Part 30

(_b_) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man; or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as in the generation of a monster. The former is properly called a sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause. Now, if the debility of the cause be not necessary, but contingent, then the effect is not necessary, but contingent. It is a rule in logic, that the conclusion always follows the weaker part. If the premises be but probable, the conclusion cannot be demonstrative. It holds as well in causes as in propositions. No effect can exceed the virtue of its cause. If the ability or debility of the causes be contingent, the effect cannot be necessary.

“Thirdly, that which concerns this question of liberty from necessity most nearly, is that (_c_) a cause is said to be sufficient in respect of the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act. The concurrence of the will is needful to the production of a free effect. But the cause may be sufficient, though the will do not concur. As God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds; but it doth not follow from thence, either that he hath produced them, or that he will produce them. The blood of Christ is a sufficient ransom for all mankind; but it doth not follow therefore, that all mankind shall be actually saved by virtue of his blood. A man may be a sufficient tutor, though he will not teach every scholar, and a sufficient physician, though he will not administer to every patient. For as much therefore as the concurrence of the will is needful to the production of every free effect, and yet the cause may be sufficient _in sensu diviso_, although the will do not concur; it follows evidently, that the cause may be sufficient, and yet something which is needful to the production of the effect, may be wanting; and that every sufficient cause is not a necessary cause.

“Lastly, if any man be disposed to wrangle against so clear light, and say, that though the free agent be sufficient _in sensu diviso_, yet he is not sufficient _in sensu composito_, to produce effect without the concurrence of the will, he saith true: but first, he bewrays the weakness and the fallacy of the former argument, which is a mere trifling between sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense. And seeing the concurrence of the will is not predetermined, there is no antecedent necessity before it do concur; and when it hath concurred, the necessity is but hypothetical, which may consist with liberty.”

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXI.

In this place he disputeth against my definition of _a sufficient cause_, namely, that cause to which nothing is wanting needful to the producing of the effect. I thought this definition could have been misliked by no man that had English enough to know that _a sufficient cause_, _and cause enough_, signifieth the same thing. And no man will say that that is _cause enough_ to produce an effect, to which any thing is wanting needful to the producing of it. But the Bishop thinks, if he set down what he understands by _sufficient_, it would serve to confute my definition: and therefore says: (_a_) “Two horses jointly are sufficient to draw a coach, which either of them singly is insufficient to do. Now to make the effect, that is, the drawing of the coach necessary, it is not only required that the two horses be sufficient to draw it, but also that it be necessary they shall be joined, and that the owner of the horses will let them draw, and that the smith hath not lamed them, and they be not resty, and list not to draw but when they list: otherwise the effect is contingent”. It seems the Bishop thinks two horses may be sufficient to draw a coach, though they will not draw, or though they be lame, or though they be never put to draw; and I think they can never produce the effect of drawing, without those needful circumstances of being strong, obedient, and having the coach some way or other fastened to them. He calls it a sufficient cause of drawing, that they be coach horses, though they be lame or will not draw. But I say they are not sufficient absolutely, but conditionally, if they be not lame nor resty. Let the reader judge, whether my sufficient cause or his, may properly be called cause enough.

(_b_) “Secondly, a cause may be said to be sufficient, either because it produceth that effect which is intended, as in the generation of a man; or else, because it is sufficient to produce that which is produced, as in the generation of a monster: the former is properly called a sufficient cause, the latter a weak and insufficient cause.” In these few lines he hath said the cause of the generation of a monster is sufficient to produce a monster, and that it is insufficient to produce a monster. How soon may a man forget his words, that doth not understand them. This term of _insufficient_ cause, which also the School calls _deficient_, that they may rhyme to _efficient_, is not intelligible, but a word devised like _hocus pocus_, to juggle a difficulty out of sight. That which is sufficient to produce a monster, is not therefore to be called an insufficient cause to produce a man; no more than that which is sufficient to produce a man, is to be called an insufficient cause to produce a monster.

(_c_) “Thirdly, a cause is said to be sufficient in respect to the ability of it to act, not in respect of its will to act, &c. As God is sufficient to produce a thousand worlds.” He understands little, when men say, God is sufficient to produce many worlds, if he understand not the meaning to be, that he is sufficient to produce them if he will. Without this supposition, _if he will_, a man is not sufficient to produce any voluntary action, not so much as to walk, though he be in health and at liberty. The will is as much a sufficient cause without the strength to do, as the strength without the will. To that which he adds, that my definition is “a mere trifling between a sufficiency in a divided sense, and a sufficiency in a compounded sense”, I can make no answer; because I understand no more what he means by sufficiency in a divided sense, and sufficiency in a compounded sense, than if he had said sufficiency in a divided nonsense, and sufficiency in a compounded nonsense.

NO. XXXII.

_T. H._ Lastly, I hold that the ordinary definition of a free agent, namely, that a free agent is that, which when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be sufficient, that is, necessary, and yet the effect not follow.

[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]

_J. D._ “This last point is but a corollary, or an inference from the former doctrine, that ‘every sufficient cause produceth its effect necessarily’; which pillar being taken away the superstructure must needs fall to the ground, having nothing left to support it. ‘Lastly, I hold’, saith he. What he is able to prove, is something: so much reason, so much trust. But what he holds, concerns himself, not others. But what holds he? ‘I hold’, saith he, ‘that the ordinary definition of a free agent implies a contradiction, and is nonsense.’ That which he calls the ‘ordinary definition’ of liberty, is the very definition which is given by the much greater part of Philosophers and Schoolmen. And doth he think that all these spake nonsense: or had no more judgment than to contradict themselves in a definition? He might much better suspect himself, than censure so many. Let us see the definition itself: ‘A free agent is that, which when all things are present that are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it.’ I acknowledge the old definition of liberty, with little variation. But I cannot see this nonsense, nor discover this contradiction. For (_a_) in these words, ‘all things needful’, or ‘all things requisite’, the actual determination of the will is not included. But by all things needful or requisite, all necessary power either operative or elective, all necessary instruments and adjuments extrinsical and intrinsical, and all conditions are intended. As he that hath pen, and ink, and paper, a table, a desk, and leisure, the art of writing, and the free use of his hand, hath all things requisite to write if he will; and yet he may forbear if he will. Or as he that hath men, and money, and arms, and munition, and ships, and a just cause, hath all things requisite for war; yet he may make peace if he will. Or as the king proclaimed in the gospel (Matth. xxii. 4): _I have prepared my dinner, my oxen and my fatlings are killed, all things are ready; come unto the marriage_. According to T. H.’s doctrine, the guests might have told him that he said not truly, for their own wills were not ready. (_b_) And indeed if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsically to every act of willing, if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to will what it doth not will; then if the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the effect was wanting. But now when science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men’s experience doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation, if the power to will be present _in actu primo_, determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.

“Secondly, these words, ‘to act or not to act, to work or not to work, to produce or not to produce’, have reference to the effect, not as a thing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to be done. They imply not the actual production, but the producibility of the effect. But when once the will hath actually concurred with all other causes and conditions and circumstances, then the effect is no more possible nor producible, but it is in being, and actually produced. Thus he takes away the subject of the question. The question is, whether effects producible be free from necessity. He shuffles out ‘effects producible’, and thrusts in their places ‘effects produced’, or which are in the act of production. Wherefore I conclude, that it is neither nonsense nor contradiction to say that a free agent, when all things requisite to produce the effect are present, may nevertheless not produce it.

ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE ANSWER TO NO. XXXII.

The question is here whether these words ‘a free agent is that, which when all things needful to the production of the effect are present, can nevertheless not produce it’, imply a contradiction; as I say it does. To make it appear no contradiction, he saith: (_a_) “In these words, ‘all things needful’, or ‘all things requisite’, the actual determination of the will is not included”: as if the will were not needful nor requisite to the producing of a voluntary action. For to the production of any act whatsoever, there is needful, not only those things which proceed from the agent, but also those that consist in the disposition of the patient. And to use his own instance, it is necessary to writing, not only that there be pen, ink, paper, &c.; but also a will to write. He that hath the former, hath all things requisite to write if he will, but not all things necessary to writing. And so in his other instances, he that hath men and money, &c. (without that which he putteth in for a requisite), hath all things requisite to make war if he will, but not simply to make war. And he in the Gospel that had prepared his dinner, had all things requisite for his guests if they came, but not all things requisite to make them come. And therefore “all things requisite”, is a term ill defined by him.

(_b_) “And indeed if the will were (as he conceives it is) necessitated extrinsically to every act of willing; if it had no power to forbear willing what it doth will, nor to will what it does not will; then if the will were wanting, something requisite to the producing of the effect were wanting. But now when science and conscience, reason and religion, our own and other men’s experience doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsical necessitation, if the power to will be present _in actu primo_, determinable by ourselves, then there is no necessary power wanting in this respect to the producing of the effect.” These words, “the will hath power to forbear willing what it doth will”; and these, “the will hath a dominion over its own acts”; and these, “the power to will is present _in actu primo_, determinable by ourselves”; are as wild as ever were any spoken within the walls of Bedlam: and if science, conscience, reason, and religion teach us to speak thus, they make us mad. And that which followeth is false: “to act or not to act, to work or not to work, to produce or not to produce, have reference to the effect, not as a thing which is already done or doing, but as a thing to be done”. For to act, to work, to produce, are the same thing with to be doing. It is not the act, but the power that hath reference to the future: for act and power differ in nothing but in this, that the former signifieth the time present, the latter the time to come. And whereas he adds, that I shuffle out effects producible, and thrust into their places effects produced; I must take it for an untruth, till he cite the place wherein I have done so.

NO. XXXIII.

_T. H._ For my first five points; where it is explicated, first, what spontaneity is; secondly, what deliberation is; thirdly, what will, propension, and appetite is; fourthly, what a free agent is; fifthly, what liberty is: there can be no other proof offered but every man’s own experience, by reflecting on himself, and remembering what he useth to have in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth, when he saith, an action is spontaneous, a man deliberates, such is his will, that agent or that action is free. Now, he that so reflecteth on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come; that by _spontaneity_ is meant inconsiderate proceeding; for else nothing is meant by it; that _will_ is the last act of our deliberation; that a _free agent_, is he that can do if he will and forbear if he will; and that _liberty_ is the absence of external impediments. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able or will not take the pains to consider what they think, when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient; because experience and matter of fact is not verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own sense and memory. For example, how can it be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good are all one, to a man that does not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that eternity is not _nunc stans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind? Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine any thing to begin without a cause, can no other way be made known but by trying how he can imagine it. But if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that is, he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible. And therefore he must think there was some special cause, why it began then rather than sooner or later; or else, that it began never, but was eternal.

[Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]

_J. D._ “Now at length he comes to his main proofs; he that hath so confidently censured the whole current of Schoolmen and Philosophers of _nonsense_, had need to produce strong evidence for himself. So he calls his reasons, No. XXXVI., _demonstrative proofs_. All demonstrations are either from the cause or the effect, not from private notions and conceptions which we have in our minds. That which he calls a demonstration, deserves not the name of an intimation. He argues thus: ‘that which a man conceives in his mind by these words, spontaneity, deliberation, &c.; that they are’. This is his proposition, which I deny. (_a_) The true natures of things are not to be judged by the private _ideas_, or conceptions of men, but by their causes and formal reasons. Ask an ordinary person what _upwards_ signifies, and whether our antipodes have their heads upwards or downwards; and he will not stick to tell you, that if his head be upwards, theirs must needs be downwards. And this is because he knows not the formal reason thereof; that the heavens encircle the earth, and what is towards heaven is upwards. This same erroneous notion of _upwards_ and _downwards_, before the true reason was fully discovered, abused more than ordinary capacities; as appears by their arguments of _penduli homines_, and _pendulæ arbores_. Again, what do men conceive ordinarily by this word _empty_, as when they say an empty vessel, or by this word _body_, as when they say, there is no body in that room? They intend not to exclude the air, either out of the vessel or out of the room: yet reason tells us, that the vessel is not truly empty, and that the air is a true body. I might give a hundred such like instances. He who leaves the conduct of his understanding to follow vulgar notions, shall plunge himself into a thousand errors; like him who leaves a certain guide to follow an _ignus fatuus_, or a will-with-the-wisp. So his proposition is false. (_b_) His reason, ‘that matter of fact is not verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own sense and memory’, is likewise maimed on both sides. Whether we hear such words or not, is matter of fact; and sense is the proper judge of it: but what these words do, or ought truly to signify, is not to be judged by sense but by reason. Secondly, reason may, and doth oftentimes correct sense, even about its proper object. Sense tells us that the sun is no bigger than a good ball; but reason demonstrates, that it is many times greater than the whole globe of the earth. As to his instance: ‘how can it be proved, that to love a thing and to think it good is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by these words’, I confess it cannot be proved; for it is not true. Beauty, and likeness, and love, do conciliate love as much as goodness, _cos amoris amor_. Love is a passion of the will; but to judge of goodness is an act of the understanding. A father may love an ungracious child, and yet not esteem him good. A man loves his own house better than another man’s; yet he cannot but esteem many others better than his own. His other instance, ‘how can it be proved that eternity is not _nunc stans_, to a man that says these words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing itself in his mind’, is just like the former, not to be proved by reason, but by fancy, which is the way he takes. And it is not unlike the counsel which one gave to a novice about the choice of his wife, to advise with the bells: as he fancied so they sounded, either take her or leave her.