Chapter XX

WHY THE JAPANESE LINGERED AT FENG-HOANG-CHENG.

The Japanese have been blamed for not taking advantage of their victory at the Yalu to press North without delay. There were many reasons for hesitation. In the first place they did not know the strength of the enemy, and feared that General Kuropatkin might descend upon them with overwhelming force. Between the Yalu and Feng-hoang-cheng were several strong positions, where the Russians might have made a stand. General Kuroki accordingly determined to seize the heights about Hamatan, and to await developments. Cavalry patrols were pushed forward, and sent back word that the enemy had evacuated Feng-hoang-cheng. These reports were hardly credited, for Feng-hoang-cheng was a point of great strategic importance--the junction of many roads--where it was expected that the Russians would offer strenuous resistance.

General Kuroki advanced upon Feng-hoang-cheng with the utmost caution, separating his army into three columns so as to guard against surprise. He was by no means certain that with the force under his command it would be prudent to remain at Feng-hoang-cheng.

The landing of a small part of the Second Army in the Liao-tung Peninsula on May 5th introduced a new factor into the calculations. It was known that a large force of Russians confronted General Oku at Kin-chow, and there was danger that they would be content with holding him while the main army struck at General Kuroki. This was a movement greatly feared by the Japanese and had a powerful influence upon their plans. General Kuroki was of opinion that for three or four months he must be prepared to encounter an enemy twice as numerous as his own army. He had, however, the satisfaction of knowing that if the Russians came upon him in force, the landing of the Second Army would be assured. Accordingly he no sooner entered Feng-hoang-cheng than he proceeded to fortify the surrounding hills. Though the position was strong for defence, the perimeter was too extended for the force at his disposal, and orders were given that in the event of attack the Japanese were to leave the position and meet the enemy in front. The Twelfth Division was posted on the East, the Second Division on the West, and the Guard’s Division in the centre on the Pekin road.

On May 26th the battle of Nanshan was fought. Until that victory was won in the Peninsula it was feared that General Oku would be attacked by the Russian forces North and South of Nanshan, and that General Kuroki would be compelled to relieve the pressure on the Second Army by marching upon Hai-chung. The Russians missed a supreme opportunity. What they ought to have done was to concentrate their forces and make a determined assault upon the army in the Liao-tung Peninsula, or upon the army at Feng-hoang-cheng. But General Kuropatkin’s vicious habit of “nibbling” prevailed, and no big movement was attempted. The Russian army was split into ineffectual fragments--some at Kin-chow, others at Kai-ping, some at Liao-tung, others near Feng-hoang-cheng.

Through all these alarms General Kuroki held fast to his purpose of accumulating stores and strengthening the position about Feng-hoang-cheng. He was conscious that the Russians feared him, and would not willingly leave open the road to Liao-tung, even in the hope of crushing General Oku. When General Stakelberg moved south to fight the battle of Te-li-tzu, it appeared as if the moment had arrived for a rapid march on Liao-yang, but the Japanese knew that the Russian force in front of them was strong.

Accordingly General Kuroki remained at Feng-hoang-cheng until he had accumulated stores and munitions of war that made him independent of the immediate control of the sea, and until there was no further risk of the Russians concentrating all their forces against one of the invading armies. The interval of forty-five days was not wasted. Engineers were occupied in constructing a light railway from the port of Antung, in building bridges across the winding stream of the Tsa-ho, which follows the North as far as the pass of Mou-tien-ling, in making and improving roads over mountains and along valleys, in entrenching hills that command approaches from the North, and in erecting bomb-proof shelters and gun emplacements. Warehouses arose outside the ancient and decaying walls of the city, and were filled with rice and the simple food of the Japanese soldier.

Nor were the combatants idle while this provision was being made for their comfort and security. Mobile columns and strong patrols pushed forward on every side, scouring the country for miles, penetrating as far North as eighty miles due East of Mukden, and creating an impression of bewildering activity. On the East a Russian cavalry division, under General Renekampf--a soldier of great energy and recognised ability--struggled for mastery along the banks of the Pa-tao river, and for a week or more Saimaki became the objective of both forces. Now the town was held by the Japanese, and now we learned that two battalions of the enemy, with a field battery and a regiment of cavalry were in occupation, and that the Japanese had fallen back upon Nai-yang-meun on the Ai-ho. The presence of this force on our right was an embarrassment, and might at a critical moment become a menace. General Kuroki, accordingly, determined to remove the risk, and despatched a brigade to Nai-yang-meun with orders to get behind the enemy at Saimaki and thus cut off his retreat. As fate would have it, the Russians chose the very hour of the arrival of these reinforcements to attack the town, and were defeated. They retired in confusion, leaving our right flank unassailed. On the West, at Siou-yen the Guards joined hands with the Division landed at Takushan, and drove the enemy in the direction of Hai-cheng.

General Kuropatkin, not being gifted with the power of divination, was deceived by this activity. He evidently believed that General Kuroki was moving Westward toward the railway, and would presently join hands with the divisions in the Liao-tung Peninsula. Appearances lent themselves to this deception. A force had landed at Takushan, two brigades of Guards had occupied Siou-yen, and every day brought report of encounters between patrols and small mobile bodies of the enemy. The long halt at Feng-hoang-cheng helped to confirm the Russian commander in his delusion.