CHAPTER XVII.

OF INTERROGATIONS, ANSWERS, AND JESTS.

The times when it is fit to ask one’s adversary a _question_, are chiefly four.

The first is, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by _interrogation_ draw him to confess the other.

The second, when of two propositions that conclude an absurdity, one is manifest of itself, and the other likely to be fetched out by a _question_; then the _interrogation_ will be seasonable; and the absurd conclusion is presently to be inferred without adding that proposition which is manifest.

The third, when a man would make appear that his adversary does contradict himself.

The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these: _In some sort, it is so; in some sort, it is not so_.

Out of these cases, it is not fit to _interrogate_. For he whose question succeeds not, is thought vanquished.

To equivocal _questions_ a man ought to answer fully, and not to be too brief.

To _interrogations_, which we foresee tend to draw from us an _answer_ contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our _answer_, presently give an _answer_ to the objection which is implied in the _question_.

And where the question exacteth an answer that concludeth against us, we must, together with our _answer_, presently _distinguish_.

_Jests_ are dissolved by serious and grave discourse; and grave discourse is deluded by _jests_.

The several kinds of _jests_ are set down in the _Art of Poetry_. Whereof one kind is _ironia_, and tends to please one’s self. The other is _scurrility_, and tends to please others.

The latter of these has in it a kind of baseness: the former may become a man of good breeding.

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