Part 46

To establish confidence in the minds of the Egyptian public that the authorities could maintain order and tranquillity, it was determined to increase permanently the strength of the British garrison. An incident occurred in June 1906 which illustrated the danger which might arise if anything happened to beget the idea that the protecting power had weakened its hold. While mounted infantry of the British army were marching from Cairo to Alexandria, five officers went (on the 13th of June) to the village of Denshawai to shoot pigeons.[28] An attack was made on the party by the villagers. The officers were told by their guide that they might shoot, but the villagers had not given permission and were incensed at the shooting of their pigeons by other officers in the previous year. A premeditated attack was made on the officers; a gun seized from one of them went off and slightly injured four natives--one a woman. The attack had been preceded by a trifling fire at a threshing floor, either accidentally caused (but not by the officers' shots) or lit as a signal for the assault. Captain S. C. Bull of the 6th Dragoons received serious injuries and died a few hours later, and two other officers were seriously injured. A number of persons were arrested and tried by a special tribunal created in 1895 to deal with offences against the army of occupation. On the 27th of the same month four of the ringleaders were sentenced to death, others received various terms of imprisonment,[29] and seven were sentenced to fifty lashes. The executions and floggings were carried out the next day at the scene of the outrage and in the presence of some five hundred natives. The quieting effect that this drastic action might have had was marred by the fact that certain members of the British parliament called in question the justice of the sentences--passed unanimously by a court of which the best English and the best native judge were members. For a time there was considerable ferment in Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian authorities received, however, the firm support of Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary in the liberal administration formed in December 1905. As far as responsible statesmen were concerned the change of government in Great Britain made no difference in the conduct of Egyptian affairs.

The Taba incident.

The Taba incident, to which reference has been made, arose in the beginning of 1906 over the claim of the sultan of Turkey to jurisdiction in the Sinai peninsula. The origin of the dispute dated back, however, to 1892, when Abbas Hilmi became khedive. Mehemet Ali and his successors up to and including Tewfik had not only administered the Sinai peninsula but certain posts on the Hejaz or Arabian side of the gulf of Akaba. The firman of investiture issued by the sultan on the occasion of the succession of Abbas differed, however, from the text of former firmans, the intention being, apparently, to exclude Egypt from the administration of the Sinai peninsula. The British government intervened and after considerable pressure upon Turkey obtained a telegram (dated the 8th of April 1892) from the grand vizier in which it was declared that the _status quo_ was maintained in the Sinai peninsula, but that the sultan resumed possession of the posts in the Hejaz heretofore garrisoned by Egypt. To this last course Great Britain raised no objection. As officially stated by the British government at the time, the eastern frontier of the Sinai peninsula was taken to be a line running in a south-easterly direction from Rafa, a place on the Mediterranean, east of El Arish, to the head of the gulf of Akaba. The fort of Akaba and other posts farther east Egypt abandoned. So matters rested until in 1905 in consequence of lawlessness among the Bedouins of the peninsula a British official was appointed commandant and inspector of the peninsula and certain administrative measures taken. The report was spread by pan-Islamic agents that the intention of the Egyptian government was to construct fortifications on the frontier near Akaba, to which place the Turks were building a branch railway from the Damascus-Mecca line. In January 1906 the sultan complained to the British ambassador at Constantinople of Egyptian encroachments on Turkish territory, whereupon the khedive asked that the frontier should be delimited, a request which Turkey rejected. A small Egyptian force was then directed to occupy Taba, a port near Akaba but on the western side of the gulf. Before this force could reach Taba that place had been seized by the Turkish commandant at Akaba. A period of considerable tension ensued, the Turks removing the boundary posts at Rafa and sending strong reinforcements to the frontier. The British government intervened on behalf of the khedive and consistently maintained that the Rafa-Akaba line must be the frontier. In April a conference was held between the khedive and Mukhtar Pasha, the Ottoman commissioner. It then appeared that Turkey was unwilling to recognize the British interpretation of the telegram of the 8th of April 1892. Turkey claimed that the peninsula of Sinai consisted only of the territory south of a straight line from Akaba to Suez, and that Egyptian territory north of that line was traced from Rafa to Suez. As a compromise Mukhtar Pasha suggested as the frontier a line drawn direct from Rafa to Ras Mahommed (the most southern point of the Sinai peninsula), which would have left the whole of the gulf of Akaba in Turkish territory. In other words the claim of the Porte was, to quote Lord Cromer:--

"to carry the Turkish frontier and strategical railways to Suez on the banks of the canal; or that if the Ras Mahommed line were adopted, the Turkish frontier would be advanced to the neighbourhood of Nekhl, i.e. within easy striking distance of Egypt, and that ... the gulf of Akaba ... would practically become a _mare clausum_ in the possession of Turkey and a standing menace to the security of the trade route to the East."

Such proposals could not be entertained by Great Britain; and as the sultan remained obstinate the British ambassador on the 3rd of May presented a note to the Porte requiring compliance with the British proposals within ten days. The Turkish ambassador in London was informed by Sir Edward Grey, foreign secretary, that if it were found that Turkish suzerainty in Egypt were incompatible with the rights of the British government to interfere in Egyptian affairs, and with the British occupation, the British position in Egypt would be upheld by the whole force of the empire. Thereupon the sultan gave way and agreed (on the 14th of May) that the line of demarcation should start at Rafa and run towards the south-east "in an approximately straight line as far as a point on the gulf of Akaba at least 3 m. distant from Akaba."[30] The Turkish troops were withdrawn from Taba, and the delimitation of the frontier was undertaken by a joint Turco-Egyptian commission. An agreement was signed on the 1st of October finally settling the frontier line.

With the ending of this dispute and the strengthening of the British garrison in Egypt a demonstration was given of the ability of the protecting power to maintain its position. At the same time encouragement was given to that section of Egyptian society which sought the reform of various Moslem institutions without injury to the principles underlying the faith of Islam: a more truly national movement than that of the agitators who clamoured for parliamentary government.

Resignation of Lord Cromer.

In April 1907, a few days after the appearance of his report for 1906, in which the "Nationalist" and pan-Islamic movements were shown to be detrimental to the welfare of Egypt, Lord Cromer resigned his post of British agent and consul-general. His resignation, dictated by reasons of health, was described by Sir Edward Grey as "the greatest personal loss which the public service of this country (Britain) could suffer." Lord Cromer's work was in a sense complete. He left the country in a state of unexampled material prosperity, free from the majority of the international fetters with which it was bound when he took up his task in 1883, and with the legitimate expectation that the work he had done would endure. The magnitude of the task he had accomplished is shown by the preceding pages, and it need only be added that the transformation effected in Egypt and the Sudan, during his twenty-four years' occupancy of the British Agency, was carried out in every department under his guidance and inspiration. Lord Cromer was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst, who had served in Egypt eighteen years under him, and was at the time of his appointment to Cairo an assistant under secretary of state for foreign affairs.

Notwithstanding, or, rather, as a consequence of, the unexampled material prosperity of the country, 1907 was a year of severe financial crisis, due to over-trading, excessive credit and the building mania induced by the rapid economic progress of Egypt, and aggravated by the unfavourable monetary conditions existing in America and Europe during the latter part of the year. Though the crisis had results disastrous to the speculators, the position of the fellahin was hardly affected; the cotton crop was marketed with regularity and at an average price higher than that of 1906, while public revenue showed a satisfactory increase. The noisy "Nationalist" agitation which was maintained during this period of financial stringency reacted unfavourably on public order. Although the degree of insecurity prevailing in the provinces was greatly exaggerated--serious crime in 1907 being less than in the preceding year--an increasing number of crimes were left untraced to their authors. The release of the Denshawai prisoners in January 1908 and the death of Mustafa Kamel in the following month had a quieting effect on the public mind; while the fact that in the elections (December 1907) for the legislative council and the general assembly only 5% of the electors went to the polls, afforded a striking commentary alike on the appreciation of the average Egyptian of the value of parliamentary institutions and of the claims of the "Nationalist" members of the assembly to represent the Egyptian people. The "Nationalists" were, too, divided into many warring sections--Mahommed Bey Ferid, chosen as successor to Mustafa Kamel, had to contend with the pretensions of several other "leaders." The khedive, moreover, markedly abstained from any association with the agitation of the Nationalists, who viewed with disfavour his highness's personal friendship with Sir Eldon Gorst. The agitators gained their chief strength from the support accorded them by certain Radical politicians in England. A number of members of the council and assembly visited England in July 1908 and were received by Sir Edward Grey, who gave them assurances that Great Britain would always strive to remedy the legitimate grievances of Egyptians.

The establishment of constitutional rule in Turkey in the summer of 1908 excited the hopes of the Egyptian Nationalists, and a deputation was sent to Constantinople to confer with the Young Turk committee. From the Young Turks, however, the deputation received no encouragement for their agitation and returned with the advice to work in co-operation with the British. In view of the rumours current, Sir Eldon Gorst, in the form of an interview in _El Mokattam_, a widely read native paper, restated (October 1908) the British view as to the occupation of the country and the demand for a parliament. Great Britain, he declared, had no intention of proclaiming a protectorate over Egypt; on the other hand, recent events in Turkey in no way affected the question of self-government in Egypt. It would be folly to think of introducing unrestricted parliamentary government at present, the conditions for its successful working not existing. The "wild and foolish" agitation on this question only served to confirm the impression that the Egyptians were not yet fit to govern themselves. At the same time steps were being taken to give them a much greater part in the management of local affairs. If the Egyptians showed that the existing institutions and the new provincial councils could do useful work, it would prove the best argument for extending their powers. Sir Eldon Gorst's statements were approved by the British government.

In November 1908 Mustafa Fehmi, who had been premier since 1895, resigned, and was succeeded by Boutros Pasha, a Copt of marked ability, who had been for several years foreign minister. Boutros incurred the enmity of the "Nationalists" and was murdered in February 1910. (D. M. W.; F. R. C.)

AUTHORITIES.--D. A. Cameron, _Egypt in the Nineteenth Century_ (London, 1898), a clear and useful summary of events up to 1882; E. Dicey, _The Story of the Khedivate_ (London, 1902); J. C. McCoan, _Egypt under Ismail_ (London, 1899); P. Mouriez, _Histoire de Méhémet-Ali_ (4 vols., Paris, 1855-1858); L. Bréhier, _L'Égypte de 1789 à 1900_ (Paris, 1901); C. de Freycinet, _La Question d'Égypte_ (Paris, 1905). See also MEHEMET ALI.

For the period immediately preceding and during the British occupation the standard authority is Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_ (2 vols., London, 1908). In this invaluable work the history of Egypt from 1875 to 1892 and that of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from 1882 to 1907 is treated fully. Lord Cromer's annual reports (1888-1906) to the British government on the affairs of Egypt should also be consulted. Next in interest are Alfred (Lord) Milner's _England in Egypt_ (11th ed., London, 1904), and Sir A. Colvin's _The Making of Modern Egypt_ (London, 1906). Consult also _Khedives and Pashas_ (London, 1884), by C. F. Moberly Bell (published anonymously); D. M. Wallace, _Egypt and the Egyptian Question_ (London, 1883); W. S. Blunt, _Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt_ (2nd ed., London, 1907), a partisan record; C. v. Malortie, _Egypt_, _Native Rulers and Foreign Interference_, 2 vols. (London, 1883); O. Borelli, _Choses politiques d'Égypte_, 1883-1895 (Paris, 1895); H. Resener, _Ägypten unter englischer Okkupation_ (Berlin, 1896). Morley's _Life of Gladstone_ and Fitzmaurice's _Life of Granville_ throw considerable light on the inner history of the period 1880-1893. See further the historical works cited in SUDAN: _Anglo-Egyptian_, and those given at the end of the first section of this article.

For military operations 1882-1899 see C. Royle, _The Egyptian Campaigns 1882 to 1899_, revised ed. (London, 1900); H. Brackenbury, _Narrative of the Advance of the River Column of the Nile Expeditionary Force_ (Edinburgh, 1885); Sir W. F. Butler, _Campaign of the Cataracts_ (London, 1887); Count A. E. W. Gleichen, _With the Camel Corps up the Nile_ (London, 1888); _Gordon's Last Journal_ (London, 1885); Sir C. W. Wilson, _From Korti to Khartum_ (Edinburgh, 1886); J. Grant, _Cassell's History of the War in the Soudan_, 6 vols. (London, 1885 et seq.); "An Officer," _Sudan Campaigns_ 1896-1899 (London, 1899); G. W. Steevens, _With Kitchener to Khartum_ (Edinburgh, 1898); W. S. Churchill, _The River War_, new edition (London, 1902).

Bibliographical notes for each section of this article are given in their several places. The following bibliographies may be consulted: Ibrahim Hilmi, _Literature of Egypt and the Soudan_, 2 vols. (London, 1886-1888); H. Jolowicz, _Bibliotheca aegyptiaca_ (Leipzig, 1858; supplement, 1861); M. Hartmann, _The Arabic Press of Egypt_ (London, 1899). (F. R. C.)

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF 1882-1885.

Bombardment of Alexandria.

In February 1879 a slight outbreak of discharged officers and soldiers occurred at Cairo, which led to the despatch of British and French ships to Alexandria. On the 26th of June of that year Ismail Pasha was removed from Egypt, and Tewfik assumed the khediviate, becoming practically the _protégé_ of the two western powers. On the 1st of February 1881 a more serious disturbance arose at Cairo from the attempt to try three colonels, Ahmed Arabi, Ali Fehmy, and Abd-el-Al, who had been arrested as the ringleaders of the military party. The prisoners were released by force, and proceeded to dictate terms to the khedive. Again British and French warships were despatched to Alexandria, and were quickly withdrawn, their presence having produced no apparent impression. It soon became clear that the khedive was powerless, and that the military party, headed by Arabi, threatened to dominate the country. The "dual note," communicated to the khedive on the 6th of January 1881, contained an intimation that Great Britain and France were prepared to afford material support if necessary; but the fall of Gambetta's ministry produced a reaction, and both governments proceeded to minimize the meaning of their language. The khedive was practically compelled to form a government in which Arabi was minister of war and Mahmud Sami premier, and Arabi took steps to extend his influence throughout his army. The situation now became critically serious: for the third time ships were sent to Alexandria, and on the 25th of May 1882 the consuls-general of the two powers made a strong representation to Mahmud Sami which produced the resignation of the Egyptian ministry, and a demand, to which the khedive yielded, by the military party for the reinstatement of Arabi. The attitude of the troops in Alexandria now became threatening; and on the 29th the British residents pointed out that they were "absolutely defenceless." This warning was amply justified by the massacres of the 11th of June, during which more than one hundred persons, including an officer and two seamen, were killed in the streets of Alexandria, almost under the guns of the ships in harbour. It was becoming clear that definite action would have to be taken, and on the 15th the channel squadron was ordered to Malta. By the end of June twenty-six warships, representing the navies of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece and Turkey, lay off the port of Alexandria, and large numbers of refugees were embarked. The order received by Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour (afterwards Lord Alcester) on the 3rd of July was as follows:--

"Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is resumed on earthworks, or fresh guns mounted, inform military commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not immediately discontinued, destroy earthworks and silence batteries if they open fire, having given sufficient notice to population, shipping and foreign men-of-war."

On the 9th the admiral received a report that working parties had been seen in Fort Silsileh "parbuckling two smoothbore guns--apparently 32-pounders--towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbour." Fort Silsileh was an old work at the extreme east of the defences of Alexandria, and its guns do not bear on the harbour. On the 10th an ultimatum was sent to Toulba Pasha, the military commandant, intimating that the bombardment would commence at sunrise on the following morning unless "the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbour of Alexandria" were previously surrendered "for the purpose of disarming." The fleet prepared for action, and the bearer of the reply, signed by the president of the council, and offering to dismount three guns in the batteries named, only succeeded in finding the flagship late at night. This proposal was rejected, and at 7 A.M. on the 11th of July the "Alexandra" opened fire and the action became general. The attacking force was disposed in three groups: (1) the "Alexandra," "Sultan" and "Superb," outside the reef, to engage the Ras-el-Tin and the earthworks under weigh; (2) the "Monarch," "Invincible" and "Penelope," inside the harbour, to engage the Meks batteries; and (3) the "Inflexible" and "Temeraire," to take up assigned stations outside the reef and to co-operate with the inshore squadron. The gunboats "Beacon," "Bittern," "Condor," "Cygnet" and "Decoy" were to keep out of fire at first and seek opportunities of engaging the Meks batteries. Meks fort was silenced by about 12.45 P.M., and a party from the "Invincible" landed and disabled the guns. As the fire delivered under weigh was not effective, the offshore squadron anchored at about 10.30 A.M., and succeeded in silencing Fort Ras-el-Tin at about 12.30 P.M., and Fort Adda, by the explosion of the main magazine, at 1.35 P.M. The "Inflexible" weighed soon after 8 A.M. and engaged Ras-el-Tin, afterwards attacking Forts Pharos and Adda. The "Condor," followed by the "Beacon," "Bittern" and "Decoy," engaged Fort Marabout soon after 8 A.M. till 11 A.M., when the gunboats were recalled. After the works were silenced, the ships moved in closer, with a view to dismount the Egyptian guns. The bombardment ceased at 5 P.M.; but a few rounds were fired by the "Inflexible" and "Temeraire" on the morning of the 12th at the right battery in Ras-el-Tin lines.

The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria is interesting as a gauge of the effect to be expected from the fire of ships under specially favourable conditions. The Egyptians at different times during the day brought into action about 33 R.M.L. guns (7-in. to 10-in.), 3 R.B.L. guns (40 prs.), and 120 S.B. guns (6.5-in. and 10-in.), with a few mortars. These guns were disposed over a coast-line of about 10 sea miles, and were in many cases indifferently mounted. The Egyptian gunners had been little trained, and many of them had never once practised with rifled ordnance. Of seventy-five hits on the hulls of the ships only five can with certainty be ascribed to projectiles from rifled guns, and thirty were unquestionably due to the old smoothbores, which were not provided with sights. The total loss inflicted was 6 killed and 27 wounded. The British ships engaged fired 1741 heavy projectiles (7-in. to 16-in.) and 1457 light (7-prs. to 64-prs.), together with 33,493 machine-gun and rifle bullets. The result was comparatively small. About 8 rifled guns and 19 smoothbores were dismounted or disabled and 4 and 1 temporarily put out of action respectively. A considerable portion of this injury was inflicted, after the works had been silenced, by the deliberate fire of the ships. As many as twenty-eight rifled guns and 140 smoothbores would have opened fire on the following day. The Egyptians made quite as good a stand as could be expected, but were driven from their guns, which they were unable to use with adequate effect; and the bombardment of Alexandria confirms previous experience that the fire of ships cannot really compete with that of well-mounted and well-handled guns on shore.

In the afternoon of the 12th, fires, which were the work of incendiaries, began to break out in the best quarters of Alexandria; and the town was left to murder and pillage till the following day, when a party of bluejackets and marines was landed at about 3 P.M.

British expedition under Sir Garnet Wolseley.

Tell-el-Kebir.