Part 39

We must object likewise to the view set forth in the preceding Sûtra, viz. that Brahman is denoted by terms denoting the individual soul because that soul when departing becomes one with Brahman. For that view cannot stand the test of being submitted to definite alternatives.--Is the soul's not being such, i.e. not being Brahman, previously to its departure from the body, due to its own essential nature or to a limiting adjunct, and is it in the latter case real or unreal? In the first case the soul can never become one with Brahman, for if its separation from Brahman is due to its own essential nature, that separation can never vanish as long as the essential nature persists. And should it be said that its essential nature comes to an end together with its distinction from Brahman, we reply that in that case it perishes utterly and does not therefore become Brahman. The latter view, moreover, precludes itself as in no way beneficial to man, and so on.-- If, in the next place, the difference of the soul from Brahman depends on the presence of real limiting adjuncts, the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the body, and we therefore cannot reasonably accept the distinction implied in saying that the soul becomes Brahman only when it departs. For on this view there exists nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, and as those adjuncts cannot introduce difference into Brahman which is without parts and hence incapable of difference, the difference resides altogether in the adjuncts, and hence the soul is Brahman even before its departure from the body.--If, on the other hand, the difference due to the adjuncts is not real, we ask--what is it then that becomes Brahman on the departure of the soul?--Brahman itself whose true nature had previously been obscured by Nescience, its limiting adjunct!--Not so, we reply. Of Brahman whose true nature consists in eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence, the true nature cannot possibly be hidden by Nescience. For by 'hiding' or 'obscuring' we understand the cessation of the light that belongs to the essential nature of a thing. Where, therefore, light itself and alone constitutes the essential nature of a thing, there can either be no obscuration at all, or if there is such it means complete annihilation of the thing. Hence Brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times, there exists no difference on account of which it could be said to _become_ Brahman at the time of the soul's departure; and the distinction introduced in the last Sûtra ('when departing') thus has no meaning. The text on which Audulomi relies, 'Having risen from this body,' &c., does not declare that that which previously was not Brahman becomes such at the time of departure, but rather that the true nature of the soul which had previously existed already becomes manifest at the time of departure. This will be explained under IV, 4, 1.

The theories stated in the two preceding Sûtras thus having been found untenable, the teacher Kâsakritsna states his own view, to the effect that words denoting the jîva are applied to Brahman because Brahman abides as its Self within the individual soul which thus constitutes Brahman's body. This theory rests on a number of well-known texts, 'Entering into them with this living (individual) soul let me evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He who dwelling within the Self, &c., whose body the Self is,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'He who moves within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body,' &c; 'Entered within, the ruler of beings, the Self of all.' That the term 'jîva' denotes not only the jîva itself, but extends in its denotation up to the highest Self, we have explained before when discussing the text, 'Let me evolve names and forms.' On this view of the identity of the individual and the highest Self consisting in their being related to each other as body and soul, we can accept in their full and unmutilated meaning all scriptural texts whatever--whether they proclaim the perfection and omniscience of the highest Brahman, or teach how the individual soul steeped in ignorance and misery is to be saved through meditation on Brahman, or describe the origination and reabsorption of the world, or aim at showing how the world is identical with Brahman. For this reason the author of the Sûtras, rejecting other views, accepts the theory of Kâsakritsna. Returning to the Maitreyî-brâhmana we proceed to explain the general sense, from the passage previously discussed onwards. Being questioned by Maitreyî as to the means of immortality, Yâjñavalkya teaches her that this means is given in meditation on the highest Self ('The Self is to be seen,' &c.). He next indicates in a general way the nature of the object of meditation ('When the Self is seen,' &c.), and--availing himself of the similes of the drum, &c.--of the government over the organs, mind, and so on, which are instrumental towards meditation. He then explains in detail that the object of meditation, i.e. the highest Brahman, is the sole cause of the entire world; and the ruler of the aggregate of organs on which there depends all activity with regard to the objects of the senses ('As clouds of smoke proceed,' &c.; 'As the ocean is the home of all the waters'). He, next, in order to stimulate the effort which leads to immortality, shows how the highest Self abiding in the form of the individual Self, is of one uniform character, viz. that of limitless intelligence ('As a lump of salt,' &c.), and how that same Self characterised by homogeneous limitless intelligence connects itself in the Samsâra state with the products of the elements ('a mass of knowledge, it rises from those elements and again vanishes into them'). He then adds, 'When he has departed, there is no more knowledge'; meaning that in the state of Release, where the soul's unlimited essential intelligence is not contracted in any way, there is none of those specific cognitions by which the Self identifying itself with the body, the sense-organs, &c., views itself as a man or a god, and so on. Next--in the passage, 'For where there is duality as it were'--he, holding that the view of a plurality of things not having their Self in Brahman is due to ignorance, shows that for him who has freed himself from the shackles of ignorance and recognises this whole world as animated by Brahman, the view of plurality is dispelled by the recognition of the absence of any existence apart from Brahman. He then proceeds, 'He by whom he knows all this, by what means should he know Him?' This means--He, i.e. the highest Self, which abiding within the individual soul as its true Self bestows on it the power of knowledge so that the soul knows all this through the highest Self; by what means should the soul know Him? In other words, there is no such means of knowledge: the highest Self cannot be fully understood by the individual soul. 'That Self,' he continues, 'is to be expressed as--not so, not so!' That means--He, the highest Lord, different in nature from everything else, whether sentient or non-sentient, abides within all beings as their Self, and hence is not touched by the imperfections of what constitutes his body merely. He then concludes, 'Whereby should he know the Knower? Thus, O Maitreyî, thou hast been instructed. Thus far goes Immortality'; the purport of these words being--By what means, apart from the meditation described, should man know Him who is different in nature from all other beings, who is the sole cause of the entire world, who is the Knower of all, Him the Supreme Person? It is meditation on Him only which shows the road to Immortality. It thus appears that the Maitreyî-brâhmana is concerned with the highest Brahman only; and this confirms the conclusion that Brahman only, and with it Prakriti as ruled by Brahman, is the cause of the world.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the connexion of sentences.'

23. (Brahman is) the material cause on account of this not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.

The claims raised by the atheistic Sânkhya having thus been disposed of, the theistic Sânkhya comes forward as an opponent. It must indeed be admitted, he says, that the Vedânta-texts teach the cause of the world to be an all-knowing Lord; for they attribute to that cause thought and similar characteristics. But at the same time we learn from those same texts that the material cause of the world is none other than the Pradhâna; with an all-knowing, unchanging superintending Lord they connect a Pradhâna, ruled by him, which is non-intelligent and undergoes changes, and the two together only they represent as the cause of the world. This view is conveyed by the following texts, 'who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 18); 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'He knows her who produces all effects, the non-knowing one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one. Ruled by him she is spread out, and incited and guided by him gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. A cow she is without beginning and end, a mother producing all beings' (see above, p. 363). That the Lord creates this world in so far only as guiding Prakriti, the material cause, we learn from the following text, 'From that the Lord of Mâya creates all this. Know Mâya to be Prakriti and the Lord of Mâya the great Lord' (Svet. Up. IV, 9, 10). And similarly Smriti, 'with me as supervisor Prakriti brings forth the Universe of the movable and the immovable' (Bha. GÎ. IX, 10). Although, therefore, the Pradhâna is not expressly stated by Scripture to be the material cause, we must assume that there is such a Pradhâna and that, superintended by the Lord, it constitutes the material cause, because otherwise the texts declaring Brahman to be the cause of the world would not be fully intelligible. For ordinary experience shows us on all sides that the operative cause and the material cause are quite distinct: we invariably have on the one side clay, gold, and other material substances which form the material causes of pots, ornaments, and so on, and on the other hand, distinct from them, potters, goldsmiths, and so on, who act as operative causes. And we further observe that the production of effects invariably requires several instrumental agencies. The Vedânta-texts therefore cannot possess the strength to convince us, in open defiance of the two invariable rules, that the one Brahman is at the same time the material and the operative cause of the world; and hence we maintain that Brahman is only the operative but not the material cause, while the material cause is the Pradhâna guided by Brahman.

This primâ facie view the Sûtra combats. Prakriti, i.e. the material cause, not only the operative cause, is Brahman only; this view being in harmony with the promissory declaration and the illustrative instances. The promissory declaration is the one referring to the knowledge of all things through the knowledge of one, 'Did you ever ask for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard?' &c. (Ch, Up. VI, 1, 3). And the illustrative instances are those which set forth the knowledge of the effect as resulting from the knowledge of the cause, 'As by one lump of clay there is made known all that is made of clay; as by one nugget of gold, &c.; as by one instrument for paring the nails,' &c. (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4). If Brahman were merely the operative cause of the world, the knowledge of the entire world would not result from the knowledge of Brahman; not any more than we know the pot when we know the potter. And thus scriptural declaration and illustrative instances would be stultified. But if Brahman is the general material cause, then the knowledge of Brahman implies the knowledge of its effect, i.e. the world, in the same way as the knowledge of such special material causes as a lump of clay, a nugget of gold, an instrument for paring the nails, implies the knowledge of all things made of clay, gold or iron--such as pots, bracelets, diadems, hatchets, and so on. For an effect is not a substance different from its cause, but the cause itself which has passed into a different state. The initial declaration thus being confirmed by the instances of clay and its products, &c., which stand in the relation of cause and effect, we conclude that Brahman only is the material cause of the world. That Scripture teaches the operative and the material causes to be separate, is not true; it rather teaches the unity of the two. For in the text, 'Have you asked for that âdesa (above, and generally, understood to mean "instruction"), by which that which is not heard becomes heard?' the word 'âdesa' has to be taken to mean _ruler_, in agreement with the text, 'by the command--or rule--of that Imperishable sun and moon stand apart' (Bri. Up. III, 8, 9), so that the passage means, 'Have you asked for that Ruler by whom, when heard and known, even that which is not heard and known, becomes heard and known?' This clearly shows the unity of the operative (ruling or supervising) cause and the material cause; taken in conjunction with the subsequent declaration of the unity of the cause previous to creation, 'Being only, this was in the beginning, one only,' and the denial of a further operative cause implied in the further qualification 'advitîyam,' i.e. 'without a second.'--But how then have we to understand texts such as the one quoted above (from the Kûlika-Upanishad) which declare Prakriti to be eternal and the material cause of the world?--Prakriti, we reply, in such passages denotes Brahman in its causal phase when names and forms are not yet distinguished. For a principle independent of Brahman does not exist, as we know from texts such as 'Everything abandons him who views anything as apart from the Self; and 'But where for him the Self has become all, whereby should he see whom?' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6; 15). Consider also the texts, 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1); and 'All this has its Self in that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); which declare that the world whether in its causal or its effected condition has Brahman for its Self. The relation of the world to Brahman has to be conceived in agreement with scriptural texts such as 'He who moves within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who moves within the Imperishable'; and 'He who dwells within the earth,' &c., up to 'He who dwells within the Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23). The highest Brahman, having the whole aggregate of non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, ever is the Self of all. Sometimes, however, names and forms are not evolved, not distinguished in Brahman; at other times they are evolved, distinct. In the latter state Brahman is called an effect and manifold; in the former it is called one, without a second, the cause. This causal state of Brahman is meant where the text quoted above speaks of the cow without beginning and end, giving birth to effects, and so on.--But, the text, 'The great one is merged in the Unevolved, the Unevolved is merged in the Imperishable,' intimates that the Unevolved originates and again passes away; and similarly the Mahâbhârata says, 'from that there sprung the Non-evolved comprising the three gunas; the Non-evolved is merged in the indivisible Person.'--These texts, we reply, present no real difficulty. For Brahman having non-sentient matter for its body, that state which consists of the three gunas and is denoted by the term 'Unevolved' is something effected. And the text, 'When there was darkness, neither day nor night,' states that also in a total pralaya non-sentient matter having Brahman for its Self continues to exist in a highly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands to Brahman the cause of the world in the relation of a mode (prakâra), and it is Brahman viewed as having such a mode that the text from the Kûl. Upanishad refers to. For this reason also the text, 'the Imperishable is merged in darkness, darkness becomes one with the highest God,' declares not that darkness is completely merged and lost in the Divinity but only that it becomes one with it; what the text wants to intimate is that state of Brahman in which, having for its mode extremely subtle matter here called 'Darkness,' it abides without evolving names and forms. The mantra, 'There was darkness, hidden in darkness,' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3), sets forth the same view; and so does Manu (I, 5), 'This universe existed in the shape of Darkness, unperceived, destitute of distinctive marks, unattainable by reasoning, unknowable, wholly immersed as it were in deep sleep.' And, as to the text, 'from that the Lord of Mâya creates everything,' we shall prove later on the unchangeableness of Brahman, and explain the scriptural texts asserting it.

As to the contention raised by the Pûrvapakshin that on the basis of invariable experience it must be held that one and the same principle cannot be both material and operative cause, and that effects cannot be brought about by one agency, and that hence the Vedânta-texts can no more establish the view of Brahman being the sole cause than the command 'sprinkle with fire' will convince us that fire may perform the office of water; we simply remark that the highest Brahman which totally differs in nature from all other beings, which is omnipotent and omniscient, can by itself accomplish everything. The invariable rule of experience holds good, on the other hand, with regard to clay and similar materials which are destitute of intelligence and hence incapable of guiding and supervising; and with regard to potters and similar agents who do not possess the power of transforming themselves into manifold products, and cannot directly realise their intentions.-- The conclusion therefore remains that Brahman alone is the material as well as the operative cause of the Universe.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection.

Brahman must be held to be both causes for that reason also that texts such as 'He desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' declare that the creative Brahman forms the purpose of its own Self multiplying itself. The text clearly teaches that creation on Brahman's part is preceded by the purpose 'May I, and no other than I, become manifold in the shape of various non- sentient and sentient beings.'

25. And on account of both being directly declared.

The conclusion arrived at above is based not only on scriptural declaration, illustrative instances and statements of reflection; but in addition Scripture directly states that Brahman alone is the material as well as operative cause of the world. 'What was the wood, what the tree from which they have shaped heaven and earth? You wise ones, search in your minds, whereon it stood, supporting the worlds.--Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they shaped heaven and earth; you wise ones, I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.'--Here a question is asked, suggested by the ordinary worldly view, as to what was the material and instruments used by Brahman when creating; and the answer--based on the insight that there is nothing unreasonable in ascribing all possible powers to Brahman which differs from all other beings--declares that Brahman itself is the material and the instruments;-- whereby the ordinary view is disposed of.--The next Sûtra supplies a further reason.

26. On account of (the Self) making itself.

Of Brahman which the text had introduced as intent on creation, 'He wished, may I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), a subsequent text says, 'That itself made its Self (II, 7), so that Brahman is represented as the object as well as the agent in the act of creation. It being the Self only which here is made many, we understand that the Self is material cause as well as operative one. The Self with names and forms non- evolved is agent (cause), the same Self with names and forms evolved is object (effect). There is thus nothing contrary to reason in one Self being object as well as agent.

A new doubt here presents itself.--'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'Bliss is Brahman' (Bri. Up. III, 9, 28); 'Free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, free from hunger and thirst' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1,5); 'Without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25)--from all these texts it appears that Brahman is essentially free from even a shadow of all the imperfections which afflict all sentient and non-sentient beings, and has for its only characteristics absolutely supreme bliss and knowledge. How then is it possible that this Brahman should form the purpose of becoming, and actually become, manifold, by appearing in the form of a world comprising various sentient and non-sentient beings--all of which are the abodes of all kinds of imperfections and afflictions? To this question the next Sûtra replies.

27. Owing to modification.

This means--owing to the essential nature of modification (parinâma). The modification taught in our system is not such as to introduce imperfections into the highest Brahman, on the contrary it confers on it limitless glory. For our teaching as to Brahman's modification is as follows. Brahman--essentially antagonistic to all evil, of uniform goodness, differing in nature from all beings other than itself, all- knowing, endowed with the power of immediately realising all its purposes, in eternal possession of all it wishes for, supremely blessed-- has for its body the entire universe, with all its sentient and non- sentient beings--the universe being for it a plaything as it were--and constitutes the Self of the Universe. Now, when this world which forms Brahman's body has been gradually reabsorbed into Brahman, each constituent element being refunded into its immediate cause, so that in the end there remains only the highly subtle, elementary matter which Scripture calls Darkness; and when this so-called Darkness itself, by assuming a form so extremely subtle that it hardly deserves to be called something separate from Brahman, of which it constitutes the body, has become one with Brahman; then Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle body forms the resolve 'May I again possess a world-body constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings, distinguished by names and forms just as in the previous aeon,' and modifies (parinâmayati) itself by gradually evolving the world-body in the inverse order in which reabsorption had taken place.