Chapter XI

THE FIRST ENCOUNTER.

The moment was drawing near when the armies would meet and the vaunted might of Russia would be put to the test. How would it fare with the Japanese? Victorious at sea, would they be conquerors on land? The people of Great Britain and the United States were divided between amazement at the presumption and admiration of the daring of the “little Japs.” Those who measure the strength of armies by statistics of area and population, and by quotations from the Stock Exchange, had no doubt that the bigger country would win. Military men, satisfied by parades, manœuvres, and official reports, were convinced that Russia would vindicate the laws of military science and crush her rival. Politicians hoped for the best and feared the worst. One member of the British Government discovered a new ground for faith. He was “sure the Japanese would win, because every military man said they could not!”

As for the Japanese soldiers, never for a moment did they dream that they could be beaten by “a corrupt, immoral, and illiterate people like the Russians.” The worst they anticipated was a heavy casualty list. General Fujii, mindful of the Russo-Turkish war, ordered the Medical Staff to prepare for five thousand wounded.

The Russians had plenty of time to make their dispositions. For several weeks they had held the north bank of the Ai-ho with twenty thousand infantry and Cossacks and forty-eight guns. In contesting the passage of a river it is obviously necessary to keep a large reserve with which to strike the enemy when he attempts to cross. But in a country devoid of lateral communications--like that occupied by the Russians--this precaution could be adopted only on one condition: that the point of attack was known. To concentrate at Antung, if the Japanese crossed at Suikochin or at Fushan, would be fatal. The plan of defence must be well conceived from the beginning or it was destined to fail. Now the Russian General could not learn the direction of the attack. The movements of the Japanese puzzled him, as it was intended that they should. Some of the younger officers believed that the crossing would be effected on the upper reaches of the Yalu near Suikochin, and urged that the left flank should be strengthened. This theory met with no support among the senior officers, who thought that no serious movement could be made in such difficult country. Others maintained that the Japanese would bridge the river between Wiju and Chiu-lien-cheng, and would follow the Imperial Pekin road. But the weight of authority was in favour of Antung, where it was comparatively easy to bridge the Yalu. In that belief General Zasselitch was confirmed by the naval demonstrations that took place in front of Antung, and he accordingly posted his reserves near that place.

On the last day of April the Russian front extended along the North bank of the river Ai for a distance of nearly eighteen miles. Their right flank was at Antung, their centre at Chiu-lien-cheng, and their left wing rested on the mountains near Wezukau. One regiment was stationed at Antung, on the hill to the North of which was a battery of eight guns; a regiment and a half, with two field batteries, held Chiu-lien-cheng; at Yushukau was another regiment with one battery; to the North of Wezukau were two companies of infantry and one field battery, and in the heights about Hamatan, to the West of Chiu-lien-cheng, where the road from Antung branches West to Feng-hoang-cheng, were posted two regiments in reserve, with one battery. Both flanks were protected by cavalry, General Mistchenko being at Tajushan, some miles to the West of Antung, where it was anticipated that the Japanese would attempt to land a small force. The hills were entrenched at several points; trenches commanded the river bank; upon summit and ridge were gun emplacements and sungars. These works were constructed by the infantry, aided by Chinese, the engineers being occupied with the roads and bridges on the line of communication which passed through Feng-hoang-cheng to Liao-yang. No attempt had been made to mask the trenches, which were of the most primitive design, and gave neither head cover nor protection against shell fire.

The Japanese lay in the hills about Wiju on the South bank of the Yalu--an army of three Divisions of forty-five thousand men, with twelve batteries of field guns, six mountain batteries, and two sections of five-inch howitzers. Their line extended from Suikochin to the South-west of Wiju. Between the two armies was the valley of the Yalu--a plain of sand and bush, intersected by rivers.

The position of the Russian flank and the nature of the terrain between the Yalu and the Ai called for a movement which in face of an energetic and well-informed enemy might have proved disastrous. A glance at the map will show that if the attack on the Russian front and flank was to be simultaneous the Twelfth Division must advance twenty-four hours before the Divisions at the centre and on the left. To arrive in front of the Russian position on the Ai-ho and to cover the crossing of the other divisions the Twelfth had to traverse the mountainous country between Suikochin and Litzuyen. General Kuroki determined to take the risk of dividing his command by sending one division in advance across the river. In order to divert attention from this movement the gunboat Maya and two torpedo boats renewed their demonstration near Antung on the morning of the 29th and bombarded the enemy’s position North of the Yalu. At eleven o’clock forty or fifty Cossacks with two guns appeared in front of Suikochin but were compelled to seek refuge in the hills. The enemy’s outpost having been driven in, a covering party of one battalion was ferried over under fire from the Russian guns.

The battery North of Wiju replied, and by two o’clock the battalion occupied a position that gave security to the engineers, who immediately began to bridge the river. This, as we have seen, was a difficult task, the current being swift (1.80 mètres per second), the water eight mètres deep and two or three anchors being required for each pontoon. The bridge was completed by three o’clock on the morning of the 30th, and the Twelfth Division crossed to the North bank of the Yalu.

The night of the 29th of April was one of great anxiety to General Kuroki and his staff. The army was divided by a deep river, and one division, upon whose safety depended the success or failure of the plan of attack, was executing the hazardous operation of deploying at right angles to its line of march within easy range of the enemy’s guns. At any moment the Russians might seize the occasion to deliver a counter attack. General Kuroki had, however, the consolation of knowing that in such difficult country it would take time to develop such an attack, and that the Twelfth Division might be depended upon to hold the line. Meanwhile, every precaution was taken to prevent surprise. Three batteries and a regiment of infantry were posted on Kontonto island; the guns North of Wiju were trained on the point of danger, and two divisions concentrated at Wiju were ready to march at a moment’s notice.