chapter 23 (volume 3)._
GREECE: B. C. 421-418. The Peloponnesian War: New combinations. The Argive League against Sparta. Conflicting alliances of Athens with both. Rising influence of Alcibiades. War in Argos. Spartan victory at Mantinea. Revolution in Argos.
"All the Spartan allies in Peloponnesus and the Boeotians refused to join in this treaty [of Nicias]. The latter concluded with the Athenians only a truce of ten days … , probably on condition, that, if no notice was given to the contrary, it was to be constantly renewed after the lapse of ten days. With Corinth there existed no truce at all. Some of the terms of the peace were not complied with, though this was the case much less on the part of Athens than on that of Sparta. … The Spartans, from the first, were guilty of infamous deception, and this immediately gave rise to bitter feelings. But before matters had come to this, and when the Athenians were still in the full belief that the Spartans were honest, all Greece was startled by a treaty of alliance between Athens and Sparta against their common enemies. This treaty was concluded very soon after the peace. … The consequence was, that Sparta suddenly found herself deserted by all her allies; the Corinthians and Boeotians renounced her, because they found themselves given over to the Athenians, and the Boeotians perhaps thought that the Spartans, if they could but reduce the Eleans to the condition of Helots, would readily allow Boeotia to be subdued by the Athenians. Thus Argos found the means of again following a policy which ever since the time of Cleomenes it had not ventured to think of, and … became the centre of an alliance with Mantinea, 'which had always been opposed to the Lacedaemonians,' and some other Arcadian towns, Achaia, Elis, and some places of the Acte. The Arcadians had dissolved their union, the three people of the country had separated themselves, though sometimes they united again; and thus it happened that only some of their towns were allied with Argos. Corinth at first would listen to neither party, and chose to remain neutral; 'for although for the moment it was highly exasperated against Sparta, yet it had at all times entertained a mortal hatred of Argos, and its own interests drew it towards Sparta.' But when, owing to Sparta's dishonesty, the affairs on the coasts of Thrace became more and more complicated, when the towns refused to submit to Athens, and when it became evident that this was the consequence of the instigations of Sparta, then the relation subsisting between the two states became worse also in Greece, and various negotiations and cavillings ensued. … After much delay, the Athenians and Spartans were already on the point of taking up arms against each other; but then they came to the singular agreement (Olympiad 89, 4), that the Athenians should retain possession of Pylos, but keep in it only Athenian troops, and not allow the Helots and Messenians to remain there. After this the loosened bonds between the Spartans, Corinthians, and Boeotians, were drawn more closely. The Boeotians were at length prevailed upon to surrender Panacton to the Spartans, who now restored it to the Athenians. This was in accordance with the undoubted meaning of the peace; but the Boeotians had first destroyed the place, and the Spartans delivered it to the Athenians only a heap of ruins. The Athenians justly complained, that this was not an honest restoration, and that the place ought to have been given back to them with its fortifications uninjured. The Spartans do not appear to have had honest intentions in any way. … While thus the alliance between Athens and Sparta, in the eyes of the world, still existed, it had in reality ceased and become an impossibility. Another alliance, however, was formed between Athens and Argos (Olympiad 89, 4) through the influence of Alcibiades, who stood in the relation of an hereditary proxenus to Argos. {1587} A more natural alliance than this could not be conceived, and by it the Athenians gained the Mantineans, Eleans, and other Peloponnesians over to their side. Alcibiades now exercised a decisive influence upon the fate of his country. … We generally conceive Alcibiades as a man whose beauty was his ornament, and to whom the follies of life were the main thing, and we forget that part of his character which history reveals to us. … Thucydides, who cannot be suspected of having been particularly partial to Alcibiades, most expressly recognises the fact, that the fate of Athens depended upon him, and that, if he had not separated his own fate from that of his native city, at first from necessity, but afterwards of his own accord, the course of the Peloponnesian war, through his personal influence alone, would have taken quite a different direction, and that he alone would have decided it in favour of Athens. This is, in fact, the general opinion of all antiquity, and there is no ancient writer of importance who does not view and estimate him in this light. It is only the moderns that entertain a derogatory opinion of him, and speak of him as an eccentric fool, who ought not to be named among the great statesmen of antiquity. … Alcibiades is quite a peculiar character; and I know no one in the whole range of ancient history who might be compared with him, though I have sometimes thought of Caesar. … Alcibiades was opposed to the peace of Nicias from entirely personal, perhaps even mean, motives. … It was on his advice that Athens concluded the alliance with Argos and Elis. Athens now had two alliances which were equally binding, and yet altogether opposed to each other: the one with Sparta, and an equally stringent one with Argos, the enemy of Sparta. This treaty with Argos, the Peloponnesians, etc., was extremely formidable to the Spartans; and they accordingly, for once, determined to act quickly, before it should be too late. The alliance with Argos, however, did not confer much real strength upon Athens, for the Argives were lazy, and Elis did not respect them, whence the Spartans had time again to unite themselves more closely with Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara. When, therefore, the war between the Spartans and Argives broke out, and the former resolutely took the field, Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to send succour to the Argives, and thus the peace with Sparta was violated in an unprincipled manner. But still no blow was struck between Argos and Sparta. … King Agis had set out with a Spartan army, but concluded a truce with the Argives (Olympiad 90, 2); this, however, was taken very ill at Sparta, and the Argive commanders who had concluded it were censured by the people and magistrates of Argos. Soon afterwards the war broke out again, and, when the Athenian auxiliaries appeared, decided acts of hostility commenced. The occasion was an attempt of the Mantineans to subdue Tegea: the sad condition of Greece became more particularly manifest in Arcadia, by the divisions which tore one and the same nation to pieces. The country was distracted by several parties; had Arcadia been united, it would have been invulnerable. A battle was fought (Olympiad 90, 3) in the neighbourhood of Mantinea, between the Argives, their Athenian allies, the Mantineans, and part of the Arcadians ('the Eleans, annoyed at the conduct of the Argives, had abandoned their cause'), on the one hand, and the Spartans and a few allies on the other. The Spartans gained a most decisive victory; and, although they did not follow it up, yet the consequence was, that Argos concluded peace, the Argive alliance broke up, and at Argos a revolution took place, in which an oligarchical government was instituted, and by which Argos was drawn into the interest of Sparta (Olympiad 90, 4). This constitution, however, did not last, and very soon gave way to a democratic form of government. Argos, even at this time, and still more at a later period, is a sad example of the most degenerate and deplorable democracy, or, more properly speaking, anarchy."
_B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History, lecture 49 (volume 2)._
ALSO IN: _Plutarch, Alcibiades._
_W. Mitford, History of Greece,