CHAPTER IX.
They which concern the speeches of two, are either in _asking_, or in _answering_.
That of _asking_, is either in _deliberation_; or in _preventing an objection_.
_Deliberation_ is when we do every now and then ask, as it were, reasons of our consultation, whereby the mind of the hearers wavering in doubt, doth set down some great thing.
This deliberation is either in _doubting_, or in _communication_.
A _doubting_ is a deliberating with ourselves, as Paul (1 Philipp. i. 23, 24), doubting whether it were better to die than to live, he garnisheth his speech in this manner: _For I am greatly in doubt on both sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with Christ, which is best of all: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you_.
_Communication_ is a deliberation with others. As, Galatians iii. 1, 2: _O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, &c._
And hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called _deliberation_.
Now followeth the figure of speech between two, called the _preventing of an objection_, or _occupation_.
_Occupation_ is, when we do bring an objection, and yield an answer unto it. Therefore this speech between two, in the first part, is called the setting down of the objection or occupation: in the latter part, an answering of the objection or the subjection: as Rom. vi. 1: _What shall we say then? Shall we continue still in sin, that grace may abound?_ In which words is set down the objection: the answering in these words, _God forbid_. And here this must be marked, that the objection is many times wanting, which must be wisely supplied by considering the occasion and answer of it: as 1 Tim. v. 11, 12: _They will marry, having condemnation_. Now lest any might say, what, _for marrying?_ He answereth: _No, for denying their first faith_.
Hitherto of the figures of _asking_. Now followeth the figures of _answering_. They are either in _suffering_ of a deed, called _permission_; or, _granting_ of an argument, called _concession_.
_Suffering_ of a deed or permission is, when mockingly we give liberty to any deed, being never so filthy; as Rev. xxii. 11: _Let him that is filthy, be filthy still_. And 1 Cor. xiv. 38: _If any be ignorant, let him be ignorant_.
Concession or granting of an argument is, when an argument is mockingly yielded unto, as Ecclesiastes xi. 9: _Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth, and let thy heart cheer thee, &c._
THE ART OF SOPHISTRY.
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Although the rules of Sophistry be needless for them that be perfect in logic; yet because the knowledge of them bringeth some profit to the young beginners, both for the ready answering of the subtle arguments, and the better practising of logic and rhetoric, we have thought good to turn it into the English tongue.
_Sophistry_ is the feigned art of _elenches_, or coloured reasons.
A coloured reason, or _elench_, is a show of reason to deceive withal. It is either when the deceit lieth in the _words_; or in the default of logic, called a _sophism_.
In _words_, is either when the deceit lieth in _one word_; or in _words joined together_. _If it were, it should be, whosoever._
In _one word_, is either the _darkness_ of a word; or, the _doubtfulness_ of a word.
The _darkness_ of a word, or an insolence, deceiveth, when by a reason the meaning is not understood, whether the strangeness be through the oldness, newness, or swelling vanity of the words; and of the last sort is that spoken of in 2 Peter ii. 18.
By this fallacy the Papists conclude, the Fathers to be on their side for deserving by good works.
_Whosoever saith man’s merits are crowned, they say man’s works do deserve._
_But the Fathers say, man’s merits are crowned._
_Therefore the Fathers say, man’s works do deserve._
Where _merits_ is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of reward, whether it come by desert or freedom of promise.
_Doubtfulness_ of a word, _likeness_ of name, is either called _homonymia_; or by a trope or fineness of speech.
The _likeness_ of name, or _homonymia_, is when one word is given to signify divers things: as,
_He that believeth shall be saved._
_The hypocrites to whom our Saviour Christ would not commit himself, believed,_
_Therefore they shall be saved._
Where faith doth note out both a justifying faith, and a dead faith.
Doubtfulness by a trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is meant figuratively or contrarily: As, _That which Christ saith is true_.
_Christ saith that bread is his body._ _Therefore it is true._
Where by _body_ is meant the sign or sacrament of his body.
Unto the first, a perfect logician would answer, that the proposition is not an axiom necessarily true, according to the rule of truth, because of the doubtfulness of the old and new signification of _merit_. And if the word be far worn out of use, that it be not understood, then the answer must be, I understand it not, or put your axiom in plain words.
To the second he would answer, that the proposition or first part is not according to the rule of righteousness, because the proper subject and adjunct are not joined together: which _hath justifying faith, or believing sincerely, shall be saved_; and then the assumption being in the same sense inferred is false.
Unto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily true; because if the word _body_ be taken properly, it is not then true that is set down; but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, and therefore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then say, Christ saith in proper words, _it is my body_; and then it is false.
Hitherto of the fallacies in single words. Now of those that are joined together.
It is either _amphibolia_, or the doubtfulness of speech: or _exposition_, or unapt setting down of the reason.
The first is, when there is doubtfulness in the frame of speech; as thus, _if any obey not our word by a letter, note him_: where some refer _by a letter_, to the first part of the sentence, and some to the latter; where the signification of the word and right pointing doth show that it must be referred to the first.
The answer is, that the right and wise placing of the sentence is perverted.
Unapt setting down of the reason, is when the parts of the question and the reasons entreated, are not set down in fit words: as,
_All sin is evil._
_Every child of God doth sin._
_Therefore every child of God is evil._
Here the answer according to logic, is that the assumption doth not take the argument out of the proposition, but putteth in another thing; and so it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of the assumption.
Hitherto of the deceits of reason, which lie in _words_. Now of the default of logic, called _sophism_.
It is either _general_ or _special_. The _general_ are those which cannot be referred to any _part of logic_. They are either begging of the question, called the petition of the principle; or bragging of no proof.
Begging of the question, is when nothing is brought to prove but the question, or that which is doubtful: as,
_That righteousness, which is both by faith and works, doth justify._
_But this righteousness, is inherent righteousness_: Ergo.
Here the proposition in effect is nothing but a question.
_If together with the blood of Christ, we must make perfect satisfaction for our sins before we come to heaven; then there must be purgatory for them that die without perfection._
_But the first is so_: Ergo.
Where the argument they bring is as doubtful, and needeth as much proof, as the question.
The answer is this, out of the definition of the syllogism; that there is no new argument invented; therefore it cannot be a certain frame of concluding.
Bragging of no proof, is when that which is brought is too much, called _redounding_.
It is either impertinent to another matter, called _heterogenium_; or a vain repetition, called _tautologia_.
Impertinent, or not to the purpose, is when anything is brought for a proof, which is nothing near to the matter in hand; whereunto the common proverb giveth answer, _I ask you of cheese, you answer me of chalk_.
A vain repetition, is when the same thing in effect, though not in words, is repeated; as they that after a long time of prayer say, _Let us pray_. And this fallacy our Saviour Christ (Matt. vi. 5) condemneth in prayer. And this is a fault in method.
_Special_ are those, which may be referred to certain parts of logic, and they are of two sorts. Such as are referred to the spring of reasons, called _invention_; or to judgment.
Those referred to invention, are when anything is put for a reason, which is not; as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect; and so of the rest.
In the distribution this is a proper fallacy, when anything simply or generally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or special not meant nor intended: as,
_He that saith there are not seven sacraments, saith true._
_He that saith there are only three, saith there are not seven._
_Therefore he that saith there are three, saith true._
The right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarily true; for there may be a way to say there are not seven, and yet affirm an untruth.
Fallacies of judgment, are those that are referred to the judgment of one sentence, or of more.
Of one sentence, either to the proprieties of an axiom, or to the sorts.
To the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contrarily: an affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So some take the words of St. John, _I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray_, for no denial; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.
To the sorts, are referred either to the simple or compound.
The first, when the general is taken for the special, and contrarily. So the Papists, by this fallacy, do answer to that general saying of Paul; _We are justified with faith without the works of the law_: which they understand of works done before faith, when that was never called in doubt.
The fallacies which are referred to a compound axiom, are those which are referred either to a _disjoined_, or _knitting_ axiom. To a _disjoined_ axiom, when the parts indeed are not _disjoined_: as, _Solomon was either a king, or did bear rule_.
To a _knitting_ axiom, is when the parts are not necessarily knit together; as, _If Rome be on fire, the Pope’s chair is burnt_.
And hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgment. Now followeth the second.
And they be either those that are referred to a _syllogism_; or to _method_. And they again are _general_, and _special_. _General_, which are referred to the general properties of a syllogism. It is either when all the parts are _denied_; or are _particular_. All parts denied: as,
_No pope is a devil._
_No man is a devil._
_Therefore no man is a pope._
And this must be answered, that it is not according to the definition of a negative syllogism, which must always have one affirmative.
All particular: as, _some unlawful thing must be suffered; as, namely, that which cannot be taken away_,
_The stews is some unlawful thing._
_Therefore the stews must be suffered._
This is answered, by the definition of a special syllogism; which is, that hath one part general.
The _special_, are those which are simple or compound.
The _simple_ is of two sorts. The first is more plain. The second less plain.
More plain, is when the assumption is denied, or the question is not particular: as,
_Every apostle may preach abroad_:
_Some apostle is not a pope_,
_Therefore some pope may not preach abroad_.
Also, _every pope is a lord_:
_Some pope may give an universal license._
_Therefore every lord may give an universal license_.
Less plain, hath one fallacy in common, when the proposition is special: as,
_Some player is a rogue_:
_Every vagabond is a rogue_,
_Therefore every player is a vagabond_.
Also, _some player is a rogue_:
_Every vagabond is a player_,
_Therefore every player is a rogue_.
The fallacy of the first kind, is when all the parts be affirmative: as,
_All Paul’s bishops were ordained for unity._
_All archbishops be ordained for unity._
_Therefore all archbishops are Paul’s bishops._
The fallacy of the second kind is when the assumption is denied: as,
_Every puritan is a Christian._
_No Lord Bishop is a puritan_,
_Therefore no Lord Bishop is a Christian_.
Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a _simple_ syllogism. Now follow those which are referred to a _compound_; which are those which are referred either to the _connexive_, or to the _disjoined_.
Of the first sort, one is when the first part or antecedent is denied, that the second or consequent may be so likewise: as,
_If any man have two benefices, he may escape unpunished at the bishop’s hands._
_But he may not have two benefices_,
_Therefore he may not escape unpunished at the bishop’s hands_.
The second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also: as,
_If every ignorant minister were put out of the church, and a preacher in his place, we should have good order_,
_But we have good order_.
_Therefore every ignorant minister is put out of the church, and a preacher in his place._
Of those referred to the disjoined, the first is when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: as,
_Every ignorant minister is to be allowed, or not._
_But he is not._
_Therefore he is._
The second kind, is when the second part of the copulative negative axiom is denied, that the first may be so: as,
_A non-resident is either a faithful, or unfaithful minister._
_But he is unfaithful. Ergo, &c._
And thus much of the fallacies in a syllogism.
The fallacy in method is when, to deceive withal, the end is set in the beginning, the special before the general; good order be gone, confounded; and finally when darkness, length, and hardness, is laboured after.
END OF VOL. VI.
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Transcriber’s Note
In the Table of Contents, the third section of this volume is entitled “The Whole Art of Rhetoric”. This title also serves as page header at p. #421. However, at p. 419, the title page contains “The Art of Rhetoric” (also the title of the following fourth section). To avoid confusion, the word “WHOLE” has been added to p. 419.
At 70.34 “_[2. ]That the design...”_ The number ‘2’ has no preceding ‘1’.
Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.
22.18 of the spiritual law[.] Added. 40.15 which he wi[./l]l, Replaced. 41.9 as in the Court of Common Pleas[.] Added. 60.20 there was a ne[e/c]essity Replaced. 108.5 was this here[it/ti]c Legat burnt? Transposed. 175.23 It seems therefo[ re,/re, ]if Shifted. 240.26 St[r]ange injustice! Inserted. 270.1 frustrate h[sa/is a]ttempts Replaced. 276.28 _[B./A.]_ But philosophy Replaced. 293.7 _quas vulgus eleger[e/i]t_ Replaced. 321.4 most benefica[i]l to the commonwealth Inserted. 388.33 there was no Parli[r/a]ment Replaced. 419.1 THE [WHOLE ]ART OF RHETORIC. Added. 423.9 to _accuse_ and _ex[s/c]use_ Replaced.