Part 44

For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Mâya and Nescience must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Mâyâ, i.e. illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And without being conscious of others the lord of Mâyâ is unable to delude them by his Mâyâ; and Mâyâ herself cannot bring about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.-- Perhaps you will say that the Mâyâ of Brahman causes him to be conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion. But if Mâyâ causes Brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements-- to become conscious of other beings, then Mâyâ is nothing but another name for Nescience.--Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, Mâyâ which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is _not_ avidyâ.--But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be nothing else but avidyâ. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!-- Let us then define avidyâ as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things. Mâyâ then, as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of avidyâ!--But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidyâ; and if, on the other hand, Mâyâ which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be permanently connected with Brahman's nature.--Well, if it were so, what harm would there be?--The harm would be that such a view implies the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were, &c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see, and whom should he see?'--But those texts set forth the Real; Mâyâ on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real conflict with the texts!--Brahman, we reply, has for its essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or affected with, unreal Mâyâ, without avidyâ. Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real Mâyâ be to Brahman?--Brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls!--But of what use should such delusion be to Brahman?--It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!--But of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?--Do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?--The cases are not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play!--The arguments set forth previously also prove the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidyâ, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Mâyâ.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidyâ, and owing to this avidyâ is conscious of plurality within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of avidyâ belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true existence: the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidyâ of one intelligent being. The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are fictitiously shaped out of the avidyâ of the one dreaming subject. For the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many avidyâs. For those also who hold that avidyâ belongs to the individual souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of one's own self and other persons, is real; and if it is unreal it can be accounted for by the avidyâ of one subject. This admits of being stated in various technical ways.--The distinctions of bondage and of one's own self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidyâ; for they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.--Other bodies also have a Self through me only; for they are bodies like this my body.--Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidyâ; for they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations, as this my body is.--The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing but _me_; for they are of intelligent nature; what is _not me_ is seen to be of non-intelligent nature; as e.g. jars.--It thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by the avidyâ of one intelligent subject.

The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not able to account for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained release; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally accounted for.--But the souls are 'infinite'; this accounts for there being souls not yet released!--What, pray, do you understand by this 'infinity' of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted? This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord surely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is not all-knowing.--But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that he is not all-knowing!--Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a number, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non- intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said to be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially limited--such as earthen vessels, and so on--which are also limited in point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space and time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever ('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and similar texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so on.

The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahmâ down to a blade of grass, springs from the avidyâ attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the influence of avidyâ illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world is 'non-different' from Brahman.

To this the Dvaitavâdin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self- illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidyâ and hence sees plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e. cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded. This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin. Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and waterpots--are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non- permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time _other_ than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time, but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self is.--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.-- But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally unmodified!--Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c., producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.--Further there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot belong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect.--And the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work.

We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos, which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs; for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego. The organ of egoity (ahamkâra), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.--Nor is there any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from the avidyâ of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of avidyâ is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of proof must be held to be real.--Nor again can you uphold the assertion that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non- intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among them, of pleasures and pains.--You have further maintained 'Through me only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious creations of _my_ avidyâ; _I_ alone constitute the whole aggregate of intelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless, for the Veda also is the effect of avidyâ, and the effort spent on it therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence. Knowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious product of avidyâ; or because it is itself of the nature of avidyâ; or because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidyâ; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidyâ; it is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non- differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidyâ; or since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidyâ; or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of avidyâ. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana).

Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence, shine forth by itself, so as not to need--for its cognition--other means of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of

## particular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular

cognising subjects--this also has been proved previously. And the different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non- differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidyâ.

Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non- differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidyâ, and implicates itself in the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general. Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non- differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and object such 'svayamprakâsatâ' could not possibly belong. With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that although you allow to such effects, being non-sublatcd as it were, a kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'--vyâvahârika), you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products of avidyâ; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and hence of the essence of avidyâ, it is in no better case than the instances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover, for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts (which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation; for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on the Vedânta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which themselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether referring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis of empirical thought.