Chapter II

JAPANESE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

The issues of war are not determined by numbers and bank balances. If victory depended on these factors the British Empire would never have been created. Our forefathers happily knew not the law of military science that judges the strength of an army by its size. They were conscious of another factor that cannot be expressed in figures, in differences of armament or even in the genius of commanders. This factor is the spirit of the army. Intangible as the law of gravitation, it cannot be stated in terms of any known value, yet it gives momentum to the mass, and without it discipline is but blind obedience, and courage the mere absence of fear. The duty of military science should be to determine this factor not less than to ascertain the numerical strength and armament of an enemy.

Mindful of this duty the Japanese studied the character of the Russian soldier and found him lacking in qualities that make an army invincible. The best testimony I can offer on this subject is a confidential paper written by General Fujii, Chief of the Staff of General Kuroki’s Army and Commandant of the Staff College. It is a concise and modest document, yet it contains psychological truths of greater value than columns of facts and figures.

It is clear from this official survey that the Japanese did not accept the European estimate of the fighting capacity of their enemy. A military _attaché_ who was in a large measure responsible for British official opinion of the Russian army exclaimed after the battle of Liao-yang: “My reputation is gone! For years I have been urging that Russian troops are invincible and here am I running away with them every day!”

The Staff in Tokyo were under no delusion. After careful study and observation they discovered the weak places in the Muscovite armour and were never for a moment doubtful of the issue. They knew the capacity of the Russian officer, his want of initiative, his proneness to jealousy and divided counsel, his readiness to put personal interest and comfort before every other consideration.

Among the multitude of things left behind by the Russians in their retreat from Liao-yang not the least interesting and valuable were the general orders issued from day to day by their Commander-in-Chief. They disclose the gravest defects in the discipline of the army, and more especially of the Cossacks. It appears from them that the Colonel of one Cossack regiment was removed from his command for deserting a post of great importance at the mere rumour of the approach of the enemy and without writing to inform the force to his immediate front--a defection that endangered the whole movement. Two Colonels of the 23rd East Siberian Regiment were cashiered for reasons not stated, and the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Ural Cossacks was dismissed the service for conduct unworthy of an officer and for habitual drunkenness. These are only a few examples of the looseness of discipline in the higher commissioned ranks. Numbers of Russian officers, according to the testimony of British and French Missionaries in Liao-yang, were drinking with courtesans while their regiments were fighting at the front. Many also were censured by General Kuropatkin for discussing in public the conduct of the war and the character of their seniors in rank.

The state of affairs disclosed in these documents confirmed the Japanese in their opinion that the Russians were inferior to themselves in discipline and training, and will strengthen the conviction of all who have mingled with Russian military and naval officers that the army officer is often a person of inferior character and social position. So marked, indeed, is the distinction, that Russian naval officers rarely accept on a footing of social equality their comrades in the army.

Of General Kuropatkin as Commander-in-Chief the Japanese staff never entertained a very high opinion. They were inclined to the opinion of Skobeleff under whom Kuropatkin laid the foundation of his reputation. “You are an ambitious man and will have a fine career, but do not forget my advice. Never accept an independent post in which you will have to direct affairs.” The truth is that after the battle of the Yalu, the Japanese refused to accept the European opinion that General Kuropatkin was a great strategist and skilful in manœuvre.

“He lost his opportunity after the Yalu,” said General Fujii, than whom there is no more competent critic. “Kuropatkin may be a great organiser, but in the field he is not to be feared.”

Neither did the Japanese understand the chorus of praise over Kuropatkin’s “masterly retreats.” They have not reached the decadent stage which accepts even successful retreat as a proof of military capacity. The Japanese estimate of the Russian General may be given in one sentence from the lips of a distinguished soldier: “He never attempts any great movement, but is always content with nibbling and retiring.”

While not under-rating the courage of the Russian soldier, the Japanese looked upon him as an ignorant and stupid peasant, who is easily depressed by failure.

“They are an imperfectly educated, strongly religious and _naïve_ sort of people. If there is a great hero to lead and set them an example they are not men to fear death, as was seen at Plevna, where they piled up corpses for earthworks and dashed into the enemy’s trenches. Yet if they meet any little reverse they are at once terrified and panic-stricken, and run away in confusion. It is therefore necessary to frighten them in the beginning.”

I am quoting from the confidential study of the Russian army, to which I would add the practical comment of an officer who fought from the Yalu to the Sha-ho: “We always win in the last ten minutes, because the Russians will not stay long enough.”

Their infantry often charge with the bayonet, but they have little skill in its use, and none at all in individual encounter.”

And what of the Cossack, about whom tradition has woven a dazzling and invincible fame? The Japanese dismiss him with mild contempt, which events have justified.

“The Cossack in the war of 1877 made no heroic movement. His reputation is built entirely on his own reports, which are always exaggerated. He invariably retires when met by a stronger force. If our infantry is a little careful we need have no fear of the Cossack.”

In this estimate of the Russian army I have abstained from expressing any personal opinion, knowing that it would be valueless. Those who have any curiosity to study the Japanese view will be rewarded by consulting General Fujii’s paper, which will be found in the appendix. I would add only this tribute to the bravery of the Russian soldiers. If they do not know how to fight they know at least how to die. Never except over the ruins of Fort Shishishan in the last days of Port Arthur have I seen the white flag.