Part 47

Military intervention being now imperatively demanded, a vote of credit for £2,300,000 was passed in the British House of Commons on the 27th of July. Five days later the French government failed to secure a similar vote, and Great Britain was left to deal with the Egyptian question alone. An expeditionary force detailed from home stations and from Malta was organized in two divisions, with a cavalry division, corps troops, and a siege train, numbering in all about 25,000 men. An Indian contingent numbering about 7000 combatants, complete in all arms and with its own transport, was prepared for despatch to Suez. General Sir Garnet Wolseley was appointed commander-in-chief, with Lieutenant-General Sir J. Adye as chief of the staff. The plan of operations contemplated the seizure of Ismailia as the base for an advance on Cairo, Alexandria and its suburbs to be held defensively, and the Egyptian forces in the neighbourhood to be occupied by demonstrations. The expeditionary force having rendezvoused at Alexandria, means were taken by Rear-Admiral Hoskins and Sir W. Hewett for the seizure of the Suez canal. Under orders from the former, Captain Fairfax, R.N., occupied Port Said on the night of 19th August, and Commander Edwards, R.N., proceeded down the canal, taking possession of the _gares_ and dredgers, while Captain Fitzroy, R.N., occupied Ismailia after slight opposition. Before nightfall on the 20th of August the canal was wholly in British hands. Meanwhile, leaving Sir E. Hamley in command at Alexandria, Sir G. Wolseley with the bulk of the expeditionary force arrived at Port Said on the 20th of August, a naval demonstration having been made at Abukir with a view to deceive the enemy as to the object of the great movement in progress. The advance from Ismailia now began. On the 21st Major-General Graham moved from Ismailia with about 800 men and a small naval force, occupying Nefiche, the junction with the Suez line, at 1.30 A.M. without opposition. On the 22nd he made a reconnaissance towards Suez, and on the 23rd another to El-Magfar, 4 m. from Nefiche. It now appeared that the enemy had dammed the sweet-water canal and blocked the railway at Tell-el-Mahuta, where entrenchments had been thrown up and resistance seemed to be contemplated. At 4 A.M. on the 24th Sir Garnet Wolseley advanced with 3 squadrons of cavalry, 2 guns, and about 1000 infantry, placed under the orders of Lieutenant-General Willis. The enemy showed in force, estimated at 7000 with 12 guns, and a somewhat desultory action ensued. Reinforcements from Ismailia were ordered up, and the British cavalry, operating on the right, helped to check the enemy's attack, which showed little vigour. At night the troops, now reinforced by the Guards Brigade, an infantry battalion, 2 cavalry regiments and 10 guns, bivouacked on the ground. Early on the morning of the 25th the advance was continued to Tell-el-Mahuta, which the enemy evacuated, while the mounted troops and horse artillery pressed on to Mahsama, capturing the Egyptian camp, with 7 guns and large quantities of ammunition and supplies. On the same evening Major-General Graham, with about 1200 marines (artillery and light infantry), reached Mahsama, and on the following day he occupied Kassassin without opposition. The advance guard had now outrun its communications and was actually short of food, while a considerable force was distributed at intervals along the line Ismailia-Kassassin. The situation on the 27th tempted attack by an enterprising enemy, and Major-General Graham's force, consisting of a squadron of the 19th Hussars, the York and Lancaster Regiment, the duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the Marine Artillery Battalion and two R.H.A. guns, short of ammunition, was in danger of being overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers from Tell-el-Kebir. On the 28th Major-General Graham's troops were attacked, and after repulsing the enemy, made a general advance about 6.45 P.M. The cavalry, summoned by heliograph from Mahsama, co-operated, and in a moonlight charge inflicted considerable loss. The British casualties amounted to 14 killed and 83 wounded. During the lull which followed the first action of Kassassin, strenuous efforts were made to bring up supplies and troops and to open up railway communication to the front. On the 9th of September the Egyptians again attacked Kassassin, but were completely repulsed by 9 A.M., with a loss of 4 guns, and were pursued to within extreme range of the guns of Tell-el-Kebir. The British casualties were 3 killed and 78 wounded. The three following days were occupied in concentrating troops at Kassassin for the attack on Tell-el-Kebir, held by about 38,000 men with 60 guns. The Egyptian defences consisted of a long line of trench (2½ m.) approximately at right angles to the railway and the sweet-water canal. At 11 P.M. on the 12th of September the advance of about 15,000 men commenced; the 1st division, under Lieutenant-General Willis, was on the right, and the 2nd division, under Lieutenant-General Hamley, was on the left. Seven batteries of artillery, under Brigadier-General Goodenough, were placed in the centre. The cavalry, under Major-General Drury Lowe, was on the right flank, and the Indian contingent, under Major-General Macpherson, starting one hour later, was ordered to move south of the sweet-water canal. The night was moonless, and the distance to be covered about 6¼ m. The ground was perfectly open, slightly undulating, and generally firm gravel. The conditions for a night march were thus ideal; but during the movement the wings closed towards each other, causing great risk of an outbreak of firing. The line was, however, rectified, and after a halt the final advance began. By a fortunate accident the isolated outwork was just missed in the darkness by the left flank of the 2nd Division; otherwise a premature alarm would have been given, which must have changed all the conditions of the operation. At dawn the Highland Brigade of the 2nd Division struck the enemy's trenches, and carried them after a brief struggle. The 1st Division attacked a few minutes later, and the cavalry swept round the left of the line of entrenchments, cutting down any fugitives who attempted resistance and reaching the enemy's camp in rear. The Indian contingent, on the south of the canal, co-operated, intercepting the Egyptians at the canal bridge. The opposition encountered at some points was severe, but by 6 A.M. all resistance was at an end. The British loss amounted to 58 killed, 379 wounded and 22 missing; nearly 2000 Egyptians were killed, and more than 500 wounded were treated in hospital. An immediate pursuit was ordered, and the Indian contingent, under Major-General Macpherson, reached Zagazig, while the cavalry, under Major-General Drury Lowe, occupied Belbeis and pushed on to Cairo, 65 m. from Tell-el-Kebir, next day. On the evening of the 14th the 10,000 troops occupying Abbasia barracks, and 5000 in the citadel of Cairo, surrendered. On the 15th General Sir Garnet Wolseley, with the brigade of Guards under H.R.H. the duke of Connaught, entered the city.

The prompt following up of the victory at Tell-el-Kebir saved Cairo from the fate of Alexandria and brought the rebellion to an end. The Egyptian troops at Kafr Dauar, Abukir and Rosetta surrendered without opposition, and those at Damietta followed on the 23rd of September, after being threatened with attack. On the 25th the khedive entered Cairo, where a review of the British troops was held on the 30th. The expeditionary force was now broken up, leaving about 10,000 men, under Major-General Sir A. Alison, to maintain the authority of the khedive. In twenty-five days, from the landing at Ismailia to the occupation of Cairo, the rebellion was completely suppressed, and the operations were thus signally successful.

The Sudan question.

The authority of the khedive and the maintenance of law and order now depended absolutely on the British forces left in occupation. Lord Dufferin, who had been sent to Cairo to draw up a project of constitutional reforms, advocated the re-establishment of a native army, not to exceed 5000 to 6000 men, with a proportion of British officers, for purely defence purposes within the Delta; and on the 13th of December 1882 Sir Evelyn Wood left England to undertake the organization of this force, with the title of sirdar. Lord Dufferin further advised the formation of a gendarmerie, which "should be in a great measure a mounted force and empowered with a semi-military character" (despatch of January 1st, 1883). The strength of this military police force was fixed at 4400 men with 2562 horses, and Baker Pasha (General Valentine Baker) was entrusted with its formation, with the title of inspector-general.

In a despatch of the 6th of February 1883 Lord Dufferin dealt with the Sudan, and stated that Egypt "could hardly be expected to acquiesce" in a policy of withdrawal from her Southern territories. At the same time he pointed out that,

"Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the Sudan had been almost uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present mahdi in raising the tribes and extending his influence over great tracts of country was a sufficient proof of the government's inability either to reconcile the inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. The consequences had been most disastrous. Within the last year and a half the Egyptians had lost something like 9000 men, while it was estimated that 40,000 of their opponents had perished."

Moreover, to restore tranquillity in the Sudan,

"the first step necessary was the construction of a railway from Suakin to Berber, or what, perhaps, would be more advisable, to Shendi, on the Nile. The completion of this enterprise would at once change all the elements of the problem."

Disaster to Hicks Pasha.

The immense responsibilities involved were most imperfectly understood by the British government. Egyptian sovereignty in the Sudan dates from 1820, when Mehemet Ali sent a large force into the country, and ultimately established his authority over Sennar and Kordofan. In 1865 Suakin and Massawa were assigned to Egyptian rule by the sultan, and in 1870 Sir Samuel Baker proceeded up the Nile to the conquest of the Equatorial provinces, of which General Gordon was appointed governor-general in 1874. In the same year Darfur and Harrar were annexed, and in 1877 Gordon became governor-general of the Sudan, where, with the valuable assistance of Gessi Pasha, he laboured to destroy the slave trade and to establish just government. In August 1879 he returned to Cairo, and was succeeded by Raouf Pasha. Misrule and oppression in every form now again prevailed throughout the Sudan, while the slave traders, exasperated by Gordon's stern measures, were ready to revolt. The authority of Egypt was represented by scattered garrisons of armed men, badly officered, undisciplined and largely demoralized. In such conditions a leader only was required to ensure widespread and dangerous rebellion. A leader appeared in the person of Mahommed Ahmed, born in 1848, who had taken up his abode on Abba Island, and, acquiring great reputation for sanctity, had actively fomented insurrection. In August 1881 a small force sent by Raouf Pasha to arrest Mahommed Ahmed was destroyed, and the latter, proclaiming himself the mahdi, stood forth as the champion of revolt. Thus, at the time when the Egyptian army was broken up at Tell-el-Kebir, the Sudan was already in flames. On the 7th of June 1882, 6000 men under Yusef Pasha, advancing from Fashoda, were nearly annihilated by the mahdists. Payara and Birket in Kordofan quickly fell, and a few days before the battle of Tell-el-Kebir was fought, the mahdi, with a large force, was besieging El Obeid. That town was captured, after an obstinate defence, on the 17th of January 1883, by which time almost the whole of the Sudan south of Khartum was in open rebellion, except the Bahr-el-Ghazal and the Equatorial provinces, where for a time Lupton Bey and Emin Pasha were able to hold their own. Abd-el-Kader, who had succeeded Raouf, telegraphed to Cairo for 10,000 additional troops, and pointed out that if they were not sent at once four times this number would be required to re-establish the authority of the government in the Sudan. After gaining some small successes, Abd-el-Kader was superseded by Suliman Niagi on the 20th of February 1883, and on the 26th of March Ala-ed-din Pasha was appointed governor-general. Meanwhile 5000 men, who had served in the Egyptian army, were collected and forcibly despatched to Khartum via Suakin. In March 1883 Colonel William Hicks, late of the Bombay army, who in January had been appointed by the khedive chief of the staff of the army of the Sudan, found himself at Khartum with nine European officers and about 10,000 troops of little military value. The reconquest of the Sudan having been determined upon, although Sir E. Malet reported that the Egyptian government could not supply the necessary funds, and that there was great risk of failure, Colonel Hicks, who had resigned his post on the 23rd of July, and had been appointed commander-in-chief, started from Khartum on 9th September, with a total force of about 10,000 men, including non-combatants, for Kordofan. On the 22nd of May Sir E. Malet had informed Sherif Pasha that,

"although Colonel Hicks finds it convenient to communicate with Lord Dufferin or with me, it must not be supposed that we endorse in any way the contents of his telegrams.... Her Majesty's government are in no way responsible for his operations in the Sudan, which have been undertaken under the authority of His Highness's government."

Colonel Hicks was fully aware of the unfitness of his rabble forces for the contemplated task, and on the 5th of August he telegraphed: "I am convinced it would be best to keep the two rivers and province of Sennar, and wait for Kordofan to settle itself." Early in November the force from Khartum was caught by the mahdists short of water at Kashgil, near El Obeid, and was almost totally destroyed, Colonel Hicks, with all his European officers, perishing. Sinister rumours having reached Cairo, Sir E. Baring (Lord Cromer), who had succeeded Sir E. Malet, telegraphed that "if Colonel Hicks's army is destroyed, the Egyptian government will lose the whole of the Sudan, unless some assistance from the outside is given," and advised the withdrawal to some post on the Nile. On the following day Lord Granville replied: "We cannot lend English or Indian troops; if consulted, recommend abandonment of the Sudan within certain limits"; and on the 25th he added that "Her Majesty's government can do nothing in the matter which would throw upon them the responsibilities for operations in the Sudan." In a despatch of the 3rd of December Sir E. Baring forcibly argued against British intervention in the affairs of the Sudan, and on the 13th of December Lord Granville telegraphed that "Her Majesty's government recommend the ministers of khedive to come to an early decision to abandon all territory south of Assuan, or, at least, of Wadi Halfa." On the 4th of January 1884 Sir E. Baring was directed to insist upon the policy of evacuation, and on the 18th General Gordon left London to assist in its execution.

Defeat of General Baker.

The year 1883 brought a great accession of power to the mahdi, who had captured about 20,000 rifles, 19 guns and large stores of ammunition. On the Red Sea littoral Osman Digna, a slave dealer of Suakin, appointed amir of the Eastern Sudan, raised the local tribes and invested Sinkat and Tokar. On the 16th of October and the 4th of November Egyptian reinforcements intended for the former place were destroyed, and on the 2nd of December a force of 700 men was annihilated near Tamanieb. On the 23rd of December General Valentine Baker, followed by about 2500 men, gendarmerie, blacks, Sudanese and Turks, with 10 British officers, arrived at Suakin to prepare for the relief of Sinkat and Tokar. The khedive appears to have been aware of the risks to be incurred, and in a private letter he informed the general that "I rely upon your prudence and ability not to engage the enemy except under the most favourable circumstances." The tragedy of Kashgil was repeated on the 4th of February 1884, when General Baker's heterogeneous force, on the march from Trinkitat to Tokar, was routed at El Teb by an inferior body of tribesmen. Of 3715 men, 2375, with 11 European officers, were killed. Suakin was now in danger, and on the 6th of February British bluejackets and marines were landed for the defence of the town.

British expedition under Sir G. Graham: battles of El Teb and Tamanieb.

Two expeditions in the Sudan led by British officers having thus ended in disaster, and General Gordon with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart having reached Khartum on the 18th of February, the policy of British non-intervention in regard to Sudan affairs could no longer be maintained. Public opinion in England was strongly impressed by the fact that the Egyptian garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat were perishing within striking distance of the Red Sea littoral. A British force about 4400 strong, with 22 guns, made up of troops from Egypt and from units detained on passage from India, was rapidly concentrated at Suakin and placed under the orders of Major-General Sir G. Graham, with Major-Generals Sir R. Buller and J. Davis as brigadiers. News of the fall of Sinkat, where the starving garrison, under Tewfik Bey, made a gallant sortie and was cut to pieces, reached Suakin on the 12th of February. On the 24th General Graham's force disembarked at Trinkitat and received information of the surrender of Tokar. At 8 A.M. on the 29th the force advanced towards Tokar in square, and came under fire at 11.20 A.M. from the enemy entrenched at El Teb. The tribesmen made desperate efforts to rush the square, but were repulsed, and the position was taken by 2 P.M. The cavalry, 10th and 19th Hussars, under Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart, became involved in a charge against an unbroken enemy, and suffered somewhat severely. The total British loss was 34 killed and 155 wounded; that of the tribesmen was estimated at 1500 killed. On the following day Tokar was reached, and on the 2nd of March the force began its return to Suakin, bringing away about 700 people belonging to the late garrison and the civil population, and destroying 1250 rifles and a quantity of ammunition found in a neighbouring village. On the 9th of March the whole force was back at Suakin, and on the evening of the 11th an advance to Tamai began, and the force bivouacked and formed a zeriba in the evening. Information was brought by a native that the enemy had assembled in the Khor Ghob, a deep ravine not far from the zeriba. At about 8.30 A.M. on the 13th the advance began in echelon of brigade squares from the left. The left and leading square (2nd Brigade) moved towards the khor, approaching at a point where a little ravine joined it. The enemy showing in front, the leading face of the square was ordered to charge up to the edge of the khor. This opened the square, and a mass of tribesmen rushed in from the small ravine. The brigade was forced back in disorder, and the naval guns, which had been left behind, were temporarily captured. After a severe hand-to-hand struggle, in which the troops behaved with great gallantry, order was restored and the enemy repulsed, with the aid of the fire from the 1st Brigade square and from dismounted cavalry. The 1st Brigade square, having a sufficient field of fire, easily repelled all attempts to attack, and advancing as soon as the situation had been restored, occupied the village of Tamai. The British loss was 109 killed and 104 wounded; of the enemy nearly 2000 were killed. On the following day the force returned to Suakin.

Two heavy blows had now been inflicted on the followers of Osman Digna, and the road to Berber could have been opened, as General Graham and Brigadier-General Sir H. Stewart suggested. General Gordon, questioned on the point, telegraphed from Khartum, on the 7th of March, that he might be cut off by a rising at Shendi, adding, "I think it, therefore, most important to follow up the success near Suakin by sending a small force to Berber." He had previously, on the 29th of February, urged that the Suakin-Berber road should be opened up by Indian troops. This, and General Gordon's proposal to send 200 British troops to Wadi Halfa, was opposed by Sir E. Baring, who, realizing soon afterwards the gravity of the situation, telegraphed on the 16th of March:--

"It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Suakin and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartum."

The government refused to take this action, and Major-General Graham's force was employed in reconnaissances and small skirmishes, ending in the destruction of the villages in the Tamanieb valley on 27th March. On the 28th the whole force was reassembled at Suakin, and was then broken up, leaving one battalion to garrison the town.

Entanglement of General Gordon at Khartum.

The abrupt disappearance of the British troops encouraged the tribesmen led by Osman Digna, and effectually prevented the formation of a native movement, which might have been of great value. The first attempt at intervention in the affairs of the Sudan was made too late to save Sinkat and Tokar. It resulted only in heavy slaughter of the tribesmen, which afforded no direct or indirect aid to General Gordon or to the policy of evacuation. The public announcement of the latter was a grave mistake, which increased General Gordon's difficulties, and the situation at Khartum grew steadily worse. On the 24th of March Sir E. Baring telegraphed:--

"The question now is, how to get General Gordon and Colonel Stewart away from Khartum.... Under present circumstances, I think an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Suakin, if it is at all a possible military operation.... We all consider that, however difficult the operations from Suakin may be, they are more practicable than any operations from Korosko and along the Nile."

A telegram from General Gordon, received at Cairo on the 19th of April, stated that

"We have provisions for five months and are hemmed in.... Our position will be much strengthened when the Nile rises.... Sennar, Kassala and Dongola are quite safe for the present."

At the same time he suggested "an appeal to the millionaires of America and England" to subscribe money for the cost of "2000 or 3000 nizams" (Turkish regulars) to be sent to Berber. A cloud now settled down upon Khartum, and subsequent communications were few and irregular. The foreign office and General Gordon appeared to be somewhat at cross purposes. The former hoped that the garrisons of the Sudan could be extricated without fighting. The latter, judging from the tenor of some of his telegrams, believed that to accomplish this work entailed the suppression of the mahdi's revolt, the strength of which he at first greatly underestimated. He had pressed strongly for the employment of Zobeir as "an absolute necessity for success" (3rd of March); but this was refused, since Sir H. Gordon advised at this time that it would be dangerous. On the 9th of March General Gordon proposed, "if the immediate evacuation of Khartum is determined upon irrespective of outlying towns," to send down the "Cairo _employés_" and the garrison to Berber with Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Stewart, to resign his commission, and to proceed with the stores and the steamers to the equatorial provinces, which he would consider as placed under the king of the Belgians. On the 13th of March Lord Granville gave full power to General Gordon to "evacuate Khartum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay," and expressed a hope that he would not resign his commission.

Relief expedition: question of route.