Part 13

(_e_) “He pleads moreover, ‘That the law is a cause of justice,’ that ‘it frames the wills of men to justice,’ and ‘that the punishment of one doth conduce to the preservation of many.’ All this is most true of a just law justly executed. But this is no God-a-mercy to T. H.’s opinion of absolute necessity. If all actions and all events be predetermined naturally, necessarily, extrinsically, how should the law frame men morally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the law to do, but either that which is done already, or that which is impossible to be done. If a man be chained to every individual act which he doth, and from every act which he doth not, by indissolvable bonds of inevitable necessity, how should the law either deter him or frame him? If a dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it. Make a thousand laws that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men do, according to T. H., they do it as necessarily as the fire burneth. Hang up a thousand thieves, and if a man be determined inevitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.

(_f_) “He adds, that ‘the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come, and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example.’ The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by law, respecteth both the evil act passed and the good to come. The ground of it, is the evil act passed, the scope or end of it, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justify the act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good. It is not lawful to do evil that good may come of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others; that is to fall into a certain crime for fear of an uncertain. Again, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted, neither probatory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but only vindicatory, to satisfy the law out of a zeal of justice by giving to every one his own, yet the action is just and warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in itself, without all undue circumstances, was never prohibited to the lawful magistrate, who is the vice-gerent or lieutenant of God, from whom he derives his power of life and death.

“T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth at every bulrush, so he lays hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause. But first, it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular. (_g_) First, he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions, though he command one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly, though he be the cause not only of the action, but also of the irregularity; though he both give man power to act, and determine this power to evil as well as good; though he punish the creatures, for doing that which he himself did necessitate them to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is tyrannical, first to necessitate a man to do his will, and then to punish him for doing of it, he leaves this pretence in the plain field, and flies to a second; that therefore a man is justly punished for that which he was necessitated to do, because the act was voluntary on his part. This hath more show of reason than the former, if he did make the will of man to be in his own disposition; but maintaining that the will is irresistibly determined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and absurdity is the same, first to necessitate a man to will, and then to punish him for willing. The dog only bites the stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand, but they make the first cause to punish the instrument for that which is his own proper act. Wherefore not being satisfied with this, he casts it off and flies to his third shift. ‘Men are not punished,’ saith he, ‘therefore, because their theft proceeded from election,’ (that is, because it was willingly done, for to elect and will, saith he, are both one; is not this to blow hot and cold with the same breath?) ‘but because it was noxious and contrary to men’s preservation.’ Thus far he saith true, that every creature by the instinct of nature seeks to preserve itself: cast water into a dusty place, and it contracts itself into little globes, that is to preserve itself. And those who are noxious in the eye of the law, are justly punished by them to whom the execution of the law is committed; but the law accounts no persons noxious, but those who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature of the thorn, and it can do no otherwise, nor a child, before it have the use of reason. If one should take my hand perforce and give another a box on the ear with it, my hand is noxious, but the law punisheth the other who is faulty. And therefore he hath reason to propose the question, ‘how it is just to kill one man to amend another, if he who killed did nothing but what he was necessitated to do.’ He might as well demand, how it is lawful to murder a company of innocent infants, to make a bath of their lukewarm blood for curing the leprosy. It had been a more rational way, first to have demonstrated that it is so, and then to have questioned why it is so. His assertion itself is but a dream, and the reason which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream.

“The sum of it is this; ‘that where there is no law, there no killing or any thing else can be unjust; that before the constitution of commonwealths, every man had power to kill another, if he conceived him to be hurtful to him; that at the constitution of commonwealths, particular men lay down this right in part, and in part reserve it to themselves, as in case of theft or murder; that the right which the commonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death, is not created by the law, but remaineth from the first right of nature which every man hath to preserve himself; that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts in order to our own preservation.’ This may well be called stringing of paradoxes.

“But first, (_h_) there never was any such time when mankind was without governors and laws, and societies. Paternal government was in the world from the beginning, and the law of nature. There might be sometimes a root of such barbarous thievish brigands, in some rocks or deserts, or odd corners of the world; but it was an abuse and a degeneration from the nature of man, who is a political creature. This savage opinion reflects too much upon the honour of mankind.

“Secondly, there never was a time when it was lawful, ordinarily, for private men to kill one another for their own preservation. If God would have had men live like wild beasts, as lions, bears, or tigers, he would have armed them with horns, or tusks, or talons, or pricks; but of all creatures man is born most naked, without any weapon to defend himself, because God had provided a better means of security for him, that is, the magistrate.

“Thirdly, that right which private men have to preserve themselves, though it be with the killing of another, when they are set upon to be murdered or robbed, is not a remainder or a reserve of some greater power which they have resigned, but a privilege which God hath given them, in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity, that when they cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that is, the magistrate, every man becomes a magistrate to himself.

“Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never had. The people, whilst they were a dispersed rabble, (which in some odd cases might happen to be), never had justly the power of life and death, and therefore they could not give it by their election. All that they do is to prepare the matter, but it is God Almighty that infuseth the soul of power.

“Fifthly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to compare the murdering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The elements are for the plants, the plants for the brute beasts, the brute beasts for man. When God enlarged his former grant to man, and gave him liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance, (Gen. ix. 3), yet man is expressly excepted (verse 6): _Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed_. And the reason is assigned, _for in the image of God made he man_. Before sin entered into the world, or before any creatures were hurtful or noxious to man, he had dominion over them as their lord and master. And though the possession of this sovereignty be lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not only the creatures to rebel, but also the inferior faculties to rebel against the superior, from whence it comes that one man is hurtful to another; yet the dominion still remains. Wherein we may observe how sweetly the providence of God doth temper this cross; that though the strongest creatures have withdrawn their obedience, as lions and bears, to shew that man hath lost the excellency of his dominion, and the weakest creatures, as flies and gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he is fallen; yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep and oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.

(_i_) “The next branch of his answer concerns consultations, ‘which,’ saith he, ‘are not superfluous, though all things come to pass necessarily, because they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect, and the means to bring it to pass.’ We were told (No. XI.) ‘that the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which breaks the horse’s back. It is well yet, that reason hath gained some command again, and is become at least a quarter-master. Certainly if any thing under God have power to determine the will, it is right reason. But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will physically, nor absolutely, much less extrinsically, and antecedently; and therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken to prove.

(_k_) “He adds further, that ‘as the end is necessary, so are the means; and when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.’ All which is truth, but not the whole truth; for as God ordains means for all ends, so he adapts and fits the means to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends, whereas T. H. would have all means, all ends, to be necessary. If God hath so ordered the world, that a man ought to use, and may freely use, those means of God, which he doth neglect, not by virtue of God’s decree, but by his own fault; if a man use those means of evil, which he ought not to use, and which by God’s decree he had power to forbear; if God have left to man in part the free managery of human affairs, and to that purpose hath endowed him with understanding: then consultations are of use, then provident care is needful, then it concerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world, that a man cannot, if he would, neglect any means of good, which by virtue of God’s decree it is possible for him to use, and that he cannot possibly use any means of evil, but those which are irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree; then not only consultations are vain, but that noble faculty of reason itself is vain. Do we think that we can help God Almighty to do his proper work? In vain we trouble ourselves, in vain we take care to use those means, which are not in our power to use, or not to use. And this is that which was contained in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer, though he be pleased both to disorder it, and to silence it. We cannot hope by our labours, to alter the course of things set down by God; let him perform his decree, let the necessary causes do their work. If we be those causes, yet we are not in our own disposition; we must do what we are ordained to do, and more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but patience, and to shrug up the shoulders. This is the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the clock which sets all the little wheels going, to be as the decree of God, and that the motion of it were perpetually infallible from an intrinsical principle, even as God’s decree is infallible, eternal, all-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second causes, and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great wheel, without missing or swerving in the least degree, as the second causes do pursue the determination of the first cause. I desire to know in this case, what cause there is to call a council of smiths, to consult and order the motion of that which was ordered and determined before to their hands? Are men wiser than God? Yet all men know, that the motion of the lesser wheels is a necessary means to make the clock strike.

(_l_) “But he tells me in great sadness, that ‘my argument is just like this other; if I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day; which, saith he, is a false consequence, and a false proposition.’ Truly, if by running through, he understands killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish proposition, and implies a contradiction. To live till to-morrow, and to die to-day, are inconsistent. But by his favour, this is not my consequence, but this is his own opinion. He would persuade us, that it is absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, and yet that it is possible that he may kill himself to-day. My argument is this: if there be a liberty and possibility for a man to kill himself to-day, then it is not absolutely necessary that he shall live till to-morrow; but there is such a liberty, therefore no such necessity. And the consequence which I make here, is this: if it be absolutely necessary, that a man shall live till to-morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate whether he should die to-day, or not. And this is a true consequence. The ground of his mistake is this, that though it be true, that a man may kill himself to-day, yet upon the supposition of his absolute necessity, it is impossible. Such heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth, which are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half upon his false grounds.

(_m_) “The next branch of my argument concerns admonitions, to which he gives no new answer, and therefore I need not make any new reply, saving only to tell him, that he mistakes my argument. I say not only, if all things be necessary, then admonitions are in vain; but if all things be necessary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools, children, or madmen. That they do admonish the one and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have not.

“Concerning praise and dispraise, he enlargeth himself. The scope of his discourse is, that ‘things necessary may be praiseworthy.’ There is no doubt of it; but withal their praise reflects upon the free agent, as the praise of a statue reflects upon the workman who made it. ‘To praise a thing,’ saith he, ‘is to say it is good.’ (_n_) True, but this goodness is not a metaphysical goodness; so the worst of things, and whatsoever hath a being, is good: nor a natural goodness; the praise of it passeth wholly to the Author of nature; _God saw all that he had made, and it was very good_: but a moral goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of things. The moral goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right reason. The moral evil of an action is the deformity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is moral praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise anything morally, is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The moral dispraise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. So moral praise is from the good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise. Whereas T. H. adds, that ‘to say a thing is good, is to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would wish, or as the state would have it, or according to the law of the land;’ he mistakes infinitely. He, and another, and the state, may all wish that which is not really good, but only in appearance. We do often wish what is profitable or delightful, without regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though the will of the state where we live, or the law of the land, do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule of moral goodness. And therefore to his question, ‘whether nothing that proceeds from necessity can please me,’ I answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaseth me, when I am cold; and I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by God for my use and for my good. Yet I do not mean to attribute any moral goodness to the fire, nor give any moral praise to it, as if it were in the power of the fire itself either to communicate its heat or to suspend it; but I praise first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for the praise which Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, that he was good by nature, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_; it hath more of the orator, than either of the theologian or philosopher in it. Man in the state of innocency did fall and become evil; what privilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave. _Narratur et divi Catonis sæpe mero caluisse virtus._ But the true meaning is, that he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of vice as others were. This is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally. Socrates was not of so good a natural temper, yet proved as good a man; the more his praise, by how much the difficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right reason.

“Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but only that they frame and conform the will to good, which hath been sufficiently answered. They do so indeed; but if his opinion were true, they could not do so. But because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to satisfy myself, (_o_) though it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge that I find some improper and analogical rewards and punishments used to brute beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog, the master of the decoy-duck whips her when she returns without company. And if it be true, which he affirmeth a little before that I have confessed, ‘that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do,’ the difficulty is increased.

“But first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some kinds of actions which are most excellent in brute beasts, and make the greatest show of reason, as the bees working their honey, and the spiders weaving their webs, are yet done without any consultation or deliberation, by a mere instinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these only kinds of works. But I did never say, I could not say, that all their individual actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in their causes, as what days the bees shall fly abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall keep in the hive, how often they shall fetch in thyme on a day, and from whence. These actions and the like, though they be not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are contingent, and therefore not necessary.

“Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some brute creatures are determined by nature to some rare and exquisite works; so in others, where it finds a natural propension, art, which is the imitator of nature, may frame and form them according to the will of the artist to some particular actions and ends, as we see in setting-dogs, and coy-ducks, and parrots; and the principal means whereby they effect this, is by their backs or by their bellies, by the rod or by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and punishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by vulgar people, but as it is used by divines and philosophers, for that recompense which is due to honest and dishonest actions. Where there is no moral liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true reward nor punishment.

“Thirdly, (_p_) when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing from another, which they are not capable of. Neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, but merely out of memory or out of a sensitive fear or hope. They remember that when they did after one manner, they were beaten; and when they did after another manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply themselves. But if their individual actions were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter them. Most certainly, if there be any desert in it, or any praise due unto it, it is to them who did instruct them.

Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, study, physic, and the like, he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied. And therefore I am silent.

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIV.