Part 1
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Marginal sidenotes, which served as section and topic aids, were often repeated on each page. The repetitive notes have been removed.
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THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES.
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THE
ENGLISH WORKS
OF
THOMAS HOBBES
OF MALMESBURY;
NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND EDITED
BY
SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH, BART.
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VOL. V.
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LONDON: JOHN BOHN, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN.
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MDCCCXLI.
LONDON: C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.
THE
QUESTIONS CONCERNING
LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE,
CLEARLY STATED AND DEBATED
BETWEEN
DR. BRAMHALL, BISHOP OF DERRY,
AND
THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY.
TO THE READER.
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You shall find in this little volume the questions concerning _necessity_, _freedom_, and _chance_, which in all ages have perplexed the minds of curious men, largely and clearly discussed, and the arguments on all sides, drawn from the authority of Scripture, from the doctrine of the Schools, from natural reason, and from the consequences pertaining to common life, truly alleged and severally weighed between two persons, who both maintain that men are free to _do_ as they _will_ and to _forbear_ as they _will_. The things they dissent in are, that the one holdeth, that it is not in a man’s power now to choose the will he shall have anon; that chance produceth nothing; that all events and actions have their necessary causes; that the will of God makes the necessity of all things. The other on the contrary maintaineth, that not only the _man_ is free to choose what he will _do_, but the _will_ also to choose what it shall _will_; that when a man willeth a good action, God’s will concurreth with his, else not; that the will may choose whether it will _will_, or not; that many things come to pass without necessity, by chance; that though God foreknow a thing shall be, yet it is not necessary that that thing shall be, inasmuch as God seeth not the future as in its causes, but as present. In sum, they adhere both of them to the Scripture; but one of them is a learned School-divine, the other a man that doth not much admire that kind of learning.
This is enough to acquaint you withal in the beginning; which also shall be more particularly explained by and by in the stating of the question, and dividing of the arguments into their several heads. The rest you shall understand from the persons themselves, when they enter. Fare ye well.
T. H.
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THE QUESTIONS
CONCERNING
LIBERTY, NECESSITY, AND CHANCE.
Whether whatsoever comes to pass proceed from _necessity_, or some things from _chance_, has been a question disputed amongst the old philosophers long time before the incarnation of our Saviour, without drawing into argument on either side the almighty power of the Deity. But the third way of bringing things to pass, distinct from _necessity_ and _chance_, namely, _freewill_, is a thing that never was mentioned amongst them, nor by the Christians in the beginning of Christianity. For St. Paul, that disputes that question largely and purposely, never useth the term of _freewill_; nor did he hold any doctrine equivalent to that which is now called the doctrine of freewill; but deriveth all actions from the irresistible will of God, and nothing from the will of him that _runneth or willeth_. But for some ages past, the doctors of the Roman Church have exempted from this dominion of God’s will the will of man; and brought in a doctrine, that not only man, but also his will is free, and determined to this or that action, not by the will of God, nor necessary causes, but by the power of the will itself. And though by the reformed Churches instructed by Luther, Calvin, and others, this opinion was cast out, yet not many years since it began again to be reduced by Arminius and his followers, and became the readiest way to ecclesiastical promotion; and by discontenting those that held the contrary, was in some part the cause of the following troubles; which troubles were the occasion of my meeting with the Bishop of Derry at Paris, where we discoursed together of the argument now in hand; from which discourse we carried away each of us his own opinion, and for aught I remember, without any offensive words, as blasphemous, atheistical, or the like, passing between us; either for that the Bishop was not then in passion, or suppressed his passion, being then in the presence of my Lord of Newcastle.
But afterwards the Bishop sent to his Lordship his opinion concerning the question in writing, and desired him to persuade me to send an answer thereunto likewise in writing. There were some reasons for which I thought it might be inconvenient to let my answer go abroad; yet the many obligations wherein I was obliged to him, prevailed with me to write this answer, which was afterwards not only without my knowledge, but also against my will, published by one that found means to get a copy of it surreptitiously. And thus you have the occasion of this controversy.
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THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.
The question in general is stated by the Bishop himself, (towards the end of No. III.), in these words: “Whether all events, natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably, without their own concurrence; so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsical causes, determining them to one.”
Which though drawn up to his advantage, with as much caution as he would do a lease, yet (excepting that which is not intelligible) I am content to admit. Not intelligible is, first, “that the conversion of a sinner concerns not the question.” If he mean, that the conversion of a sinner is from necessity, and predetermined, then he is, for so much as the question concerns religion, of the same mind that I am; and what he can mean else by that exception, I cannot guess. Secondly, these words, “without their own concurrence,” are insignificant, unless he mean that the events themselves should concur to their production: as that fire doth not necessarily burn without the concurrence of burning, as the words properly import: or at least without concurrence of the fuel. Those two clauses left out, I agree with him in the state of the question as it is put universally. But when the question is put of the necessity of any particular event, as of the will to write, or the like, then it is the stating of that particular question: but it is decided in the decision of the question universal.
He states the same question again in another place thus: “This is the very question where the water sticks between us, whether there be such a liberty free from necessitation and extrinsical determination to one, or not.” And I allow it also for well stated so.
Again he says, “In a word, so great difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question.” So that the state of the question is reduced to this, “Whether there be a moral efficacy which is not natural?” I say there is not: he says there is.
Again he writes thus: “And therefore as it were ridiculous to say, that the object of sight is the cause of seeing; so it is to say, that the proposing of the object by the understanding to the will, is the cause of willing.” Here also the question is brought to this issue, “Whether the object of sight be the cause that it is seen?” But for these words, “proposing of the object by the understanding to the will,” I understand them not.
Again, he often useth such words as these: “The will willeth; the will suspendeth its act, (_Rid est_, the will willeth not); the understanding proposeth; the understanding understandeth.” Herein also lyeth the whole question. If they be true, I, if false, he is in error.
Again, the whole question is decided, when this is decided, “Whether he that willingly permitteth a thing to be done, when without labour, danger, or diversion of mind, he might have hindered it, do not will the doing of it?”
Again the whole question of free-will is included in this, “Whether the will determine itself?”
Again, it is included in this, “Whether there be an universal grace, which particular men can take without a particular grace to take it?”
Lastly, there be two questions; one, “Whether a man be free in such things as are within his power, to do what he will;” another, “Whether he be free to will.” Which is as much as to say (because will is appetite), it is one question, whether he be free to eat that has an appetite, and another, whether he be free to have an appetite? In the former, “whether a man be free to do what he will,” I agree with the Bishop. In the latter, “whether he be free to will,” I dissent from him. And, therefore, all the places of Scripture that he allegeth to prove that a man hath liberty to do what he will, are impertinent to the question. If he has not been able to distinguish between these two questions, he has not done well to meddle with either: if he has understood them, to bring arguments to prove that a man is free to do if he will, is to deal uningenuously and fraudulently with his readers. And thus much for the state of the question.
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THE FOUNTAINS OF ARGUMENT IN THIS QUESTION.
The arguments by which this question is disputed, are drawn from four fountains. 1. From _authorities_. 2. From _the inconveniences consequent to either opinion_. 3. From _the attributes of God_. 4. From _natural reason_.
The _authorities_ are of two sorts, _divine_ and _human_. _Divine_ are those which are taken from the holy Scriptures. _Human_ also are of two sorts; one, the authorities of those men that are generally esteemed to have been learned, especially in this question, as the Fathers, Schoolmen, and old Philosophers: the other, are the vulgar and most commonly received opinions in the world.
His reasons and places of Scripture I will answer the best I am able; but his human authorities I shall admit and receive as far as to Scripture and reason they be consonant, and no further.
And for the arguments derived from the attributes of God, so far forth as those attributes are argumentative, that is, so far forth as their significations be conceivable, I admit them for arguments; but where they are given for honour only, and signify nothing but an intention and endeavour to praise and magnify as much as we can Almighty God, there I hold them not for arguments, but for oblations; not for the language, but (as the Scripture calls them) for the calves of our lips; which signify not true nor false, nor any opinion of our brain, but the reverence and devotion of our hearts; and therefore they are no sufficient premises to infer truth or convince falsehood.
The places of Scripture that make for me are these. First, (Gen. xlv. 5): Joseph saith to his brethren that had sold him, _Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preserve life._ And again (verse 8), _So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God._
And concerning Pharaoh, God saith, (Exod. vii. 3): _I will harden Pharaoh’s heart._ And concerning Sihon King of Heshbon, Moses saith, (Deut. ii. 30): _The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate._
And of Shimei that did curse David, David himself saith, (2 Sam. xvi. 10): _Let him curse, because the Lord hath said unto him, curse David._ And (1 Kings, xii. 15): _The King hearkened not to the people, for the curse was from the Lord._
And Job, disputing this very question, saith, (Job xii. 14): _God shutteth man, and there can be no opening_: and verse 16: _The deceived and the deceiver are his_: and verse 17: _He maketh the Judges fools_: and verse 24: _He taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness where there is no way_: and verse 25: _He maketh them to stagger like a drunken man._
And of the King of Assyria, God saith, _I will give him a charge to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down like the mire of the streets._ (Isaiah x. 6.)
And Jeremiah saith, (Jer. x. 23): _O Lord, I know that the way of man is not in himself, it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps._
And to Ezekiel, whom God sent as a watchman to the house of Israel, God saith thus: _When a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block before him, he shall die; because thou hast not given him warning, he shall die in his sin._ (Ezek. iii. 20.) Note here, God lays the stumbling block, yet he that falleth dieth in his sin: which shows that God’s justice in killing dependeth not on the sin only.
And our Saviour saith, (John vi. 44): _No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him._
And St. Peter, concerning the delivering of Christ to the Jews, saith thus, (Acts ii. 23): _Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken_, &c.
And again, those Christians to whom Peter and John resorted after they were freed from their troubles about the miracle of curing the lame man, praising God for the same, say thus: _Of a truth against the holy child Jesus whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done._ (Acts iv. 27, 28.)
And St. Paul, Rom. ix. 16: _It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy_: and verse 18, 19, 20: _Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say unto me, why doth he yet find fault; for who hath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that disputest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?_
And again, (1 Cor. iv 7): _Who maketh thee differ from another? and what hast thou that thou hast not received?_ and 1 Cor. xii. 6: _There are diversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in all_: and Eph. ii. 10: _We are his workmanship created in Jesus Christ unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them_: and Philip. ii. 13: _It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do, of his good pleasure._
To these places may be added all the places that make God the giver of all graces, that is to say, of all good habits and inclinations; and all the places wherein men are said to be dead in sin. For by all these it is manifest, that although a man may live holily if he _will_, yet _to will_ is the work of God, and not eligible by man.
A second sort of places there be, that make equally for the Bishop and me; and they be such as say that a man hath election, and may do many things _if he will_, and also _if he will_ he may leave them undone; but not that God Almighty naturally or supernaturally worketh in us every act of the will, as in my opinion; nor that he worketh it not, as in the Bishop’s opinion; though he use those places as arguments on his side.
The places are such as these, (Deut. xxx. 19): _I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live_: and (Ecclesiasticus xv. 14): _God in the beginning made man, and left him in the hand of his counsel_: and verse 16, 17: _He hath set fire and water before thee, stretch forth thy hand to whither thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whether him liketh shall be given him._
And those places which the Bishop citeth: _If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice, either to establish it, or to make it void_, (Numb. xxx. 13): and (Josh. xxiv. 15): _Chuse ye this day whom you will serve_, &c. _But I and my house will serve the Lord_: and (2 Sam. xxiv. 12): _I offer thee three things, choose which of them I shall do_: and (Isaiah vii. 16): _before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good_. And besides these very many other places to the same effect.
The third sort of texts are those which seem to make against me. As Isaiah v. 4: _What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?_
And Jeremiah xix. 5: _They have also built the high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my mind._
And Hosea xiii. 9: _O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself, but in me is thy help._
And 1 Tim. ii. 4: _Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of truth._
And Eccl. xv. 11, 12: _Say not thou, it is through the Lord I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou, he hath caused me to err; for he hath no need of thee, sinful man._ And many other places to the like purpose.
You see how great the apparent contradiction is between the first and the third sort of texts, which being both Scripture, may and must be reconciled and made to stand together; which unless the rigour of the letter be on one or both sides with intelligible and reasonable interpretations mollified, is impossible.
The Schoolmen, to keep the literal sense of the third sort of texts, interpret the first sort thus; the words of Joseph, _It was not you that sent me hither, but God_; they interpret in this manner: _It was you that sold me into Egypt, God did but permit it; it was God that sent me and not you_; as if the _selling_ were not the _sending_. This is Suarez; of whom and the Bishop I would know, whether the _selling_ of Joseph did infallibly and inevitably follow that permission. If it did, then that _selling_ was necessitated beforehand by an eternal permission. If it did not, how can there be attributed to God a foreknowledge of it, when by the _liberty of human will_ it might have been frustrated? I would know also whether the _selling_ of Joseph into Egypt were a sin? If it were, why doth Joseph say, _Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither_? Ought not a man to be grieved and angry with himself for sinning? If it were no sin, then treachery and fratricide is no sin.
Again, seeing the _selling_ of him consisted in these acts, _binding_, _speaking_, _delivering_, which are all corporeal motions, did God _will_ they should not be, how then could they be done? Or doth he permit barely, and neither _will_ nor _nill_ corporeal and local motions? How then is God the first mover and cause of all local motion? Did he cause the motion, and _will_ the law against it, but not the irregularity? How can that be, seeing the motion and law being existent, the contrariety of the motion and law is necessarily coexistent?
So these places, _He hardened Pharaoh’s heart_, _he made Sihon’s heart obstinate_, they interpret thus: “He permitted them to make their own hearts obstinate.” But seeing that man’s heart without the grace of God, is uninclinable to good, the _necessity_ of the hardness of heart, both in Pharaoh and in Sihon, is as easily derived from God’s _permission_, that is, from his withholding his grace, as from his _positive decree_. And whereas they say, He _wills_ godly and free actions conditionally and consequently, that is, if the man _will_ them, then God _wills_ them, else not; and _wills_ not evil actions, but _permits_ them; they ascribe to God nothing at all in the causation of any action either good or bad.
Now to the third sort of places, that seem to contradict the former, let us see if they may not be reconciled with a more intelligible and reasonable interpretation, than that wherewith the Schoolmen interpret the first.
It is no extraordinary kind of language, to call the commandments and exhortations and other significations of the _will_, by the name of _will_; though the _will_ be an internal act of the soul, and commands are but words and signs external of that internal act. So that the _will_ and the _word_ are diverse things; and differ as the _thing signified_, and the _sign_. And hence it comes to pass, that the Word and Commandment of God, namely, the holy Scripture, is usually called by Christians God’s will, but his revealed will; acknowledging the very will of God, which they call his counsel and decree, to be another thing. For the revealed will of God to Abraham was, that Isaac should be sacrificed; but it was his will he should not. And his revealed will to Jonas, that Nineveh should be destroyed within forty days; but not his decree and purpose. His decree and purpose cannot be known beforehand, but may afterwards by the event; for from the event we may infer his will. But his revealed will, which is his word, must be foreknown, because it ought to be the rule of our actions.