chapter 17 (volume 3)._

GREECE: B. C. 416. Siege and conquest of Melos by the Athenians. Massacre of the inhabitants.

"It was in the beginning of summer 416 B. C. that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mêlos, one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mêlos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but, at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias."

_G. Grote, History of Greece, part 2, chapter 56._

"They desired immediate submission on the part of Melos, any attempt at resistance being regarded as an inroad upon the omnipotence of Athens by sea. For this reason they were wroth at the obstinate courage of the islanders, who broke off all further negotiations, and thus made it necessary for the Athenians to commence a costly circumvallation of the city. The Melians even succeeded on two successive occasions in breaking through part of the wall built round them by the enemy, and obtaining fresh supplies; but no relief arrived; and they had to undergo sufferings which made the 'Melian famine' a proverbial phrase to express the height of misery; and before the winter ended the island was forced to surrender unconditionally. … There was no question of quarter. All the islanders capable of bearing arms who had fallen into the hands of the Athenians were sentenced to death, and all the women and children to slavery."

_E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapter 4 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN: _Thucydides, History, book 5, sections 84-116._

GREECE: B. C. 415. The mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.

See ATHENS: B. C. 415.

GREECE: B. C. 415-413. The Peloponnesian War: Disastrous Athenian expedition against Syracuse. Alcibiades a fugitive in Sparta. His enmity to Athens.

See SYRACUSE: B. C. 415-413.

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GREECE: B. C. 413. The Peloponnesian War: Effects and consequences of the Sicilian expedition. Prostration of Athens. Strengthening of Sparta. Negotiations with the Persians against Athens. Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. The Decelian War.

"The Sicilian expedition ended in a series of events which, to this day, it is impossible to recall without a feeling of horror. … Since the Persian wars it had never come to pass, that on the one side all had been so completely lost, while on the other all was won. … When the Athenians recovered from the first stupefaction of grief, they called to mind the causes of the whole calamity, and hereupon in passionate fury turned round upon all who had advised the expedition, or who had encouraged vain hopes of victory, as orators, prophets, or soothsayers. Finally, the general excitement passed into the phase of despair and terror, conjuring up dangers even greater and more imminent than existed in reality. The citizens every day expected to see the Sicilian fleet with the Peloponnesians appear off the harbor, to take possession of the defenceless city; and they believed that the last days of Athens had arrived. … Athens had risked all her military and naval resources for the purpose of overcoming Syracuse. More than 200 ships of state, with their entire equipment, had been lost; and if we reckon up the numbers despatched on successive occasions to Sicily, the sum total, inclusive of the auxiliary troops, may be calculated at about 60,000 men. A squadron still lay in the waters of Naupactus; but even this was in danger and exposed to attack from the Corinthians, who had equipped fresh forces. The docks and naval arsenals were empty, and the treasury likewise. In the hopes of enormous booty and an abundance of new revenues, no expense had been spared; and the resources of the city were entirely exhausted. … But, far heavier than the material losses in money, ships, and men, was the moral blow which had been received by Athens, and which was more dangerous in her case than in that of any other state, because her whole power was based on the fear inspired in the subject states, so long as they saw the fleets of Athens absolutely supreme at sea. The ban of this fear had now been removed; disturbances arose in those island-states which were most necessary to Athens, and whose existence seemed to be most indissolubly blended with that of Attica, —in Eubœa, Chios, and Lesbos; everywhere the oligarchical parties raised their head, in order to overthrow the odious dominion of Athens. … Sparta, on the other hand, had in the course of a few months, without sending out an army or incurring any danger or losses, secured to herself the greatest advantages, such as she could not have obtained from the most successful campaign. Gylippus had again proved the value of a single Spartan man: inasmuch as in the hour of the greatest danger his personal conduct had altered the course of the most important and momentous transaction of the entire war. He was, in a word, the more fortunate successor of Brasidas. The authority of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, which the peace of Nicias had weakened, was now restored; with the exception of Argos and Elis, all her allies were on amicable terms with her; the brethren of her race beyond the sea, who had hitherto held aloof, had, by the attack made by the Athenian invasion, been drawn into the war, and had now become the most zealous and ardent allies of the Peloponnesians. … Moreover, the Athenians had driven the most capable of all living statesmen and commanders into the enemy's camp. No man was better adapted than Alcibiades for rousing the slowly-moving Lacedæmonians to energetic action; and it was he who supplied them with the best advice, and with the most accurate information as to Athenian politics and localities. Lastly, the Spartans were at the present time under a warlike king, the enterprising and ambitious Agis, the son of Archidamus. … Nothing was now required, except pecuniary means. And even these now unexpectedly offered themselves to the Spartans, in consequence of the events which had in the meantime occurred in the Persian empire. … Everywhere [in that empire] sedition raised its head, particularly in Asia Minor. Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, who had on several previous occasions interfered in Greek affairs, rose in revolt. He was supported by Greek soldiers, under the command of an Athenian of the name of Lycon. The treachery of the latter enabled Darius to overthrow Pissuthnes, whose son, Amorges, maintained himself by Athenian aid in Caria. After the fall of Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus appear in Asia Minor as the first dignitaries of the Great King. Tissaphernes succeeded Pissuthnes as satrap in the maritime provinces. He was furious at the assistance offered by Athens to the party of his adversary; moreover, the Great King (possibly in consequence of the Sicilian war and the destruction of the Attic fleet) demanded that the tributes long withheld by the coast-towns, which were still regarded as subject to the Persian empire, should now be levied. Tissaphernes was obliged to pay the sums according to the rate at which they were entered in the imperial budget of Persia; and thus, in order to reimburse himself, found himself forced to pursue a war policy. … Everything now depended for the satrap upon obtaining assistance from a Greek quarter. He found opportunities for this purpose in Ionia itself, in all the more important cities of which a Persian party existed. … The most important and only independent power in Ionia was Chios. Here the aristocratic families had with great sagacity contrived to retain the government. … It was their government which now became the focus of the conspiracy against Athens, in the first instance establishing a connection on the opposite shore with Erythræ. Hereupon Tissaphernes opened negotiations with both cities, and in conjunction with them despatched an embassy to Peloponnesus charged with persuading the Spartans to place themselves at the head of the Ionian movement, the satrap at the same time promising to supply pay and provisions to the Peloponnesian forces. The situation of Pharnabazus was the same as that of Tissaphernes. Pharnabazus was the satrap of the northern province. … Pharnabazus endeavored to outbid Tissaphernes in his promises; and two powerful satraps became rival suitors for the favor of Sparta, to whom they offered money and their alliance. … While thus the most dangerous combinations were on all sides forming against Athens, the war had already broken out in Greece. This time Athens had been the first to commence direct hostilities. … A Peloponnesian army under Agis invaded Attica, with the advent of the spring of B. C. 413 (Olympiad xci. 3); at which date it was already to be anticipated how the Sicilian war would end. For twelve years Attica had been spared hostile invasions, and the vestiges of former wars had been effaced. {1589} The present devastations were therefore doubly ruinous; while at the same time it was now impossible to take vengeance upon the Peloponnesians by means of naval expeditions. And the worst point in the case was that they were now fully resolved, instead of recurring to their former method of carrying on the war and undertaking annual campaigns, to occupy permanently a fortified position on Attic soil." The invaders seized a strong position at Decelea, only fourteen miles northward from Athens, on a rocky peak of Mount Parnes, and fortified themselves so strongly that the Athenians ventured on no attempt to dislodge them. From this secure station they ravaged the surrounding country at pleasure. "This success was of such importance that even in ancient times it gave the name of the Decelean War to the entire last division of the Peloponnesian War. The occupation of Decelea forms the connecting link between the Sicilian War and the Attico-Peloponnesian, which now broke out afresh. … Its immediate object … it failed to effect; inasmuch as the Athenians did not allow it to prevent their despatching a fresh armament to Sicily. But when, half a year later, all was lost, the Athenians felt more heavily than ever the burden imposed upon them by the occupation of Decelea. The city was cut off from its most important source of supplies, since the enemy had in his power the roads communicating with Eubœa. … One-third of Attica no longer belonged to the Athenians, and even in the immediate vicinity of the city communication was unsafe; large numbers of the country-people, deprived of labor and means of subsistence, thronged the city; the citizens were forced night and day to perform the onerous duty of keeping watch."

_E. Curtius, History of Greece, book 4, chapters 4-5 (volume 3)._

ALSO IN: _G. Grote, History of Greece,