CHAPTER XXXV

CLASSIFICATION OF TOPICS; STAGES OF EVOLUTION

I. PHILOSOPHIC CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES; THE ARRANGEMENT OF VINCENT’S ENCYCLOPAEDIA, OF THE LOMBARD’S _SENTENCES_, OF AQUINAS’S _SUMMA THEOLOGIAE_.

II. THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT: GRAMMAR, LOGIC, METALOGICS.

I

Having considered the spirit, the field, and the dual method, of mediaeval thought, there remain its classifications of topics. The problem of classification presented itself to Gerbert as one involved in the rational study of the ancient material.[431] But as scholasticism culminated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the problem became one of arrangement and presentation of the mass of knowledge and argument which the Middle Ages had at length made their own, and were prepared to re-express. This ordering was influenced by a twofold principle of classification; for, as abundantly shown by Aquinas,[432] theology in which all is ordered with reference to God, will properly follow an arrangement of topics quite unsuitable to the natural or human sciences, which treat of things with respect to themselves. But the mediaeval practice was more confused than the theory; because the interest in human knowledge was apt to be touched by motives sounding in the need of divine salvation; and speculation could not free itself of the moving principles of Christian theology. On the other hand, an enormous quantity of human dialectic, and a prodigious mass of what strikes us as profane information, or misinformation, was carried into the mediaeval _Summa_, and still more into those encyclopaedias, which attempted to include all knowledge, and still were influenced in their aim by a religious purpose.[433]

As the human sciences came from the pagan antique, the accepted classifications of them naturally were taken from Greek philosophy. They followed either the so-called Platonic division, into Physics, Ethics, and Logic,[434] or the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical. The former scheme, of which it is not certain that Plato was the author, passed on through the Stoic and Epicurean systems of philosophy, was recognized by the Church Fathers, and received Augustine’s approval. It was made known to the Middle Ages through Cassiodorus, Isidore, Alcuin, Rabanus, Eriugena and others.

Nevertheless the Aristotelian division of philosophy into theoretical and practical was destined to prevail. It was introduced to the western Middle Ages through Boëthius’s Commentary on Porphyry’s _Isagoge_,[435] and adopted by Gerbert; later it passed over through translations of Arabic writings. It was accepted by Hugo of St. Victor, by Albertus Magnus and by Thomas, to mention only the greatest names; and was set forth in detail with explanation and comment in a number of treatises, such as Gundissalinus’s _De divisione philosophiae_, and Hugo of St. Victor’s _Eruditio didascalica_,[436] which were formal and schematic introductions to the study of philosophy and its various branches.

The usual subdivisions of these two general parts of philosophy were as follows. Theoretica (or _Theorica_) was divided into (1) Physics, or _scientia naturalis_, (2) Mathematics, and (3) Metaphysics or Theology, or _divina scientia_, as it might be called. Physics and Mathematics were again divided into more special sciences. _Practica_ was divided commonly into Ethics, Economics, Politics, or into Ethics and _Artes mechanicae_. There was a difference of opinion as to what to do with Logic. It had, to be sure, its position in the current Trivium, along with grammar and rhetoric. But this was merely current, and might not approve itself on deeper reflection. Gundissalinus speaks of three propaedeutic sciences, the _scientiae eloquentiae_, grammar, poetics, and rhetoric, and then puts Logic after them as a _scientia media_ between these primary educational matters and philosophy, _i.e._ the whole range of knowledge, theoretical and practical. Again, over against _philosophia realis_, which contains both the _theoretica_ (or _speculativa_) and the _practica_, Thomas Aquinas sets the _philosophia rationalis_, or logic; and Richard Kilwardby opposes _logica_, the _scientia rationalis_, to _practica_, in his division.[437]

The last-named philosopher was the pupil and then the hostile critic of Aquinas, and also became Archbishop of Canterbury. He was the author of a careful and elaborate classification of the parts of philosophy, entitled _De ortu et divisione philosophiae_.[438] In it, following the broad distinction between _res divinae_ and _res humanae_, Kilwardby divides philosophy into _speculativa_ and _practica_. _Speculativa_ is divided into _naturalis_ (physics), _mathematica_, and _divina_ (metaphysics). He does not divide the first and third of these; but he divides _mathematica_ into those sciences which treat of quantity in continuity and separation respectively (_quantitas continua_ and _quantitas discreta_). The former embrace geometry, astronomy and astrology, and perspective; the latter, music and arithmetic. _Practica_, which is concerned with _res humanae_, is divided into _activa_ and _sermocinalis_: because _res humanae_ consist either of _operationes_ or _locutiones_. The _activa_ embraces Ethics and mechanics; the _scientia sermocinalis_ embraces grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Such are Kilwardby’s bare captions; his treatise lengthily treats of the interrelations of these various branches of knowledge.

An idea of the scholastic discussion of the classification of sciences may be had by following Albertus Magnus’s ponderous approach to a consideration of logic: whether it be a science, and, if so, what place should be allotted it. We draw from the opening of his _liber_ on the _Predicables_,[439] that is to say, his exposition of Porphyry’s Introduction. Albert will consider “what kind of a science (_qualis scientia_) logic may be, and whether it is any part of philosophy; what need there is of it, and what may be its use; then of what it treats, and what are its divisions.” The ancients seem to have disagreed, some saying that logic is no science, since it is rather a _modus_ (mode, manner or method) of every science or branch of knowledge. But these, continues Albertus, have not reflected that although there are many sciences, and each has its special _modus_, yet there is one _modus_ common to all sciences, pertaining to that which is common to them all: the principle, to wit, that through reason’s inquiry, from what is known one arrives at knowledge of the unknown. This mode or method common to every science may be considered in itself, and so may be the subject of a special science. After further balancing of the reasons and authorities _pro_ and _con_, Albertus concludes:

“It is therefore clear that logic is a special science just as in ironworking there is the special art of making a hammer, yet its use pertains to everything made by the ironworker’s craft. So this process of discovering the unknown through the known, is something special, and may be studied as a special art and science; yet the use of it pertains to all sciences.”

He next considers whether logic is a part of philosophy. Some say no, since there are (as they say) only three divisions of philosophy, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; others say that logic is a _modus_ of philosophy and not one of its divisions. But, on the contrary, it is shown by others that this view of philosophy omits the practical side, for philosophy’s scope comprehends the truth of everything which man may understand, including the truth of that which is in ourselves, and strives to comprehend both truth and the process of advancing from the known to a knowledge of the unknown. These point out that

“... the Peripatetics divided philosophy first into three parts, to wit, into _physicam generaliter dictam_, and _ethicam generaliter dictam_ and _rationalem_ likewise taken broadly. I call _physica generaliter dicta_ that which embraces _scientia naturalis_, _disciplinalis_, and _divina_ (_i.e._ physics in a narrower sense, mathematics which is called _scientia disciplinalis_, and metaphysics which is _scientia divina_). And I call _ethica_, that which, broadly taken, contains the _scientia monastica_, _oeconomica_ and _civilis_. And I call that the _scientia rationalis_, broadly taken, which includes every mode of proceeding from the known to the unknown. From which it is evident that logic is a part of philosophy.”

And finally it may be shown that

“if anything is within the scope of philosophy it must be that without which philosophy cannot reach any knowledge. He who is ignorant of logic can acquire no perfect cognition of the unknown, because he is ignorant of the way in which he should proceed from the known to the unknown.”

From these latter arguments, approved by him and in part stated as his own, Albertus advances to a classification of the parts of logic, which he makes to include rhetoric, poetics, and dialectic, and to be demonstrative, sophistical or disputatious, according to the use to which logic (broadly taken) is applied and the manner in which it may in each case proceed, in advancing from the known to some farther ascertainment or demonstration.[440] Soon after this, in discussing the subject of this science, Albertus points out how logic differs from rhetoric and poetics, although with them it may treat of _sermo_, or speech, and be called a _scientia sermonalis_; for, unlike them, it treats of _sermo_ merely as a means of drawing conclusions, and not in and for itself.

From the purely philosophical division of the sciences we pass to the hybrid arrangement adopted by Vincent of Beauvais, who died in 1264. This man was a prodigious devourer of books, and for a sufficient pabulum, St. Louis set before him his collection of twelve hundred volumes. Thereupon Vincent compiled the most famous of mediaeval encyclopaedias, employing in that labour enormous diligence and a number of assistants. His ponderous _Speculum majus_ is drawn from the most serviceable sources, including the works of Albertus, his contemporary, and great scholastics like Hugo of St. Victor, who were no more. It consisted of the _Speculum naturale_, _doctrinale_, and _historiale_; and a fourth, the _Speculum morale_, was added by a later hand.[441] Turning its leaves, and reading snatches here and there, especially from its Prologues, we shall gain a sufficient illustration of the arrangement of topics followed by this writer, whose faculties seem to drown in his shoreless undertaking.[442]

In his turgid _generalis prologus_ to the _Speculum naturale_, Vincent presents his motives for collecting in one volume

“... certain flowers according to my modicum of faculty, gathered from every one I have been able to read, whether of our Catholic Doctors or the Gentile philosophers and poets. Especially have I drawn from them what seemed to pertain either to the building up of our dogma, or to moral instruction, or to the incitement of charity’s devotion, or to the mystic exposition of divine Scripture, or to the manifest or symbolical explanation of its truth. Thus by one grand _opus_ I would appease my studiousness, and perchance, by my labours, profit those who, like me, try to read as many books as possible, and cull their flowers. Indeed of making many books there is no end, and neither is the eye of the curious reader satisfied, nor the ear of the auditor.”

He then refers to the evils of false copying and the ascription of extracts to the wrong author. And it seems to him that Church History has been rather neglected, while men have been intent on expounding knotty problems. And now considering how to proceed and group his various matters, Vincent could find no better method than the one he has chosen, “to wit, that after the order of Holy Scripture, I should treat first of the Creator, next of the creation, then of man’s fall and reparation, and then of events (_rebus gestis_) chronologically.” He proposes to give a summary of titles at the end of the work. Sometimes he may state as his own, things he has had from his teachers or from very well-known books; and he admits that he did not have time to collate the _gesta martyrum_, and so some of the abstracts which he gives of these are not by his own hand, but by the hand of scribes (_notariorum_).

Vincent proposes to call the whole work _Speculum majus_, a Speculum indeed, or an _Imago mundi_, “containing in brief whatever, from unnumbered books, I have been able to gather, worthy of consideration, admiration, or imitation _as to things which have been made or done or said in the visible or invisible world from the beginning until the end, and even of things to come_.” He briefly adverts to the utility of his work, and then gives his motive for including history. This he thinks will help us to understand the story of Christ; and from a perusal of the wars which took place “before the advent of our pacific King, the reader will perceive with what zeal we should fight against our spiritual foes, for our salvation and the eternal glory promised us.” From the great slaughter of men in many wars, may be realized also the severity of God against the wicked, who are slain like sheep, and perish body and soul.[443]

As to nature, Vincent says:

“Moreover I have diligently described the nature of things, which, I think, no one will deem useless, who, in the light of grace, has read of the power, wisdom and goodness of God, creator, ruler and preserver, in that same book of the Creation appointed for us to read.”

Moreover, to know about things is useful for preachers and theologians, as Augustine says. But Vincent is conscious of another motive also:

“Verily how great is even the humblest beauty of this world, and how pleasing to the eye of reason diligently considering not only the modes and numbers and orders of things, so decorously appointed throughout the universe, but also the revolving ages which are ceaselessly uncoiled through abatements and successions, and are marked by the death of what is born. I confess, sinner as I am, with mind befouled in flesh, that I am moved with spiritual sweetness toward the creator and ruler of this world, and honour Him with greater veneration, when I behold at once the magnitude, and beauty and permanence of His creation. For the mind, lifting itself from the dunghill of its affections, and rising, as it is able, into the light of speculation, sees as from a height the greatness of the universe containing in itself infinite places filled with the divers orders of creatures.”

Here Vincent feels it well to apologize for the limitlessness of his matter, being only an excerptor, and not really knowing even a single science; and he refers to the example of Isidore’s _Etymologiae_. He proceeds to enumerate the various sources upon which he relies, and then to summarize the headings of his work; which in brief are as follows:

The Creator.

The empyrean heaven and the nature of angels; the state of the good, and the ruin of the proud, angels.

The formless material and the making of the world, and the nature and properties of each created being, according to the order of the Works of the Six Days.

The state of the first man.

The nature and energies of the soul, and the senses and parts of the human body.

God’s rest and way of working.

The state of the first man and the felicity of Paradise.

Man’s fall and punishment.

Sin.

The reparation of the Fall.

The properties of faith and other virtues in order, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the beatitudes.

_The number and matter of all the sciences._

_Chronological history of events in the world, and memorable sayings, from the beginning to our time_, with a consideration of the state of souls separated from their bodies, of the times to come, of Antichrist, the end of the World, the resurrection of the dead, the glorification of the saints and the punishments of the wicked.

One may stand aghast at the programme. Yet practically all of it would go into a _Summa theologiae_, excepting the human history, and the matter of what we should call the arts and sciences! A programme like this might be handled summarily, according to the broad captions under which it is stated; or it might be carried out in such detail as to include all available information, or opinion, touching every part of every topic included under these universal heads. The latter is Vincent’s way. Practically he tries to include all knowledge upon everything. The first of his tomes (the _Speculum naturale_) is to be devoted to a full description of the forms and species of created beings, which make up the visible world. Yet it includes much relating to beings commonly invisible; for Vincent begins with a treatment of the angels. He then passes to a consideration of the seven heavens; and then to the physical phenomena of nature; then on to every known species of plant, the cultivation of trees and vines, and the making of wine; then to the celestial bodies, and after this to living things, birds, fishes, savage beasts, reptiles, the anatomy of animals,--and at last comes to man. He discusses him body and soul, his psychology, and the phenomena of sleep and waking; then human anatomy--nor can he keep from considerations touching the whole creation; then human generation, and a description of the countries and regions of the earth, with a brief compendium of history until the time of Antichrist and the Last Judgment. Of course he is utterly uncritical, even the pseudo-Turpin’s fictions as to Charlemagne serving him for authority.

Vincent’s Prologue to his second tome, the _Speculum doctrinale_, briefly mentions the topics of the _tota naturalis historia_, contained in his first giant tome. In that he had brought his matter down to God’s creation of _humana natura, omnium rerum finis ac summa_--and its spoliation (_destitutio_) through sin. _Humana natura_ as constituted by God, was a _universitas_ of all nature or created being, corporeal and spiritual. Now

“in this second part, in like fashion we propose to treat of the plenary restitution of that destitute nature.... And since that restitution, or restoration, is effected and perfected by _doctrina_ (imparted knowledge, science), this part not improperly is called the _Speculum doctrinale_. For of a surety everything pertaining to recovering or defending man’s spiritual or temporal welfare (_salutem_) is embraced under _doctrina_. In this book, the sciences (_doctrinae_) and arts are treated thus: First concerning all of them in general, to wit, concerning their invention, origin, and species; and concerning the method of acquiring them. Then concerning the singular arts and sciences in particular. And here first concerning those of the Trivium, which are devoted to language (grammar, rhetoric, logic); for without these, the others cannot be learned or communicated. Next concerning the practical ones (_practica_), because through them, the eyes of the mind being clarified, one ascends to the speculative (_theorica_). Then also concerning the mechanical ones; since, as they consist in making (_operatio_), they are joined by affinity to the _practica_. Finally concerning the speculative sciences (_theorica_), because the end and aim (_finis_) of all the rest is placed by the wise in them. And since (as Jerome says) one cannot know the power (_vis_) of the antidote unless the power of the poison first is understood, therefore to the _reparatio doctrinalis_ of the human race, the subject of the book, something is prefixed as a brief epilogue from the former book, concerning the fall and misery of man, in which he still labours, as the penalty for his sin, in lamentable exile.”

So Vincent begins with the fall and misery of man; the _peccatum_ and the _supplicium_. Then he proceeds to discuss the goods (_bona_) which God bestows, like the mental powers, by which man may learn wisdom, and how to strive against error and vice, and be overcome solely by the desire of the highest and immutable good. He speaks also of the corporeal goods bestowed on man, and the beauty and utility of visible things; and then of the principal evils;--ignorance which corrupts the divine image in man, concupiscence which destroys the divine similitude, sickness which destroys his original bodily immortality. “And the remedies are three by which these three evils may be repelled, and the three goods restored, to wit, Wisdom, Virtue, and Need.”

Here we touch the gist of the ordering of topics in the _Speculum doctrinale_, which treats of all the arts and sciences:

“For the obtaining of these three remedies every art and every _disciplina_ was invented. In order to gain Wisdom, _Theorica_ was devised; and _Practica_ for the sake of virtue; and for Need’s sake, _Mechanica_. _Theorica_ driving out ignorance, illuminates Wisdom; _Practica_ shutting out vice, strengthens Virtue; _Mechanica_ providing against penury, tempers the infirmities of the present life. _Theorica_, in all that is and that is not, chooses to investigate the true. _Practica_ determines the correct way of living and the form of discipline, according to the institution of the virtues. _Mechanica_ occupied with fleeting things, strives to provide for the needs of the body. For the end and aim of all human actions and studies, which reason regulates, ought to look either to the reparation of the integrity of our nature or to alleviating the needs to which life is subjected. The integrity of our nature is repaired by Wisdom, to which _Theorica_ relates, and by Virtue, which _Practica_ cultivates. Need is alleviated by the administration of temporalities, to which _Mechanica_ attends. Last found of all is Logic, source of eloquence, through which the wise who understand the aforesaid principal sciences and disciplines, may discourse upon them more correctly, truly and elegantly; more correctly, through Grammar; more truly through Dialectic; more elegantly through Rhetoric.”[444]

Thus the entire round of arts and sciences is connected with man’s corporeal and spiritual welfare, and is made to bear directly or indirectly on his salvation. All constitutes _doctrina_, and by _doctrina_ man is saved. This is the reason for including the arts and sciences in one tome, rightly called the _Speculum doctrinale_. We need not follow the detail, but may view as from afar the long course ploughed by Vincent through his matter. He first sketches the history of antique philosophy, and then turns to books and language, and presents a glossary of Latin synonyms. Book II. treats of Grammar, Book III. of Logic, Book IV. of _Practica scientia_ or _Ethica_, first giving pagan ethics and then passing on to the virtues of the monastic life. Book V. is a continuation of this subject. Book VI. concerns the _Scientia oeconomica_, treating of domestic economy, then of agriculture. Books VII. and VIII. take up Politica, and, having discussed political institutions, proceed to a treatment of law--the law of persons, things, and actions, according to the canon and the civil law. Books IX. and X. consider Crimes--simony, heresy, perjury, sacrilege, homicide, rape, adultery, robbery, usury. Book XI. is more cheerful, _De arte mechanica_, and tells of building, the military art, navigation, alchemy, and metals. Book XII. is Medicine, and Books XIII. and XIV. discuss Physics, in connection with the healing art.

## Book XV. is Natural Philosophy--animals and plants. Book XVI., _De

mathematica_, treats of arithmetic, music, geometry, astronomy, and metaphysics cursorily. Book XVII. likewise thins out in a somewhat slight discussion of Theology, which was to form the topic of the tome that Vincent did not write.

But Vincent did complete another tome, the _Speculum historiale_. It is a loosely chronological compilation of tradition, myth, and history, with discursions upon the literary works of the characters coming under review. It would be tedious to follow its excerpted presentation of the profane and sacred matter.

We may leave Vincent, with the obvious reflection that his work is a conglomerate, both in arrangement and contents. It has the pious aim of contributing to man’s salvation, and yet is an attempted universal encyclopaedia of human knowledge, much of which is plainly secular and mundane. The monstrous scope and dual purpose of the work prevented any unity in method and arrangement. More single in aim, and better arranged in consequence, are the _Sentences_ of Peter Lombard and the _Summa theologiae_ of Aquinas. For although their scope, at least the scope of the _Summa_, is wide, all is ordered with respect to the true aim of _sacra doctrina_, just as Thomas explained in the passage which we have already given.

The alleged principle of the Lombard’s division strikes one as curious; yet he got it from Augustine: _Signum_ and _res_--the symbol and the thing: verily an age-long play of spiritual tendency lay back of these contrasted concepts. Christian _doctrina_ related, perhaps chiefly, to the significance of _signa_, signs, symbols, allegories, mysteries, sacraments. It was not so strange that the Lombard made this antithesis the ground of his arrangement. Quite as of course he begins by saying it is clear to any one who considers, with God’s grace, that the “contents of the Old and New Law are occupied either with _res_ or _signa_. For as the eminent doctor Augustine says in his _Doctrina Christiana_, all teaching is of things or signs; but things also are learned through signs. Properly those are called _res_ which are not employed in order to signify something; while _signa_ are those whose use is to signify.” Then the Lombard separates the sacraments from other _signa_, because they not only signify, but also confer saving aid; and he points out that evidently a _signum_ is also some sort of a thing; but not everything is a _signum_. He will treat first of _res_ and then of _signa_.

As to _res_, one must bear in mind, as Augustine says, that some things are to be enjoyed (_fruendum_), as from love we cleave to them for their own sake; and others are to be used (_utendum_) as a means; and still others to be both enjoyed and used.

“Those which are to be enjoyed make us blessed (_beatos_); those which are to be used, aid us striving for blessedness.... We ourselves are the things which are both to be enjoyed and used, and also the angels and the saints.... The things which are to be enjoyed are Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and so the Trinity is _summa res_.”

So the Lombard’s first two Books consider _res_ in the descending order of their excellence; the third considers the Incarnation, which, if not itself a sacrament, and the chief and sum of all sacraments, is the source of those of the New Law, considered in the fourth Book. The scheme is single and orderly; the difficulty will be in actually arranging the various topics within it. Endeavouring to do so, the Lombard in Book I. puts together the doctrine of the Trinity, the three Persons composing it, and their attributes and qualities. Book II. considers in order, the Angels, and very briefly, the work of the Six Days down to the creation of man; then the Christian _doctrina_ as to man is presented: his creation and its reasons; the creation of his _anima_; the creation of woman; the condition of man and woman before the Fall; their sin; next free-will and grace. Book III. treats of the Incarnation, in all the aspects in which it may be known, and of the nature of Christ, His saving merit, and the grace which was in Him; also of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, the seven gifts of the Spirit, and the existence of them all in Christ. Book IV. considers the Sacraments of the New Law: Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, ordination to holy orders, marriage. It concludes with setting forth the Resurrection and the Last Judgment.

The first chapters of Genesis were the ultimate source of the Lombard’s actual arrangement. And the _Summa_ will follow the same order of treatment. One may perceive how naturally the adoption of this order came to Christian theologians by glancing over Augustine’s _De Genesi ad litteram_.[445] This Commentary was partially constructive, and not simply exegetical; and afforded a _cadre_, or frame, of topical ordering, which could readily be filled out with the contents of the _Sentences_ or even of the _Summa_: God, in His unity and trinity, the Creation, man especially, his fall, the Incarnation as the saving means of his restoration, and then the Sacraments, and the final Judgment unto heaven and hell. One may say that this was the natural and proper order of presenting the contents of the Christian _sacra doctrina_.

So the great _Summa theologiae_ of Thomas Aquinas adopts the same order which the Lombard had followed. The _Pars prima_ begins with defining _sacra doctrina_.[446] It then proceeds to consider God--whether He exists; then treats of His _simplicitas_ and _perfectio_; next of His attributes; His _bonitas_, _infinitas_, _immutabilitas_, _aeternitas_, _unitas_; then of our knowledge of Him; then of His knowledge, and therein of truth and falsity; thereupon are considered the divine will, love, justice, and pity; the divine providence and predestination; the divine power and beatitude.

All this pertains to the _unitas_ of the divine essence; and now Thomas passes on to the _Trinitas personarum_, or the more distinctive portions of Christian theology. He treats of the _processio_ and _relationes_ of the _divinae Personae_, and then of themselves--Father, Son, Holy Spirit, and then of their essential relationship and properties. Next he discusses the _missio_ of the divine Persons, and the relations between God and His Creation. First comes the consideration of the principle of creation, the _processio creaturarum a Deo_, and of the nature of created things, with some discussion of evil, whether it be a thing.

Among created beings, Thomas treats first of angels, and at great length; then of the physical creation, in its order--the work of the six days, but with no great detail. Then man, created of spiritual and corporeal substance--his complex nature is to be analysed and fathomed to its depths. Thomas discusses the union of the _anima ad corpus_; then the powers of the anima, _in generali_ and _in speciali_--the intellectual faculties, the appetites, the will and its freedom of choice; how the _anima_ knows--the full Aristotelian theory of cognition is given. Next, more specifically as to the creation of the soul and body of the first man, and the nature of the image and similitude of God within him; then as to man’s condition and faculties while in a state of innocence; also as to Paradise.

This closes the treatment of the _creatio et distinctio rerum_; and Thomas passes to their _gubernatio_, and the problem of how God conserves and moves the corporeal and spiritual; then concerning the action of one creature on another, and how the angels are ranged in hierarchies, and although purely spiritual beings, minister to men and guard them; then concerning the action of corporeal things, concerning fate, and the action of men upon men.

Here ends _Pars prima_. The first section of the second part (_Prima secundae_) begins. In a short Prologue Thomas says:

“Because man is made in the image of God, that is, free in his thought and will, and able to act through himself (_per se potestativum_), after what has been said concerning the Exemplar, God, and everything proceeding from the divine power according to His will, it remains for us to consider His image, to wit, man, in so far as he is the source or cause (_principium_) of his own works, having free-will and power over them.”

Hereupon Thomas takes up in order: the ultimate end of man; the nature of man’s beatitude, and wherein it consists, and how it may be attained; then voluntary and involuntary acts, and the nature and action of will; then fruition, intention, election, deliberation, consent, and actions good and bad, flowing from the will; then the passions; concupiscence and pleasure, sadness, hope and despair, fear, anger; next habits (_habitus_) and the virtues, intellectual, cardinal, theological; the gifts of the Spirit, and the beatitudes; the vices, and sin, and penalty. Thereupon it becomes proper to consider the external causes (_principia_) of acts: “The external cause (_principium_) moving toward good is God; who instructs us through law, and aids us through grace. Therefore we must speak, first of law, then of grace.” So Thomas discusses: the _essentia_ of law, and the different kinds of law--_lex aeterna_, _lex naturalis_, _lex humana_--their effect and validity; then the precepts of the Old Law (of the Old Testament); then as to the law of the Gospel and the need of grace; and lastly, concerning grace and human merit.

The _Secunda secundae_ (the second division of the second part) opens with a Prologue, in which the author says that, having considered generally the virtues and vices, and other things pertaining to the matter of ethics, it is needful to consider these same matters more particularly, each in turn; “for general moral statements (_sermones morales universales_) are less useful, inasmuch as actions are always _in particularibus_.” A more special statement of moral rules may proceed in two ways: the one from the side of the moral material, discussing this or that virtue or vice; the other considers what applies to special orders (_speciales status_) of men, for instance prelates and the lower clergy, or men devoted to the

## active or contemplative religious life. “We shall, therefore, consider

specially, first what applies to all conditions of men, and then what applies to certain orders (_determinatos status_).” Thomas adds that it will be best to consider in each case the virtue and corresponding gift, and the opposing vice, together; also that “virtues are reducible to seven, the three theological,[447] and the four cardinal virtues. Of the intellectual virtues, one is Prudence, which is numbered with the cardinal virtues; but ars does not pertain to morals, which relate to what is to be done, while ars is the correct faculty of making things (_recta ratio factibilium_).[448] The other three intellectual virtues, _sapientia_, _intellectus_, _et scientia_, bear the names of certain gifts of the Holy Spirit, and are considered with them. Moral virtues are all reducible to the cardinal virtues; and therefore, in considering each cardinal virtue, all the virtues related to it are considered, and the opposite vices.”

This classification of the virtues seems anything but clear. And perhaps the weakest feature of the _Summa_ is this scarcely successful ordering, or combination, of the Aristotelian virtues with those more germane to the Christian scheme. However this may be, the author of the _Summa_ proceeds to consider in order: _fides_, and the gifts (_dona_) of _intellectus_ and _scientia_ which correspond to the virtue faith; next the opposing vices: _infidelitas_, _haeresis_, _apostasia_, _blasphemia_, and _caecitas mentis_ (spiritual blindness). Next in order come the virtue _spes_, and the corresponding gift of the Spirit, _timor_, and the opposing vices of _desperatio_ and _praesumptio_.[449] Next, _caritas_, with its _dilectio_, its _gaudium_, its _pax_, its _misericordia_, its _beneficentia_ and _eleemosyna_, and its _correctio fraterna_; then the opposite vices, _odium_, _acedia_, _invidia_, _discordia_, _contentio_, _schisma_, _bellum_, _rixa_, _seditio_, _scandalum_. Next the _donum sapientiae_, and its opposite, _stultitia_; next, _prudentia_, and its correspondent gift, _consilium_; and its connected vices, _imprudentia_, _negligentia_, and its evil semblances, _dolus_ and _fraus_.

Says Thomas: _Consequenter post prudentiam considerandum est de Justitia_. Whereupon follows a juristic treatment of _jus_, _justitia_, _judicium_, _restitutio_, _acceptio personarum_; then _homicide_ and other crimes recognized by law. Then come the virtues, connected with _justitia_, to wit, _religio_, and its acts, _devotio_, _oratio_, _adoratio_, _sacrificium_, _oblatio_, _decimae_, _votum_, _juramentum_; then the vices opposed to _religio_: _superstitio_, _idolatria_, _tentatio Dei_, _perjurium_, _sacrilegium_, _simonia_. Next is considered the virtue of _pietas_; then _observantia_, with its parts, i.e. _dulia_ (service), _obedientia_, and its opposite, _inobedientia_. Next, _gratia_ (thanks) or _gratitudo_, and its opposite, _ingratitudo_; next, _vindicatio_ (punishment); next, _veritas_, with its opposites, _hypocrisis_, _jactantia_ (boasting), and _ironia_; next, _amicitia_, with the vices of _adulatio_ and _litigium_. Next, the virtue of _liberalitas_, and its vices, _avaritia_ and _prodigalitas_; next, _epieikeia_ (_aequitas_). Finally, closing this discussion of all that is connected with _Justitia_, Thomas speaks of its corresponding gift of the Spirit, _pietas_.

Now comes the third cardinal virtue, _Fortitudo_--under which _martyrium_ is the type of virtuous act; _intimiditas_ and _audacia_ are the two vices. Then the parts of _Fortitudo_, to wit, _magnanimitas_, _magnificentia_, _patientia_, _perseverantia_, and the obvious opposing vices. Next, the fourth cardinal virtue, _Temperantia_, its obvious opposing vices, and its parts, to wit, _verecundia_, _honestas_, _abstinentia_, _sobrietas_, _castitas_, _clementia_, _modestia_, _humilitas_, and the various appropriate acts and opposing vices related to these special virtues.

So far,[450] Thomas has been considering the virtues proper for all men; and now he comes to those specially pertaining to certain kinds of men, according to their gifts of grace, their modes of life, or the diversity of their offices, or stations. Of the special virtues related to gifts of grace, the first is _prophetia_, next _raptus_ (vision), then _gratia linguarum_, and _gratia miraculorum_. After this, the _vita activa_ and _contemplativa_, with their appropriate virtues, are considered. And then Thomas proceeds to speak _De officiis et statibus hominum_, and their respective virtues.

Here ends the _Secunda secundae_, and _Pars tertia_ opens with this Prologue:

“Inasmuch as our Saviour Jesus Christ (as witnesseth the Angel, _populum suum salvum faciens a peccatis eorum_) has shown in himself the way of truth, through which we are able to come to the beatitude of immortal life by rising again, it is necessary, for the consummation of the whole theological matter, after the consideration of the final end of human life, and of the virtues and vices, that our attention should be fixed upon the Saviour of all and His benefactions to the human race.

“As to which, first one must consider the Saviour himself; secondly, His sacraments, by which we obtain salvation; thirdly, concerning the end (_finis_), immortal life, to which we come by rising again through Him.

“As to the first, one has to consider the mystery of the Incarnation, in which God was made man for our salvation, and then those things that were done and suffered by our Saviour, that is, God incarnate.”

This Prologue indicates sufficiently the order of topics in the _Pars tertia_ of the _Summa_, through Quaestio xc., at which point the hand of the Angelic Doctor was folded to eternal rest. He was then considering _penance_, the fourth in his order of Sacraments. All that he had to say as to the person, and attributes, and acts and passion of Christ had been written; and he had considered the Sacraments of baptism, confirmation, and the eucharist; he was occupied with _poenitentia_; and still other sacraments remained, as well as his final treatment of the matters which lie beyond the grave. So he left his work unfinished, and, in spite of many efforts, unfinishable by any of his pupils or successors.[451]

II

Inasmuch as the matter of their thoughts was transmitted to the men of the Middle Ages, and was not drawn from their own observation or constructive reasoning, the fundamental intellectual endeavour for mediaeval men was to apprehend and make their own, and re-express. Their intellectual progress followed this process of appropriation, and falls into three stages--learning, organically appropriating, and re-expressing with added elements of thought. Logically, and generally in time, these three stages were successive. Yet, of course, they overlapped, and may be observed progressing simultaneously. Thus, for example, what was known of Aristotle at the beginning of the twelfth century was slight compared with the knowledge of his philosophy that was opened to western Europe in the latter part of the twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth. And while, by the middle of the twelfth century, the elements of Aristotle’s logic had been thoroughly appropriated, the substantial Aristotelian philosophy had still to be learned and mastered, before it could be reformulated and re-expressed as part of mediaeval thought.

Looking solely to the outer form, the three stages of mediaeval thought are exemplified in the Scriptural Commentary of the later Carolingian time, in the twelfth-century _Books of Sentences_, and at last in the more organic _Summa theologiae_. With this significant evolution and change of outer form, proceeded the more substantial evolution consisting in learning, appropriating, and re-expressing the inherited material. In both cases, these three stages were necessitated by the greatness of the transmitted matter; for the intellectual energies of the mediaeval period were fully occupied with mastering the data proffered so pressingly, with presenting and re-presenting this superabundant material, and recasting it in new forms of statement, which were also expressions, or realizations, of the mediaeval genius. So the mediaeval product may be regarded as given by the past, and by the same token necessitated and controlled. But, on the other hand, each stage of intellectual progress rendered possible the next one.

The first stage of learning is represented by the Carolingian period, which we have considered. It was then that the patristic material was extracted from the writings of the Fathers, and rearranged and reapplied, to meet the needs of the time. The mastery of this material had scarcely made such vital progress as to enable the men of the ninth and tenth and eleventh centuries to re-express it largely in terms of their own thinking. In the ninth century, Eriugena affords an extraordinary exception with his drastic restatement of what he had drawn from Pseudo-Dionysius and others; and at the end comes Anselm, whose genius is metaphysically constructive. But Anselm touches the coming time; and the springs of Eriugena’s genius are hidden from us.

As for the antique thought during these Carolingian centuries, Eriugena dealt in his masterful way with what he knew of it through patristic and semi-patristic channels. But let us rather seek it in the curriculum of the Trivium and Quadrivium. What progress Gerbert made in the Quadrivium, that is, in the various branches of mathematics which he taught, has been noted, and to what extent his example was followed by his pupil Fulbert, at the cathedral school of Chartres.[452] The courses of the Trivium--grammar, rhetoric, logic--demand our closer attention; for they were the key of the situation. We must keep in mind that we are approaching mediaeval thought from the side of the innate human need of intellectual expression--the impulse to know and the need to formulate one’s conceptions and express them consistently. For mediaeval men the first indispensable means to this end was grammar, including rhetoric, and the next was logic or dialectic. The Latin language contained the sum of knowledge transmitted to the Middle Ages. And it had to be learned. This was true even in Italy and Spain and France, where each year the current ways of Romance speech were departing more definitely from the parent stock; it was more patently true in the countries of Teutonic speech. Centuries before, the Roman youth had studied grammar that they might speak and write correctly. Now it was necessary to study Latin grammar, to wit, the true forms and literary usages of the Latin tongue, in order to acquire any branch of knowledge whatsoever, and express one’s corresponding thoughts. And men would not at first distinguish sharply between the mediating value of the learned tongue and the learning which it held.[453]

Thus grammar, the study of the Latin language, represented the first stage of knowledge for mediaeval men. This was to remain true through all the mediaeval centuries; since all youths who became scholars had to learn the language before they could study what was contained in it alone. One may also say, and yet not speak fantastically, that grammar, the study of the correct use of the language itself, corresponded spiritually with the main intellectual labour of the Carolingian period. Alcuin’s attention is commonly fixed upon the significance of language, Latin of course. And the labours of his pupil Rabanus, and the latter’s pupil Walafrid, are as it were devoted to the grammar of learning. That is to say, they read and endeavour to understand the works of the Fathers; they compare and collate, and make volumes of extracts, which they arrange for the most part as Scripture commentaries; commentaries, that is, upon the significance of the canonical writings which were the substance of all wisdom, but needed much explication. Such works were the very grammar of knowledge, being devoted to the exposition of the meaning of the Scriptures and the vast burden of patristic thought. A like purpose was evinced in the efforts of the great emperor himself to re-establish schools of grammar, in order that the Scriptures might be more correctly understood, and the expositions of the holy Fathers. In fine, just as knowledge of the Latin tongue was the end and aim of grammar, so a correct understanding of what was contained in Latin books was the aim of the intellectual labours of this period. It all represented the first stage in the mediaeval acquisition of knowledge, or in the presentation or expression of the same; and thus the first stage in the mediaeval endeavour to realize the human impulse to know.

The next course of the Trivium was logic; and likewise its study will represent truly the second stage in the mediaeval realization of the human impulse to know, to wit, the second stage in the appropriation and expression of the knowledge transmitted from the past. We have spoken at some length of the logical studies of Gerbert, and his endeavours to adjust his thinking and classify the branches of knowledge by means of formal logic.[454] Those discussions of his which seem somewhat puerile to us, were essential to his endeavours to formulate what he had learned, and present it as rational and ordered knowledge. Logic is properly the stage succeeding grammar in the formulation of rational knowledge. At least it was for men of Gerbert’s time, and the following centuries. Rightly enough they looked on logic as a _scientia sermotionalis_, which on one side touched sheer linguistics, and on the other, had for its field the further processes of reason. Thus Hugo of St. Victor, Abaelard’s very great contemporary, says:

“Logic is named from the Greek word _logos_, which has a twofold interpretation. For _logos_ means either _sermo_ or _ratio_; and therefore logic may be termed either a _scientia sermotionalis_ or a _scientia rationalis_. _Logica rationalis_ embraces dialectic and rhetoric, and is called _discretiva_ (argumentative and exercising judgment); _logica sermotionalis_ is the genus which includes grammar, dialectic and rhetoric, to wit, discursive science (_disertiva_).”[455]

The close connection between grammar and logic is evident. Logic treats of language used in rational expression, as well as of the reasoning processes carried on in language. Its elementary chapters teach a rational use of language, whereby men may reach a more deeply consistent expression of their thoughts than is gained from grammar. Yet grammar also is logic, and based on logical principles. All this is exemplified in the logical treatises composing the Aristotelian _Organon_, which the Middle Ages used. First comes Porphyry’s _Isagoge_, which clearly is bound up in language. Likewise Aristotle’s _Categories_ treat of the rational and consistent use of language, or of what may be stated in language. Next it is obvious that the _De interpretatione_ treats of language used to express thought, its generic function. The more advanced treatises of the _Organon_, the _Prior_ and _Posterior Analytics_, the _Topics_, and _Sophistical Elenchi_, treat directly and elaborately of the reasoning processes themselves. So one perceives the grammatical affinities of the simpler treatises in the _Organon_. The more advanced ones seem to stand to them as oratorical rhetoric stands to elementary grammar. For the _Analytics_, _Topics_, and _Sophistical Elenchi_ are a kind of _eristic_, training the student to use the processes of thought and their expression in order to attain an end, commonly argumentative. The prior treatises have taught the elements, as it were the orthography and etymology of the rational expression of thought in language; the latter (even as syntax and rhetoric), train the student in the use of these elements. And one observes a nice historical fitness in the fact that only the simpler treatises of the _Organon_ were in common use in the early Middle Ages, since they alone were necessary to the first stage in the appropriation of the substance of patristic and antique thought. The full _Organon_ was rediscovered, and retaken into use in the middle or latter part of the twelfth century, when men had progressed to a more organic appropriation of the patristic material and what they knew of the antique philosophy.

Thus in mediaeval education, and in the successive order of appropriating the patristic and the antique, logic stood on grammar’s shoulders. It was grammar’s rationalized stage, and treated language as the means of expressing thought consistently and validly; that is, so as not to contravene the necessities of that whereof it was the vehicle. And since language thus treated was in accord with rational thought, it would accord with the realities to which thought corresponds; and might be taken as expressing _them_. This last reflection introduces metaphysics.

And properly. For the three stages in the mediaeval appropriation and expression of knowledge were grammar, logic, metaphysics. Logic has to do with the processes of thought; with the positing of premises and the drawing of the conclusion. It does not necessarily consider whether the contents of its premises represent realities. This is matter for ontology, metaphysics. Now mediaeval metaphysics, which were those of Greek philosophy, were extremely pre-Kantian, in assuming a correspondence between the necessities or conclusions of thought and the supreme realities, God and the Universe. Nor did mediaeval logic doubt that its processes could elucidate and express the veritable natures of things. So mediaeval logic readily wandered into the province of metaphysics, and ignored the line between the two.

Yet there is little metaphysics in the _Organon_; none in its simpler treatises. So there was none in the elementary logical instruction of the schools before the twelfth century at least.[456] One may always distinguish between logic and metaphysics; and it is to our purpose to do so here. For as we have taken logic to represent the second stage in the mediaeval appropriation of knowledge, so metaphysics, poised in turn on logic’s shoulders, is very representative of the third stage, to wit, the stage of systematic and organic re-expression of the ancient matter, with elements added by the great schoolmen.

Metaphysics was very properly the final stage. The grammatical represented an elementary learning of what the past had transmitted; the logical a further retrying of the matter, an attempt to understand and express it, formulate parts of it anew, with deeper consistency of expression. Then follows the attempt for final and universal consistency: final inasmuch as thought penetrates to the nature of things and expresses realities and the relationships of realities; and universal, in that it seeks to order and systematize all its concepts, and bring them to unity in a _Summa_--a perfected scheme of rational presentation of God and His creation. This will be, largely speaking, the final endeavour of the mediaeval man to ease his mind, and realize _his_ impulse to know and express himself with uttermost consistency.

So for mediaeval men, metaphysics stood on logic’s shoulders and represented the final completion of their thought, in a universal system and scheme of God and man and things.[457] But the first part of this proposition had not been true with Greek philosophy. Metaphysics is properly occupied with being, in its ultimate essence and relationships; with the consistent putting together of things, to wit, the presentation or expression of them so as not to disagree with any of the data recognized as pertinent. The thinker considers profoundly, seeking to penetrate the ultimate reality and relationships of things, through which a universal whole is constituted. This makes ontology, metaphysics--the science of being, of causes, and so the science of the first Cause, God. Aristotle called this the “first” philosophy, because lying at the base of all branches of knowledge, and depending on nothing beyond itself. Some time after his death, the Peripatetics and then the Neo-Platonists called this first science by the name of Metaphysics, “after” or “beyond” physics, if one will, perhaps because of the actual order of treatment in the schools.

The term Metaphysics is vague enough; either “first” philosophy or “ontology” is preferable. Yet as to Greek philosophy the term has apt historical suggestiveness. For it did come after physics in time, and was in fact evoked by the imperfect method and consequent contradictions of the earlier philosophies. From the beginning, Greek philosophy drove straight at the cause or origin of things--surely the central problem of metaphysics. Thales and the other Ionians began with rational, though crude, hypotheses as to the sources of the universe. These were first attempts to reach a consistent expression of its origin and nature. Each succeeding philosopher considered further, from the vantage-ground of the recognized inconsistencies or inadequacies in the theories of his predecessors. He was thus led on to consider more profoundly the essential relationships of things, the very truth of their relationships, and on and on into the problem of their being. For the verity of relations must be according to the verity of being of the things related. The world about us consists in relationships, of antecedents and sequences, of cause and effect; and our thought of it is made up of consistencies or contradictions, which last we struggle to eliminate, or to transform to consistencies.

These early philosophers looked only to the Aristotelian material cause for the origin and cause of things; yet reflection plunged them deeper into a consideration of the nature of being and relationships. The other causes were evoked by Anaxagoras and then by Plato, and by them were led into the arena of debate; and philosophers discussed the efficient and final cause as well as the material. Such discussions are recognized by Plato, and finally by Aristotle as relating to the first principles of cognition and being, and so as constituting metaphysics. The constant search for a deeper consistency of explanation had led on and on through a manifold consideration of those palpable relationships which make up the visible world; it had disclosed the series of necessary assumptions required by those visible relationships; and thus the search for causality and origins, and essential relationships, became one and the same--metaphysics.

Metaphysics was not ineptly called so, since it had in time come after the cruder physical hypotheses. But such was not the order of _mediaeval_ intellectual progress. The Middle Ages passed through no preliminary course of physical hypotheses, explanatory of the universe. Not physics, but logic (introduced by grammar) led up to the final construction--or rather adoption and reconstruction--of ultimate hypotheses as to God and man, led up to the all-ordering and all-compassing _Theologia_. _Metalogics_, rather than Metaphysics, would be the proper name for these final expressions or actualizations of the mediaeval impulse to know.

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