Part 62

Since the pranava, which is a part of the udgîtha, is introduced as the subject of meditation in the first prapâthaka of the Chândogya, and extends over the later vidyâs also, it is appropriate to assume that also in the clause 'the gods took the udgîtha'--which stands in the middle--the term udgîtha denotes the pranava. Expressions such as 'the cloth is burned' show that frequently the whole denotes the part.--The conclusion from all this is that in the Chândogya the object of meditation is constituted by the pranava--there termed udgîtha--viewed under the form of prâna; while in the Vâjasaneyaka the term udgîtha denotes the whole udgîtha, and the object of meditation is he who produces the udgîtha, i.e. the udgâtri, viewed under the form of prâna. And this proves that the two vidyâs are separate.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'difference.'

10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.

The Chândogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike record a meditation on Prana; the object of meditation being Prana as possessing the qualities of being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other qualities such as being the richest, and so on (Ch. Up. V, 1; Bri. Up. VI, 1). In the text of the Kaushîtakins, on the other hand, there is a meditation on Prâna which mentions the former qualities ('being the best' and 'being the oldest'), but not the latter ('being the richest,' and so on). This, the Pûrvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference between the objects of meditation, and hence between the meditations themselves.--This view the Sûtra sets aside 'on account of non- difference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on Prâna of the Kaushîtakins; 'since there is non-difference of everything,' i.e. since the text of the Kaushîtakins also exhibits the very same method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove, viz. that Prâna is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is required that Prâna should be viewed as possessing also the quality of being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be comprised in the meditation of the Kaushîtakins also. Hence there is no difference of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non- difference of everything.'

In the same way as the meditation on Prâna as the oldest and best cannot be accomplished without Prâna being also meditated upon as the richest, and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in the meditation on Prâna of the Kaushîtakins, although they are not expressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without which the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included in all meditations on Brahman--this is the point to be proved next.

11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the qualities.

The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities of Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman.-- Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing that meditation, only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned should be included!--This primâ facie view is negatived by the Sûtra. The clause, 'on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from the preceding Sûtra. As the 'subject of the qualities,' i.e. Brahman is the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all meditations.--But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy for its head' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all meditations on Brahman!--This the next Sûtra negatives.

12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be increase and decrease.

The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy for its head' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities of Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i.e. if Brahman really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it would be liable to increase and decrease, and this would be in conflict with texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'--But if this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belonging to Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, compassion, and so on--all of which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they belong-would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman where they are not expressly mentioned; and this could not possibly be done, as those qualities are infinite in number.--This difficulty the next Sûtra removes.

13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.

Those other qualities which are 'equal to the thing,' i. e. which are attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this class belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity, and so on. For of Brahman--which by texts such as 'that from which all these beings,' &c. had been suggested as the cause of the world--the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'bliss is Brahman,' and others; and hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on, have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional qualities, on the other hand, as e.g. compassion, which indeed cannot exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations only where they are specially mentioned.

But, an objection is raised, if 'having joy for its head' and the like are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this representation introduced? For if something is represented as something else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e.g. the sacred text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body and organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i.e. the body, the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.--The next Sûtra disposes of this difficulty.

14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.

As no other purpose can be assigned, the text must be supposed to represent Brahman as having joy for its head, and so on, for the purpose of meditation. In order to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is enjoined in the text 'he who knows (i.e. meditates on) Brahman reaches the Highest,' the text represents the Brahman consisting of bliss as made up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and compares these to the head, the wings, and so on. The Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the Selfs mentioned in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in a definite shape; just as in the preceding sections the Self of food, the Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been represented in definite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and so on. As thus the qualities of having joy for its head, &c. are merely secondary marks of the Self of bliss, they are not necessarily included in each meditation that involves the idea of that Self.

15. And on account of the term 'Self.'

That this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause 'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term 'Self is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and tail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a metaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.--But, in the preceding sections, the term _Self_ had been applied to what is _not_ of the nature of Self--the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase 'the Self of bliss' the term Self denotes a true _Self_?--To this the next Sûtra replies.

16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of the subsequent passage.

In the clause,'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self can refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i.e. as in other passages--'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought, let me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones--the term 'Self denotes the highest Self only.--But whereby is this proved?--'By the subsequent passagel, i.e. by the passage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,'--which refers to the Self of bliss.

17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of ascertainment.

But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected with what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath, and so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the subsequent passage!--It _is_ possible, the Sûtra replies, 'on account of ascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there originated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self, and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in the Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the same time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the highest Self. The term Self thus connects itself from the beginning with things which are not true Selfs, because the highest Self is as it were viewed in them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest.'

18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has to be done.

The Sûtra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation on breath. Both texts--the Chândogya as well as the Vâjasaneyaka-declare that water constitutes a dress for prana, and refer to the rinsing of the mouth with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on prâna as having water for its dress.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former view; for, he says, the Vâjasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse,' while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation; and what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing. And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already established by Smriti and custom, we must conclude that the text means to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to the meditation on prâna.--To this the Sûtra replies that what the text enjoins is the new' thing, i.e. the previously non-established meditation on water as forming the dress of prâna. 'On account of the statement of what has to be done,' i.e. on account of the statement of what is not established--for only on the latter condition Scripture has a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the Vâjasaneyaka-text clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming a dress for prâna; and as rinsing is already established by Smriti and custom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also explains why the Chândogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but merely the clothing of breath with water.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done.'

19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.

In the book of the Vâjasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya, we meet with a meditation on Brahman called Sândilyavidyâ; and there is also a Sândilya- vidyâ in the Brihadâranyaka. The Pûrvapakshin holds that these two meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities--such as Brahman being the lord of all--which are not mentioned in the former; the objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations themselves are different.--This the Sûtra negatives. The object of meditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as 'consisting of mind,' and so on; and the additional qualities stated in the Brihad-âranyaka, such as the rulership of Brahman,'do not differ' from those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all its purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in character.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal.'

20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.

In the Brihad-âranyaka (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye; and then the text mentions two secret names of Brahman--_aham_ and _ahar_. Here the Pûrvapakshin holds that both these names are to be comprehended in each of the two meditations 'On account of connexion,' i.e. on account of the object of meditation, i.e. Brahman being one only, although connected with different abodes, it is 'thus elsewhere also,' i. e. the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the Sândilya-vidyâs, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding in the sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and hence the two secret names apply to Brahman in both its abodes.--This view the next Sûtra negatives.

21. Or not so, on account of difference.

This is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon in two different abodes, the meditations are separate. In both the Sândilya-vidyâs, on the other hand, Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the heart.

22. The text also declares this.

That the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which abides in the eye are not to be combined, the text itself moreover shows by specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of the other. For such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where the qualities are not of themselves established, i.e. where the two things are naturally different.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion,'

23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the sky.

In the Taittiriyaka and in the khilas of the Rânâyanîyas we have the following passage: 'Gathered together are the powers among which Brahman is the oldest; Brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the sky. Brahman was born as the first of all beings; who may rival that Brahman?' which declares that Brahman gathered together all the most ancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and so on. And as these attributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation, we must infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on Brahman.--This primâ facie view is controverted by the Sûtra. The holding together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in connexion with any special meditation, is not to be included in all meditations whatever, but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same ground,' i.e. according to difference of place. _Where_ those qualities have to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility. The attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a meditation on Brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart, and hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the attribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And when we find that in meditations on Brahman as abiding within a small place it is said that Brahman is greater than the earth, or that the ether within the heart is as great as the universal ether, these attributes cannot be taken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations, but must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for meditation.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'holding together.'

24. And although (they both be) meditations on man; on account of others not being recorded.

In the Taittiriyaka as well as the Chândogya we meet with a meditation on man (purusha-vidyâ), in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully identified with the parts of the human body.--Here the Pûrvapakshin maintains that these two meditations are identical; for, he says, both meditations have the same name (purusha-vidyâ), and the same character as stated above; and as the Taittirîyaka mentions no fruit of the meditation, the fruit declared in the Chândogya holds good for the Taittirîyaka also, and thus there is no difference of fruit.--This view the Sûtra negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on man, yet they are separate 'on account of the others not being recorded,' i.e. on account of the qualities recorded in one sâkhâ not being recorded in the other. For the Taittirîyaka mentions the three libations, while the Chândogya does not, and so on. The character of the two meditations thus differs. And there is a difference of result also. For an examination of the context in the Taittirîyaka shows that the purusha-vidyâ is merely a subordinate part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of Brahman; while the Chândogya meditation is an independent one, and has for its reward the attainment of long life. The two meditations are thus separate, and hence the details of one must not be included in the other.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the meditation on man.'

25. On account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on.

The text of the Âtharvanikas exhibits at the beginning of their Upanishad some mantras, 'Pierce the sukra, pierce the heart.' The followers of the Sâma-veda read at the beginning of their rahasya- brâhmana 'O God Savitri, promote the sacrifice.' The Kâthakas and the Taittirîyakas have 'May Mitra be propitious to us, may Varuna be propitious.' The Sâtyâyanins have 'Thou art a white horse, a tawny and a black one!' The Kaushîtakins have a Brâhmana referring to the Mahavrata- ceremony, 'Indra having slain Vritra became great.' The Kaushîtakins also have a Mahâvrata-brâhmana. 'Prajâpati is the year; his Self is that Mahâvrata.' The Vâjasaneyins have a Brâhmana referring to the Pravargya, 'The gods sat down for a sattra-celebration.' With reference to all this a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred to in the Brâhmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the Upanishads or not.--The Pûrvapakshin affirms this, on the ground that as the mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of the meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally presents itself. Such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as the pravargya may indeed--on the basis of direct statement (sruti), inferential mark (linga), and syntactical connexion (vâkya), which are stronger than mere proximity--be understood to be connected with certain

## actions; but, on the other hand, mantras such as 'May Varuna be

propitious' have no application elsewhere, and are suitable introductions to meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the meditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all meditations.--This view the Sûtra sets aside 'on account of the difference of sense of piercing, and so on.' The inferential marks contained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'; 'I shall speak the right, I shall speak the true,' show that the mantras have an application in connexion with certain magical practices, or else the study of the Veda, and the like, and do not therefore form part of meditations. That is to say--in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the heart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra' belongs to some magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of mantras such as 'I shall speak the right,' &c., that also mantras such as 'May Mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the Veda, and do not therefore form part of meditations. That mantras of this kind and Brâhmana passages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed at the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having, like the latter, to be studied in the forest.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'piercing and the like.'

26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has to be combined with the obtaining), as it is supplementary to statements of obtaining; as in the case of the kusas, the metres, the praise, and the singing. This has been explained.