Part 48

By the end of March 1884 Sir E. Baring and the British officers in Egypt were convinced that force would have to be employed, and the growing danger of General Gordon, with the grave national responsibility involved, began to be realized in Great Britain. Sir Henry Gordon, however, who was in personal communication with Mr Gladstone, considered that his brother was in no peril, and for some time disbelieved in the need for a relief expedition. Meanwhile it was at least necessary to evolve some plan of action, and on the 8th of April the adjutant-general addressed a memorandum to the secretary of state for war detailing the measures required for placing 6500 British troops "in the neighbourhood of Shendi." The battle of the routes began much earlier, and was continued for some months. Practically the choice lay between the Nile and the Suakin-Berber road. The first involved a distance of 1650 m. from Cairo along a river strewn with cataracts, which obstructed navigation to all but small boats, except during the period of high water. So great was this obstruction that the Nile had never been a regular trade route to the Sudan. The second entailed a desert march of about 250 m., of which one section, Obak-Bir Mahoba (52 m.), was waterless, and the rest had an indifferent water supply (except at Ariab, about half-way to Berber), capable, however, of considerable development. From Berber the Nile is followed (210 m.) to Khartum. This was an ancient trade route with the Sudan, and had been used without difficulty by the reinforcements sent to Hicks Pasha in 1883, which were accompanied by guns on wheels. The authorities in Egypt, headed by General Stephenson, subsequently supported by the Admiral Lord John Hay, who sent a naval officer to examine the river as far as Dongola, were unanimous in favour of the Suakin-Berber route. From the first Major-General Sir A. Clarke, then inspector-general of fortifications, strongly urged this plan, and proposed to begin at once a metre gauge railway from Suakin, to be constructed by Indian labour under officers skilled in laying desert lines. Some preliminary arrangements were made, and on the 14th of June the government sanctioned certain measures of preparation at Suakin. On the other side were the adjutant-general (Lord Wolseley) and a small number of officers who had taken part in the Red River expedition of 1870. The memorandum of the adjutant-general above referred to was based on the hypothesis that Khartum could not hold out beyond the 15th of November, and that the expedition should reach Berber by the 20th of October. Steamers were to be employed in such reaches as proved practicable, but the force was to be conveyed in special whale-boats, by which "the difficulty of transport is reduced to very narrow limits." The mounted force was to consist of 400 men on native horses and 450 men on horses or camels. The question of routes continued to be the subject of animated discussion, and on the 29th of July a committee of three officers who had served in the Red River expedition reported:--

"We believe that a brigade can easily be conveyed in small boats from Cairo to Dongola in the time stated by Lord Wolseley; and, further, that should it be necessary to send a still larger force by water to Khartum, that operation will present no insuperable difficulties."

Lord Wolseley sent out; Nile route adopted.

This most inconclusive report, and the baseless idea that the adoption of the Nile route would involve no chance of bloodshed, which the government was anxious to avoid, seem to have decided the question. On the 8th of August the secretary of state for war informed General Stephenson that "the time had arrived when some further measures for obtaining accurate information as to his (General Gordon's) position, and, if necessary, for tendering him assistance, should be adopted." General Stephenson still urged the Suakin-Berber route, and was informed on the 26th of August that Lord Wolseley would be appointed to take over the command in Egypt for the purposes of the expedition, for which a vote of credit had been taken in the House of Commons on the 5th of August. On the 9th of September Lord Wolseley arrived at Cairo, and the plan of operations was somewhat modified. A camel corps of 1100 men selected from twenty-eight regiments at home was added, and the "fighting force to be placed in line somewhere in the neighbourhood of Shendi" was fixed at 5400. The construction of whale-boats began on the 12th of August, and the first batch arrived at Wadi Halfa on the 14th of October, and on the 25th the first boat was hauled through the second cataract. The mounted forces proceeded up the banks, and the first half-battalion embarked at Gemai, 870 m. from Khartum, on the 5th of November, ten days before the date to which it had been assumed General Gordon could hold out. In a straggling procession the boats worked their way up to Korti, piloted by Canadian _voyageurs_. The labour was very great, and the troops, most of whom were having their first lesson in rowing, bore the privations of their unaccustomed conditions with admirable cheerfulness. By the 25th of December 2220 men had reached Korti, of whom about 800 only had been conveyed by the whale-boats, the last of which did not arrive till the 27th of January. Beyond Korti lay the very difficult section of the river to Abu Hamed, which was quite unknown. Meanwhile news of the loss of the "Abbas" and of the murder of Colonel J. D. Stewart and his party on the 18th of September had been received. A letter from Gordon, dated the 4th of November and received on the 17th of November, stated that his steamers would await the expedition at Metemma, and added, "We can hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult." In his diary, on the 13th of December, when his difficulties had become extreme, he noted that "if the expeditionary force does not come in ten days, the town may fall."

Stewart's Desert Column; battle of Abu Klea wells.

Failure of relief expedition.

It was clear at Korti that something must be done at once; and on the 13th of December 1100 men, with 2200 camels, under General Sir H. Stewart, were despatched to occupy Jakdul wells, 96 m. on the desert route to Metemma. Stewart returned on the 5th of January, and started again on the 8th, with orders to establish a fort at Abu Klea and to occupy Metemma. The Desert Column, 1800 men, with 2880 camels in poor condition and 153 horses, found the enemy in possession of Abu Klea wells on the 16th, and was desperately attacked on the 17th. The want of homogeneity of the force, and the unaccustomed tactics imposed upon the cavalry, somewhat hampered the defence, and the square was broken at the left rear corner. Driven back upon the camels in the centre, the troops fought hand to hand with the greatest gallantry. Order was quickly restored, and the attack was repulsed, with a loss of 74 killed and 94 wounded. At least 1100 of the enemy were killed. The wells being occupied and a zeriba formed, the column started on the evening of the 18th. The wrong road was taken, and great confusion occurred, during the night, but at dawn this was rectified; and after forming a rough fort under fire, by which General Sir H. Stewart was fatally wounded, an advance was made at 3 P.M. The square was again heavily attacked, but the Arabs could not get to close quarters and in the evening a bivouac was formed on the Nile. The British losses on this day were 23 killed and 98 wounded. The Desert Column was now greatly exhausted. On the 20th the village of Gubat was occupied; and on the following day Sir C. Wilson, on whom the command had devolved, advanced against Metemma, which was found too strong to assault. On this day General Gordon's four steamers arrived; and on the morning of the 24th Sir C. Wilson, with 20 British soldiers in red coats and about 280 Sudanese, started in the "Bordein" and "Telahawiyeh" for Khartum. The "Bordein" grounded on the following day, and again on the 26th, by which twenty-four hours were lost. At 11 A.M. on the 28th Khartum was sighted, and it soon became clear that the town was in the hands of the enemy. After reconnoitring farther, the steamers turned and proceeded down stream under a heavy fire, the Sudanese crews showing signs of disaffection. The "Telahawiyeh" was wrecked on the 29th of January and the "Bordein" on the 31st, Sir C. Wilson's party being rescued on the 4th of February by Lord C. Beresford in the "Safieh," which had come up from Gubat on receipt of news carried there by Lieutenant Stuart Wortley in a row-boat. Khartum had been taken and General Gordon killed on the morning of the 26th of January 1885, having thus held out thirty-four days beyond the date when he had expected the end. The garrison had been reduced to starvation; and the arrival of twenty British soldiers, with orders to return at once, could not have affected the situation. The situation of the Desert Column and of its transport was most imperfectly understood at Korti, where impossible plans were formed. Fortunately Major-General Sir R. Buller, who arrived at Gubat on the 11th of February, decided upon withdrawal, thus averting impending disaster, and by the 16th of March the Desert Column had returned to Korti.

The advance from Korti of the River Column, under Major-General Earle, began on the 28th of December, and great difficulties of navigation were encountered. On the 10th of February an action was fought at Kirbekan with about 800 of the enemy, entailing a loss of 10 killed, including Major-General Earle, and 47 wounded. The column, now commanded by Brigadier-General Brackenbury, continued its slow advance, and on the morning of the 24th of February it was about 26 m. below Abu Hamed, a point where the Korosko desert route strikes the Nile, 350 m. from Khartum. Here it received orders to retire, and it reached Korti on the 8th of March.

Suakin operations.

The verbal message received from General Gordon on the 30th of December 1884 rendered the extreme danger of the position at Khartum painfully apparent, and the secretary of state for war, acting on Sir E. Baring's advice, offered to make an active demonstration from Suakin. To this proposal Lord Wolseley demurred, but asked that ships of war should be sent to Suakin, and that "marines in red coats should be frequently landed and exercised." Lord Hartington replied that the government did not consider that a demonstration of this kind could be effective, and again suggested stronger measures. On the 8th of January 1885 Lord Wolseley repeated that "the measures you propose will not assist my operations against Khartum," adding:--

"I have from first endeavoured to impress on government that I am strong enough to relieve Khartum, and believe in being able to send a force, when returning by way of Berber, to Suakin, to open road and crush Osman Digna."

On this very day the small Desert Column started from Korti on its hazardous mission to the relief of a town fully 270 m. distant, held by a starving garrison, and invested by 30,000 fighting men, mostly armed with good rifles. Before reaching the Nile the Desert Column had lost 300 men and was unable to take Metemma, while its transport had completely broken down. On the 8th of February Lord Wolseley telegraphed, "The sooner you can now deal with Osman Digna the better," and recommended the despatch of Indian troops to Suakin, to "co-operate with me in keeping road to Berber open." On the 11th of February, the day on which Sir R. Buller most wisely decided to withdraw the Desert Column from a position of extreme danger, it was determined at Korti that the River Column should proceed to attack Berber, and Lord Wolseley accepted the proposal of the government to make a railway from Suakin, telegraphing to Lord Harrington:--

"By all means make railway by contract to Berber, or as far as you can, during summer. It will be invaluable as a means of supply, and I recommend it being begun immediately. Contract to be, if possible, for so much per ton military stores and supplies and men carried, per mile."

Battle of Hashin.

Every effort was now concentrated upon sending an expeditionary force to Suakin, and before the end of March about 13,000 men, including a brigade from India and a field battery from New South Wales, with nearly 7000 camels and 1000 mules, were there assembled. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Graham was placed in command of this force, with orders to break down the power of Osman Digna and to press the construction of the railway towards Berber. The troops at Suakin, on arrival, were much harassed by small night attacks, which ceased as soon as the scattered camps were drawn together. On the 19th of March Sir G. Graham, with the cavalry brigade and the infantry of the Indian contingent, reconnoitred as far as Hashin, finding the country difficult on account of the dense mimosa scrub. The enemy occupied the hills and fired upon the cavalry. On the 20th Sir G. Graham, with about 9000 men, again advanced to Hashin, and Dehilbat hill was taken by the Berkshire regiment and the Royal Marines. A squadron of the 9th Royal Lancers, which was dismounted in the thick bush, was driven back with the loss of 9 men; but elsewhere the Arabs never succeeded in closing, and the troops returned to Suakin in the afternoon, leaving the East Surrey regiment in a zeriba covering some low hills near Hashin village. The total British loss was 9 killed and 39 wounded.

McNeill's zeriba.

On the 22nd of March a force, consisting of two British and three Indian battalions, with a naval brigade, a squadron of lancers, two companies of engineers, and a large convoy of camels carrying water and supplies, under Major-General Sir J. McNeill, started from Suakin for Tamai, with orders to form a half-way zeriba. The advance was much impeded by the dense bush, and the force halted at Tofrik, about 6 m. out, at 10.30 A.M. A native had brought information that the enemy intended to attack while the zeriba was being formed, and this actually occurred. The force was caught partly unprepared soon after 2.30 P.M., and severe fighting took place. The enemy were repulsed in about twenty minutes, the naval brigade, the Berkshire regiment, the Royal Marines, and the 15th Sikhs showing the greatest gallantry. The casualties, including those among non-combatants, were 150 killed, 148 missing, and 174 wounded. More than 500 camels were killed. The tribesmen lost more than 1000 killed. As soon as firing was heard at Suakin, Sir G. Graham, with two battalions of Guards and a battery of horse artillery, started for Tofrik, but returned on being assured that reinforcements were not required. On the 24th and 26th convoys proceeding in square to Tofrik were attacked, the enemy being repulsed without difficulty. On the 2nd of April a force exceeding 7000 men, with 14 guns and 1600 transport animals, started from Suakin at 4.30 A.M., and bivouacked twelve hours later at Tesela Hill. Next morning an advance was made towards Tamai, and a number of huts in the Khor Ghob were burned. The force then returned to Suakin. The railway was now pushed on without interruption, reaching Otao on the 30th. On the night of the 6th of May a combined movement was made from Suakin and Otao, which resulted in the surprise and break-up of a force of the enemy under Mahommed Sardun, and the capture of a large number of sheep and goats. The moral effect of this operation was marked, and large numbers of tribesmen placed themselves unconditionally at the disposal of Sir G. Graham. A great native movement could now have been organized, which would have kept the route to Berber and enabled the railway to be rapidly pushed forward.

Political and military situation at end of operations.

Meanwhile many communications had passed between the war office and Lord Wolseley, who at first believed that Berber could be taken before the summer. In a long despatch of the 6th of March he discussed the general situation, and pointed out that although the force at his disposal "was amply sufficient" for raising the siege of Khartum and defeating the mahdi, the conditions were changed by the fall of the town. It was now "impossible ... to undertake any offensive operations until about the end of the summer," when twelve additional British battalions, four strong squadrons of British cavalry, and two R.H.A. batteries, together with a large extension of the Wadi Halfa railway, eleven steamers, and three hundred more whale-boats, would be required. He considered it necessary to hold Dongola, and he reported that he was "distributing this army along the left bank of the Nile, on the open reach of water" between the Hannek cataract and Abu Dom, opposite Merawi. On the 30th of March Lord Wolseley quitted the army and proceeded to Cairo. A cloud having arisen on the frontiers of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of the troops from the Sudan was ordered on the 11th of May. On the formation of Lord Salisbury's cabinet, the new secretary of state for war, Mr W. H. Smith, inquired whether the retirement could be arrested, but Major-General Sir R. Buller reported that the difficulties of reoccupation would be great, and that if Dongola was to be held, a fresh expedition would be required. On the 22nd of June, before the British rearguard had left Dongola, the mahdi died. The withdrawal of the Suakin force began on the 17th of May, and the friendly tribes, deprived of support, were compelled to make terms with Osman Digna, who was soon able to turn his attention to Kassala, which capitulated in August, nearly at the same time as Sennar.

The failure of the operations in the Sudan had been absolute and complete, and the reason is to be sought in a total misconception of the situation, which caused vacillation and delay, and in the choice of a route by which, having regard to the date of the decision, the relief of General Gordon and Khartum was impossible. (G. S. C.)

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 1885 TO 1896

The operations against Mahdism during the eleven years from the end of the Nile expedition and the withdrawal from the Sudan to the commencement of the Dongola campaign will be more easily understood if, instead of narrating them in one chronological sequence, the operations in each province are considered separately. The mahdi, Mahommed Ahmed, died at Omdurman on the 22nd of June 1885. He was succeeded by the principal khalifa, Abdullah el Taaisha, a Baggara Arab, who for the next thirteen years ruled the Sudan with despotic power. Cruel, vicious, unscrupulous and strong, the country groaned beneath his oppression. He removed all possible rivals, concentrated at Omdurman a strong military force composed of men of his own tribe, and maintained the ascendancy of that tribe over all others. As the British troops retired to Upper Egypt, his followers seized the evacuated country, and the khalifa cherished the idea, already formulated by the mahdi, of the conquest of Egypt, but for some years he was too much occupied in quelling risings, massacring the Egyptians in the Sudan, and fighting Abyssinia, to move seriously in the matter.

_Upper Egypt._--Mahommed el Kheir, dervish amir of Dongola, however, advanced towards the frontier in the autumn of 1885, and at the end of November came in touch with the frontier field force, a body of some 3000 men composed in nearly equal parts of British and Egyptian troops. A month of harassing skirmishes ensued, during which the Egyptian troops showed their mettle at Mograka, where 200 of them held the fort against a superior number of dervishes, and in combats at Ambigol, Kosha and Firket. Sir Frederick Stephenson, commanding the British army of occupation in Egypt, then concentrated the frontier field force at Firket, and attacked the main body of the enemy at Ginnis on the 30th of December 1885, completely defeating it and capturing two guns and twenty banners. It was here the new Egyptian army received its baptism of fire and acquitted itself very creditably. Although checked, the dervishes were not discouraged, and continued to press upon the frontier in frequent raids, and thus in many bloody skirmishes the fighting qualities of the Egyptian troops were developed. In April 1886 the frontier was drawn back to Wadi Halfa, a fortified camp at the northern end of the desolate defile, Batn-el-Hagar, through which the Nile tumbles amid black, rocky hills in a succession of rapids, and debouches on a wide plain. The protection of the frontier was now left in the hands of the Egyptian army, a British force remaining at Assuan, 200 m. to the north, as a reserve in case of emergency, and two years later even this precaution was deemed unnecessary.

In October 1886 Wad en Nejumi, the amir who had defeated Hicks Pasha in Kordofan three years before, and led the assault at Khartum when General Gordon was slain in January 1885, replaced Mahommed el Kheir as "commander of the force for the conquest of Egypt," and brought large reinforcements to Dongola. An advanced column under Nur-el-Kanzi occupied Sarras in April 1887, was attacked by the Egyptian force under Colonel H. Chermside on the 28th of that month, and after a stubborn resistance was defeated with great loss. Nur-el-Kanzi was killed and ten standards taken.

Battle of Toski.

The troubles in Darfur and with Abyssinia (q.v.) induced the khalifa to reduce the garrisons of the north; nevertheless, the dervishes reoccupied Sarras, continued active in raids and skirmishes, and destroyed the railway south of Sarras, which during the Nile expedition of 1884 and 1885 had been carried as far as Akasha. It was not until May 1889 that an invasion of the frontier on a large scale was attempted. At this time the power and prestige of the khalifa were at their height: the rebellions in Darfur and Kordofan had been stamped out, the anti-mahdi was dead, and even the dervish defeat by the Abyssinians had been converted by the death of King John and the capture of his body into a success. It was therefore an opportune time to try to sweep the Turks and the British into the sea. On the 22nd of June Nejumi was at Sarras with over 6000 fighting men and 8000 followers. On the 2nd of July Colonel J. Wodehouse headed off a part of this force from the river at Argin, and, after a sharp action, completely defeated it, killing 900, among whom were many important amirs, and taking 500 prisoners and 12 banners, with very small loss to his own troops. A British brigade was on its way up stream, but the sirdar, who had already arrived to take the command in person, decided not to wait for it. The Egyptian troops, with a squadron of the 20th Hussars, concentrated at Toski, and thence, on the 3rd of August, General Grenfell, with slight loss, gained a decisive victory. Wad en Nejumi, most of his amirs, and more than 1200 Arabs were killed; 4000 prisoners and 147 standards were taken, and the dervish army practically destroyed. No further serious attempts were made to disturb the frontier, of which the most southerly outpost was at once advanced to Sarras.