Chapter I

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

For the origin of the war between Russia and Japan we must glance back over three centuries. After the famous expedition of 1592–8, Korea was bound to Japan by the closest ties. It was an independent Kingdom in “political intercourse” with the Japanese as distinguished from countries like Holland and China, whose relations were purely commercial. For this reason the Government at Seoul was notified in 1869 of the overthrow of the Shagunate and the restoration of the Imperial Authority. Ignorant of events beyond her own borders, and animated by a spirit of aggressive conservatism, Korea refused to acknowledge the new Government and returned a defiant and insulting answer to the representations of the Mikado.

Upon this issue the newly organised Government in Japan was divided. One party was for vindicating the national honour by appeal to arms; the other party was for peace at any price. The peace party prevailed and Field Marshal Saigo, who more than any other man was responsible for the new order of things and for the restoration of the Imperial power, withdrew from public life. Trusted and beloved by the people, he was followed into retirement by several hundred soldiers and civilians who held office under the new Government. When Saigo emerged from privacy it was as leader of the rebellion of 1877, which was quelled after a sanguinary struggle that lasted eight months.

Meanwhile the Koreans were encouraged to acts of aggression, and a Japanese gunboat, taking soundings near Chemulpo, was fired upon. The fort was attacked and the garrison dispersed. Recognising the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Korea, the Japanese entered into negotiations in Pekin. But the Government of China declined to be responsible for the acts of this tributary kingdom, and declared that the Koreans had complete liberty to do whatever they liked in all matters of State, whether internal or external. Upon this repudiation of her suzerain power, the Japanese despatched a mission to Korea and a treaty was made between the two countries. The preamble to that document contains a precise declaration that Korea is “an independent country, equal to Japan.”

As soon as the danger was past, China, after her wont, sought to reassert her claim to suzerain power. By stealthy and underhand means she strove to regain her authority over Korea. Chinese interference in the foreign affairs of the Hermit Kingdom became acute in 1882 and was the cause of the riots at Seoul. These disturbances were directed against the Japanese colony and legation, and, being met by intrigues on the part of the Japanese residents, were responsible for the war between China and Japan in 1894–5.

No sooner had peace been concluded than Russian intrigue took the place of Chinese, and Japan found herself threatened by a more persistent and formidable rival for control over her neighbour Korea. Having just been deprived of the fruits of victory by a coalition of Russia, France and Germany, the Japanese were not prepared to enter immediately upon a struggle with the Czar. They accordingly came to terms with Russia, and on May 14th, 1896, an agreement was entered into at Seoul between Baron Komura, _chargé d’affaires_--now Minister of Foreign Affairs and chief negotiator of the treaty of peace at Portsmouth--and M. J. Waeber, the representative of Russia. In the same year another agreement was made at Moscow between the Marquis Yamagata--now chief of staff at Imperial Head-Quarters--and Prince Lobanoff.

The vital part of that agreement is in the clause which states that “with the object of relieving Korea from financial embarrassment, Russia and Japan counsel the Government to suppress all useless charges and to establish equilibrium between expenditure and revenue.

“If after the introduction of reforms recognised to be indispensable, it becomes necessary to have recourse to external loans, the two Governments (Russia and Japan) will in common accord lend their support to Korea. The Governments of Japan and Russia will endeavour, as far as the financial and economic situation of the countries will admit, to leave to Korea the creation and maintenance of an armed force of native police sufficiently large to preserve internal order without foreign assistance. In the event of the contracting parties desiring more precise or detailed definition, or in the event of other points arising on which it may be necessary to act in concert, the representatives of the two Powers shall be charged with the duty of arriving at a friendly understanding.”

This treaty is the basis of the report that the Marquis Ito was desirous of forming an alliance, not with Great Britain, but with Russia. The ink was hardly dry before the Russian Government began to display that bad faith which has characterised her policy in the East. M. Alexieff, an official in the Treasury at St. Petersburgh, who is not to be confused with the Admiral of the same name who figured so prominently later on, was despatched as a sort of financial agent; and several Russian military agents under the familiar guise of “instructors” were imposed upon the King at Seoul, who was informed that the number would be increased to twenty-six.

The Japanese Government was not made cognisant of these acts of “pacific penetration,” nor was its opinion invited. As soon as the Government in Tokyo became aware of the presence of these Russian agents at Seoul, its representative at St. Petersburg was instructed to enter a protest, and to point out that the action of the Russian Government was in violation of the spirit of the agreement between the Marquis Yamagata and Prince Lobanoff. Count Muravieff was at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Lobanoff having died in the interval. The new Minister declared that the appointment of these advisers and instructors was the act of Prince Lobanoff. While disclaiming responsibility, Count Muravieff urged that the Emperor of Korea was an independent Sovereign and that Russia could not well refuse his request for agents and advisers. He promised, however, that no more “military instructors” should be sent to Seoul, though it was impossible to recall those already there.

This discussion was protracted with exasperating delays until news reached Tokyo of the occupation of Kiao-chiao by Germany. Remembering the part played by Germany after the war with China, the Japanese not unnaturally suspected another act of collusion with Russia, and their representative in St. Petersburg was instructed to invite an expression of opinion on the subject. Count Muravieff treated the occupation as of no consequence. The Russian Government, he remarked, did not look upon the matter very seriously. The action of Germany was instigated by the desire of the Emperor to stimulate enthusiasm for the expansion of the navy and not by any motive of aggression in the Far East. Accordingly, the Russian Government could take no step and could enter no protest against the German occupation of a Chinese port.

That Kiao-chiao was the first card laid upon the table in this game of diplomatic “bluff” was quickly apparent. Russia had already made up her mind to acquire Port Arthur, and, with it, command of the Eastern Seas. On the last day of the year 1897 Count Muravieff dined with the Czar and the Empress Dowager, and on the first day of the New Year he had an interview with the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg. The Count declared that the Czar was desirous of arriving at an understanding about Korea on the basis of recognising the preponderant interest of Japan in that country; Russia having there no interest other than political and that of no great importance. The Empress Dowager, added Count Muravieff, had expressed similar opinions, and they were anxious to learn the views of the Japanese.

The Minister replied that nothing would be more welcome to the Japanese Government, for ever since the Chinese war they had been very desirous of coming to such an understanding about Korea. He himself, as the Count well knew, had, throughout a whole year, endeavoured to bring about an agreement of that kind, but had not succeeded. Invited to name a day for beginning the negotiations, Count Muravieff displayed no convincing alacrity. He had authority to do no more than communicate the desire of the Czar and to ask in a general way the views of the Japanese Minister. Further consideration was necessary and at an early and convenient day he would make another communication.

The next step was taken in Tokyo, in January, 1898, when the Russian Minister informed the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs that Russia would support the “commercial and industrial interests” of Japan in Korea, and was prepared to come to an understanding on that basis. Experience had taught the Japanese to be wary in their dealings with Russian diplomacy, and Tokyo required a pledge of good faith. Before _pourparlers_ began, the Czar must recall from Korea his “financial adviser” and “military instructors.”

Again Russia displayed no unseemly haste. While the Czar was deliberating, a confidential information from China came to the Japanese Government to the effect that Russia was demanding a long lease of Port Arthur. There was the secret of this complacence toward Germany and of these tentative offers to Japan. It was added that the Chinese Government “would not reply in haste,” but would take advantage of its reputation for never doing to-day what could be put off till the morrow.

In the month of March an unforeseen incident arose in Korea which solved the problem of “financial and military advisers.” M. Speyer, formerly Russian Minister in Tokyo, had been transferred to Seoul, with the promise that he should succeed to the representation in Pekin. M. Speyer was a conscientious diplomatist, and when the Emperor of Korea refused to accept certain proposals made by his Russian “financial and military advisers,” he issued an ultimatum. His Majesty was allowed twenty-four hours to decide whether he had need of these advisers.

M. Speyer would not have laid such a trap for himself and M. Alexieff if he had not been convinced that the Emperor would be terrified into acceptance of every demand. But His Majesty, assured of support from another quarter and aware of the dispute between Russia and Japan, showed unexpected firmness. After three days’ delay he informed M. Speyer that he had no further need of Russian advisers, and, “with many thanks for past services,” discharged them from their engagements. Here was an _impasse_ from which there was no escape without betraying the determination of the Czar not to relax his hold on Korea.

In St. Petersburg it was recognised that their representative had managed the business badly and had defeated their carefully laid scheme. M. Speyer accordingly did not go to Pekin, but was sent to vegetate at Rio Janeiro. This incident removed every obstacle to agreement on the subject of Korea, and on April 25th, 1898, was signed the Nissi and Rosen Convention, which solved the problem of Russian advisers.

Russia was the more ready to make this concession because nearly a month before--on March 27--a convention had been signed in Pekin, whereby China ceded to the Czar the use of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent country. Count Muravieff was evidently convinced that the withdrawal of the Russian advisers from Korea and the formal recognition of Japan’s interest in that country would be regarded in Tokyo as ample compensation for the occupation of Port Arthur. He boldly expressed this opinion in an interview with the Japanese Minister, who pointed out that, after all, this was a very one-sided arrangement, inasmuch as, while Japan’s preponderant interests in Korea were admitted, she was expressly forbidden by the Nissi-Rosen convention to appoint advisers to the Emperor of Korea.

The occupation of Wei-hai-wei by Great Britain followed soon afterwards. Russia clearly anticipated this move, for in April Count Muravieff caused the Japanese Government to understand that, if they desired it, China would give an assurance that, after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, Wei-hai-wei should not be conceded to any other Power. Russia was prepared to assent to such an assurance, and was willing to use her efforts to induce the other Powers to accept that arrangement. From this act of amazing self-denial Russia was saved by the Japanese and British Governments. Japan declared that she had no wish to impose such a condition in the terms of evacuation, and Great Britain, with the connivance of the Government in Tokyo, and in despite of Russia, calmly stepped into Wei-hai-wei.

These facts, which cannot be disputed, afford abundant evidence of the extreme moderation of the Japanese demands. They prove that the Japanese manifested no hostility to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, but were prepared to make great concessions in order to secure the heritage of Korea, to which they were entitled by conquest, by “pacific penetration,” and by the necessities of geographical position. But appetite comes with eating. Having absorbed Port Arthur and begun on Manchuria, Russia saw no reason why she should not have Korea also. When her Imperial company promoters and traders crossed the Yalu, Japanese patience was exhausted. Her fleet and army had been more successful than her diplomatists, and were more ready to accept the challenge. The Anglo-Japanese alliance--the sequel to the Russian occupation of Manchuria after the Boxer trouble--ensured for her a fair fight, and Japan proceeded to demonstrate to an amazed world that the Muscovite giant, who had long overshadowed the East, has feet of clay and the hollowness of sounding brass.