Chapter XXXVI
. I.
[428] _Introductio ad theologiam_, lib. ii. (Migne 178, col. 1039).
[429] See Denifle, “Die Sentenzen Abaelard’s und die Bearbeitungen seiner Theologia,” _Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte_, i. p. 402 _sqq._ and p. 584 _sqq._ Also Picavet, “Abélard et Alexander de Hales, créateurs de la méthode scholastique,” _Bib. de l’école des hautes études, sciences religieuses_, t. vii. p. 221 _sqq._
[430] Two extracts, one from the _Sentences_ and one from the _Summa_, touching the same matter, will illustrate the stage in the scholastic process reached by Peter Lombard, about the year 1150, and that attained by Thomas Aquinas a hundred years later.
The Lombard’s _Four Books of Sentences_ are divided into _Distinctiones_, with sub-titles to the latter. Distinctio xlvi. of the first Book bears the general title: “The opinion (_sententia_) declaring that the will of God which is himself, cannot be frustrated, seems to be opposed by some opinions.” The first subdivision of the text begins: “Here the question rises. For it is said by the authorities above adduced [the preceding Distinctio had discussed “The will of God which is His essence, one and eternal”] that the will of God, which is himself, and is called His good pleasure (_beneplacitum_) cannot be frustrated, because by that will _fecit quaecumque voluit in caelo et in terra_, which--witness the Apostle--_nihil resistit_. [I leave the Scriptural quotations in Latin, so as to mark them.] It is queried, therefore, how one should understand what the Apostle says concerning the Lord, 1 Tim. 2: _Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri_. For since all are not saved, but many are damned, that which God wills to take place, seems not to take place (become, _fieri_), the human will obstructing the will of God. The Lord also in the Gospel reproaching the wicked city, Matt, xxiii., says: _Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina congregat pullos suos sub alis, et noluisti_. Thus it might seem from these, that the will of God may be overcome by the will of men, and, resisted by the unwillingness of the weakest, the Most Strong may prove unable to do what He willed. Where then is that omnipotence by which in _coelo et terra_, according to the Prophet, _omnia quaecumque voluit fecit_? And how does nothing withstand His will, if He wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not? For these sayings seem indeed to oppose what has been stated.”
The second paragraph proceeds: “But let us see the solution, and first hear how what the Lord said should be understood. For it was not intended to mean (as Augustine says, _Enchiridion_, c. 97, solving this question) that the Lord wished to gather the children of Jerusalem, and did not do what He willed because she would not; but rather she did not wish her children to be gathered by Him, yet in spite of her unwillingness (_qua tamen nolente_) He gathered all He willed of her children.... And the sense is: As many as I have gathered by my will, always effective, I have gathered, thou being unwilling. Hence it is evident that these words of the Lord are not opposed to the authorities referred to.”
(Paragraph 3) “Now it remains to see how the aforesaid words do not contradict what the Apostle said of the Lord: _Vult omnes homines salvos fieri_. Because of these words many have wandered from the truth, saying that God willed many things which did not come to pass. But the saying is not thus to be understood, as if God willed any to be saved, and they were not. For who can be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot change the evil wills of men to good when and where He will? Surely what is said in Psalm 113, _Quaecumque voluit fecit_, is not true, if He willed anything and did not accomplish it. Or,--(and this is still more shameful) for that reason He did not do it, because what the Omnipotent willed to come to pass, the will of man obstructed. Hence when we read in Holy Scripture _velit omnes homines salvos fieri_, we should not detract from the will of omnipotent God, but understand the text to mean that no man is saved except whom He wills to be saved: not that there is no man whom He does not will to be saved, but that no man may be saved except whom He wills should be saved.... Thus also is to be understood the text from John i.: _Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum_; not as if there is no man who is not lighted, but that none is lighted save from Him....”
The next and fourth paragraph takes up the problem whether evil, that is sin, takes place by the will of God, or He unwilling (_eo nolente_). “As to this, divers men thinking diversely have been found in contradiction. For some say that God wills evils to be or become (_esse vel fieri_) yet does not will evils. But others say that He neither wills evils to be nor to become. Yet these and those agree in declaring that God does not will evils. Yet each with arguments as well as authorities strives to make good his assertion.” We will not follow the Lombard through this thorny problem. He cuts his way with passages from his chief patristic authority, Augustine, and in the end concludes: “Leaving this and other like foolish opinions, and favouring the sounder view, which is more fully sanctioned by the testimonies of the Saints, we may say that God neither wills evils to become, nor wills that they should not become, nor yet is He unwilling (_nolle_) that they should become. All that He wills to become, becomes, and all that He wills not to become does not become. Yet many things become which He does not will to become, as every evil.”
Thus the Lombard. Now let us see how Thomas, in his _Summa theologiae_, Pars Prima, Quaestio xix. Articulus ix. expounds the point: _utrum voluntas Dei sit malorum_.
“As to the ninth articulus thus one proceeds. (1) It seems [_Videtur_, formula for stating the initial argument which will not be approved] that the will of God is [the cause] of evils. For God wills every good that becomes (_i.e._ comes into existence). But it is good that evils should come; for Augustine says in the _Enchiridion_: ‘Although those things which are evils, in so far as they are evils, are not goods; yet it is good (_bonum_) that there should be not only goods (_bona_) but evils.’ Therefore God wills evils.”
“(2) Moreover [_Praeterea_, Thomas’s regular formula for introducing the succeeding arguments, which he will not approve] Dionysius says, iv. cap. _de divinis nominibus_: ‘There will be evil making for the perfection of the whole.’ And Augustine says in the _Enchiridion_: ‘Out of all (things) the admirable beauty of the universe arises; wherein even that which is called evil, well ordered and set in its place, commends the good more highly; since the good pleases more, and is the more praiseworthy, when compared with evil.’ But God wills everything that pertains to the perfection and grace of the universe; since this is what God chiefly wills in His creation. Therefore God wills evils.”
“(3) Moreover, the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils (_mala fieri, et non fieri_) are contradictory opposites. But God does not will evils not to occur; because since some evils do occur, the will of God would not be fulfilled. Therefore God wills evils to occur.”
“_Sed contra est_ [Thomas’s formula for stating the opinion which he will approve] what Augustine says in his book of Eighty-three Questions: ‘No wise man is the author of man’s deterioration; yet God is more excellent than any wise man; much less then, is God the author of any one’s deterioration. But He is said to be the author when He is spoken of as willing anything. Therefore man becomes worse, God not willing it. But with every evil, something becomes worse. Therefore God does not will evils.’”
“_Respondeo dicendum quod_ [Thomas’s formula for commencing his elucidation] since the reason (or ground or cause, _ratio_) of the good is likewise the reason of the desirable (as discussed previously), evil is opposed to good: it is impossible that any evil, as evil, should be desired, either by the natural appetite or the animal, or the intellectual, which is will. But some evil may be desired _per accidens_, in so far as it conduces to some good. And this is apparent in any appetite. For the natural impulse (_agens naturale_) does not aim at privation or destruction (_corruptio_); but at form, to which the privation of another form may be joined (_i.e._ needed, _conjungitur_); and at the generation of one, which is the destruction of another. Thus a lion, killing a stag, aims at food, to which is joined the killing of an animal. Likewise the fornicator aims at enjoyment, to which is joined the deformity of guilt.
“Thus evil which is joined to some good, is privation of another good. Never, therefore, is evil desired, not even _per accidens_, unless the good to which the evil is joined appears greater than the good which is annulled through the evil. But God wills no good more than His goodness; yet He wills some one good more than some other good. Hence the evil of guilt, which destroys relationship to divine good (_quod privat ordinem ad bonum divinum_), God in no way wills. But the evil of natural defect, or the evil of penalty, He wills in willing some good to which such evil is joined; as, in willing righteousness He wills penalty; and in willing that the order of nature be preserved, He wills certain natural corruptions.
“_Ad primum ergo dicendum_ [Thomas’s formula for commencing his reply to the first false argument] that certain ones have said that although God does not will evils, He wills evils to be or become: because, although evils are not goods, yet it is good that evils should be or become. They said this for the reason that those things which are evil in themselves, are ordained for some good; and they deemed this ordainment involved in saying _mala esse vel fieri_. But that is not said rightly. Because evil is not ordained for good _per se_ but _per accidens_. For it is beyond the sinner’s intent, that good should come of it; just as it was beyond the intent of the tyrants that from their persecutions the patience of the martyrs should shine forth. And therefore it cannot be said that such ordainment for good is involved in saying that it is good for evil to be or become: because nothing is adjudged according to what pertains to it _per accidens_ but according to what pertains to it _per se_.”
“_Ad secundum dicendum_ that evil is not wrought for the perfection or beauty of the whole except _per accidens_, as has been shown. Hence this which Dionysius says that evil makes for the perfection of the whole may lead to an illogical conclusion.”
“_Ad tertium dicendum_ that although the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils are opposed as contradictories; yet to will the occurrence and to will the non-occurrence of evils, are not opposed as contradictories, since both one and the other may be affirmative. God therefore neither wills the occurrence nor the non-occurrence of evils; but wills to permit their occurrence. And this is good.”
[431] _Ante_,