Chapter VI

THE NORTHERN ADVANCE.

General Kuroki and his staff arrived at Pyng-yang on March 21st, and began to prepare for the advance. Four problems had first to be solved. At what point were the Russians likely to offer serious resistance? Along what road must the Japanese march? How were three divisions to be supplied with food and ammunition? Was it possible to transport heavy artillery to the Yalu? Without precise information as to the enemy’s plans the first question could not be answered. It was known, of course, that the Russians had an entrenched position North of the Yalu, but of their strength beyond Pyng-yang General Kuroki was ignorant. Spies reported that the enemy had not bridged the river, but were able to cross the ice West of Wiju by means of planks and straw. There was, consequently, nothing to prevent the Russians from appearing in force South of the Yalu before the Japanese army could be concentrated at a point near the river.

General Kuroki had to take precautions against this contingency. Reconnaissances showed that the Cossacks were hovering about the river which flows through Anju, but whether with artillery and infantry could not be ascertained. Uncertain of what lay behind this cavalry screen, General Kuroki prepared to fight in the course of his advance on the river.

Anju accordingly became the next objective. The Second Division had landed at the mouth of the Tai-tong river on March 16th, and before the 21st the greater part of the Twelfth Division had marched from Seoul to Ping-yang. The advance was begun a few days later, and was made in this order. The three divisions formed a line about thirty miles north of Ping-yang, stretching from Syunchong on the East through Sukchon on the main road and onward towards the coast. On the right, near Syunchong, was the Twelfth Division: in the centre, at Sukchon, was the Guards Division, and on the left was the Second Division.

As the troops moved rapidly Northward their difficulties increased. Despite the labours of an army of sappers the roads were in a terrible state. The surface, frozen to a depth of twelve inches, began to melt, and man and horse plunged through morass and quagmire. At Pyng-yang it was comparatively easy to feed three divisions because of the river, but the task grew heavier with every mile, for transport trains that were intended to cover six ri a day could often march only two ri. Native coolies were engaged in tens of thousands, yet even these did not suffice, and the army must have suffered serious privations had it not been that Korea, unlike Manchuria, produces large quantities of rice and that the people were willing to sell.

At Anju it was apparent that the Russians did not intend to oppose the advance South of the Yalu. General Kuroki accordingly halted to collect supplies at that place and to complete his plans. Assuming that no battle would be fought until the Yalu was reached, the army must march seven days and each division must have twenty-one days supplies of food and ammunition. It was calculated that at least four weeks’ stores must be collected at Anju before the advance could begin. Fortunately it was possible now to send ships from Chinampo to the mouth of the river Tching-chien, so that Anju was provisioned more quickly than the Japanese had anticipated.

From Anju General Kuroki had choice of two roads. He might march along the Mandarin road that runs direct to Wiju, or he might take the Eastern road which passes through Yunsan and reaches the Yalu at Chosan. Natives declared that field guns and wheeled transport could not move along the Eastern road, whereas if the Mandarin road was repaired in certain places the passage of guns and carts was practicable. In one respect, at least, there was no uncertainty. No sooner would the army begin to march along one road than it would regret that it had not chosen the other. But there were considerations more important than those of ease. It was imperative that the force should be on the same road that the main body of the enemy would select if by any chance the Russians made up their minds to come South of the Yalu. As far as that river the Mandarin road was undoubtedly the better, but beyond the Yalu the Eastern road was good and would be more convenient in the event of the Japanese having to turn the intrenched position at Chiu-lien-cheng or to march directly on Liao-yang. To divide the army and send it by both roads would facilitate transport, but in the face of a strong and enterprising foe this would be dangerous tactics, for there were no lateral communications or cross-roads.

The Japanese Staff decided to make use of both roads. A mixed brigade was sent by the Eastern route through Yunsan, while the main body of two and a half divisions advanced along the Mandarin road. Once more arose the serious question of supplying with food and ammunition this great force on the march. The stores accumulated at Anju would not suffice, as they could not be sent forward quickly enough. It was necessary to discover another sea base further North. To make wide reconnaisances was not easy, seeing that the enemy’s cavalry were still South of the Yalu. But the Japanese had two strong incentives. Besides the question of food was that of the heavy artillery. At Chinampo were two batteries of 5-inch howitzers that must be carried to the Yalu with speed and secrecy. To transport them by the main road, even if practicable, would be to disclose their presence to the Russians, who were confident that nothing heavier than field guns could be brought to the Yalu.

Volunteers were not wanting to undertake this dangerous enterprise. Officers of the navy and army put off in small boats under cover of night, and searched every mile of the coast and of the tracks leading therefrom. The peninsula of South-West of Charenkwan was deemed the best place, and General Kuroki decided to send a force sufficient to cover the landing of guns and supplies at Richao. A large number of men would be needed should the Russians discover the secret and descend into the peninsula. But again rose the problem of feeding a detached body of troops, whose sea communications were dependent on the weather and on the absence of a Russian squadron. After careful calculation General Kuroki came to the conclusion that he could not send more than two regiments of cavalry and one regiment of infantry. This force accordingly marched North and came to Chonju on March 28th. General Michtchenko four days earlier had received a message reproaching him for having allowed Pyng-yang to be occupied by a single company of Japanese infantry, and commanding him to do something to check the rapid advance of the enemy. He accordingly went South with six hundred Cossacks, and encountered the Japanese detached force under the walls of Chonju.

The Russians attacked Chonju from three sides, and were opposed at first by only a few soldiers who had been left to hold the town. Hearing shots some cavalry of the Guard that had ridden North returned with all speed, and messengers were despatched to warn the main body. Hard pressed, and almost surrounded, the Japanese held a position South of Chonju, until reinforced by infantry from main detachment, who arrived breathless after a race of three miles. Seizing elevations on the East and South-east the infantry opened fire, and drove back the Cossacks, who fell back upon Charenkwan.

This little victory secured for the Japanese a fresh landing place. Roads, however, must be made before howitzers and carts could be moved inland. This was a work of tremendous difficulty, for the whole country-side was a fathomless bog. Yet the engineers of the Second Division were equal to the task, despite the fact that for twenty days they had been making every foot of the road along which the division marched from Chinampo. From Richao, where the howitzers were put on shore, to the main road at Charenkwan is a distance of fifteen miles--fifteen miles of rice fields and morass. Pine trees were cut from the hills and sunk in the mire until a foundation could be secured for branches and brush wood, which in turn were covered with earth. In nine days a path was made from the sea, and the pioneers of the Second Division had the satisfaction of knowing that if heavy artillery failed the Japanese as it did in the Chinese War it would not be for the same reason.