chapter 5._

"The Peloponnesian War was a protracted struggle, and attended by calamities such as Hellas had never known within a like period of time. Never were so many cities captured and depopulated—some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes themselves fighting against one another; and several of them after their capture were re-peopled by strangers. Never were exile and slaughter more frequent, whether in the war or brought about by civil strife. … There were earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are recorded to have happened in any former age; there were also in some places great droughts causing famines, and lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed numbers of the people. All these calamities fell upon Hellas simultaneously with the war, which began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians violated the thirty years' truce concluded by them after the recapture of Euboea. Why they broke it and what were the grounds of quarrel I will first set forth, that in time to come no man may be at a loss to know what was the origin of this great war. The real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war."

_Thucydides, History (translated by Jowett), book 1, section 23._

The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, out of which, as an immediate excitement, the Peloponnesian War grew, concerned "the city of Epidamnus, known afterwards, in the Roman times, as Dyrrachium, hard by the modern Durazzo—a colony founded by the Korkyreans on the coast of Illyria, in the Ionic gulf, considerably to the north of their own island." {1580} The oligarchy of Epidamnus, driven out by the people, had allied themselves with the neighboring Illyrians and were harassing the city. Korkyra refused aid to the latter when appealed to, but Corinth (of which Korkyra was itself a colony) promptly rendered help. This involved Corinth and Korkyra in hostilities, and Athens gave support to the latter.

_E. Curtius, History of Greece, volume 3, book 4._

ALSO IN: _C. Thirlwall, History of Greece, chapters 19-30._

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapters 47-48 (volume 5)._

GREECE: B. C. 432. Great Sea-fight of the Corinthians with the Korkyrians and Athenians. Revolt of Potidæa.

"Although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements. The Corinthians lost no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of 150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra. The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt. After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian fleet, borne down by sheer force of numbers, was put to flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships, they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and, still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians, supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force, hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own kinsfolk. On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service, supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians, far from wishing to come to blows with the newcomers, were anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to her. … Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard to their own interests. Their object was to send these prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic city.

_G. W. Cox, General History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1._

"The evils of this imprudent interference of the Athenians began now to be seen. In consequence of the Corcyrian alliance, the Athenians issued an order to Potidæa, a Macedonian town acknowledging their supremacy, to demolish its walls; to send back certain officers whom they had received from Corinth, and to give hostages for their good conduct. Potidæa, although an ally of Athens, had originally been a colony of Corinth, and thus arose the jealousy which occasioned these harsh and peremptory orders. Symptoms of universal hostility to Athens now appeared in the states around. The Corinthians and their allies were much irritated; the oppressed Potidæans were strongly instigated to revolt; and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who had some time since been at open war with the Athenians, now gladly seized the opportunity to distress them, by exciting and assisting the malcontents. The Potidæans, however, deputed ambassadors to Athens to deprecate the harsh orders which had been sent them; but in the mean time to prepare for the worst, they also sent messengers to Sparta entreating support, where they met deputies from Corinth and Megara. By these loud and general complaints Sparta was at length roused to head the conspiracy against Athens, and the universal flames of war shortly afterwards broke forth throughout Greece." The revolt of Potidæa followed immediately; the Corinthians placed a strong force in the town, under Aristeus, and the Athenians sent an army under Phormion to lay siege to it.

_Early History of Greece (Enc. Metropolitana), page 283._

GREECE: B. C. 432-431. Charges brought by Corinth against Athens. The hearing and the Congress at Sparta. Decision for war. Theban attack on Platæa. The Peloponnesian War begun.

The Corinthians "invited deputies from the other states of the confederacy to meet them at Sparta, and there charged the Athenians with having broken the treaty, and trampled on the rights of the Peloponnesians. The Spartans held an assembly to receive the complaints of their allies, and to discuss the question of peace or war. Here the Corinthians were seconded by several other members of the confederacy, who had also wrongs to complain of against Athens, and urged the Spartans for redress. … It happened that at this time Athenian envoys, who had been sent on other business, were still in Sparta. {1581} They desired permission to attend and address the assembly. … When the strangers had all been heard, they were desired to withdraw, that the assembly might deliberate. The feeling against the Athenians was universal; most voices were for instant war. … The deputies of the allies were then informed of the resolution which the assembly had adopted, and that a general congress of the confederacy would shortly be summoned to deliberate on the same question, in order that war, if decided on, might be decreed by common consent. … The congress decided on the war; but the confederacy was totally unprepared for commencing hostilities, and though the necessary preparations were immediately begun and vigorously prosecuted, nearly a year elapsed before it was ready to bring an army into the field. In the meantime embassies were sent to Athens with various remonstrances and demands, for the double purpose of amusing the Athenians with the prospect of peace, and of multiplying pretexts for war. An attempt was made, not, perhaps, so foolish as it was insolent, to revive the popular dread of the curse which had been supposed to hang over the Alcmæonids. The Athenians were called upon, in the name of the gods, to banish all who remained among them of that blood-stained race. If they had complied with this demand, they must have parted with Pericles, who, by the mother's side, was connected with the Alcmæonids. This, indeed, was not expected; but it was hoped that the refusal might afford a pretext to his enemies at Athens for treating him as the author of the war. The Athenians retorted by requiring the Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had profaned the sanctuary of Tænarus, by dragging from it some Helots who had taken refuge there, and that of Athene, by the death of Pausanias. … Still, war had been only threatened, not declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the two confederacies. But early in the following spring, B. C. 431, in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an event took place which closed all prospects of peace, precipitated the commencement of war, imbittered the animosity of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night the city of Platæa was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans, commanded by two of the great officers called Bœotarchs. They had been invited by a Platæan named Nauclides, and others of the same party, who hoped, with the aid of the Thebans, to rid themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded, as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the marketplace. … The Platæans, who were not in the plot, imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered. … Having barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other preparations as they thought necessary, a little before daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans. The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and were assisted by the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the houses on the enemy, all, at the same time, raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet. … The main body, which had kept together, entered a large building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans, who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered at discretion. Before their departure from Thebes it had been concerted that as large a force as could be raised should march the same night to support them. The distance between the two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were expected to reach the gates of Platæa before the morning; but the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first inclined to seize as many of the Platæans as they could find without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. … The Thebans afterward alleged that they had received a promise, confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring from the Platæan territory, the prisoners should be released; and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The Platæans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is certain, however, that they retired, and that the Platæans, as soon as they had transported their movable property out of the country into the town, put to death all the prisoners— amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the greatest influence in Thebes. On the first entrance of the Thebans into Platæa, a messenger had been despatched to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid all the Bœotians in Attica under arrest; and when another messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the Platæans, they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The herald came too late to prevent the execution; and the Athenians, foreseeing that Platæa would stand in great need of defence, sent a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with provisions, and removed the women and children and all persons unfit for service in a siege. {1582} After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only be decided by arms. Platæa was so intimately united with Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed day for the invasion of Attica."

_C. Thirlwall, History of Greece,