chapter 28._
ALSO IN: _Thucydides, History, book 2, sections 80-92, and book 3, sections 1-50._
_E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3)._
GREECE: B. C. 425. The Peloponnesian War: Spartan catastrophe at Sphacteria. Peace pleaded for and refused by Athens.
In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War (B. C. 425), the enterprising Athenian general, Demosthenes, obtained permission to seize and fortify a harbor on the west coast of Messenia, with a view to harassing the adjacent Spartan territory and stirring up revolt among the subjugated Messenians. The position he secured was the promontory of Pylus, overlooking the basin now called the Bay of Navarino, which latter was protected from the sea by the small island of Sphacteria, stretching across its front. The seizure of Pylus created alarm in Sparta at once, and vigorous measures were taken to expel the intruders. The small force of Demosthenes was assailed, front and rear, by a strong land army and a powerful Peloponnesian fleet; but he had fortified himself with skill and stoutly held his ground, waiting for help from Athens. Meantime his assailants had landed 420 men on the island of Sphacteria, and these were mostly hoplites, or heavy-armed soldiers, from the best citizenship of Sparta. In this situation an Athenian fleet made its sudden and unexpected appearance, defeated the Peloponnesian fleet completely, took possession of the harbor and surrounded the Spartans on Sphacteria with a ring from which there was no escape. To obtain the release of these citizens the Spartans were reduced to plead for peace on almost any terms, and Athens had her opportunity to end the war at that moment with great advantage to herself. But Cleon, the demagogue, persuaded the people to refuse peace. The beleaguered hoplites on Sphacteria were made prisoners by force, and little came of it in the end.
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_Thucydides, History, book 4, sections 2-38._
Pylus remained in the possession of the Athenians until B. C. 408, when it was retaken by the Spartans.
_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 52._
ALSO IN: _E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 2 (volume 3)._
GREECE: B. C. 424-421. The Peloponnesian War: Brasidas in Chalcidice. Athenian defeat at Delium. A year's Truce. Renewed hostilities. Death of Brasidas and Cleon at Amphipolis. The Peace of Nikias (Nicias).
"About the beginning of 424 B. C. Brasidas did for Sparta what Demosthenes had done for the Athenians. Just as Demosthenes had understood that the severest blow which he could inflict on Sparta was to occupy the coasts of Laconia, so Brasidas understood that the most effective method of assailing the Athenians was to arouse the allies to revolution, and by all means to aid the uprising. But since, from lack of a sufficient naval force, he could not work on the islands, he resolved to carry the war to the allied cities of the Athenians situated on the coast of Macedonia; especially since Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, the inhabitants of Chalkidike, and some other districts subject to the Athenians, had sought the assistance of Sparta, and had asked Brasidas to lead the undertaking. Sparta permitted his departure, but so little did she appear disposed to assist him, that she granted him only 700 Helots. In addition to these, however, he succeeded, through the money sent from Chalkidike, in enrolling about 1,000 men from the Peloponnesus. With this small force of 1,700 hoplites, Brasidas resolved to undertake this adventurous and important expedition. He started in the spring of 424, and reached Macedonia through eastern Hellas and Thessaly. He effected the march with great daring and wisdom, and on his way he also saved Megara, which was in extreme danger from the Athenians. Reaching Macedonia and uniting forces with Perdikkas, Brasidas detached from the Athenians many cities, promising them liberty from the tyranny they suffered, and their association in the Peloponnesian alliance on equal terms. He made good these promises by great military experience and perfectly honest dealings. In December he became master of Amphipolis, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens. The historian Thucydides, to whom was intrusted the defense of that important town, was at Thasos when Brasidas surprised it. He hastened to the assistance of the threatened city, but did not arrive in time to prevent its capture. Dr. Thirlwall says it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances; yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile, where he composed his history. … The revolution of the allied cities in Macedonia astonished the Athenians, who almost at the same time sustained other misfortunes. Following the advice of Kleon, instead of directing their main efforts to the endangered Chalkidike, they decided, about the middle of 424, to recover Bœotia itself, in conjunction as usual with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to break down and democratize the oligarchical governments. The undertaking, however, was not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. A force of 7,000 hoplites [among them, Socrates, the philosopher—see DELIUM], several hundred horsemen, and 25,000 light-armed under command of Hippokrates, took possession of Delium, a spot strongly situated, overhanging the sea, about five miles from Tanagra, and very near the Attic confines. But while the Athenians were still occupied in raising their fortifications, they were suddenly startled by the sound of the Bœotian pæan, and found themselves attacked by an army of 7,000 hoplites, 1,000 horse, and 500 peltasts. The Athenians suffered a complete defeat, and were driven away with great loss. Such was the change of affairs which took place in 424 B. C. During the preceding year they could have ended the war in a manner most advantageous to them. They did not choose to do so, and were now constantly defeated. Worse still, the seeds of revolt spread among the allied cities. The best citizens, among whom Nikias was a leader, finally persuaded the people that it was necessary to come to terms of peace, while affairs were yet undecided. For, although the Athenians had suffered the terrific defeat near Delium, and had lost Amphipolis and other cities of Macedonia, they were still masters of Pylos, of Kythera, of Methone, of Nisæa, and of the Spartans captured in Sphakteria; so that there was now an equality of advantages and of losses. Besides, the Lacedæmonians were ever ready to lay aside the sword in order to regain their men. Again, the oligarchy in Sparta envied Brasidas, and did not look with pleasure on his splendid achievements. Lately they had refused to send him any assistance whatever: The opportunity, therefore, was advantageous for the conclusion of peace, … Such were the arguments by which Nikias and his party finally gained the ascendency over Kleon, and in the beginning of 423 B. C. persuaded the Athenians to enter into an armistice of one year, within which they hoped to be able to put an end to the destructive war by a lasting peace. Unfortunately, the armistice could not be carried out in Chalkidike. The cities there continued in their rebellion against the Athenians. Brasidas could not be prevailed upon to leave them unprotected in the struggle which they had undertaken, relying on his promises of assistance. The war-like party at Athens, taking advantage of this, succeeded in frustrating any definite conditions of peace. On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians, seeing that the war was continued, sent an ample force to Brasidas. This army did not succeed in reaching him, because the king of Macedonia, Perdikkas, had in the meantime become angered with Brasidas, and persuaded the Thessalians to oppose the Lacedæmonians in their passage. The year of the armistice passed, and Kleon renewed his expostulations against the incompetency of the generals who had the control of affairs in Chalkidike. … The Athenians decided to forward a new force, and intrusted its command to Kleon. He therefore, in August, 422 B. C., started from the Peiræus, with 1,200 hoplites, 300 horsemen, a considerable number of allies, and thirty triremes. Reaching Chalkidike, he engaged in battle against Brasidas in Amphipolis, suffered a disgraceful defeat, and was killed while fleeing. Brasidas also ended his short but glorious career in this battle, dying the death of a hero. The way in which his memory was honored was the best evidence of the deep impression that he had made on the Hellenic world. {1586} All the allies attended his funeral in arms, and interred him at the public expense, in front of the market-place of Amphipolis. … Thus disappeared the two foremost champions of the war—its good spirit, Brasidas, and its evil, Kleon. The party of Nikias finally prevailed at Athens, and that general soon after arranged a conference with King Pleistoanax of Sparta, who was also anxious for peace. Discussions continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. Finally, at the beginning of the spring of 421 B. C., a peace of fifty years was agreed upon. The principal conditions of this peace, known in history as the 'peace of Nikias,' were as follows:
1. The Lacedæmonians and their allies were to restore Amphipolis and all the prisoners to the Athenians. They were further to relinquish to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Skolus, Olynthus, and Spartolus. But, with the exception of Amphipolis, these cities were to remain independent, paying to the Athenians only the usual tribute of the time of Aristeides.
2. The Athenians should restore to the Lacedæmonians Koryphasium, Kythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies.
3. Respecting Skione, Torone, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians should have the right to adopt such measures as they pleased.
4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies should restore Panaktum to the Athenians.
When these terms were submitted at Sparta to the consideration of the allied cities, the majority accepted them. The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, however, summarily refused their consent. The Peloponnesian war was now considered to be at an end, precisely ten years from its beginning; Both the combatants came out from it terribly maimed. Sparta not only did not attain her object—the emancipation of the Hellenic cities from the tyranny of the Athenians—but even officially recognized this tyranny, by consenting that the Athenians should adopt such measures as they choose toward the allied cities. Besides, Sparta obtained an ill repute throughout Hellas, because she had abandoned the Greeks in Chalkidike, who had at her instigation revolted, and because she had also sacrificed the interests of her principal allies. … Athens, on the other hand, preserved intact her supremacy, for which she undertook the struggle. This, however, was gained at the cost of Attica ravaged, a multitude of citizens slain, the exhaustion of the treasury, and the increase of the common hatred."
_T. T. Timayenis, History of Greece, part 5, chapter 4 (volume 1)._
ALSO IN: _C. Thirlwall, History of Greece,