libro 4

^o metro sexto [_line_ 35].

METRE III.

_Quenam discors federa rerum._

What discordable cause hath to-rent and unioined the bindinge, _or the alliaunce_, of thinges, _that is to seyn, the coniunccioun of god and man_? Whiche god hath establisshed so greet bataile bitwixen thise two soothfast or verray thinges, _that is to seyn, bitwixen the purviaunce of god and free wil_, that they ben singuler 5 and devyded, ne that they ne wolen nat be medeled ne coupled to-gidere? But ther nis no discord to the verray thinges, but they clyven, certein, alwey to hem-self. But the thought of man, confounded and overthrowen by the dirke membres of the body, ne may nat, by fyr of his derked looking, _that is to seyn, by the vigour_ 10 _of his insighte, whyl the soule is in the body_, knowe the thinne subtil knittinges of thinges. But wherfore enchaufeth it so, by so greet love, to finden thilke notes of sooth y-covered; _that is to seyn, wherfore enchaufeth the thoght of man by so greet desyr to knowen thilke notificacions that ben y-hid under the covertoures of 15 sooth?_ Wot it aught thilke thing that it, anguissous, desireth to knowe? _As who seith, nay; for no man travaileth for to witen thinges that he wot. And therfore the texte seith thus_: but who travaileth to witen thinges y-knowe? And yif that he ne knoweth hem nat, what seketh thilke blinde thoght? What is he that 20 desireth any thing of which he wot right naught? _As who seith, who so desireth any thing, nedes, somwhat he knoweth of it; or elles, he ne coude nat desire it._ Or who may folwen thinges that ne ben nat y-wist? _And thogh that he seke tho thinges_, wher shal he finde hem? What wight, that is al unconninge and ignoraunt, 25 may knowen the forme that is y-founde? But whan the soule biholdeth and seeth the heye thoght, _that is to seyn, god_, than knoweth it to-gidere the somme and the singularitees, _that is to seyn, the principles and everich by him-self_.

But now, whyl the soule is hid in the cloude and in the derkenesse 30 of the membres of the body, it ne hath nat al for-yeten it-self, but it with-holdeth the somme of thinges, and leseth the singularitees. Thanne, who-so that seeketh soothnesse, he nis in neither nother habite; for he noot nat al, ne he ne hath nat al foryeten: but yit him remembreth the somme of thinges that he 35 with-holdeth, and axeth conseil, and retreteth deepliche thinges y-seyn biforn, _that is to seyn, the grete somme in his minde_: so that he mowe adden the parties that he hath for-yeten to thilke that he hath with-holden.'

ME. III. 1. C. vnioygnyd, _glossed_ s. ne se compaciant_ur_ si_mi_l_iter_. 2. C. coniuncciou_n_s; A. coniuncc_i_oun. 3. C. man, _quasi dicat, nullus_. // C. which that god; A. Ed. whiche god (_quis Deus_). 6. C. deuydyd, _quasi dicat, non est ita_. 7. A. _om._ the. // C. thinges, _s. prudencia et liberum arbitrium_. 8. A. cleuen. 10. A. dirk. 12. C. it, _s. anima_. 13. A. note (Lat. _notas_). 16. C. it, _s. anima_. 18. _After_ thus, A. _adds_--Si enim anima ignorat istas subtiles connexiones, responde, vnde est quod desiderat scire cum nil ignotum possit desiderare; _but both_ C. _and_ Ed. _omit this_. 21. wot] C. not. // C. nawht, _quasi dicat, non_. 24. A. _om._ that. 26. C. yfownde, _quasi dicat, nullus_. 29. A. Ed. principles; C. principulis. 34. A. nouthir habit. 36. C. retretith, _i. retractat_; A. tretith.

PROSE IV.

_Tum illa: Vetus, inquit, hec est._

Thanne seide she: 'this is,' quod she, 'the olde question of the purviaunce of god; and Marcus Tullius, whan he devyded the divynaciouns, _that is to seyn, in his book that he wroot of divynaciouns_, he moevede gretly this questioun; and thou thy-self has y-sought it mochel, and outrely, and longe; but yit ne hath it nat ben 5 determined ne y-sped fermely and diligently of any of yow. And the cause of this derkenesse and of this difficultee is, for that the moevinge of the resoun of mankinde ne may nat moeven to (_that is to seyn, applyen or ioinen to_) the simplicitee of the devyne prescience; the whiche _simplicitee of the devyne prescience_, yif 10 that men mighten thinken it in any maner, _that is to seyn, that yif men mighten thinken and comprehenden the thinges as god seeth hem_, thanne ne sholde ther dwellen outrely no doute: the whiche _resoun and cause of difficultee_ I shal assaye at the laste to shewe and to speden, whan I have first y-spended and answered to tho 15 resouns by which thou art y-moeved. For I axe why thou wenest that thilke resouns of hem that assoilen this questioun ne ben nat speedful y-nough ne sufficient: the whiche _solucioun, or the whiche resoun_, for that it demeth that the prescience nis nat cause of necessitee to thinges to comen, than ne weneth it nat that 20 freedom of wil be destorbed or y-let by prescience. For ne drawestow nat arguments from elles-where of the necessitee of thinges to-comen (_as who seith, any other wey than thus_) but that thilke thinges that the prescience wot biforn ne mowen nat unbityde? _That is to seyn, that they moten bityde._ But thanne, yif 25 that prescience ne putteth no necessitee to thinges to comen, as thou thy-self hast confessed it and biknowen a litel her-biforn, what cause or what is it (_as who seith, ther may no cause be_) by which that the endes voluntarie of thinges mighten be constreined to certein bitydinge? For by grace of positioun, so that thou mowe 30 the betere understonde this that folweth, I pose, _per impossibile_, that ther be no prescience. Thanne axe I,' quod she, 'in as mochel as apertieneth to that, sholden thanne thinges that comen of free wil ben constreined to bityden by necessitee?'

_Boece._ 'Nay,' quod I. 35

'Thanne ayeinward,' quod she, 'I suppose that ther be prescience, but that it ne putteth no necessitee to thinges; thanne trowe I, that thilke selve freedom of wil shal dwellen al hool and absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt seyn that, al-be-it so that prescience nis nat cause of the necessitee of bitydinge to thinges 40 to comen, algates yit it is a signe that the thinges ben to bityden by necessitee. By this manere thanne, al-thogh the prescience ne hadde never y-ben, yit _algate or at the leeste weye_ it is certein thing, that the endes and bitydinges of thinges to comen sholden ben necessarie. For every signe sheweth and signifyeth only what 45 the thing is, but it ne maketh nat the thing that it signifyeth. For which it bihoveth first to shewen, that no-thing ne bitydeth that it ne bitydeth by necessitee, so that it may appere that the prescience is signe of this necessitee; or elles, yif ther nere no necessitee, certes, thilke prescience ne mighte nat be signe of thing that nis 50 nat. But certes, it is now certein that the proeve of this, y-sustened by stidefast resoun, ne shal nat ben lad ne proeved by signes ne by arguments y-taken fro with-oute, but by causes covenable and necessarie. But _thou mayst seyn_, how may it be that the thinges ne bityden nat that ben y-purveyed to comen? 55 But, certes, right as we trowen that tho thinges which that the purviance wot biforn to comen ne ben nat to bityden; but that ne sholden we nat demen; but rather, al-thogh that they shal bityden, yit ne have they no necessitee of hir kinde to bityden. And this maystow lightly aperceiven by this that I shal seyn. For 60 we seen many thinges whan they ben don biforn oure eyen, right as men seen the cartere worken in the torninge or atempringe or adressinge of hise cartes or charietes. And by this manere (_as who seith, maystow understonde_) of alle othere _workmen_. Is ther thanne any necessitee, _as who seith, in oure lokinge_, that constreineth 65 or compelleth any of thilke thinges to ben don so?'

_Boece._ 'Nay,' quod I; 'for in ydel and in veyn were al the effect of craft, yif that alle thinges weren moeved by constreininge;' _that is to seyn, by constreininge of oure eyen or of oure sight_.

_Philosophie._ 'The thinges thanne,' quod she, 'that, whan men 70 doon hem, ne han no necessitee that men doon hem, eek tho same thinges, first or they ben doon, they ben to comen with-oute necessitee. For-why ther ben somme thinges to bityden, of which the endes and the bitydinges of hem ben absolut and quit of alle necessitee. For certes, I ne trowe nat that any man wolde seyn 75 this: that tho thinges that men doon now, that they ne weren to bityden first or they weren y-doon; and thilke same thinges, al-thogh that men had y-wist hem biforn, yit they han free bitydinges. For right as science of thinges present ne bringeth in no necessitee to thinges that men doon, right so the prescience of 80 thinges to comen ne bringeth in no necessitee to thinges to bityden. But thou mayst seyn, that of thilke same it is y-douted, as whether that of thilke thinges that ne han non issues and bitydinges necessaries, yif ther-of may ben any prescience; for certes, they semen to discorden. For thou wenest that, yif that 85 thinges ben y-seyn biforn, that necessitee folweth hem; and yif necessitee faileth hem, they ne mighten nat ben wist biforn, and that no-thing ne may ben comprehended by science but certein; and yif tho thinges that ne han no certein bitydinges ben purveyed as certein, it sholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat soothfastnesse 90 of science. And thou wenest that it be diverse fro the hoolnesse of science that any man sholde deme a thing to ben other-weys thanne it is it-self. And the cause of this erroure is, that of alle the thinges that every wight hath y-knowe, they wenen that tho thinges been y-knowe al-oonly by the strengthe and by the nature 95 of the thinges that ben y-wist or y-knowe; and it is al the contrarie. For al that ever is y-knowe, it is rather comprehended and knowen, nat after his strengthe and his nature, but after the facultee, _that is to seyn, the power and the nature_, of hem that knowen. And, for that this thing shal mowen shewen by a short 100 ensaumple: the same roundnesse of a body, other-weys the sighte of the eye knoweth it, and other-weyes the touchinge. The lokinge, by castinge of his bemes, waiteth and seeth from afer al the body to-gidere, with-oute moevinge of it-self; but the touchinge clyveth and conioineth to the rounde body, and moeveth aboute 105 the environinge, and comprehendeth by parties the roundnesse. And the man him-self, other-weys wit biholdeth him, and other-weys imaginacioun, and other-weys resoun, and other-weys intelligence. For the wit comprehendeth withoute-forth the figure of the body of the man that is establissed in the 110 matere subiect; but the imaginacioun comprehendeth only the figure withoute the matere. Resoun surmounteth imaginacioun, and comprehendeth by universal lokinge the comune spece that is in the singuler peces. But the eye of intelligence is heyere; for it surmounteth the environinge of the universitee, and looketh, 115 over that, by pure subtilitee of thoght, thilke same simple forme _of man that is perdurably in the divyne thoght_. In whiche this oughte greetly to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to comprehenden thinges enbraseth and contieneth the lowere strengthe; but the lowere strengthe ne aryseth nat in no manere 120 to heyere strengthe. For wit ne may no-thing comprehende out of matere, ne the imaginacioun ne loketh nat the universels speces, ne resoun taketh nat the simple forme _so as intelligence taketh it_; but intelligence, that looketh al aboven, whan it hath comprehended the forme, it knoweth and demeth alle the thinges 125 that ben under that forme. But _she knoweth hem_ in thilke manere in the whiche it comprehendeth thilke same simple forme that ne may never ben knowen to none of that other; _that is to seyn, to none of tho three forseide thinges of the sowle_. For it knoweth the universitee of resoun, and the figure of the imaginacioun, 130 and the sensible material _conceived by wit_; ne it ne useth nat nor of resoun ne of imaginacioun ne of wit withoute-forth; but it biholdeth alle thinges, so as I shal seye, by a strok of thought formely, _withoute discours or collacioun_. Certes resoun, whan it looketh any-thing universel, it ne useth nat of imaginacioun, nor 135 of witte, and algates yit it comprehendeth the thinges imaginable and sensible; for resoun is she that diffinisseth the universel of hir conseyte right thus:--man is a resonable two-foted beest. And how so that this knowinge is universel, yet nis ther no wight that ne woot wel that a man is a thing imaginable and sensible; and 140 this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by imaginacioun nor by wit, but it looketh it by a resonable concepcioun. Also imaginacioun, al-be-it so that it taketh of wit the beginninges to seen and to formen the figures, algates, al-thogh that wit ne were nat present, yit it environeth and comprehendeth alle thinges 145 sensible; nat by resoun sensible of deminge, but by resoun imaginatif. Seestow nat thanne that alle the thinges, in knowinge, usen more of hir facultee or of hir power than _they doon of the facultee or power_ of thinges that ben y-knowe? Ne that nis nat wrong; for so as every Iugement is the dede or doinge of him 150 that demeth, it bihoveth that every wight performe the werk and his entencioun, nat of foreine power, but of his propre power.

PR. IV. 2. C. deuynede; Ed. deuyded; A. deuided; _distribuit_. 7. C. dirknesse; A. derkenesse. // A. _om. 2nd_ of this. 11, 12. A. _om._ mighten thinken it ... yif men. 15. A. _om._ y-spended and. // C. the; A. tho. 22. A. drawest thou. 24. A. thinge. // A. _om._ ne. 28. A. _om._ or what. 29. C. A. _gloss_ endes _by_ exitus. 30. Ed. posycion (Lat. _positionis_); C. A. possessioun; _and_ C. _glosses_ For ... possessioun _by_ uerbi gratia. 31. A. _inpossibile_; C. _per impossibile_ (as a gloss). 37. Ed. it; C. is. 44. C. endes, _i. exitus_. // A. and the (_for_ and). 46. C. thing is, _i. se eius significatum_. // C. maketh, _glossed_ causat. 47, 48. A. _om._ that it ne bitydeth. 48, 49. C. _om._ so that ... necessitee. 51. A. preue. 52. A. stedfast. // A. p_ro_ued. 57. C. but that; A. _om._ that. 58. A. _om._ that. 60. A. maist thou. 62. A. and in attempryng or in adressyng. 63. A. chariottes. 64. A. mayst thou. 65. A. _om._ that. 66. C. _om._ thilke. // C. so, _quasi dicat, non_. 70. A. thise thingus. 80, 81. A. _om._ that men doon ... to thinges. 83. C. Ed. issues; A. endes; C. _adds_--_i. exitus_. 87, 88. C. and yif (_wrongly_); A. Ed. and that. 91-93. A. _om._ And thou ... is it-self _here, but inserts the same in a wrong place_ (131 _below_). 99. A. _om. 2nd_ the. 100. A. Ed. that; C. _om._ // Ed. thing; C. A. _om._ 103. C. after; A. afer; Ed. a-ferre. 105. C. body, _glossed_ orbis; A. body, _glossed_ orbi (Lat. _orbi_). 109. A. fro with-outen furthe. 111. C. comprehendeth, _vel iudicat_. 111, 2. A. _om._ comprehendeth ... imaginacioun. 113. C. Ed. by; A. by an. // C. A. (_gloss_) speciem. 120, 121. A. _om._ but the ... strengthe. // A. Ed. For; C. _om._ 124. A. Ed. it; C. _om._ // A. but the. // A. Ed. that; C. _om._ 126. C. she; _glossed_ intelligence. // C. Ed. in; A. vndir. 131. _Here_ A. _wrongly inserts a clause omitted above_ (91-93). 136. A. _om._ it. // A. comprendith. 139. A. _om._ is. 140. A. _om._ a thing. 142. A. _om._ a. 147. A. Sest thou. 148. A. of faculte or of power. 149. A. Ed. no (_for_ nat). 150. A. or the.

METRE IV.

_Quondam porticus attulit._

The Porche, _that is to seyn, a gate of the town of Athenes ther-as philosophres hadden hir congregacioun to desputen_, thilke Porche broughte som-tyme olde men, ful derke in hir sentences, _that is to seyn, philosophres that highten Stoiciens_, that wenden that images and sensibilitees, _that is to seyn, sensible imaginaciouns, or elles 5 imaginaciouns of sensible thinges_, weren empreinted in-to sowles fro bodies withoute-forth; _as who seith, that thilke Stoiciens wenden that the sowle hadde ben naked of it-self, as a mirour or a clene parchemin, so that alle figures mosten first comen fro thinges fro withoute-forth in-to sowles, and ben empreinted in-to sowles_: TEXT: 10 right as we ben wont som-tyme, by a swifte pointel, to ficchen lettres empreinted in the smothenesse or in the pleinnesse of the table of wex _or in parchemin_ that ne hath no figure ne note in it. GLOSE. _But now argueth Boece ayeins that opinioun, and seith thus_: But yif the thryvinge sowle ne unpleyteth no-thing, _that is 15 to seyn, ne doth no-thing_, by his propre moevinges, but suffreth and lyth subgit to tho figures and to tho notes of bodies withoute-forth, and yildeth images ydel and veyn in the manere of a mirour, whennes thryveth thanne or whennes comth thilke knowinge in our sowle, that discerneth and biholdeth alle thinges? And 20 whennes is thilke strengthe that biholdeth the singuler thinges; or whennes is the strengthe that devydeth thinges y-knowe; and thilke strengthe that gadereth to-gidere the thinges devyded; and the strengthe that cheseth his entrechaunged wey? For som-tyme it heveth up the heved, _that is to seyn, that it heveth up the entencioun 25 to right heye thinges_; and som-tyme it descendeth in-to right lowe thinges. And whan it retorneth in-to him-self, it reproeveth and destroyeth the false thinges by the trewe thinges. Certes, this strengthe is cause more efficient, and mochel more mighty _to seen and to knowe thinges_, than thilke cause that 30 suffreth and receiveth the notes and the figures impressed in maner of matere. Algates the passioun, _that is to seyn, the suffraunce or the wit_, in the quike body, goth biforn, excitinge and moevinge the strengthes of the thought. Right so as whan that cleernesse smyteth the eyen _and moeveth hem to seen_, or right so 35 as vois or soun hurteleth to the eres _and commoeveth hem to herkne_, than is the strengthe of the thought y-moeved and excited, and clepeth forth, to semblable moevinges, the speces that it halt with-inne it-self; and addeth tho speces to the notes and to the thinges withoute-forth, and medleth the images of 40 thinges withoute-forth to tho formes y-hidde with-inne him-self.

ME. IV. 3. C. dirke; A. Ed. derke. 5. A. _om._ and. 9. A. _om._ first. 10. A. inp_re_ntid; C. apreyntyd (_but_ emprientyd _just below, and_ enpreynted _above_). 12. A. emp_re_ntid. 13. A. _om. 2nd._ ne. 14. A. Ed. that; C. the. 15. A. vnplitith. 17. A. subgit; Ed. subiecte; C. _om._ // A. the (_for_ tho); _twice_. 20. A. Ed. discernith; C. decerneth. 26. C. heye thinges, _i. principijs_. // C. dessendith; A. discendith. 27. C. lowe thynges, s. conclu_sion_es. // A. rep_re_uith. 29. C. strengthe, _s. anima_. 31. C. resseyuyth; A. resceyueth; Ed. receyueth. // C. A. inpressed; Ed. impressed. 36. A. hurtlith. 38. C. Ed. to; A. the (Lat. _Ad_). 40. A. medeleth. 41. A. to the forme.

PROSE V.

_Quod si in corporibus sentiendis._

But what yif that in bodies to ben feled, _that is to seyn, in the takinge of knowelechinge of bodily thinges_, and al-be-it so that the qualitees of bodies, that ben obiecte fro withoute-forth, moeven and entalenten the instruments of the wittes; and al-be-it so that the passioun of the body, _that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce_, 5 goth to-forn the strengthe of the workinge corage, the which passioun or suffraunce clepeth forth the dede of the thoght in him-self, and moeveth and exciteth in this mene whyle the formes that resten withinne-forth; and yif that, in sensible bodies, as I have seyd, our corage nis nat y-taught or empreinted by passioun _to 10 knowe thise thinges_, but demeth and knoweth, of his owne strengthe, the passioun or suffraunce subiect to the body: moche more thanne tho thinges that ben absolut and quite fro alle talents or affecciouns of bodies, _as god or his aungeles_, ne folwen nat in discerninge thinges obiect fro withoute-forth, but they accomplisshen 15 and speden the dede of hir thoght. By this resoun thanne ther comen many maner knowinges to dyverse and differinge substaunces. For the wit of the body, the whiche wit is naked and despoiled of alle other knowinges, thilke wit comth to beestes that ne mowen nat moeven hem-self her and 20 ther, as _oystres and muscules, and other swiche_ shelle-fish of the see, that clyven and ben norisshed to roches. But the imaginacioun comth to remuable beestes, that semen to han talent to fleen or to desiren any thing. But resoun is al-only to the linage of mankinde, right as intelligence is only [to] the devyne nature: 25 of which it folweth, that thilke knowinge is more worth than thise othre, sin it knoweth by his propre nature nat only his subiect, _as who seith, it ne knoweth nat al-only that apertieneth properly to his knowinge_, but it knoweth the subiects of alle other knowinges. But how shal it thanne be, yif that wit and imaginacioun stryven 30 ayein resoninge, and seyn, that of thilke universel thing that resoun weneth to seen, that it nis right naught? _For wit and imaginacioun seyn that_ that, that is sensible or imaginable, it ne may nat be universel. Thanne is either the Iugement of resoun sooth, ne that ther nis nothing sensible; or elles, for that resoun 35 wot wel that many thinges ben subiect to wit and to imaginacioun, thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn and false, which that loketh and comprehendeth that that is sensible and singuler as universel. And yif that resoun wolde answeren ayein to thise two, _that is to seyn, to witte and to imaginacioun_, and seyn, that 40 soothly she hir-self, _that is to seyn, resoun_, loketh and comprehendeth, by resoun of universalitee, bothe that that is sensible and that that is imaginable; and that thilke two, _that is to seyn, wit and imaginacioun_, ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhansen hem-self to the knowinge of universalitee, for that the knowinge of 45 hem ne may exceden ne surmounte the bodily figures: certes, of the knowinge of thinges, men oughten rather yeven credence to the more stedefast and to the more parfit Iugement. In this maner stryvinge thanne, we that han strengthe of resoninge and of imagininge and of wit, _that is to seyn, by resoun and by imaginacioun 50 and by wit_, we sholde rather preyse the cause of resoun; _as who seith, than the cause of wit and of imaginacioun_.

Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of mankinde ne weneth nat that the devyne intelligence bi-holdeth or knoweth thinges to comen, but right as the resoun of mankinde knoweth hem. For 55 thou arguest and seyst thus: that yif it ne seme nat to men that some thinges han certein and necessarie bitydinges, they ne mowen nat ben wist biforn certeinly to bityden. And thanne nis ther no prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that prescience be in thise thinges, thanne is ther no-thing that it ne 60 bitydeth by necessitee. But certes, yif we mighten han the Iugement of the devyne thoght, as we ben parsoneres of resoun, right so as we han demed that it behoveth that imaginacioun and wit be binethe resoun, right so wolde we demen that it were rightful thing, that mannes resoun oughte to submitten it-self and to ben 65 binethe the divyne thoght. For which, yif that we mowen, _as who seith, that, yif that we mowen, I counseyle, that_ we enhanse us in-to the heighte of thilke sovereyn intelligence; for ther shal resoun wel seen that, that it ne may nat biholden in it-self. And certes that is this, in what maner the prescience of god seeth alle 70 thinges certeins and diffinisshed, al-thogh they ne han no certein issues or bitydinges; ne this is non opinioun, but it is rather the simplicitee of the sovereyn science, that nis nat enclosed nor y-shet within none boundes.

PR. V. 1. A. _om._ yif (Lat. _Quod si_). 5. C. A. witte; Ed. wytte. // A. _om._ or the. 6, 7. A. _om._ goth ... suffraunce. 10. A. enp_re_ntid; C. emprienpted. 20, 1. A. here ne there. // A. muscles. 25. _I supply_ to. 26, 7. C. thise oothr_e_; A. is other. 29. A. subgitz. 31. Ed. vnyuersal thynge; A. vniuersel thinges; C. vniuersels thinges (Lat. _uniuersale_). 35. C. soth; Ed. sothe; A. _om._ // C. sensible, _quod absurdum est_. 41. C. seyn; A. seyn that. 44. C. enhansen; A. enhaunsen. 45. Ed. the knowing; A. knowynge; C. knowy (Lat. _cognitionem_). 46. A. figure. 48. C. stidefast; A. stedfast. 51. C. and we; A. Ed. _om._ and. 52. C. Ed. and of; A. or. 56. A. Ed. ne; C. _om._ 58. A. _om._ And. 59. A. _om._ ther. 61. C. bideth (!). 62. C. parsoneres; A. parsoners; Ed. parteners. 63. A. _om. 1st_ that. 65. A. su_m_mitten. 66. C. yif that; Ed. if; A. that yif. 71. C. diffinysshed; A. difinissed. 72. A. Ed. is; C. nis.

METRE V.

_Quam uariis terris animalia permeant figuris._

The beestes passen by the erthes by ful diverse figures. For som of hem han hir bodies straught and crepen in the dust, and drawen after hem a tras or a foruh y-continued; _that is to seyn, as nadres or snakes_. And other beestes, by the wandringe lightnesse of hir winges, beten the windes, and over-swimmen the spaces of 5 the longe eyr by moist fleeinge. And other beestes gladen hem-self to diggen hir tras or hir steppes in the erthe with hir goings or with hir feet, and to goon either by the grene feldes, or elles to walken under the wodes. And al-be-it so that thou seest that they alle discorden by diverse formes, algates hir faces, enclined, 10 hevieth hir dulle wittes. Only the linage of man heveth heyeste his heye heved, and stondeth light with his up-right body, and biholdeth the erthes under him. And, but-yif thou, erthely man, wexest yvel out of thy wit, this figure amonesteth thee, that axest the hevene with thy righte visage, and hast areysed thy fore-heved, 15 to beren up a-heigh thy corage; so that thy thoght ne be nat y-hevied ne put lowe under fote, sin that thy body is so heye areysed.

ME. V. 3. C. traas; A. t_ra_is; Ed. trace. // C. forwh; A. forghe; Ed. forough. // A. Ed. continued. 4. A. addres; Ed. nedders. // A. _om._ the. 7. C. A. traas. // A. goynge (Lat. _gressibus_). 8. C. feeldes. // A. _om._ elles. 10. A. _om._ faces. // A. enclini[n]g. 13. A. erthe (Lat. _terras_). // A. _om._ And. 16. A. on heye.

PROSE VI.

_Quoniam igitur, uti paullo ante._

Therfor thanne, as I have shewed a litel her-biforn, that al thing that is y-wist nis nat knowen by his nature propre, but by the nature of hem that comprehenden it, lat us loke now, in as mochel as it is leveful to us, _as who seith, lat us loke now as we mowen_, which that the estat is of the devyne substaunce; so that 5 we mowen eek knowen what his science is. The commune Iugement of alle creatures resonables thanne is this: that god is eterne. Lat us considere thanne what is eternitee; for certes that shal shewen us to-gidere the devyne nature and the devyne science.

Eternitee, thanne, is parfit possessioun and al-togidere of lyf 10 interminable; and that sheweth more cleerly by the comparisoun or the collacioun of temporel thinges. For al thing that liveth in tyme it is present, and procedeth fro preterits in-to futures, _that is to seyn, fro tyme passed in-to tyme cominge_; ne ther nis no-thing establisshed in tyme that may enbracen to-gider al the space of 15 his lyf. For certes, yit ne hath it taken the tyme of to-morwe, and it hath lost the tyme of yisterday. And certes, in the lyf of this day, ye ne liven no more but right as in the moevable and transitorie moment. Thanne thilke thing that suffreth temporel condicioun, al-thogh that it never bigan to be, ne thogh it never 20 cese for to be, as Aristotle demed of the world, and al-thogh that the lyf of it be strecched with infinitee of tyme, yit algates nis it no swich thing that men mighten trowen by right that it is eterne. For al-thogh that it comprehende and embrace the space of lyf infinit, yit algates ne embraceth it nat the space of the lyf 25 al-togider; for it ne hath nat the futures that ne ben nat yit, _ne it ne hath no lenger the preterits that ben y-doon or y-passed_. But thilke thing thanne, that hath and comprehendeth to-gider al the plentee of the lyf interminable, to whom ther ne faileth naught of the future, and to whom ther nis naught of the preterit escaped 30 nor y-passed, thilke same is y-witnessed and y-proeved by right to be eterne. And it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke thing be al-wey present to him-self, and compotent; _as who seith, al-wey present to him-self, and so mighty that al be right at his plesaunce_; and that he have al present the infinitee of the moevable tyme. 35 Wher-for som men trowen wrongfully that, whan they heren that it semede to Plato that this world ne hadde never beginninge of tyme, ne that it never shal han failinge, they wenen in this maner that this world be maked coeterne with his maker; _as who seith, they wene that this world and god ben maked togider eterne,_ 40 _and that is a wrongful weninge_. For other thing is it to ben y-lad by lyf interminable, as Plato graunted to the world, and other thing is it to embrace to-gider al the present of the lyf interminable, the whiche thing it is cleer and manifest that it is propre to the devyne thoght. 45

Ne it ne sholde nat semen to us, that god is elder thanne thinges that ben y-maked by quantitee of tyme, but rather by the propretee of his simple nature. For this ilke infinit moevinge of temporel thinges folweth this presentarie estat of lyf unmoevable; and so as it ne may nat countrefeten it ne feynen it ne be evenlyke 50 to it for the inmoevabletee, _that is to seyn, that is in the eternitee of god_, it faileth and falleth in-to moevinge fro the simplicitee of the presence _of god_, and disencreseth in-to the infinit quantitee of future and of preterit: and so as it ne may nat han to-gider al the plentee of the lyf, algates yit, for as moche as it 55 ne ceseth never for to ben in som maner, it semeth som-del to us, that it folweth and resembleth thilke thing that it ne may nat atayne to ne fulfillen, and bindeth it-self to som maner presence of this litel and swifte moment: the which _presence of this litel and swifte moment_, for that it bereth a maner image or lyknesse 60 of the ay-dwellinge presence _of god_, it graunteth, to swiche maner thinges as it bitydeth to, that it semeth hem as thise thinges _han y-ben, and_ ben.

And, for that _the presence of swich litel moment_ ne may nat dwelle, ther-for it ravisshed and took the infinit wey of tyme, _that_ 65 _is to seyn, by successioun_; and by this maner is it y-doon, for that it sholde continue the lyf in goinge, of the whiche lyf it ne mighte nat enbrace the plentee in dwellinge. And for-thy, yif we wollen putten worthy names to thinges, and folwen Plato, lat us seye thanne soothly, that god is eterne, and the world is perpetuel. 70 Thanne, sin that every Iugement knoweth and comprehendeth by his owne nature thinges that ben subiect un-to him, ther is soothly to god, al-weys, an eterne and presentarie estat; and the science of him, that over-passeth al temporel moevement, dwelleth in the simplicitee of his presence, and embraceth and considereth alle 75 the infinit spaces of tymes, preterits and futures, and loketh, in his simple knowinge, alle thinges _of preterit_ right as they weren y-doon presently right now. Yif thou wolt thanne thenken and avyse the prescience, by which it knoweth alle thinges, thou ne shal nat demen it as prescience of thinges to comen, but thou 80 shalt demen it more rightfully that it is science of presence or of instaunce, that never ne faileth. For which it nis nat y-cleped "previdence," but it sholde rather ben cleped "purviaunce," that is establisshed ful fer fro right lowe thinges, and biholdeth from a-fer alle thinges, right as it were fro the heye heighte of thinges. 85

Why axestow thanne, or why desputestow thanne, that thilke thinges ben doon by necessitee whiche that ben y-seyn and knowen by the devyne sighte, sin that, forsothe, men ne maken nat thilke thinges necessarie which that they seen ben y-doon in hir sighte? For addeth thy biholdinge any necessitee to thilke 90 thinges that thou biholdest presente?'

'Nay,' quod I.

_Philosophie._ 'Certes, thanne, if men mighte maken any digne comparisoun or collacioun of the presence devyne and of the presence of mankinde, right so as ye seen some thinges in this 95 temporel present, right so seeth god alle thinges by his eterne present. Wher-fore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth nat the nature ne the propretee of thinges, but biholdeth swiche thinges present to him-ward as they shullen bityde to yow-ward in tyme to comen. Ne it confoundeth nat the Iugement of thinges; but 100 by o sighte of his thought, he knoweth the thinges to comen, as wel necessarie as nat necessarie. Right so as whan ye seen to-gider a man walken on the erthe and the sonne arysen in the hevene, al-be-it so that ye seen and biholden that oon and that other to-gider, yit natheles ye demen and discernen that that 105 oon is voluntarie and that other necessarie. Right so thanne the devyne lookinge, biholdinge alle thinges under him, ne troubleth nat the qualitee of thinges that ben certeinly present to him-ward; but, as to the condicioun of tyme, forsothe, they ben future. For which it folweth, that this nis noon opinioun, but rather a stedefast 110 knowinge, y-strengthed by soothnesse, that, whanne that god knoweth anything to be, he ne unwot nat that thilke thing wanteth necessitee to be; _this is to seyn, that, whan that god knoweth any thing to bityde, he wot wel that it ne hath no necessitee to bityde._

And yif thou seyst heer, that thilke thing that god seeth to 115 bityde, it ne may nat unbityde (_as who seith, it mot bityde_), and thilke thing that ne may nat unbityde it mot bityde by necessitee, and that thou streyne me by this name of necessitee: certes, I wol wel confessen and biknowe a thing of ful sad trouthe, but unnethe shal ther any wight mowe _seen it or_ come ther-to, but-yif 120 that he be biholder of the devyne thoght. For I wol answeren thee thus: that thilke thing that is future, whan it is referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne is it necessarie; but certes, whan it is understonden in his owne kinde, men seen it is outrely free, and absolut _fro alle necessitee_. 125

For certes, ther ben two maneres of necessitee. That oon necessitee is simple, as thus: that it bihoveth by necessitee, that alle men be mortal _or deedly_. Another necessitee is conditionel, as thus: yif thou wost that a man walketh, it bihoveth by necessitee that he walke. Thilke thing thanne that any wight hath y-knowe 130 to be, it ne may ben non other weyes thanne he knoweth it to be. But this condicioun ne draweth nat with hir thilke necessitee simple. For certes, this necessitee _conditionel_, the propre nature of it ne maketh it nat, but the adieccioun of the condicioun _maketh it_. For no necessitee ne constreyneth a man to gon, 135 that goth by his propre wil; al-be-it so that, whan he goth, that it is necessarie that he goth. Right on this same maner thanne, yif that the purviaunce of god seeth any thing present, than mot thilke thing ben by necessitee, al-thogh that it ne have no necessitee of his owne nature. But certes, the futures that 140 bityden by freedom of arbitre, god seeth hem alle to-gider present. Thise thinges thanne, yif they ben referred to the devyne sighte, thanne ben they maked necessarie by the condicioun of the devyne knowinge. But certes, yif thilke thinges be considered by hem-self, they ben absolut _of necessitee_, and ne forleten nat ne 145 cesen nat of the libertee of hir owne nature. Thanne, certes, with-oute doute, alle the thinges shollen ben doon which that god wot biforn that they ben to comen. But som of hem comen and bityden of free arbitre _or of free wille_, that, al-be-it so that they bityden, yit algates ne lese they nat hir propre nature in 150 beinge; by the which first, or that they weren y-doon, they hadden power nat to han bitid.'

_Boece_. 'What is this to seyn thanne,' quod I, 'that thinges ne ben nat necessarie _by hir propre nature_, so as they comen in alle maneres in the lyknesse of necessitee by the condicioun of the 155 devyne science?'

_Philosophie._ 'This is the difference,' quod she; 'that tho thinges that I purposede thee a litel heer-biforn, that is to seyn, the sonne arysinge and the man walkinge, that, ther-whyles that thilke thinges been y-doon, they ne mighte nat ben undoon; 160 natheles, that oon of hem, or it was y-doon, it bihoved by necessitee that it was y-doon, but nat that other. Right so _is it here_, that the thinges that god hath present, with-oute doute they shollen been. But som of hem descendeth of the nature of thinges, _as the sonne arysinge_; and som descendeth of the power 165 of the doeres, _as the man walkinge_. Thanne seide I no wrong, that yif these thinges ben referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne ben they necessarie; and yif they ben considered by hem-self, thanne ben they absolut fro the bond of necessitee. Right so as alle thinges that apereth or sheweth to the wittes, yif thou referre 170 it to resoun, it is universel; and yif thou referre it or loke it to it-self, than is it singuler. But now, yif thou seyst thus, that yif it be in my power to chaunge my purpos, than shal I voide the purviaunce _of god_, whan that, peraventure, I shal han chaunged the thinges that he knoweth biforn, thanne shal I answere thee 175 thus. Certes, thou mayst wel chaunge thy purpos; but, for as mochel as the present soothnesse of the devyne purviaunce biholdeth that thou mayst chaunge thy purpos, and whether thou wolt chaunge it or no, and whiderward that thou torne it, thou ne mayst nat eschuen the devyne prescience; right as thou ne mayst 180 nat fleen the sighte of the presente eye, al-though that thou torne thy-self by thy free wil in-to dyverse acciouns. But thou mayst seyn ayein: "How shal it thanne be? Shal nat the devyne science be chaunged by my disposicioun, whan that I wol o thing now, and now another? And thilke prescience, ne semeth it nat 185 to entrechaunge stoundes of knowinge;"' _as who seith, ne shal it nat seme to us, that the devyne prescience entrechaungeth hise dyverse stoundes of knowinge, so that it knowe sum-tyme o thing and sum-tyme the contrarie of that thing?_

'No, forsothe,' _quod I_. 190

_Philosophie._ 'For the devyne sighte renneth to-forn and seeth alle futures, and clepeth hem ayein, and retorneth hem to the presence of his propre knowinge; ne he ne entrechaungeth nat, so as thou wenest, the stoundes of forknowinge, as now this, now that; but he ay-dwellinge comth biforn, and embraceth at o strook alle thy 195 mutaciouns. And this presence to comprehenden and to seen alle thinges, god ne hath nat taken it of the bitydinge of thinges to come, but of his propre simplicitee. And her-by is assoiled thilke thing that thou puttest a litel her-biforn, _that is to seyn_, that it is unworthy thing to seyn, that our futures yeven cause of 200 the science of god. For certes, this strengthe of the devyne science, which that embraceth alle thinges by his presentarie knowinge, establissheth maner to alle thinges, and it ne oweth naught to latter thinges; and sin that these thinges ben thus, _that is to seyn, sin that necessitee nis nat in thinges by the devyne_ 205 _prescience_, than is ther freedom of arbitre, that dwelleth hool and unwemmed to mortal men. Ne the lawes ne purposen nat wikkedly medes and peynes to the willinges of men that ben unbounden and quite of alle necessitee. And god, biholder and for-witer of alle thinges, dwelleth above; and the present eternitee 210 of his sighte renneth alwey with the dyverse qualitee of oure dedes, despensinge and ordeyninge medes to goode men, and torments to wikked men. Ne in ydel ne in veyn ne ben ther nat put in god hope and preyeres, that ne mowen nat ben unspeedful ne with-oute effect, whan they ben rightful. 215

Withstond thanne and eschue thou vyces; worshipe and love thou virtues; areys thy corage to rightful hopes; yilde thou humble preyeres a-heigh. Gret necessitee of prowesse and vertu is encharged and commaunded to yow, yif ye nil nat dissimulen; sin that ye worken and doon, _that is to seyn, your dedes or your 220 workes_, biforn the eyen of the Iuge that seeth _and demeth_ alle thinges.' _To whom be glorye and worshipe by infinit tymes_. AMEN.

PR. VI. 1, 2. C. alle thinges; A. Ed. al thing (Lat. _omne_). 6. A. _om._ eek. 12. A. _om._ the. // C. alle; A. al. 16. A. the morwe. 17. A. that (_for_ the tyme). 18. A. this (_for_ the). 20. A. _om._ it. 22. C. strechched. 25. A. braceth. 30. C. preterite; A. preterit. 31. C. I-witnesshed; A. ywitnessed. // C. and; A. or. 34. A. plesaunce; C. pleasaunce. 35. A. infinit. 41. A. it (_for_ that). 43. A. embracen. 49. A. of the lijf. 53. A. _om._ the. // C. in-to; A. to. 58. A. presence; C. presensse. 64. A. _om._ that. 65. A. _om._ it. // C. Infynyte; A. infinit. 73. A. alwey to god. 78. C. thinken; A. thenke. 81. A. _om._ it. 83. A. prouidence; C. puruydence (_glossed_ p_r_ouidentia); _but see note_. 86. A. disputest thou. 88. A. yknowen. 101. C. o; Ed. one; A. of (!); Lat. _unoque_. 104. A. _om._ the. 106. A. _om._ the. 110. C. stidefast; A. stedfast. 116. A. bitide; C. bide (_miswritten_; _2nd time_). 120. A. _om._ mowe. 124. A. _om._ is. 134. A. nau[gh]t (_for_ nat). 135, 6. A. _om._ gon that. 141. A. presentz. 142. A. _om._ yif. 143. C. by; A. to (Lat. _per_). 149. A. _om. 1st_ free. 150. C. in; A. ne (_wrongly_). 161. A. byhoued; Ed. behoueth; C. houyd (!). 169. A. _om._ as. 170. Ed. apereth; C. apiereth; A. appiereth. 178. C. wheyther; A. whethir. 179. A. _om._ ne. 186. A. knowynges (Lat. _noscendi_). 189. Ed. of that thing; C. A. _om._ 190. Ed. quod she (_for_ quod I; _wrongly_). 193. A. _om._ so. 194. A. _om._ as. 203. A. awith nat. 205, 6. C. _om._ that is ... prescience; Ed. _and_ A. _have it_. 213. C. torment; A. tourmentz (_supplicia_). 214. A. nat; Ed. not; C. ne. 216. C. withston (_sic_). 218. A. an hey[gh]e. 222. C. To whom be goye (_sic_) and worshipe bi Infynyt tymes. AMEN; _which_ A. Ed. (_perhaps rightly_) _omit_.

TROILUS AND CRISEYDE.

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