Part 8

_J. D._ “Secondly, (_a_) they who might have done, and may do, many things which they leave undone; and they who leave undone many things which they might do, are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true liberty. But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as is plain, (1 Kings iii. 11): _Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life, neither hast asked riches for thyself, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies_ &c. God gave Solomon his choice. He might have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisdom, which he did ask. He did ask wisdom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did not ask. And (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?_ It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power to retain it. Yet if he did give it, he could not retain it; and if he did retain it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do not. And we do not, what we might do. That is, we have true liberty from necessity.”

_T. H._ The second argument from Scripture consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when, if they would, they might have done another. The places are two; one is in 1 Kings iii. 11, where the history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wisdom at God’s hands. The other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?_

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places: that they prove that there is election, but do not disprove the necessity which I maintain of what they so elect.

“We have had the very same answer twice before. It seemeth that he is well-pleased with it, or else he would not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a panchreston, a salve for all sores, or _dictamnum_, sovereign dittany, to make all his adversaries’ weapons to drop out of the wounds of his cause, only by chewing it, without any application to the sore. I will not waste the time to show any further, how the members of his distinction do cross one another, and one take away another. To make every election to be of one thing imposed by necessity, and of another thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no election at all. But I forbear to press that at present. If I may be bold to use his own phrase, his answer looks quite another way from mine argument. My second reason was this: ‘They who may do, and might have done many things which they leave undone, and who leave undone many things which they might do, are not necessitated, nor precisely and antecedently determined to what they do.’

“But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as appears evidently by the texts alleged. Therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined, nor necessitated to do all things which we do. What is here of _election_ in this argument? To what proposition, to what term doth T. H. apply his answer? He neither affirms, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of any thing contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a more pertinent answer.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. IX.

The Bishop, for the proving of free-will, had alleged this text: _Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thyself long life_, &c. And another, (Acts v. 4): _After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?_ Out of which he infers, there was no necessity that Solomon should ask wisdom rather than long life, nor that Ananias should tell a lie concerning the price for which he sold his land: and my answer, that they prove election, but disprove not the necessity of election, satisfieth him not; because, saith he, (_a_) “they who might have done what they left undone, and left undone what they might have done, are not necessitated.”

But how doth he know (understanding power properly taken) that Solomon had a real power to ask long life? No doubt Solomon knew nothing to the contrary; but yet it was possible that God might have hindered him. For though God gave Solomon his choice, that is, the thing which he should choose, it doth not follow, that he did not also give him the act of election. And for the other text, where it is said, that the price of the land was in Ananias’s power, the word _power_ signifieth no more than the word right, that is, the right to do with his own what he pleased, which is not a real and natural power, but a civil power made by covenant. And therefore the former answer is sufficient, that though such places are clear enough to prove election, they have no strength at all to take away necessity.

NO. X.

[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]

_J. D._ “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those interrogations, and objurgations, and reprehensions, and expostulations, which we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect), but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations? _Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat?_ (Gen. iii. 11.) And (verse 13) he saith to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ And (Gen. iv. 6) to Cain, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down?_ And, (Ezech. xviii. 31): _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ Doth God command openly not to eat, and yet secretly by himself or by the second causes necessitate him to eat? Doth he reprehend him for doing that, which he hath antecedently determined that he must do? Doth he propose things under impossible conditions? Or were not this plain mockery and derision? Doth a loving master chide his servant because he doth not come at his call, and yet knows that the poor servant is chained and fettered, so as he cannot move, by the master’s own order, without the servant’s default or consent? They who talk here of a twofold will of God, _secret_ and _revealed_, and the one opposite to the other, understand not what they say. These two wills concern several persons. The secret will of God, is what he will do himself; the revealed will of God, is what he would have us to do; it may be the secret will of God to take away the life of the father, yet it is God’s revealed will that his son should wish his life and pray for his life. Here is no contradiction, where the agents are distinct. But for the same person to command one thing, and yet to necessitate him that is commanded to do another thing; to chide a man for doing that, which he hath determined inevitably and irresistibly that he must do; this were (I am afraid to utter what they are not afraid to assert) the highest dissimulation. God’s chiding proves man’s liberty.”

_T. H._ To the third and fifth arguments, I shall make but one answer.

_J. D._ (_a_) “Certainly distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, the one drawn from the truth of God, the other from the justice of God, the one from his objurgations and reprehensions, the other from his judgments after life, did require distinct answers. But the plain truth is, that neither here, nor in his answer to the fifth argument, nor in this whole treatise, is there one word of solution or satisfaction to this argument, or to any part of it. All that looks like an answer is contained, No. XII: ‘That which he does is made just by his doing; just, I say, in him, not always just in us by the example; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the same, if he punish him whom he commanded so for not doing it, is unjust.’ (_b_) I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad as the words intimate and as I apprehend, that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is truth itself, and to justify feigning and dissimulation in God, as he doth tyranny, by the infiniteness of his power and the absoluteness of his dominion. And therefore, by his leave, I must once again tender him a new summons for a full and clear answer to this argument also. He tells us, that he was not surprised. Whether he were or not, is more than I know. But this I see plainly, that either he is not provided, or that his cause admits no choice of answers. The Jews dealt ingeniously, when they met with a difficult knot which they could not untie, to put it upon Elias: _Elias will answer it when he comes_.

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. X.

The Bishop argued thus: “Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are those interrogations we find so frequently in holy Scriptures, (be it spoken with all due respect), but feigned and hypocritical exaggerations?” Here putting together two repugnant suppositions, either craftily or (be it spoken with all due respect) ignorantly, he would have men believe, because I hold necessity, that I deny liberty, I hold as much that there is true liberty as he doth, and more, for I hold it as from necessity, and that there must of necessity be liberty; but he holds it not from necessity, and so makes it possible there may be none. His expostulations were, first, _Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat?_ Secondly, _Why hast thou done this?_ Thirdly, _Why art thou wroth, and why is thy countenance cast down?_ Fourthly, _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ These arguments requiring the same answer which some other do, I thought fit to remit them to their fellows. But the Bishop will not allow me that. For he saith,

(_a_) “Certainly, distinct arguments, as the third and fifth are, &c. did require distinct answers.”

I am therefore to give an account of the meaning of the aforesaid objurgations and expostulations; not of the end for which God said, _Hast thou eaten of the tree, &c._, but how those words may be taken without repugnance to the doctrine of necessity. These words, _Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded that thou shouldst not eat_, convince Adam that, notwithstanding God had placed in the garden a means to keep him perpetually from dying in case he should accommodate his will to obedience of God’s commandment concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil, yet Adam was not so much master of his own will as to do it. Whereby is signified, that a mortal man, though invited by the promise of immortality, cannot govern his own will, though his will govern his actions; which dependence of the actions on the will, is that which properly and truly is called _liberty_. And the like may be said of the words to Eve, _Why hast thou done this?_ and of those to Cain, _Why art thou wroth? &c._ and to Israel, _Why will ye die, O house of Israel?_ But the Bishop here will say _die_ signifieth not _die_, but live eternally in torments; for by such interpretations any man may answer anything. And whereas he asketh, “Doth God reprehend him for doing that which he hath antecedently determined him that he must do?” I answer, no; but he convinceth and instructeth him, that though immortality was so easy to obtain, as it might be had for the abstinence from the fruit of one only tree, yet he could not obtain it but by pardon, and by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ: nor is there here any punishment, but only a reducing of Adam and Eve to their original mortality, where death was no punishment but a gift of God. In which mortality he lived near a thousand years, and had a numerous issue, and lived without misery, and I believe shall at the resurrection obtain the immortality which then he lost. Nor in all this is there any plotting secretly, or any mockery or derision, which the Bishop would make men believe there is. And whereas he saith, that “they who talk here of a twofold will of God, secret and revealed, and the one opposite to the other, understand not what they say:” the Protestant doctors, both of our and other Churches, did use to distinguish between the secret and revealed will of God; the former they called _voluntas bene placiti_, which signifieth absolutely his will, the other _voluntas signi_, that is, the signification of his will, in the same sense that I call the one his _will_, the other his _commandment_, which may sometimes differ. For God’s commandment to Abraham was, that he should sacrifice Isaac, but his will was, that he should not do it. God’s denunciation to Nineveh was, that it should be destroyed within forty days, but his will was, that it should not.

(_b_) “I dare not insist upon it, I hope his meaning is not so bad, as the words intimate, and as I apprehend; that is, to impute falsehood to Him that is truth itself,” &c.

What damned rhetoric and subtle calumny is this? God, I said, might command a thing openly, and yet hinder the doing of it, without injustice; but if a man should command a thing to be done, and then plot secretly the hinderance of the same, and punish for the not doing it, it were injustice. This it is which the Bishop apprehends as an imputation of falsehood to God Almighty. And perhaps if the death of a sinner were, as he thinks, an eternal life in extreme misery, a man might as far as Job hath done, expostulate with God Almighty; not accusing him of injustice, because whatsoever he doth is therefore just because done by him; but of little tenderness and love to mankind. And this expostulation will be equally just or unjust, whether the necessity of all things be granted or denied. For it is manifest that God could have made man impeccable, and can now preserve him from sin, or forgive him if he please; and therefore, if he please not, the expostulation is as reasonable in the cases of _liberty_ as of _necessity_.

NO. XI.

[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]

_J. D._ “Fourthly, if either the decree of God, or the foreknowledge of God, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of objects, or the last dictate of the understanding, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. For he was subjected to the same decrees, the same prescience, the same constellations, the same causes, the same objects, the same dictates of the understanding. But, _quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi_; the greatest opposers of our liberty, are as earnest maintainers of the liberty of Adam. Therefore none of these supposed impediments take away true liberty.”

_T. H._ The fourth argument is to this effect: “If the decree of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. _Quicquid ostendes mihi sic, incredulus odi._” That which I say necessitateth and determineth every action, (that he may no longer doubt of my meaning), is the sum of all those things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced. This concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined to be such as it is by a like concourse of former causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the decree of God.

But that the foreknowledge of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said; seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge dependeth on the existence of the things known, and not they on it.

The influence of the stars is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.

Nor doth the concourse of all causes make one simple chain or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link, God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event does not always depend upon one single chain, but on many together.

Natural efficacy of objects does determine voluntary agents, and necessitates the will, and consequently the action; but for moral efficacy, I understand not what he means by it. The last dictate of the judgment concerning the good or bad that may follow on any action, is not properly the whole cause, but the last part of it; and yet may be said to produce the effect necessarily, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break an horse’s back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that to do it.

Now for his argument, that if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty. I deny the consequence; for I make not only the effect, but also the election of that particular effect to be necessary, inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, than that a man, or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have election, that is, liberty to do what he has a fancy to, though it be not in his will or power to choose his fancy, or choose his election or will.

This doctrine, because he says he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed; as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

_J. D._ (_a_) “This argument was sent forth only as an espy to make a more full discovery, what were the true grounds of T. H.’s supposed necessity. Which errand being done, and the foundation whereupon he builds being found out, which is, as I called it, a concatenation of causes, and, as he calls it, a concourse of necessary causes; it would now be a superfluous and impertinent work in me to undertake the refutation of all those other opinions, which he doth not undertake to defend. And therefore I shall waive them at the present, with these short animadversions.

(_b_) “Concerning the eternal decree of God, he confounds the decree itself with the execution of his decree. And concerning the foreknowledge of God, he confounds that speculative knowledge, which is called _the knowledge of vision_, (which doth not produce the intellective objects, no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects), with that other knowledge of God, which is called the _knowledge of approbation_, or _a practical knowledge_, that is, knowledge joined with an act of the will, of which divines do truly say, that it is the cause of things, as the knowledge of the artist is the cause of his work. John i.: _God made all things by his word_; that is, by his wisdom. Concerning the influence of the stars, I wish he had expressed himself more clearly. For as I do willingly grant, that those heavenly bodies do act upon these sublunary things, not only by their motion and light, but also by an occult virtue, which we call influence, as we see by manifold experience in the loadstone and shell-fish, &c.: so if he intend that by these influences they do naturally or physically determine the will, or have any direct dominion over human counsels, either in whole or in part, either more or less, he is in an error. Concerning the concatenation of causes, whereas he makes not one chain, but an innumerable number of chains, (I hope he speaks hyperbolically, and doth not intend that they are actually infinite), the difference is not material whether one or many, so long as they are all joined together, both in the first link, and likewise in the effect. It serves to no end but to shew what a shadow of liberty T. H. doth fancy, or rather what a dream of a shadow. As if one chain were not sufficient to load poor man, but he must be clogged with innumerable chains. This is just such another freedom as the Turkish galley-slaves do enjoy. But I admire that T. H., who is so versed in this question, should here confess that he understands not the difference between physical or natural, and moral efficacy: and much more that he should affirm, that outward objects do determine voluntary agents by a natural efficacy. No object, no second agent, angel or devil, can determine the will of man naturally, but God alone, in respect of his supreme dominion over all things. Then the will is determined naturally, when God Almighty, besides his general influence, whereupon all second causes do depend, as well for their being as for their acting, doth moreover at some times, when it pleases him in cases extraordinary, concur by a special influence, and infuse something into the will, in the nature of an act, or an habit, whereby the will is moved and excited, and applied to will or choose this or that. Then the will is determined morally, when some object is proposed to it with persuasive reasons and arguments to induce it to will. Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will, but not so where the determination is moral. In the former case, the will is determined extrinsically, in the latter case intrinsically; the former produceth an absolute necessity, the latter only a necessity of supposition. If the will do not suspend, but assent, then the act is necessary; but because the will may suspend, and not assent, therefore it is not absolutely necessary. In the former case, the will is moved necessarily and determinately; in the latter, freely and indeterminately. The former excitation is immediate; the latter is mediate _mediante intellectu_, and requires the help of the understanding. In a word, so great a difference there is between natural and moral efficacy, as there is between his opinion and mine in this question.