chapter xiii

., which is devoted to the _scientia experimentalis_:

“But beyond these sciences is one more perfect than all, which all serve, and which in a wonderful way certifies them all: this is called the experimental science, which neglects arguments, since they do not make certain, however strong they may be, unless at the same time there is present the _experientia_ of the conclusion. Experimental science teaches _experiri_, that is, to test, by observation or experiment, the lofty conclusions of all sciences.” This science none but Master Peter knows.

By following the text further, we may be able to appreciate what Bacon will shortly say of him:

“Another dignity of this science is that it attests these noble truths in terms of the other sciences, which they cannot prove or investigate: like the prolongation of human life; for this truth is in terms of medicine, but the art of medicine never extends itself to this truth, nor is there anything about it in medical treatises. But the _fidelis experimentator_ has considered that the eagle, and the stag, and the serpent, and the phoenix prolong life, and renew their youth, and knows that these things are given to brutes for the instruction of men. Wherefore he has thought out noble plans (_vias nobiles_) with this in view, and has commanded alchemy to prepare a body of like constitution (_aequalis complexionis_), that he may use it.”

It may be pertinent to our estimate of Bacon’s experimental science to query where the _experimentator_ ever observed an eagle or a phoenix renewing its youth, outside of the _Physiologus_?

“The third dignity of this science is that it does not accept truths in terms of the other sciences, yet uses them as handmaids.... And this science attests all natural and artificial data specifically and in the proper province, _per experientiam perfectam_; not through arguments, like the purely speculative sciences, and not through weak and imperfect _experientias_, like the operative sciences (_scientiae operativae_).[648] So this is the mistress of all, and the goal of all speculation. But it requires great expenditures for its prosecution; Aristotle, by Alexander’s authority, besides those whom he used at home _in experientia_, sent many thousands of men through the world to examine (_ad experiendum_) the natures and properties of all things, as Pliny tells. And certainly to set on fire at any distance would cost more than a thousand marks, before adequate glasses could be prepared; but they would be worth an army against the Turks and Saracens. For the perfect experimenter could destroy any hostile force by this combustion through the sun’s rays. This is a marvellous thing, yet there are many other things more wonderful in this science; but very few people are devoted to it, from lack of money. I know but one, who deserves praise for the prosecution of its works; he cares not for wordy controversies, but prosecutes the works of wisdom, and in them rests. So what others as purblind men try to see, like bats in the twilight, he views in the full brightness of day, because he is _dominus experimentorum_. He knows natural matters _per experientiam_, and those of medicine and alchemy, and all things celestial and below. He is ashamed if any layman, or old woman, or knight, or rustic, knows what he does not. He has studied everything in metal castings, and gold and silver work, and the use of other metals and minerals; he knows everything pertaining to war and arms and hunting; he has examined into agriculture and surveying; also into the experiments and fortune-tellings of old women, knows the spells of wizards; likewise the tricks and devices of jugglers. In fine, nothing escapes him that he ought to know, and he knows how to expose the frauds of magic.”

It is impossible to complete philosophy, usefully and with certitude, without Peter; but he is not to be had for a price; he could have had every honour from princes; and if he wished to publish his works, the whole world of Paris would follow him. But he cares not a whit for honours or riches, though he could get them any time he chose through his wisdom. This man has worked at such a burning-glass for three years, and soon will perfect it by the grace of God.

There is a great deal of Roger Bacon in these curious passages; much of his inductive genius, much of his sanguine hopefulness, not to say inventive imagination; and enough of his credulity. No one ever knew or could perform all he ascribes to this astounding Peter, from whom, apparently, there is extant a certain intelligent treatise upon the magnet.[649] And as for those burning-glasses, or possibly reflectors, by which distant fleets and armies should be set afire--did they ever exist? Did Archimedes ever burn with them the Roman ships at Syracuse? Were they ever more than a myth? It is, at all events, safe to say that no device from the hand and brain of Peter of Maharncuria ever threatened Turk or Saracen.

It is knowledge that gives insight. Modern critical methods amount chiefly to this, that we know more. Bacon did not have such knowledge of animal physiology as would assure him of the absurdity of the notion that an eagle or any animal could renew its youth. Nor did he know enough to realise the vast improbability of Greek philosophers drawing their knowledge from the books of Hebrew prophets. And one sees how loose must have been the practice, or the dreams, of his “experimental science.” His fundamental conception seems to waver: _Scientia experimentalis_, is it a science, or is it a means and method universally applicable to all scientific investigation? The sciences serve it as handmaids, says Bacon; and he also says, that it alone can test and certify, make sure and certain, the conclusions of the other sciences. Perhaps he thought it the master-key fitting all the doors of knowledge; and held that all sciences, so far as possible, should proceed from experience, through further observation and experiment. But he has not said quite this.

He is little to be blamed for his vagueness, and greatly to be admired for having reached his possibly inconsistent conception. Observation and experiment were as old as human thought upon human experience. And Albert the Great says that the conclusions of all sciences should be tested by them. But he evinces no formal conception of either an experimental science or method; though he has much to say as to logic, and ponderously considers whether it is a science or the means or method of all sciences.[650] Herein he is discussing consciously with respect to logic, the very point as to which Bacon, in respect to experimental science, rather unconsciously wavers: is it a science, and almost the queen? Or is it the true scientific method to be followed by all sciences when applicable?[651] Bacon had no high regard for the study of logic, deeming that the thoughts of untaught men naturally followed its laws.[652] This was doubtless true, and just as true, moreover, of experimental science as of logic. The one and the other were built up from the ways of the common man and universal processes of thought. Yet the logic of the trained mind is the surer; and so experimental science may reach out beyond the crude observations of unscientific men.

Manifestly with Roger Bacon the _scientia experimentalis_ held the place which logic held with Albert, or queenly dialectic with Abaelard. He repeats himself continually in stating its properties and prerogatives, yet without advancing to greater clearness of conception. _Pars sexta_ of the _Opus majus_ is devoted to it: and we may take one last glance to see whether the statements there throw any further light upon the matter.

“The roots of the wisdom of the Latins having been placed and set in Languages, Mathematics, and Perspective, I now wish to re-examine these _radices_ from the side of _scientia experimentalis_; because, without _experientia_ nothing can be known adequately. There are two modes of arriving at knowledge (_cognoscendi_), to wit, argument and _experimentum_. Argument draws a conclusion and forces us to concede it, but does not make it certain or remove doubt, so that the mind may rest in the perception of truth, unless the mind find truth by the way of experience.”

And Bacon says, as illustration, that you could never by mere argument convince a man that fire would burn; also that “in spite of the demonstration of the properties of an equilateral triangle, the mind would not stick to the conclusion _sine experientia_.”

After referring to Aristotle, and adducing some examples of foolish things believed by learned and common men alike, because they had not applied the tests of observation, he concludes: “Oportet ergo omnia certificari per viam experientiae.” He continues with something unexpected:

“_Sed duplex est experientia_: one is through the external senses, and thus those _experimenta_ take place which are made through suitable instruments in astronomy, and by the tests of observation as to things below. And whatever like matters may not be observed by us, we know from other wise men who have observed them. This _experientia_ is human and philosophical; but it is not sufficient for man, because it does not give plenary assurance as to things corporeal; and as to things spiritual it reaches nothing. The intellect of man needs other aid, and so the holy patriarchs and prophets, who first gave the sciences to the world, received inner illuminations and did not stand on sense alone. Likewise many believers after Christ. For the grace of faith illuminates much, and divine inspirations, not only in spiritual but corporeal things, and in the sciences of philosophy. As Ptolemy says, the way of coming to a knowledge of things is duplex, one through the _experientia_ of philosophy, and the other through divine inspiration, which is much better.”[653]

Any doubt as to the religious and Christian meaning of the last passage is removed by Bacon’s statement of the

“seven grades of this inner science: the first is through _illuminationes pure scientiales_; the next consists in virtues, for the bad man is ignorant; ... the third is in the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, which Isaiah enumerates; the fourth is in the beatitudes which the Lord defines in the Gospel; the fifth is in the _sensibus spiritualibus_; the sixth is in _fructibus_, from which is the peace of God which passes _omnem sensum_; the seventh consists in raptures (_in raptibus_) and their modes, as in various ways divers men have been enraptured, so that they saw many things which it is not lawful for man to tell. And who is diligently exercised in these experiences, or some of them, can certify both to himself and others not only as to spiritual things, but as to all human sciences.”[654]

These utterances are religious, and bring us back to the religious, or practical, motive of Bacon’s entire endeavour after knowledge: knowledge should have its utility, its practical bearing; and the ultimate utility is that which promotes a sound and saving knowledge of God. The true method of research, says Bacon in the _Compendium studii_,

“... is to study first what properly comes first in any science, the easier before the more difficult, the general before the particular, the less before the greater. The student’s business should lie in chosen and useful topics, because life is short; and these should be set forth with clearness and certitude, which is impossible without _experientia_. Because, although we know through three means, authority, reason, and _experientia_, yet authority is not wise unless its reason be given (_auctoritas non sapit nisi detur ejus ratio_), nor does it give knowledge, but belief. We believe, but do not know, from authority. Nor can reason distinguish sophistry from demonstration, unless we know that the conclusion is attested by facts (_experiri per opera_). Yet the fruits of study are insignificant at the present time, and the secret and great matters of wisdom are unknown to the crowd of students.”[655]

It is as with an echo of this thought, that Bacon begins the second chapter of his exposition of experimental science in the sixth part of the _Opus majus_, from which we have but now withdrawn our attention. He anxiously reiterates what he has already said more than once, as to the properties and prerogatives of this _scientia experimentalis_. Then he gives his most interesting and elaborate example of its application in the investigation of the rainbow, an example too lengthy and too difficult to reproduce. In stating the three prerogatives, he makes but slight change of phrasing; yet his restatement of the last of them:--“The third _dignitas_ of this science is that it investigates the secrets of nature by its own competency and out of its own qualities, irrespective of any connection with the other sciences,”--signifies an autonomous science, rather than a method applicable to all investigation. The illustrations which Bacon now gives, range free indeed; yet in the main relate to “useful discoveries” as one might say: to ever-burning lamps, Greek fire, explosives, antidotes for poison, and matters useful to the Church and State. Along these lines of discovery through experiment, Bacon lets his imagination travel and lead him on to surmises of inventions that long after him were realised. “Machines for navigating are possible without rowers, like great ships suited to river or ocean, going with greater velocity than if they were full of rowers: likewise wagons may be moved _cum impetu inaestimabili_, as we deem the chariots of antiquity to have been. And there may be flying machines, so made that a man may sit in the middle of the machine and direct it by some devise: and again, machines for raising great weights.”[656] The modern reality has outdone this mediaeval dream.

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