chapter 15 (volume 1)._

The Persian fleet, after suffering heavily from a destructive storm on the Magnesian coast, reached Aphetæ, opposite Artemisium, at the mouth of the Pagasæan gulf. Notwithstanding its losses, it still vastly outnumbered the armament of the Greeks, and feared nothing but the escape of the latter. But, in the series of conflicts which ensued, the Greeks were generally victorious and proved their superior naval genius. They could not, however, afford the heavy losses which they sustained, and, upon hearing of the disaster at Thermopylæ and the Persian possession of the all-important pass, they deemed it necessary to retreat.

_W. Mitford, History of Greece, chapter 8, section 4 (volume 2)._

GREECE: B. C. 480. The Persian Wars: Salamis.

Leonidas and his Spartan band having perished vainly at Thermopylæ, in their heroic attempt to hold the pass against the host of Xerxes, and the Greek ships at Artemisium having vainly beaten their overwhelming enemies, the whole of Greece north of the isthmus of Corinth lay completely at the mercy of the invader. The Thebans and other false-hearted Greeks joined his ranks, and saved their own cities by helping to destroy their neighbors. The Platæans, the Thespians and the Athenians abandoned their homes in haste, conducted their families, and such property as they might snatch away, to the nearer islands and to places of refuge in Peloponnesus. The Greeks of Peloponnesus rallied in force to the isthmus and began there the building of a defensive wall. Their fleet, retiring from Artemisium, was drawn together, with some re-enforcements, behind the island of Salamis, which stretches across the entrance to the bay of Eleusis, off the inner coast of Attica, near Athens. {1574} Meantime the Persians had advanced through Attica, entered the deserted city of Athens, taken the Acropolis, which a small body of desperate patriots resolved to hold, had slain its defenders and burned its temples. Their fleet had also been assembled in the bay of Phalerum, which was the more easterly of the three harbors of Athens. At Salamis the Greeks were in dispute. The Corinthians and the Peloponnesians were bent upon falling back with the fleet to the isthmus; the Athenians, the Eginetans and the Megarians looked upon all as lost if the present combination of the whole naval power of Hellas in the narrow strait of Salamis was permitted to be broken up. At length Themistocles, the Athenian leader, a man of fertile brain and overbearing resolution, determined the question by sending a secret message to Xerxes that the Greek ships had prepared to escape from him. This brought down the Persian fleet upon them at once and left them no chance for retreat. Of the memorable fight which ensued (September 20 B. C. 480) the following is a part of the description given by Herodotus: "Against the Athenians, who held the western extremity of the line towards Eleusis, were placed the Phœnicians; against the Lacedæmonians, whose station was eastward towards the Piræus, the Ionians. Of these last, a few only followed the advice of Themistocles, to fight backwardly; the greater number did far otherwise. … Far the greater number of the Persian ships engaged in this battle were disabled, either by the Athenians or by the Eginetans. For as the Greeks fought in order and kept their line, while the barbarians were in confusion and had no plan in anything that they did, the issue of the battle could scarce be other than it was. Yet the Persians fought far more bravely here than at Eubœa, and indeed surpassed themselves; each did his utmost through fear of Xerxes, for each thought that the king's eye was upon himself. … During the whole time of the battle Xerxes sat at the base of the hill called Ægaleos, over against Salamis; and whenever he saw any of his own captains perform any worthy exploit he inquired concerning him; and the man's name was taken down by his scribes, together with the names of his father and his city. … When the rout of the barbarians began, and they sought to make their escape to Phalêrum, the Eginetans, awaiting them in the channel, performed exploits worthy to be recorded. Through the whole of the confused struggle the Athenians employed themselves in destroying such ships as either made resistance or fled to shore; while the Eginetans dealt with those which endeavoured to escape down the straits; so that the Persian vessels were no sooner clear of the Athenians than straightway they fell into the hands of the Eginetan squadron. … Such of the barbarian vessels as escaped from the battle fled to Phalêrum, and there sheltered themselves under the protection of the land army. … Xerxes, when he saw the extent of his loss, began to be afraid lest the Greeks might be counselled by the Ionians, or without their advice might determine, to sail straight to the Hellespont and break down the bridges there; in which case he would be blocked up in Europe and run great risk of perishing. He therefore made up his mind to fly."

_Herodotus, History (edited and translated by Rawlinson), book 8, sections 85—97 (volume 4)._

ALSO IN: _E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 3, chapter 1 (volume 2)._

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 4 (volume 4)._

_W. W. Goodwin, The Battle of Salamis (Papers of the American School at Athens, volume 1)._

GREECE: B. C. 479. The Persian Wars: Platæa.

When Xerxes, after the defeat of his fleet at Salamis, fled back to Asia with part of his disordered host, he left his lieutenant, Mardonius, with a still formidable army, to repair the disaster and accomplish, if possible, the conquest of the Greeks. Mardonius retired to Thessaly for the winter, but returned to Attica in the spring and drove the Athenians once more from their shattered city, which they were endeavoring to repair. He made overtures to them which they rejected with scorn, and thereupon he destroyed everything in city and country which could be destroyed, reducing Athens to ruins and Attica to a desert. The Spartans and other Peloponnesians who had promised support to the Athenians were slow in coming, but they came in strong force at last. Mardonius fell back into Bœotia, where he took up a favorable position in a plain on the left bank of the Asopus, near Platæa. This was in September, B. C. 479. According to Herodotus, he had 300,000 "barbarian" troops and 50,000 Greek allies. The opposing Greeks, who followed him to the Asopus, were 110,000 in number. The two armies watched one another for more than ten days, unwilling to offer battle because the omens were on both sides discouraging. At length the Greeks undertook a change of position and Mardonius, mistaking this for a movement of retreat, led his Persians on a run to attack them. It was a fatal mistake. The Spartans, who bore the brunt of the Persian assault, soon convinced the deluded Mardonius that they were not in flight, while the Athenians dealt roughly with his Theban allies. "The barbarians," says Herodotus, "many times seized hold of the Greek spears and brake them; for in boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit inferior to the Greeks; but they were without bucklers, untrained, and far below the enemy in respect of skill in arms. Sometimes singly, sometimes in bodies of ten, now fewer and now more in number, they dashed forward upon the Spartan ranks, and so perished. … After Mardonius fell, and the troops with him, which were the main strength of the army, perished, the remainder yielded to the Lacedæmonians and took to flight. Their light clothing and want of bucklers were of the greatest hurt to them: for they had to contend against men heavily armed, while they themselves were without any such defence." Artabazus, who was second in command of the Persians, and who had 40,000 immediately under him, did not strike a blow in the battle, but quitted the field as soon as he saw the turn events had taken, and led his men in a retreat which had no pause until they reached and crossed the Hellespont. Of the remainder of the 300,000 of Mardonius' host, only 3,000, according to Herodotus, outlived the battle. It was the end of the Persian invasions of Greece.

_Herodotus, History (translated by Rawlinson), book 9._

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 42 (volume 5)._

_C. Thirlwall, History of Greece,