Chapter XXIII

ASSAULT ON CHAOTOA.

At Chaotoa the Russians had a position of the highest strategic importance, from which they could threaten the advance of our right wing upon Liao-yang or Mukden. Bridge Head--as it was called--was also a barrier against the junction of our division--an armed point thrust between our centre and our right flank that an enterprising enemy might use to arrest any forward movement or in another attack on Mou-tien-ling. The necessity of removing this menace became urgent after the second attempt to recover the Pass, and the task was undertaken by the force whose head quarters were at Saimaki. Chaotoa is twenty miles north of Lien-chen-kwan, but in order to reach it safely we must retrace our steps toward Feng-hoang-cheng and strike North-east beyond the watershed. Leaving Saimaki on the right the road traverses a mountainous country and in fifty miles crosses the river at a score of places. By a rapid ascent we reach the watershed of the Eastern range--a lofty eminence whence the eye wanders over a heaving ocean of mountain and valley, clothed in many shaded greens of ripening maize and cotton and indigo. As you draw near to the Tai-tsu river you enter a long defile through which flows a stream, and at the western end of the defile rises Chaotoa. The strength of the position is at once apparent. Its precipitous front is washed by a tributary river which flows North to join the valley stream and turning West empties its waters into the broad flood of the Tai-tsu beyond Am-ping. In the angle of the meeting of the waters was the enemy’s fortified position. Their front was a sheer precipice with the deep river below; their left flank sloped gently down to the valley stream beyond which was a plain stretching to the Northern heights, and their right wing was defended by hills. From this secure angle the Russian guns commanded the valley and road: approach on their left was impossible without scaling heights beyond which runs the deep broad river Tai-tsu.

[Illustration: Japanese Ambulance Party, Chaotoa.]

Chaotoa had been chosen as a defensive position some weeks before. Trenches and gun emplacements had been made and had been abandoned. But when General Kuropatkin decided to attack Mou-tien-ling a second time, Chaotoa came once more into favour, and two brigades with twenty-four field guns, eight mountain guns and a regiment of cavalry were sent to re-occupy the place. Their first duty was to construct new trenches and gun emplacements. The lines of trenches followed the contour of the ridge, covering front and flanks save on the left slope by which the united streams flow Westward. The right flank resting on hills was thrown back toward the river and the gun positions dominated road and valley, one battery being posted at the right centre. This was the strength and situation of the enemy for several days previous to the assault on Mou-tien-ling upon the 17th of July. But they were not to remain long in uninterrupted possession. On the morning of the 17th, the Japanese began their advance. One thousand Cossacks appeared on their flank to the North-west of Saimaki and sought to arrest the movement. But cavalry that must keep to the roads is of little use except for reconnoitring and the Japanese had ceased to hold the Cossack in much respect. The Russians were easily persuaded to retire, and the only result of this demonstration of weakness was that one battalion, instead of three battalions as was originally intended, remained near Saimaki to guard our communications.

On the afternoon of the 18th, the advance guard of the Japanese entered the valley before Chaotoa. The road winds between ranges of hills following the course of the river whose banks are dotted with peaceful homesteads and are vividly green with the ripening crops. As it approaches Chaotoa the valley opens out to the South and West into a cultivated plain backed by hills, and bounded by the stream which flows along the front of the enemy’s position. Russian patrols and pickets were in the hills along the South of the valley, but they made no effort to arrest the advance. Before the steady movement of our troops, the Russians fell back behind the trenches and guns of Chaotoa and awaited the inevitable assault.

At noon a Japanese battalion had taken up a position near a village on the South from which the movements of the enemy could be observed. Clouds of dust indicated that they were withdrawing their heavy baggage to a safe distance; soldiers retired from the trenches, and a wild fear seized the Japanese that the enemy were about to escape without a fight. Orders were given to prepare for the pursuit, and the battalion was about to leave the village when a mounted officer was seen to ride away, and presently the Russian troops re-ascended the slope and lined the trenches. At half past four in the afternoon the enemy opened on the village with sixteen guns and did considerable damage, for the Japanese mountain batteries had not arrived.

From the valley the position looked unassailable save by a frontal attack against an entrenched precipice--an assault from which even the votaries of frontal attacks would shrink. But the Japanese are not easily deterred by appearances; they hold fast to the sound doctrine that every position, however strong, has its weak point, and that the first duty of a commander is to discover that weakness. So the day passed in desultory fighting and at night the real preparations were made. Among military experts in Europe there is a tradition that the Japanese avoid movements in the night. It is the part of wisdom to prefer the light; yet this theory, like many more affecting the Japanese, will bear revision. Under cover of darkness General Inouye made his disposition for the assault on the morrow. His command consisted of three infantry regiments, five mountain batteries and some cavalry. Two regiments were moved forward to the front of Chaotoa. They lay in the maize fields hidden from view by the broad green leaves of the rising corn and spent the night in making breastworks. This front line stretched from the North side of the valley across the stream and extended over the plain on the enemy’s front and right. The Japanese right flank was within 900 mètres from the Russian trenches and their left was only 1,200 mètres distant. Before them were the deep river and the precipitous side of Chaotoa. One regiment, commanded by Colonel Hiraoka, who was the Japanese _attaché_ in the Boer war, remained in reserve for a most important mission.

Night came, and the shadows stole up the hills, leaving the valley in darkness. A strange stillness filled the air with foreboding. The moon rose and flooded the hills with light, but revealed no sign of the approaching conflict. Yet, in the corn fields below, thousands of khaki clad men burrowed like moles. The enemy must have been conscious of their presence, for they opened a cannonade that continued at intervals through the night. From the trenches also came rifle fire, and twice in the darkness a small force advanced to dispute the passage of the river. They brought with them drums and trumpets. Could it be that the Russians had adopted Chinese methods of warfare, and hoped to scare the enemy with discord, or did they imagine that they might delude the Japanese into belief that they were an army on the march? The musicians left some of their instruments on the field. But from the corn fields came no response. Bullets whistled among the green stalks, carrying death and wounds in sharp swift notes to two hundred and eighty unseen men, but not a sound or a sign was given. On the left, especially, our casualties were heavy, for the line of infantry was within decisive range. At last day dawned, and the hills awoke. Two mountain batteries had been carried to the crest of a hill commanding the Russian position from the East at a distance of 3,480 mètres; three other mountain batteries were posted on the North bank of the stream, about half way down the valley; they were in the shadow of a temple, 2,800 mètres from the enemy. The Russians had no difficulty in locating the first artillery position, but of the second they remained long in ignorance. The four hundred shells they directed against it fell on a hill upon the opposite bank of the stream where there was neither gun nor rifle. When they discovered the mistake their range was deadly in its accuracy, for it had doubtless been carefully measured, but there were defects in the Russian fuses that rendered their shells often harmless.

While the artillery duel was in progress the Japanese were launching a bolt more deadly than the shells of their mountain guns. I have spoken of a weak point in the Russian position. That weakness was on the right, where the hills appeared to afford a natural defence. But hills are dangerous things unless well guarded, and the Russians had not learned the lesson of turning movements. Soon after daybreak there came from the rear of our position at the Eastern end of the valley a regiment of brave and determined men. They had before them a long and difficult march, and at the end of the journey a desperate task to perform. Their leader was a soldier who had learned some useful lessons in South Africa, for Colonel Hiraoka did not believe that military science began and ended with the Franco-German War. He led his regiment into the mountains and vanished from our view. Meanwhile, the men in the cornfields waited long and anxiously. Already they had observed symptoms of uneasiness on the part of the Russians, and feared that they might escape before the web was spun round them. At one o’clock in the afternoon some men left the trenches and did not return. Another hour crept by and the Russian guns were withdrawn. It was obvious that the enemy suspected some deep laid scheme and was making ready to depart. General Inouye watched anxiously from the gun position in the valley, and his glance was fixed on the hills to his left. Moments went by, and half an hour seemed an age.

At last the signal! from the Russian trenches on the right came volley after volley hurtling over the plain. The leaden hail swept across the fields, and the corn stalks snapped under the hurricane like the cracking of a myriad whips. This sudden storm was directed against the defile beyond the plain where the head of Colonel Hiraoka’s regiment appeared--appeared and vanished again to hurl itself on the right flank of the Russians. In seven hours they had marched across nineteen miles of trackless mountains, and climbed three steep ranges under a blazing sun. Their arrival was well timed; had they been half-an-hour later they would have failed in their mission. Two companies from the force near Lien-cheng-kwan had hurried forward to meet them, and were fortunate in effecting a junction. For a second or two they stood out against the sky--a dark extended line advancing rapidly under a heavy fire. On they swept with a cheer! The mountain batteries in the valley--no longer having to face the superior range and weight of the Russian guns--moved forward to their aid and hurled shrapnel into the position. For nearly an hour the fight went on with fury; but not for a moment did the regiment waver or loosen its grip on the enemy. Their losses were heavy, and their leader fell mortally wounded, yet they held fast, and the victory was theirs. With a shout that rang like a trumpet among the echoing hills up sprang the fighting line from the cornfields; each maize stalk became an armed man. Into the river they rushed. The waters were deep and the current was strong, yet in they sprang, holding their rifles aloft. Up to their necks they were, and only one man was drowned. Under cover of the precipice they darted toward the exposed flank of the Russians. Before this desperate onslaught the shaken enemy could not stand. They fled down the slope, and, massing near a plantation, made ready for flight. But their retirement was not so orderly and deliberate as at Mou-tien-ling. The guns opened and they bolted like hares.

To complete their discomfiture two companies and one section had scaled the heights on the North, and, hurrying West, suddenly appeared among the hills on the Russian flank. The enemy were now under rifle fire from three sides and did not stop to arrange the order of their going. The flight spread North and West, and at a quarter past five o’clock in the afternoon the flag of the Rising Sun floated over Chaotoa and one hundred and fifty Russians dead. Sixty-five prisoners were taken of whom thirty-three were unwounded. Many wounded were carried from the field early in the day when the fight was practically suspended. Among the spoil were 215 rifles, 17,878 rounds of ammunition, three caisons, 152 shells, 26 tents, seven drums and four trumpets. The Japanese casualties were 523--two officers and seventy men killed, sixteen officers and 435 men wounded. The Japanese guns fired 440 common shells and 2,500 shrapnel shells.

The capture of Chaotoa was a brilliant exploit, and must be accepted as another proof of the immense superiority of the Japanese infantry. The Russian troops were from Europe; they outnumbered their assailants by nearly two to one; their twenty-four field guns were opposed to mountain batteries; their position was strong by nature and art, and much depended on their retention of Chaotoa. The flanking movements were splendidly executed; and the one regret was that Colonel Hiraoka did not live to reap the reward of his victory.