Part 23

If, however, true being is present with us, but non-being is absent, and real being is not present with us in conjunction with other things [of a nature foreign to it]; it does not accede in order that it may be present, but we depart from it, when it is not present [with things of a different nature]. And why should this be considered as wonderful? For you when present are not absent from yourself; and yet you are not present with yourself, though present. And you are both present with and absent from yourself when you survey other things, and omit to behold yourself. If, therefore, you are thus present, and yet not [in reality] present with yourself, and on this account are ignorant of yourself, and in a greater degree discover all things, though remote from your essence, than yourself, with which you are naturally present, why should you wonder if that which is not present is remote from you who are remote from it, because you have become remote from yourself? For, by how much the more you are [truly] present with yourself, though it is present, and inseparably conjoined with you, by so much the more will you be present with real being, which is so essentially united to you, that it is as impossible for it to be divulsed from you, as for you to be separated from yourself. So that it is universally possible to know what is present with real being, and what is absent from it, though it is every where present, and again is also no where. For those who are able to proceed into their own essence intellectually, and to obtain a knowledge of it, will, in the knowledge itself, and the science accompanying this knowledge, be able to recover or regain themselves, through the union of that which knows with that which is known. And with those, who are present with themselves, truly-existing being will also be present. But from such as abandon the proper being of themselves to other things,—from these, as they are absent from themselves, true being will also be absent. If, however, we are naturally adapted to be established in the same essence, to be rich from ourselves, and not to descend to that which we are not; in so doing becoming in want of ourselves, and thus again associating with Poverty, though Porus[177] [or Plenty] is present;—and if we are cut off from real being, from which we are not separated either by place, or essence, nor by any thing else, through our conversion to non-being, we suffer as a just punishment of our abandonment of true being, a departure from, and ignorance of ourselves. And again, by a proper attention to, we recover ourselves, and become united to divinity. It is, therefore, rightly said, that the soul is confined in body as in a prison, and is there detained in chains like a fugitive slave[178]. We should, however, [earnestly] endeavour to be liberated from our bonds. For, through being converted to these sensible objects, we desert ourselves, though we are of a divine origin, and are, as Empedocles says,

Heaven’s exiles, straying from the orb of light.

So that every depraved life is full of servitude; and on this account is without God and unjust, the spirit in it being full of impiety, and consequently of injustice. And thus, again, it is rightly said, that justice is to be found in the performance of that which is the province of him who performs it. The image also of true justice consists in distributing to each of those with whom we live, that which is due to the desert of each.

42. That which possesses its existence in another [_i.e._ in something different from itself], and is not essentialized in itself, separably from another, if it should be converted to itself, in order to know itself, without that in which it is essentialized, withdrawing itself from it; would be corrupted by this knowledge, in consequence of separating itself from its essence. But that which is able to know itself without the subject in which it exists, and is able to withdraw itself from this subject, without the destruction of itself, cannot be essentialized in that, from which it is capable of converting itself to itself, without being corrupted, and of knowing itself by its own energies. Hence, if sight, and every sensitive power, neither perceives itself, nor apprehends or preserves itself by separating itself from body; but intellect, when it separates itself from body, then especially perceives intellectually, is converted to itself, and is not corrupted;—it is evident that the sensitive powers obtain the power of energizing through the body; but that intellect possesses its energies and its essence not in body, but in itself.

43. Incorporeal natures are properly denominated, and conceived to be what they are, according to a privation of body; just as, according to the ancients, matter, and the form which is in matter, and also natures and [physical] powers, are apprehended by an abstraction from matter. And after the same manner place, time, and the boundaries of things, are apprehended. For all such things are denominated according to a privation of body. There are likewise other things which are said to be incorporeal improperly, not according to a privation of body, but, in short, because they are not naturally adapted to generate body[179]. Hence those of the former signification subsist in bodies; but those of the second are perfectly separated from bodies, and from those incorporeal natures which subsist about bodies. For bodies, indeed, are in place, and boundaries are in body. But intellect, and intellectual reason, neither subsist in place nor in body; nor proximately give existence to bodies, nor subsist together with bodies, or with those incorporeal natures which are denominated according to a privation of bodies. Neither, therefore, if a certain incorporeal vacuum should be conceived to exist, would it be possible for intellect to be in a vacuum. For a vacuum may be the recipient of body; but it is impossible that it should be the recipient of intellect, and afford a place for its energy. Since, however, the genus of an incorporeal nature appears to be twofold, one of these the followers of Zeno do not at all admit, but they adopt the other; and perceiving that the former is not such as the latter, they entirely subvert it, though they ought rather to conceive that it is of another genus, and not to fancy that, because it is not the latter, it has no existence.

44. Intellect and the intelligible are one thing, and sense and that which is sensible another. And the intelligible, indeed, is conjoined with intellect, but that which is sensible with sense. Neither, however, can sense by itself apprehend itself.... But the intelligible, which is conjoined with intellect, and intellect, which is conjoined with the intelligible, by no means fall under the perception of sense. Intellect, however, is intelligible to intellect. But if intellect is the intelligible object of intellect, intellect will be its own intelligible object. If, therefore, intellect is an intellectual and not a sensible object, it will be intelligible. But if it is intelligible to intellect, and not to sense, it will also be intelligent. The same thing, therefore, will be that which is intelligent, or intellectually perceives, and which is intellectually perceived, or is intelligible; and this will be true of the whole with respect to the whole; but not as he who rubs, and he who is rubbed. Intellect, therefore, does not intellectually perceive by one part, and is intellectually perceived by another: for it is impartible, and the whole is an intelligible object of the whole. It is likewise wholly intellect, having nothing in itself which can be conceived to be deprived of intelligence. Hence one part of it does not intellectually perceive, but not another part of it[180]. For, so far as it does not intellectually perceive, it will be unintelligent. Neither, therefore, departing from this thing, does it pass on to that. For of that from which it departs, it has no intellectual perception. But if there is no transition in its intellections, it intellectually perceives all things at once. If, therefore, it understands all things at once, and not this thing now, but another afterwards, it understands all things instantaneously and always....[181]

Hence, if all things are instantaneously perceived by it, its perceptions have nothing to do with the past and the future, but subsist in an indivisible untemporal _now_; so that the simultaneous, both according to multitude, and according to temporal interval, are present with intellect. Hence, too, all things subsist in it according to one, and in one, without interval, and without time. But if this be the case, there is nothing discursive or transitive in its intellections, and consequently they are without motion. Hence, they are energies according to one, subsisting in one, and without increase or mutation, or any transition. If, however, the multitude subsists according to one, and the energy is collected together at once, and without time, an essence of this kind must necessarily always subsist in [an intelligible] one. But this is eternity. Hence, eternity is present with intellect. That nature, however, which does not perceive intellectually according to one, and in one, but transitively, and with motion, so that in understanding it leaves one thing and apprehends another, divides and proceeds discursively,—this nature [which is soul] subsists in conjunction with time. For with a motion of this kind, the future and the past are consubsistent. But soul, changing its conceptions, passes from one thing to another; not that the prior conceptions depart, and the posterior accede in their place, but there is, as it were, a transition of the former, though they remain in the soul, and the latter accede, as if from some other place. They do not, however, accede in reality from another place; but they appear to do so in consequence of the self-motion of the soul, and through her eye being directed to a survey of the different forms which she contains, and which have the relation of parts to her whole essence. For she resembles a fountain not flowing outwardly, but circularly scattering its streams into itself. With the motion, therefore, of soul, time is consubsistent; but eternity is consubsistent with the permanency of intellect in itself[182]. It is not, however, divided from intellect in the same manner as time is from soul; because in intellect the consubsistent essences are united. But that which is perpetually moved, is the source of a false opinion of eternity, through the immeasurable extent of its motion producing a conception of eternity. And that which abides [in one,] is falsely conceived to be the same with that which is [perpetually] moved. For that which is perpetually moved, evolves the time of itself in the same manner as _the now_ of itself, and multiplies it, according to a temporal progression. Hence, some have apprehended that time is to be surveyed in permanency no less than in motion; and that eternity, as we have said, is infinite time; just as if each of these imparted its own properties to the other; time, which is always moved, adumbrating eternity by the perpetuity of itself, and the sameness of its motion; and eternity, through being established in sameness of energy, becoming similar to time, by the permanency of itself arising from energy. In sensibles, however, the time of one thing is distinct from that of another. Thus, for instance, there is one time of the sun, and another of the moon, one time of the morning-star, and another of each of the planets. Hence, also, there is a different year of different planets. The year, likewise, which comprehends these times, terminates as in a summit in the motion of the soul [of the universe,] according to the imitation of which the celestial orbs are moved. The motion of this soul, however, being of a different nature from that of the planets, the time of the former also is different from that of the latter. For the latter subsists with interval, and is distinguished from the former by local motions and transitions.

FOOTNOTES:

[146] In the original, Ου το ποιουν εις αλλο, πελασει και αφῃ ποιει, α ποιει· κ.τ.λ. But it is evident, from the sense of the whole passage, that, for Ου το ποιουν, we should read, Ου παν το ποιουν, κ.τ.λ.

[147] The article ο is wanting here in the original before ετερος.

[148] Knowledge subsists conformably to the nature by which it is possessed, and not conformably to the thing known. Hence it is either better than, or co-ordinate with, or inferior to the object of knowledge. Thus the rational soul has a knowledge of sensibles, which is superior to sensibles; but it knows itself with a co-ordinate knowledge; and its knowledge of divinity is inferior to the object of knowledge. Porphyry, therefore, is not correct in what he here says. This dogma respecting the conformity of knowledge to that which knows, rather than to the thing known, originated from the divine Iamblichus, as we are informed by Ammonius in his commentary on Aristotle’s treatise De Interpretatione, and is adopted by Proclus (in Parmenid.). Boetius likewise employs it in his reasoning in lib. v. about the prescience of divinity. None of his commentators, however, have noticed the source from whence it was derived.

[149] Because here the generator is that _primarily_ which the thing generated is _secondarily_. See my translation of Proclus’s Theological Elements.

[150] Porphyry here summarily comprehends the rational gnostic powers of the soul in intellect, because, being rational, they are expansions of intellect properly so called. But these powers, beginning from the lowest, are _opinion_, _dianoia_, and the summit of dianoia, which summit is the intellect of the human soul, and is that power, by the light of which we perceive the truth of axioms, it being intuitive perception. _Dianoia_ is the discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which reasons scientifically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect. And _opinion_ is that power which knows _that_ a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or _why_ it is.

[151] In the original, ει δε μη εξω εκτεινομενος; but for ει δε μη, it appears to me to be obviously necessary to read ουδε μη.

[152] In the original, εξω δε οντων υλης, ουδαμου αν ειη ταυτα; which Holstenius, wholly mistaking the meaning, most erroneously translates, “At si extra materiam sint, neutiquam id fieri poterit.” Farther on, Porphyry asserts, that God, intellect, and soul, are no where, according to corporeal locality.

[153] In the original, η μνημη ουκ εστι φαντασιων σωτηρια, αλλα των μελετηθεντων προβαλλεσθαι εκ νεας προβληματα. But for προβληματα, I read προλημματα. This power, by which Porphyry characterizes memory, is of a stable nature. And hence memory is _stability of knowledge_, in the same manner as immortality is _stability of life_, and eternity _stability of being_.

[154] See the notes on the 3d book of my translation of Aristotle’s treatise on the Soul, and also my translation of Plotinus on Felicity. “The phantasy,” says Olympiodorus (in Platonis Phæd.) “is an impediment to our intellectual conceptions; and hence, when we are agitated by the inspiring influence of Divinity, if the phantasy intervenes, the enthusiastic energy ceases: for enthusiasm and the phantasy are contrary to each other. Should it be asked, whether the soul is able to energize without the phantasy? we reply, that its perception of universals proves that it is able. It has perceptions, therefore, independent of the phantasy; at the same time, however, the phantasy attends it in its energies, just as a storm pursues him who sails on the sea.”

[155] The analogy of the soul to harmony, is more accurately unfolded as follows, by Olympiodorus, in his Commentary on the Phædo of Plato, than it is in this place by Porphyry: “Harmony has a triple subsistence. For it is either harmony itself, or it is that which is first harmonized, and which is such according to the whole of itself; or it is that which is secondarily harmonized, and which partially participates of harmony. The first of these must be assigned to intellect, the second to soul, and the third to body. This last, too, is corruptible, because it subsists in a subject; but the other two are incorruptible, because they are neither composites, nor dependent on a subject. Hence, the rational soul is analogous to a musician, but the animated body to harmonized chords; for the former has a subsistence separate, but the latter inseparable from the musical instrument.”

[156] What Porphyry here says about matter, is derived from the treatise of Plotinus, _On the Impassivity of Incorporeal Natures_, to my translation of which I refer the reader.

[157] See my translation of the before-mentioned treatise of Plotinus.

[158] For τα οντα here, I read τα αυτα.

[159] Hence, it is beautifully said in the Clavis of Hermes Trismegistus, “that the knowledge of _the good_ [or the supreme principle of things], is a divine silence, and the quiescence of all the senses.” See, also, on this subject, a most admirable extract from Damascius, περι αρχων, at the end of the 3d volume of my Plato.

[160] For that which is truly incorporeal, is _every where_ virtually, _i.e._ in power and efficacy, but is _no where_ locally.

[161] For μερισταις here, I read, μερικαις. For Porphyry is here speaking of essences which are opposed to _such as rank as wholes_, as is evident from the whole of this paragraph.

[162] The primary natures of which Porphyry is now speaking, are rational partial souls, such as ours; for the natures superior to these, are never converted to beings posterior to themselves.

[163] For αυτου, _isthic_, I read, αυτος.

[164] In the original, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε και θεῳ πανταχου, και ουδαμου εν σωματι, but it appears to me to be necessary to read, και ψυχη εν νῳ τε και θεῳ, και πανταχου και ουδαμου εν σωματι.

[165] και εν νῳ, is omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted, as is evident from the version of Holstenius.

[166] The irrational life is a thing of this kind, which is partly separable and partly inseparable from body. Hence, so far as it is inseparable from body, it partakes of the _every where_; but, so far as it is separable, of the _no where_.

[167] _i.e._ The animal spirit, or pneumatic soul, in which the rational soul suffers her punishments in Hades.

[168] _i.e._ That part of the soul which is the source of all-various desires.

[169] This philosophic apathy is not, as is stupidly supposed by most of the present day, insensibility, but a perfect subjugation of the passions to reason.

[170] The words και δικαιοσυνη, are omitted in the original. But it is evident from the treatise of Plotinus “On the Virtues,” that they ought to be inserted. For what Porphyry says in this Section about the virtues, is derived from that treatise.

[171] Instead of κατ’ αυτην, here it is necessary to read, κατ’ αισθησιν.

[172] Conformably to this, as we have before observed, Aristotle says in the 7th Book of his Nicomachean Ethics, “that corporeal pleasures are remedies against pain, and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but perfect no energy of the rational soul.”

[173] In the original, αλλα το εκβεβηκος τον μεγιστον ογκον, εις το μεγιστον, και τον ελαχιστον εις το ελαχιστον, αμα λαβων, κ.τ.λ. This Holstenius most erroneously translates, “Verum id quod maximam molem intervallo maximo, et minimam minimo excedit simul sumens, &c.” For a truly incorporeal nature, such as that of which Porphyry is now speaking, has nothing to do with interval, and, therefore, does not by interval surpass either the greatest or the least corporeal mass; but is received transcendently by the greatest and the least magnitude.

[174] For διαληψεσιν, here, I read καταληψεσιν, and Holstenius also has in this place _comprehensionibus_.

[175] In the original, καθο εν τι των κατ’ αισθησιν συνεγνωσμενων; but it appears to me to be necessary, after καθο, to insert the words ουκ εστιν. For incorporeal being is not like some one of the things which are known by the senses, because no one of these is one, and, at the same time, all things. Holstenius did not perceive the necessity of this emendation, as is evident from his version of the passage.

[176] Immediately after this something is wanting in the original, (as is evident from the asterisks,) which, as it appears to me, no conjecture can appropriately supply.

[177] In the original, και δια τουτων παλιν τῃ πενιᾳ συνειναι, καιπερ παροντος αυτου; but for αυτου, I read πορου; as it appears to me that Porphyry is here alluding to what is said by Diotima, in the Banquet of Plato, concerning the parents of Love, viz. that they are _Poverty_ and _Porus_, or _Plenty_.

[178] See the Phædo of Plato. But something is here wanting in the original, as is evident not only from the asterisks, but from the want of connexion in the words themselves.

[179] _i.e._ They are not adapted to be the immediate causes of body, because they are perfectly separated from it. The original is, ηδη δε ην αλλα καταχρηστικως λεγομενα ασωματα, ου κατα στερησιν σωματος, κατα δε ολως μη πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν σωμα. Holstenius, not understanding what is here said by Porphyry, translates the words κατα δε ολως μη πεφυκεναι γεννᾳν σωμα, “sed quod nullum omnino corpus generare possunt.” For Porphyry, as is evident from what immediately follows, is here speaking of natures which are perfectly separated from bodies, and which are, therefore, not naturally adapted to be the immediate generators of them, not through any deficiency, but through transcendency of power.

[180] In the original, διο ουχι τοδε μεν εαυτου νοει, τοδε δε ου νοει, which Holstenius erroneously translates, “Ideoque non quidem unam sui partem intelligit, alteram vero non intelligit.” For Porphyry is not here speaking of intellect surveying its parts, but of its being _wholly_ intellective. This is evident from what immediately follows.

[181] The asterisks in the original denote something is wanting. Nevertheless, what immediately follows them, is evidently connected with what immediately precedes.

[182] See the fourth book of my translation of Proclus, on the Timæus of Plato, in which the nature of time and eternity is most admirably unfolded. See, also, my translation of Plotinus, on Eternity and Time. In these works, what both these divine men have said of eternity, and what the former has said of time, contains, as it appears to me, the _ne plus ultra_ of philosophical investigation on these most abstruse subjects.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

ON THE WANDERINGS OF ULYSSES.

In my History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology [see Vol. II. of my Proclus on Euclid,] and in a note accompanying my translation of the treatise of Porphyry, on the Cave of the Nymphs, in that work, I attempted, from the hints afforded by Porphyry, and the work of an anonymous Greek writer, De Ulyxis Erroribus, to unfold the latent meaning of the wanderings of Ulysses, as narrated by Homer. But as, from my continued application to the philosophy of Plato for upwards of forty years, I now know much more of that philosophy than I then did, a period of thirty-five years having elapsed from that to the present time, I shall again attempt to explain those wanderings, rejecting some things, and retaining others which I had adopted before.