sô=ma leptomere/s, par' ho/lon to\ a/throisma~ (i.e. of atoms to a body) ~paresparme/non, prosemphere/staton de\ pneu/mati thermou= tina kra=sin e/chonti~, D.L. x, 63. Cf. Lucr. iii, 126 ff.; more precise is iii, 231-46. It is the ~a/throisma~ which ~tê\n psuchê\n stega/zei~, D.L. x, 64. vas quasi constitit eius, Lucr. iii, 440, 555.]

[73\14: Lucr. iii, 94 ff., 117 ff.]

[74\14: The ~a/logon ho\ en tô=| loipô=| pare/spartai sô/mati, to\ de\ logiko\n en tô=| thô/raki~, Sch. D.L. x, 67 (p. 21 Us.), _fr._ 312, 313 Us. _anima_ and _animus_, Lucr. iii, 136 ff. The _anima_, though it is diminished {522} when the man loses his limbs (in which it inheres), yet allows him to remain alive. The _animus_, however, _vitai claustra coercens_, must not be diminished otherwise the _anima_ escapes as well and the man dies: Lucr. iii, 396 ff. The _animus_ with its perceptions is more independent of _anima_ and _corpus_ than they are of it: Lucr. iii, 145 ff.]

[75\14: Lucr. iii, 421-4.]

[76\14: Lucr. iii, 445 ff.]

[77\14: The soul ~diaspei/retai, luome/nou tou= ho/lou athroi/smatos~ and cannot retain any ~ai/sthêsis~ apart from its ~a/throisma~, D L. x, 65-6. The winds disperse it: Lucr. iii, 506 ff. ~kapnou= di/kên ski/dnatai~, Epicur. _fr._ 337. _ceu fumus_, Lucr. iii, 446-583.]

[78\14: radicitus e vita se tollit et eicit, Lucr. iii, 877.]

[79\14: Lucr. iii, 854-60; 847-53.]

[80\14: ~oude\ taphê=s phrontiei=n (to\n sopho/n)~ _fr._ 578. Cf. Lucr. iii, 870 ff. The way in which the body, deserted by its soul, is buried or disposed of is of no consequence: Phld., _Mort._, p. 41-2 Mekl.]

[81\14: D.L. x, 124-5.]

[82\14: ~ho tha/natos oude\n pro\s hêma=s, to\ ga\r dialuthe\n anaisthêtei=, to\ de\ anaisthêtou=n oude\n pro\s hêma=s~, Ep., _Sent._ ii; D.L. x, 139 (p. 71 Us.). Frequently repeated: see Usen., p. 391 f.]

[83\14: dolor and morbus, leti fabricator uterque, affect the soul too, Lucr. iii, 459 ff., 470 ff., 484 ff. Nothing that can be broken up into parts can be eternal; 640 ff., 667 ff. The chief argument: quod cum corpore nascitur, cum corpore intereat necesse est, Ep., _fr._ 336. (They are identical in part with the arguments which Karneades directed against the theory of the eternity and indestructibility of the highest ~zô=|on~, God. Karn. must have got them from Epicurus.)]

[84\14: Cf. Ep., _Sent._ xi, p. 73 f. Us.]

[85\14: To be able to see ~mêde\n pro\s hêma=s ei=nai to\n tha/naton, apo/lauston poiei= to\ tê=s zô|ê=s thnêto/n, ouk a/peiron protithei=sa chro/non alla\ to\n tê=s athanasi/as aphelome/nê po/thon~, D.L. x, 123; cf. Metrod. (?), ed. Körte, p. 588, col. xvi.]

[86\14: ~gego/namen ha/pax, di\s de\ ouk e/sti gene/sthai ktl.~ hence _carpe diem_! _fr._ 204; see also _fr._ 490-4. Metrod. _fr._ 53 K.]

[87\14: D.L. x, 81.]

[88\14: Against the fear of torment and punishment in the underworld: _fr._ 340-1, cf. Lucr. iii, 1011 ff. (torments such as those fabled of Hades exist in _this_ world: iii, 978 ff.). Cf. the letter of the Epicurean Diogenes, _Rh. Mus._ 47, 428 ~. . . phobou=mai ga\r oude\n~ (sc. ~to\n tha/naton) dia\ tou\s Tituou\s kai\ tou\s Tanta/lous hou\s anagra/phousin en Ha/idou tine/s, oude\ phri/ttô tê\n mu/dêsin (mê/dêsin~ the stone) ~ktl.~]

[89\14: metus ille foras praeceps Acheruntis agendus, funditus humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo, omnia suffundens mortis nigrore neque ullam esse voluptatem liquidam puramque reliquit, Lucr. iii, 37 ff.]

[90\14: D.L. x, 126. ridiculum est currere ad mortem taedio vitae, _fr._ 496.]

[91\14: artifex vitae, Sen. _Ep._ 90, 27.]

[92\14: ~--su\ de\ tê=s au/rion ouk ô\n ku/rios anaba/llê| to\n kairo/n; ho de\ pa/ntôn bi/os mellêsmô=| parapo/llutai . . .~ _fr._ 204.]

[93\14: Negat Epicurus ne diuturnitatem quidem temporis ad beate vivendum aliquid afferre, nec minorem voluptatem percipi in brevitate temporis quam si sit illa sempiterna, Cic., _Fin._ ii, 87; cf. Ep., _Sent._ xix (p. 75 Us.). ~chro/non ou to\n mê/kiston alla\ to\n hê/diston karpi/zetai (ho sopho/s)~: D.L. x, 126.--quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido, Lucr. iii, 1077. eadem sunt omnia semper, 945.] {523}

[94\14: ~hê dia/noia . . . to\n pantelê= bi/on pareskeu/asen kai\ oude\n e/ti tou= apei/rou chro/nou prosedeê/thê~, _Sent._ xx (p. 75 Us.).]

[95\14: ~ouk e/sti phusikê\ koinôni/a toi=s logikoi=s pro\s allê/lous~.--_sibi quemque consulere_, _fr._ 523. Aloofness from ~tai=s tô=n plêthô=n archai=s~ _frr._ 554, 552, 9.]

[96\14: ~hoi no/moi cha/rin tô=n sophô=n kei=ntai, ouch ho/pôs mê\ adikô=sin, all' ho/pôs mê\ adikô=ntai~, _fr._ 530.]

[97\14: ~ouke/ti dei= sô/|zein tou\s He/llênas, oud' epi\ sophi/a| stepha/nôn par' autoi=s tugcha/nein . . .~ Metrod. _fr._ 41.]

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