Chapter XXXI

RETREAT OF THE RUSSIANS.

Exhausted by long hours of continuous combat upon a few handfuls of dry rice, the Japanese were unable to make any progress. To add to their troubles the field wire failed and General Kuroki was ignorant of the movements of the armies in front of Liao-yang. All he could hope was that the last report was an accomplished fact, and that they had advanced as far as the river. But so far from showing signs of retreating, the enemy, under General Kuropatkin himself, continued to receive reinforcements, and pressed hard upon the Twelfth Division. Throughout the 2nd of September, General Kuroki’s divisions were merely a target for the Russian guns. No advance was possible until the Guards on his left could make good their position. As this appeared remote, the commander ordered them to leave three batteries with a small force to occupy the Russians, while the greater part of the division joined the main body at Kokanton. Meanwhile the fight went on with unabated fury.

At three o’clock on the morning of the 3rd, the last desperate assault of the Russians was repelled and Manjuyama was silent. Upon the reverse slope within a few yards from the summit lay a triple line of Russian dead. They lay as they had fallen--like brave men with their faces to the foe--in almost perfect alignment as if stricken down by one blow. Already the air was tainted with corruption and the Chinese were robbing the dead. An awful sight was that hill, littered with blood-sprinkled equipment, broken bayonets and shattered rifles. Dark stains showed where many had fallen, and out of the reeking earth that strove to hide them many a blackened hand was raised in mute appeal to Heaven. Talk of the glory of a soldier’s grave! The poet who sings of it cannot imagine its horrors. Though driven from the hill the enemy held stubbornly to a position three thousand yards South, and a great force was concentrated at Yentai on the railway, and at another point to the North. Anxious to push on and to turn the Russian retreat into a rout, General Kuroki found it impossible to advance. He had now two divisions, and another brigade was hurrying to his support. But his men were exhausted by many days of hard fighting. Two army corps confronted him, and all he could reasonably hope and expect to do was to hold his ground in the event of attack. Moreover, he knew nothing of the situation South of Liao-yang, for his communication by wire was still interrupted. Had he been informed of the success of the assault on the trenches before the city he might have taken the risk and pushed on toward the railway. In the circumstances, his hesitation was natural and perhaps prudent, for it is open to doubt whether he could have succeeded, and failure would have meant disaster.

On the 4th of September, having been reinforced by one brigade and having command of two and a half divisions, General Kuroki decided to advance. A dense fog screened our front and compelled us to proceed with caution. But little or no resistance was encountered. The five-peaked range was in our possession: the enemy had been expelled from the colliery, and it was apparent that the Russians on our front had retired. A mixed brigade marching from the coal mine discovered a strong force in the hills four miles North and drove it out. Two and a half miles to the South-west of the colliery another body of Russians was encountered and engaged us in a confused sort of way until six o’clock on the morning of the 5th, while five miles North-west of the mine another skirmish lasted until morning.

At one o’clock on the morning of the 5th we occupied Sautowha, on the main road ten miles north of Liao-yang, and in the afternoon shelled the retreating columns of the enemy along the railway. Our losses were heavy. From August 24th to September 5th the division operating on our left flank had 2,082 casualties: 21 officers killed, 61 officers wounded, 2,000 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded; the central division had 2,024 casualties: 25 officers killed, 58 officers wounded, 1 officer missing, 1,940 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded; the division on our right lost 1,540: 16 officers killed, 36 wounded, 1,421 non-commissioned officers and men killed and wounded, and 67 missing. The reserves had 490 casualties, making a total of 6,136 casualties, including 234 officers and 5,902 men. The proportion of killed to wounded was about five to one. The army on our left in front of Liao-yang had 6,853 casualties, including 1,328 killed, of whom 56 were officers. The army on the extreme left lost nearly 10,000.

Even this heroic struggle against overwhelming odds failed to turn the Russian retreat into a rout. To effect the retirement of a defeated army of two hundred thousand men without leaving captives and spoil in the hands of the enemy requires time as well as adroitness. In the opinion of men best qualified to judge, General Kuropatkin had ample time in these three days. The resources at his command were great; the country was in his favour, and his communications were never in serious danger. He had many bridges across the river; many trains were waiting on the railway to carry stores and equipment; his horses and wagons were practically unlimited. The country over which he had to retreat is a broad open plain without a single defile or range of hills that the enemy might seize. Once over the river--and there was none to oppose his crossing--General Kuropatkin’s army could move along a front of three or four miles without risk or interference, and fifteen miles North of Liao-yang he was beyond any danger of effective pursuit. General Kuropatkin received all the credit due to so successful a retreat, but it is well to point out that the conditions were altogether on his side, and that in five months his troops had had abundant experience to perfect themselves in these essential manœuvres.