CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE INVENTION OF ENTHYMEMES.

Seeing an enthymeme differs from a logical syllogism, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote principles; the _places_ of it, from whence a man may argue, ought to be certain and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a _syllogism_, rhetorical or other, should know all or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make war or no, must know what their revenues be, what and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, &c.: it will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.

He that is to speak _ex tempore_, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most _proper_ in the matter in hand.

_Proper_, I call those things which are least common to others: as, he that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him and Diomedes; as that he was a prince, and warred against the Trojans: but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the war young and voluntary.

Let this therefore be one general _place; from that which is proper_.

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